Child care is essential for working parents, but is the industry ready and safe to reopen? [feedly]

Child care is essential for working parents, but is the industry ready and safe to reopen?
https://equitablegrowth.org/child-care-is-essential-for-working-parents-but-is-the-industry-ready-and-safe-to-reopen/

By now, it is no secret that parents across the United States are struggling. Adapting to life during the coronavirus pandemic has been difficult for nearly everyone, but parents—particularly those with young children—are facing day-in, day-out work-life conflicts with no end in sight. Whether they are continuing to work from home, unemployed, or still working outside the house, providing for their children without the support of schools, daycare, camps, or even help from grandparents is taking an emotional and economic toll. Rarely has the role of child care in supporting our economy, by freeing up parents' time and minds to focus on work, been more self-evident.

For weeks, experts and parents alike have been warning that child care will be essential in any economic recovery from the coronavirus recession. Without it, many parents, particularly women, will have to weigh dropping out of the labor force or reducing their work hours if their caregiving responsibilities remain incompatible with their work responsibilities. Still, plans to reopen schools and child care facilities remain scattershot, largely driven by uncertainty about how coronavirus infections spread in such environments, how children may contract or spread the virus to adult staff, and how susceptible children themselves are to COVID-19, the disease spread by the coronavirus.

How to provide child care safely is primarily a question for scientists and public health experts, but policymakers and social science researchers have their own role to play in this ongoing crisis. First, the coronavirus pandemic must be treated as the workplace safety issue that it is. This involves developing a national set of safety standards—along with the appropriate education, training, and funding to enact those standards—so that parents and staff can be confident that their care is as safe as it can be. Without such standards, each facility will have to fend for itself with limited knowledge and potentially disastrous consequences.

Also important are policies designed to make child care accessible and affordable even in the midst of a pandemic. Recent research suggests that the child care market will be unprepared to provide care in a post-pandemic environment without significant public investment. If parents are shifting their preferences as a result of the pandemic and ensuing economic crisis—either by desiring smaller providers or working more nonstandard hours—then the policy challenges of providing high-quality and affordable care will only grow.

More research on what child care services families need and what the child care industry is poised to provide will help target the policy response supporting families as they return to work and fuel the economic recovery.

Child care priorities prior to the coronavirus pandemic limit our post-pandemic options

The United States does not have a universal child care system, so many families rely on a patchwork of polices, including tax credits, licensing standards, and subsidy programs, to access high-quality child care. These policies help some families afford much-needed care, but they are largely insufficient in meeting the variety of care options that families need. What's more, these policies underpin a child care system that lacks the flexibility necessary to meet the shifting needs of families in response to the current pandemic. 

As the coronavirus and COVID-19 continue to spread through communities, larger child care centers, where dozens of children are together in one building, may be more prone to spreading both the virus and the disease. Already, some communities are reporting alarming transmission of COVID-19 in child care centers, though some studies suggest the disease is less likely to spread among children.

While wealthy families can hire nannies or babysitters to limit exposure, middle- and lower-incomes parents may be driven to seek in-home care. This type of care, also called home-based care, typically occurs in the provider's home, where only a handful of children are present. It may be reasonable to assume these less-crowded settings are a safer alternative for families concerned about the safety of their kids and themselves. But the number of licensed in-home providers has rapidly declined over the past two decades. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

As some of these in-home providers exit the market, others may be transitioning to an "underground" market of unlicensed providers. These providers, which may be legally unlicensed depending on state statute, do not necessarily provide lower-quality care. But regulators cannot oversee the quality of care in these settings to the same extent that they can with those that are licensed. Parents who prefer in-home care over child care centers may be left with a difficult trade-off between accessibility of care and their confidence in a provider's quality. Unfortunately, even parents who find an acceptable in-home provider could lose out on the subsidies that made their previous care arrangements affordable.

Child care can be incredibly expensive, even exceeding the cost of college in some states. Many families rely on some combination of tax credits or subsidies to help cover the cost. The Child Care Development Fund is the primary child care subsidy program for low-income families in the United States. When the program was reauthorized in 2014, it included important health and safety requirements for eligible child care providers but did not guarantee sufficient additional funds for states to enact these requirements. Experts say this has inadvertently advantaged child care centers, where states are better positioned to provide oversight and training. 

Centers care for about 40 percent of preschoolers with a regular, nonrelative child care arrangement but serve more than 70 percent to 78 percent of similarly aged children receiving Child Care Development Fund subsidies. Conversely, in-home care serves 34 percent of similar preschoolers but around 18 percent to 25 percent of those receiving subsidies. This disparity in funding has dramatically widened in the previous decade. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2

Reshifting subsidies toward these in-home providers is not a simple task. States will need to devote significant resources supporting in-home providers, particularly those that are exempt from licensing, to meet quality standards. Experts already worry that quality standards are too geared toward center-based providers and do not reflect the relative strengths and opportunities of in-home care. This could present an opportunity for high-level rethinking of what defines "quality" for these settings—a task for researchers as much as it is for regulators and policymakers.

Information on the spread of the coronavirus and COVID-19 and their effects on the economy changes rapidly. In the coming months, many families will be continuously reassessing their child care needs and what levels of risk are acceptable. The child care system, and the policies that help make it accessible to more families, must be flexible enough to meet parents' needs without sacrificing quality or affordability. Unfortunately, these may be longer-term fixes in a system facing immediate shortfalls.

The supply of child care amid the pandemic is down, but parents are still searching for the care they need

These challenges in the U.S. child care market are longstanding, but they are now exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic and COVID-19. More research is needed to understand how larger structural changes—such as additional subsidies or adjusted licensing standards—can be accomplished. In the meantime, the child care industry also faces an immediate critical shortage of providers who can care for the nation's children once parents return to work.

Like many industries, the coronavirus pandemic and resulting public health measures were shocks to the child care market. An April poll by the Bipartisan Policy Center found 60 percent of licensed providers shut their doors amid lockdowns and stay-at-home orders. More than 330,000 jobs were lost in the child care sector in only a few short weeks. (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3

The U.S. child care system was already in a pre-existing financial crisis, and the fallout from the pandemic could mean millions of child care slots are permanently lost. Affordable and accessible child care will be the foundation of any economic recovery, but right now, that foundation has multiples fractures.

In addition to layoffs, the industry dramatically slowed hiring in recent months. A new working paper by Umair Ali, Chris Herbst, and Christos Makridis, economists at Arizona State University, titled "The Impact of COVID-19 on the U.S. Child Care Market: Evidence from Stay-at-Home Orders," finds that new online postings for early child care and education jobs declined 13 percent per dayfollowing the adoption of states' stay-at-home orders, resulting in approximately 1,000 fewer providers hired per month than if the pandemic had not occurred. Assuming that these postings were to replace providers who exited the field and not providers who may be postponing a retirement or resignation during the pandemic, 1,000 fewer providers could mean as much as 10,000 fewer child care slots each month.

Even as the industry has been rattled by the coronavirus pandemic and recession, there is evidence that families remain interested in—or at least curious about—their child care options. The same working paper by the three researchers finds no statistically significant decline in Google searches for child care-related terms following state lockdowns. Of course, parents searching for online information on child care does not mean that they currently want or need those services. Many parents—63 percent in one survey—are skeptical about sending their children to child care while the coronavirus and COVID-19 are still spreading.

But just because many parents are not sending their children to child care now doesn't mean they will not want to—or need to—soon. Even larger child care centers could face a critical capacity issue as parents return to work. Child care operates with low child-to-caregiver ratios, which means providers may need to hire quickly in order to ensure appropriate staffing for returning children. Encouragingly, child care job postings have rebounded by 23.4 percentage points since their lowest point in May, but they remain more than 39 percent below the postings in July 2019. And these recent gains may be tenuous as states resume partial shutdowns through the summer.

Sooner or later, many parents will have to make difficult decisions on when their children are going back into child care and what type of child care is best for their family. Without significant public investment—more than $9 billion a month, according to some estimates—the industry will be unable to provide the care necessary to help families get back to work.

Conclusion

The struggle facing parents today is not one they face alone—it boasts important implications for everyone affected by the coronavirus recession. Research shows that when child care is not accessible or affordable, it can prevent parents, particularly mothers, from entering the workforce. Policymakers and economists are already seeing signs that the lack of child care is creating a drag on women's employment during the current crisis. Fewer working parents means a smaller tax base, reduced household income, and less money spent on goods and services—all the tools needed to help the economy recover.

As states decide whether to continue to ease their coronavirus restrictions or return to earlier lockdown levels, and as families decide whether to take cautious steps toward resuming their pre-pandemic lives, the demand for child care is only going to rise, particularly as schools and summer camps remain closed and public health experts caution against grandparent care. Policymakers need to take bold action to ensure that child care is accessible and affordable, and high-quality research must help target the policy response.

Most immediately, the industry needs an injection of cash to keep the doors open and caregivers on the payrolls. Many child care advocates have requested $50 billion in flexible funding in the next congressional coronavirus relief aid package. Looking further out, policymakers and researchers will need to turn their attention to the structural challenges discussed above that could limit parents' options as they seek safe and affordable child care for their children. Otherwise, child care could remain out of reach for many families returning to work, and the economic recovery will stall before it even begins.

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Interview with Melissa Dell: Persistence Across History [feedly]

The new John Bates Clark winner -- nearly as prestigious as the Nobel in Economics. The historical data mining technique she discusses is fascinating: its goal is to do textual analysis, yielding semantic, and sentimental context  through recorded history. The potential is huge for many disciplines in the social sciences

Interview with Melissa Dell: Persistence Across History
https://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2020/07/interview-with-melissa-dell-persistence.html

Tyler Cowen inteviews Melissa Dell, the most recent winner of the Clark medal(which "is awarded annually .. to that American economist under the age of forty who is judged to have made the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge). Both audio and a transcript of the one-hour conversation are available. From the overview: 

Melissa joined Tyler to discuss what's behind Vietnam's economic performance, why persistence isn't predictive, the benefits and drawbacks of state capacity, the differing economic legacies of forced labor in Indonesia and Peru, whether people like her should still be called a Rhodes scholar, if SATs are useful, the joys of long-distance running, why higher temps are bad for economic growth, how her grandmother cultivated her curiosity, her next project looking to unlock huge historical datasets, and more.

Here, I'll just mention a couple of broad points that caught my eye. Dell specializes in looking at how conditions in at one point in time--say, being in an area which for a time has strong centralized tax-collecting government--can have persistent effects on economic outcomes decades or even centuries later. For those skeptical of such effects, Dell argues that explaining, say, 10% of a big difference between two areas is a meaningful feat for social science. She says: 

I was presenting some work that I'd done on Mexico to a group of historians. And I think that historians have a very different approach than economists. They tend to focus in on a very narrow context. They might look at a specific village, and they want to explain a hundred percent of what was going on in that village in that time period. Whereas in this paper, I was looking at the impacts of the Mexican Revolution, which is a historical conflict in economic development. And this historian, who had studied it extensively and knows a ton, was saying, "Well, I kind of see what you're saying, and that holds in this case, but what about this exception? And what about that exception?"

And my response was to say my partial R-squared, which is the percent of the variation that this regression explains, is 0.1, which means it's explaining 10 percent of the variation in the data. And I think, you know, that's pretty good because the world's a complex place, so something that explains 10 percent of the variation is potentially a pretty big deal.

But that means there's still 90 percent of the variation that's explained by other things. And obviously, if you go down to the individual level, there's even more variation there in the data to explain. So I think that in these cases where we see even 10 percent of the variation being explained by a historical variable, that's actually really strong persistence. But there's a huge scope for so many things to matter.

I'll say the same thing when I teach an undergrad class about economic growth in history. We talk about the various explanations you can have: geography, different types of institutions, cultural factors. Well, there's places in sub-Saharan Africa that are 40 times poorer than the US. When you have that kind of income differential, there's just a massive amount of variation to explain.

Nathan Nunn's work on slavery and the role that that plays in explaining Africa's long-run underdevelopment — he gets pretty large coefficients, but they still leave a massive amount of difference to be explained by other things as well, because there's such large income differences between poor places in the world and rich places. I think if persistence explains 10 percent of it, that's a case where we see really strong persistence, and of course, there's other cases where we don't see much. So there's plenty of room for everybody's preferred theory of economic development to be important just because the differences are so huge.

Dell also discusses a project to organize historical data, like old newspapers, in ways that will make them available for empirical analysis.  She says: 

I have a couple of broad projects which are, in substance, both about unlocking data on a massive scale to answer questions that we haven't been able to look at before. If you take historical data, whether it be tables or a compendia of biographies or newspapers, and you go and you put those into Amazon Textract or Google Cloud Vision, it will output complete garbage. It's been very specifically geared towards specific things which are like single-column books and just does not do well with digitizing historical data on a large scale. So we've been really investing in methods in computer vision as well as in natural language processing to process the output so that we can take data, historical data, on a large scale. These datasets would be too large to ever digitize by hand. And we can get them into a format that can be used to analyze and answer lots of questions.

One example is historical newspapers. We have about 25 million-page scans of front pages and editorial pages from newspapers across thousands and thousands of US communities. Newspapers tend to have a complex structure. They might have seven columns, and then there's headlines, and there's pictures, and there's advertisements and captions. If you just put those into Google Cloud Vision, again, it will read it like a single-column book and give you total garbage. That means that the entire large literature using historical newspapers, unless it uses something like the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal that has been carefully digitized by a person sitting there and manually drawing boxes around the content, all you have are keywords.

You can see what words appear on the page, but you can't put those words together into sentences or into paragraphs. And that means we can't extract the sentiment. We don't understand how people are talking about things in these communities. We see what they're talking about, what words they use, but not how they're talking about it.

So, by devising methods to automatically extract that data, it gives us a potential to do sentiment analysis, to understand, across different communities in the US, how people are talking about very specific events, whether it be about the Vietnam War, whether it be about the rise of scientific medicine, conspiracy theories — name anything you want, like how are people in local newspapers talking about this? Are they talking about it at all?

We can process the images. What sort of iconic images are appearing? Are they appearing? So I think it can unlock a ton of information about news.

We're also applying these techniques to lots of firm-level and individual-level data from Japan, historically, to understand more about their economic development. We have annual data on like 40,000 Japanese firms and lots of their economic output. This is tables, very different than newspapers, but it's a similar problem of extracting structure from data, working on methods to get all of that out, to look at a variety of questions about long-run development in Japan and how they were able to be so successful. 

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Comments on Weekly Unemployment Claims [feedly]

Comments on Weekly Unemployment Claims
http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/CalculatedRisk/~3/IUs8nb4Uwfo/comments-on-weekly-unemployment-claims_16.html

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China's GDP Rebound Shows Resilience Trump's Strategy Overlooks [feedly]

China's GDP Rebound Shows Resilience Trump's Strategy Overlooks
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2020-07-16/supply-chains-latest-china-s-gdp-shows-strength-u-s-overlooks

China's data on gross domestic product for the second quarter shows the economy bouncing back.

Sure, growth of 3.2% year-on-year is way off the pre-virus trend. Still, with the Covid-19 pandemic dragging the world into a deep recession, the country's return to expansion is a rare bright spot. The contrast with the U.S., where spiraling new cases raise the possibility of an extended downturn, couldn't be clearer.

China's rapid recovery also exposes the fallacies in the "coming collapse" thesis that continues to pervade U.S. views on its main geopolitical rival. According to the conventional narrative, China's massive debt, conflicted leadership, sclerotic state sector, and overbuilt real estate represent insuperable problems. The question on the China crisis is not "if," but "when" and "how big."

In fact, as I argue in my new book China: The Bubble That Never Pops, the conventional narrative ignores important sources of strength. In the Covid-19 stress test, some of those have come in handy:

• China's policy makers — in common with democratic governments in Europe, South Korea, and Japan — have been relatively successful at containing the virus.
• State firms have held on to their workers and accelerated investment plans — hiring and spending when private firms turn cautious and accelerating progress out of the slump.
• Banks that are overextended on loans but rock solid on funding have been able to provide cash-strapped borrowers with a payment holiday — heading off risks to financial stability.

As the U.S.-China conflict spreads across trade, technology, capital flows, scientific research, claims to the South China Sea, and mounting concern about human rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, the rapid rebound in China's growth carries a lesson for U.S. policy makers. While China's economic model has serious stresses, it also has major strengths. If the Covid-19 shock doesn't burst the bubble, it's not clear what will.

U.S.-China relations are at a critical moment. Whether Washington continues with the strategy of containment adopted by the Trump administration or shifts to managed engagement under a possible Biden administration, the starting point should be a realistic appraisal of China's economic strengths. A strategy underpinned by the assumption of weakness is doomed to fail.

—Tom Orlik in Washington

Charted Territory

India's trade balance returned to a surplus in June after 18 years, as a decline in imports was sharper than exports. Exports contracted 12.4% from a year earlier, while imports declined 47.6%, leaving a trade surplus of $790 million. The balance was last in surplus in March 2002.

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Dean Baker: Ross Douthat Shows Trouble With Arithmetic In New York Times Column on China’s “Decade” [feedly]

omigod: Baker is becoming a China watcher too, like me, and questioning the NYT/Post liberal line....

Ross Douthat Shows Trouble With Arithmetic In New York Times Column on China's "Decade"
http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/beat_the_press/~3/DkmZZ5JxCGo/

Ross Douthat has good news for folks who don't like China. His NYT columnyesterday told us that China's economy will run out of steam in a decade and that the U.S. will again be able to reclaim world leadership after 2030. The problem is that the piece presents nothing to support this claim.

After telling readers that China is passing the U.S. for world leadership due to the inept presidency of Donald Trump, Douthat gets to the meat of his piece:

"It's possible that we're nearing a peak of U.S.-China tension not because China is poised to permanently overtake the United States as a global power, but because China itself is peaking — with a slowing growth rate that may leave it short of the prosperity achieved by its Pacific neighbors, a swiftly aging population, and a combination of self-limiting soft power and maxed-out hard power that's likely to diminish, relative to the U.S. and India and others, in the 2040s and beyond.

"Instead of a Chinese Century, in other words, the coronavirus might be ushering in a Chinese Decade, in which Xi Jinping's government behaves with maximal aggression because it sees an opportunity that won't come again."

The problem is that the cited piece for "China's slowing growth rate" still has China growing close to 4.0 percent annually. That is almost 2.0 percentage points faster than the 2.1 percent growth rate projected for the U.S. in the last five years of the decade.

Furthermore, the U.S. economy is starting from a much lower base. In 2019 China's economy was already more than 25 percent larger than the U.S. economy, while the U.S. economy is projected to shrink by 5.5 percent this year, China's is expected to grow by 1.8 percent. It is hard to see how an economy that is starting from a lower level and growing at a slower pace, will pass a larger economy that is growing more rapidly. I guess it takes an NYT columnist to figure that one out.

One final point, there seems to be an obsession in the media with China's lower birth rate and likely declining population. While the idea that this is a big problem for China is repeated endlessly, it really lead to the obvious question, why?

So the country will have fewer people. This will likely mean fewer people working in very low productivity jobs in agriculture and the service sector. And why exactly would this be a problem for China?

The post Ross Douthat Shows Trouble With Arithmetic In New York Times Column on China's "Decade" appeared first on Center for Economic and Policy Research.

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The Kansas City Approach to Modern Money Theory [feedly]

The Kansas City Approach to Modern Money Theory
http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/?docid=2682

Modern money theory (MMT) synthesizes several traditions from heterodox economics. Its focus is on describing monetary and fiscal operations in nations that issue a sovereign currency. As such, it applies Georg Friedrich Knapp's state money approach (chartalism), also adopted by John Maynard Keynes in his Treatise on Money. MMT emphasizes the difference between a sovereign currency issuer and a sovereign currency user with respect to issues such as fiscal and monetary policy space, ability to make all payments as they come due, credit worthiness, and insolvency. Following A. Mitchell Innes, however, MMT acknowledges some similarities between sovereign and nonsovereign issues of liabilities, and hence integrates a credit theory of money (or, "endogenous money theory," as it is usually termed by post-Keynesians) with state money theory. MMT uses this integration in policy analysis to address issues such as exchange rate regimes, full employment policy, financial and economic stability, and the current challenges facing modern economies: rising inequality, climate change, aging of the population, tendency toward secular stagnation, and uneven development. This paper will focus on the development of the "Kansas City" approach to MMT at the University of Missouri–Kansas City (UMKC) and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.  

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Reconstructing internationalism [feedly]

Reconstructing internationalism
https://www.lemonde.fr/blog/piketty/2020/07/14/reconstructing-internationalism/

Can we restore positive meaning to the idea of internationalism? Yes, but on condition that we turn our backs on the ideology of unfettered free trade which has till now guided globalisation and adopt a new model for development based on explicit principles of economic and climatic justice. This model must be internationalist in its final aims but sovereignist in its practical modalities, in the sense that each country, each political community must be able to determine the conditions for the pursuit of trade with the rest of the world without waiting for the unanimous agreement of its partners. The task will not be simple and it will not always be easy to distinguish this sovereignism with a universalist vocation from nationalist-type sovereignism. It is therefore particularly urgent to indicate the differences.

Lets us suppose that one country, or a political majority within it, considers it would be desirable to set up a highly progressive tax on top income and wealth holders to bring about a major redistribution in favour of the poorest socioeconomic groups while at the same time financing a programme for social, educational and ecological investment. To move in this direction, this country is considering a taxation at source on corporate profits and most importantly a system of financial registry that would enable the identification of the ultimate owners of the shares and dividends and thus the application of the desired progressive tax rates at individual level. The whole package could be completed by an individual carbon card thus encouraging responsible behaviour, while taxing the highest emissions heavily ; those who benefit from the profits of the most polluting firms would also be taxed. Once again this would demand a knowledge of the owners.

Unfortunately, a financial registry of this type has not been provided for by the Treaties for the free circulation of capital established in the 1980s-1990s, in particular in Europe in the framework of the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992), texts which have strongly influenced those adopted thereafter throughout the world. This ultra-sophisticated legal architecture, still in force today, has de facto created a quasi-sacred right to get rich by using the infrastructures of one country, then by one click on a laptop, transferring one's assets to another jurisdiction, with no possibility provided for the community to find any trace of it. Following the crisis in 2008, as the excesses of financial deregulation came to light, agreements on the automatic exchange of banking information have been developed within the OECD, true. But these measures, established on a purely voluntary basis, do not contain the slightest sanction for recalcitrant countries.

Let us suppose therefore that a country wishes to accelerate the movement and sets up a redistributive form of taxation and a financial registry. Now, let's imagine that one of its neighbours does not share this point of view and applies a ridiculously small profit tax and carbon tax on firms based on its territory (whether in actual fact or fictiously), while refusing to transmit the information as to their owners. In these circumstances, the first country should in my view impose commercial sanctions on the second ; the amount would vary, depending on the firm and the extent of the fiscal and climatic damage caused. Recent research has shown that sanctions of this type would bring in substantial revenues and would encourage other countries to co-operate. Of course, we would have to plead that these sanctions are merely correcting unfair competition and the non-respect of the climate agreements. But the latter are so vague and, on the contrary, the treaties on the free circulation of goods and capital are so sophisticated and absolute, particularly at European level, that a country which adopts this approach stands a considerable risk of being condemned by European or International bodies (The Court of Justice of the European Union, the World Trade Organisation). If such were the case, the country should leave the Treaties in question unilaterally, while at the same time suggesting new ones.

What is the difference between the social and ecological sovereignism which I have just outlined and nationalist sovereignism (for example, of the Trump, Chinese, Indian or, tomorrow, the French or European variety) based on the defense of identity of a specific civilisation and of interests deemed to be homogenous within it ?

There are two. Firstly, before taking possible unilateral measures, it is crucial to propose to other countries a model for cooperative development based on universal values : social justice, reduction of inequality, conservation of the planet. It is also important to describe in detail the transnational assemblies (such as the French-German Agreement created last year, but with real powers) which ideally would be in charge of global public property and common policies for fiscal and climatic justice.

Then, if these social-federalist proposals are not taken up at the moment, the unilateral approach should nevertheless remain incentive-based and reversible. The aim of sanctions is to encourage other countries to exit from fiscal and climatic dumping ; the aim is not to establish permanent protectionism. From this point of view the sectoral measures with no universal basis such as the GAFA tax should be avoided because they easily lend themselves to ratcheting up sanctions (wine taxes versus digital taxes, etc.)

To claim that this type of path is easy to follow and well sign-posted would be absurd : it all still has to be invented. But historical experience demonstrates that nationalism can only lead to exacerbating inegalitarian and climatic tensions and that there is no future for unfettered free trade. One more reason for thinking, as from today, about the conditions for a new internationalism.

Note. For a first estimate of the possible amount of anti-dumping sanctions, see Ana Seco Justo, « Profit Allocation and Corporate Taxing Rights: Global and Unilateral Perspectives« , PSE 2020.

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