Saturday, September 22, 2018

Hello













Hello my dear,

Could you help me to receive an inheritance fund at the rate of $4,900,000.00USD (Four Million Nine hundred thousand US Dollars)?

Into your bank account in your country or elsewhere.

A fund has been overdue for International transfer in one of the account held in our Banque Commerciale du Burkina BCB. In our research we found out that the original owner of this fund died in a fatal gassy car-accident that killed both him and his only son whom was supposed to be a beneficiary next of kin to his father's asset. This accident happened on his way back to one of his factory in suburb Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

The owner of this fund is a citizen of South Korea, he own about 2 companies here in Burkina Faso 1 textile meal Plant, and another cement manufacturing factory, all of this generated him a lot of money here in Africa.

In the light of the above, I am reaching you with this notification to revert back to me so we can discuss on the successful manners to remits this fund into your bank account in your country.

This fund is overdue for transfer or withdrawal to be made, but nobody has been coming for this fund hence the owner of fund is dead and the supposed beneficiary Next of Kin which is his only son dead too. No information pertaining the deposit of this fund has passed to anybody or organization. And my position in the bank cannot allow me to lay claim on this fund because the owner is a foreigner and we the citizen of Burkina Faso are not permitted to interfere in any foreign affairs.

If you are interested to receive this fund under my guidelines I am able to give you all information's and the password to pass through our bank examination for approval to transfer fund to your bank.

Just reply me and give me your full names and telephone
number's……………………………………………

We shall talk about the percentage sharing of fund between both of us, in return e-mail, more details and information shall be released to you immediately you indicate your interest.

Reply me at: dr.stanleyanorue@hotmail.com, you call me on +226 63 71 51 67.

Waiting very urgent to discuss with you.


Dr. Stanley Anorue
Retail & Wealth Management
Banque Commerciale du Burkina BCB

Friday, September 21, 2018

The financial crisis and the foundations for macroeconomics [feedly]

The financial crisis and the foundations for macroeconomics
http://larrysummers.com/2018/09/13/the-financial-crisis-and-the-foundations-for-macroeconomics/

A, if not the, preoccupation of macroeconomists for the last generation has been providing macroeconomics with a microeconomic foundation. At one level this totally makes sense. How can one be against establishing foundations? And it makes sense to think that macroeconomic theories of fluctuations in investment, for example, should be rooted in theories of how individual businesses makes investment decisions.

Yet it has to be acknowledged that the principle of building macroeconomics on microeconomic foundations, as applied by economists, contributed next to nothing to predicting, explaining or resolving the Great Recession. The insights into the financial meltdown that policymakers found most valuable came from scholars, such as Hyman Minsky and Charles Kindleberger, who thought in terms of broad aggregates and made no effort to establish micro foundations. The market participants, such as Ray Dalio, who were most prescient with respect to the crisis ignored microeconomics as they theorized in terms of debt and credit aggregates.

What went wrong, and what is to be learned? In my view, the core supposition of much of macroeconomics, which is that it is best to operate with as fundamental a foundation as possible, is not supported by the history of science. Psychologists understand much of human behavior without thinking about neurons. Geologists product earthquakes without going back to the first principles of physics. Structural engineers use rules of thumb gained from experience for understanding the properties of materials used in construction.

So, too, macroeconomics need not be, and probably should not be, built on foundations that center on optimizing decisions by households and firms. For such an approach to be tractable too much needs to be abstracted from. In addition, recent research in behavioral economics suggests that optimization of the kind envisioned by economists is a poor model for understanding actual spending decisions.

But some kind of foundation is still required for macroeconomics. That is why I'm very excited by my friend Andrei Shleifer's new book with Nicola Gennaioli, "A Crisis of Beliefs: Investor Psychology and Financial Fragility." The book puts expectations at the center of thinking about economic fluctuations and financial crises — but these expectations are not rational. In fact, as all the evidence suggests, they are subject to systematic errors of extrapolation. The book suggests that these errors in expectations are best understood as arising out of cognitive biases to which humans are prone.

It starts with the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, showing how their ideas can be used to build tractable models of expectations in the economy. The approach helps to reevaluate the housing bubble before the financial crisis but also explains why investors and policymakers were so slow to catch on to the vulnerabilities of markets as the bubble began to deflate. It provides a persuasive account of the 2008 crisis and suggests the kind of perspectives that could have prevented or at least mitigated its consequences. And it points the way toward reducing future crisis risks.

To be sure there is much more work to do. The arguments that Gennaioli and Shleifer make need to be debated in the profession. And, yes, it is easier to explain the past than to predict the future. But theories of economic fluctuation and crisis based on the tendency of human beings to become too greedy and then too fearful seem much more fruitful than theories based on accurate optimization.

Something is wrong with the economics profession if events like those of 2008 do not change its thinking. Those wanting to be in the vanguard of the new thinking should be reading "A Crisis of Beliefs."


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Did Trump just kill the US auto industry? [feedly]

Did Trump just kill the US auto industry?
http://www.atimes.com/article/did-trump-just-kill-the-us-auto-industry/

Economic historians will cite July 9, 2018 as the date on which the US lost the trade war with China – before the war began.

That was when Germany's top manufacturing companies – Volkswagen, BMW, Daimler, BASF and Siemens – announced tens of billions of dollars of new investments in China as Chinese Premier Li Keqiang posed for a photo op with German Chancellor Merkel in Berlin.

BMW will expand its joint venture with Brilliance Auto to produce 519,000 vehicles a year. It also set up a joint venture to produce an electric version of the Mini together with Great Wall Auto. And it agreed to buy US$4.7 billion worth of batteries from Chinese producer CATL, which just announced a new plant in southern Germany. Volkswagen earlier this year announced that it would invest US$18 billion in China by 2022 and construct six plants to build electric vehicles. BMW will move some of its SUV production out of its South Carolina plant in response to auto tariffs.

Since then the prices of US automakers have tanked, and German auto stocks have rallied. The future of the auto industry lies in electric vehicles, for which China will be the world's largest market by far. China also has the world's most advanced battery technology as well as the most robust supply chain for battery production.

China's response to American tariffs has been to offer German and Japanese industrial companies a privileged position in joint ventures with Chinese manufacturers. China also is reportedly planning to reduce import tariffs for America's competitors. Toyota and Honda also announced plans to expand Chinese production in July.

The US administration often cites the relative performance of equity prices as a gauge of its success in the present trade confrontation with China. At the sector level, though, equity prices tell a different story.

Auto stock performance since July

President Trump apparently believes that tariffs will bring auto production back to the United States, as he suggested on Twitter in early September:

Trump tweet

Ford's North American production manager Mike Levine tweeted in reply, "It would not be profitable to build the Focus Active in the U.S. given an expected annual sales volume of fewer than 50,000 units and its competitive segment."

The fate of the Ford Focus, though, is the least of the problems of the American auto industry. China has prepared a supply chain for electric vehicles in depth, and it is extremely difficult for automakers who are not entrenched in the Chinese market to compete.

China also holds the keys to the future of self-driving cars. Rather than attempt to design autonomous vehicles to negotiate the poor infrastructure of American cities, China is designing cities around the concept of autonomous vehicles, with roads fenced off from pedestrians and 5th-generation mobile broadband.

China is not only the largest auto market in the world, and likely to grow as a percentage of the world auto market, but it is the center of auto industry innovation.

Wall Street analysts are busy calculating the prospective advantages to European and Japanese exporters. As I wrote in August (Europe, Japan, China and Russia line up against the US), America's trade war on China portends a global shift in trading relationships away from the US.

Alicia Garcia Herrero, an economist at the French bank Natixis, summarized the potential shift on September 14:

"For the first batch of import tariffs ($50 billion from each side), the key beneficiaries in Europe from substituting Chinese exports into the US would be general purpose machinery. As for China's market, European car manufacturers, followed by aircraft and aerospace, would be the key winners from potentially replacing the US exporters…For the second batch of import tariffs (on $200 billion from US side and $60 billion from China's side), Europe's potential gains in the US are extended to many more sectors, including office, accounting & computing machinery as well as furniture […] European gains in China will also be more widespread, covering sectors such as medical & precision products, basic chemicals and general purpose machinery."


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Middle-Class Influence vs. Working-Class Character [feedly]

Middle-Class Influence vs. Working-Class Character
https://workingclassstudies.wordpress.com/2018/09/10/middle-class-influence-vs-working-class-character/

"Jesse" is one of a cohort of 80 students sociologist Jessica Calarco observed from the 3rdthrough the 5th grades and then revisited in middle school for her new book, Negotiating Opportunities: How the Middle Class Secures Advantages in School.  Calarco also interviewed the students' parents. Her research reveals that middle-class children practice "strategies of influence" in school because their parents prioritize academic success, while working-class kids generally follow "strategies of deference" because their parents care more about developing long-term character.

In middle school Jesse lost a homework packet and simply accepted a "0" grade when the assignment was due.  Several weeks later his mother found the packet and made Jesse complete it.  When Jesse turned it in, his teacher "firmly, and a bit incredulously" returned the packet ungraded, saying: "It's a little too late for that now.  I mean, that [assignment] was like a month ago."  Here's how Calarco describes Jesse's reaction:

"Jesse does not look up.  He nods slowly, but he keeps his shoulders hunched forward and his head low.  As Ms. Cartwright heads back to her desk, Jesse glances up at me, his face and shoulders heavy with resignation.  He murmurs quietly, almost sadly: 'It wasn't to get a better grade.  It was to make me a better person.'"

Jesse later explained to Calarco that his mother had told him to complete the late assignment not to improve his grade but because it was the right thing to do – "to work hard and take responsibility for his actions."

Jesse is from a working-class family, and Calarco recounts in heart-breaking detail how the working-class kids she observed are disadvantaged in grade school by their inability and unwillingness to push teachers to give them more time on a test, help them with answers, and allow them to turn in homework late. Middle-class kids, on the other hand, often treat teachers' instructions as but opening statements in a game of negotiating that these kids become amazingly good at as early as the 4th grade.

According to Calarco, middle-class kids are taught to question and negotiate with the authority of their teachers, who are there to serve and help them. They learn that children should ask for help and seek  special accommodations when they need them.  Working-class kids, conversely, are taught to defer to teachers, to do what they're told, and not to burden teachers with unnecessary questions but to work out their problems on their own.

Calarco argues that it is not only teachers' own middle-class predispositions that disadvantage working-class students (a "hidden curriculum" noted by other scholars like Annette Lareau), but middle-class kids' own crafty agency, and their knowledge that they can count on their parents to intervene if necessary, that makes it nearly impossible for teachers to give the same time and attention to working- as to middle-class kids.  In Calarco's observation, teachers are often frustrated with the demands middle-class kids make on them and appreciative of the working-class kids' deference and respect.  But the middle-class students are so confident, persistent, and often humorously, good-heartedly creative in seeking attention that as a practical matter, teachers have to give them more time just to get through their day.  This dynamic is further aided by working-class kids' commitment to not being a bother to teachers and to working out things on their own, and many of them see what the middle-class kids are doing as undignified begging at best or even cheating, which they disdain ever doing.   At a Working-Class Studies conference where she presented some of this research, I asked Calarco whether the working-class kids' disdain for middle-class negotiating might be based in a commitment to personal integrity.  She said, "Oh, for sure, though nobody used those words, of course."

As for remedies, Calarco argues against both teaching working-class kids to negotiate better or urging middle-class parents to restrain from teaching their children strategies of influence.  Rather, she advocates for teachers and schools to enforce sharper boundaries against negotiating the special deals middle-class kids are so good at bargaining for and to stick to those boundaries when parents complain and threaten to go to the school board.

I found her arguments for that approach sensible and cogent, but as with many remedies for addressing our growing inequalities, it puts too much responsibility on only one of our institutions and on teachers, whom Calarco so vividly shows want to treat all their students equally and often work ingeniously if unsuccessfully to do so.  I wish Calarco had pulled back a bit to a larger frame that built on one of her most insightful paragraphs:

"All the parents . . . regardless of class or mobility, wanted to support their children's academic success.  At the same time, parents worried that too much support could undermine their children's development of good character (i.e., respect, responsibility, and work ethic).  Middle-class and working-class parents alike struggled with how to balance those seemingly competing priorities.  Ultimately, middle-class parents prioritized good grades, and working-class parents prioritized good character.  Both groups, however, made those choices with reservations."

She doesn't spell out the reservations, maybe because they're pretty obvious.  As Jesse's story suggests, he just wanted to be "a better person," not to be too much of a bother, and for sure not a beggar or a cheater.  He could do with some negotiating skills, and with some more willingness to speak up for himself so he can be treated more fairly.  But no matter what he does, he'll never catch up to the increasingly manipulative influencing skills the middle-class kids are developing – partly, and importantly, because neither he nor his parents want him to.  By prioritizing good character, however, he is gradually undermining his academic competitiveness and eventually his competitiveness in a bifurcated labor market that increasingly has only low-wage and high-wage jobs that track education levels.  His parents may sense that, and thus their reservations.  Middle-class parents' reservations are likely based on the same perception – that if their kids have to sacrifice a little character and integrity to achieve academic success, it will be worth it in the long run because it will improve their chances of getting one of those increasingly rare jobs with good wages and conditions.  But is this really what middle-class parents want: Finagling, transactional grade-hounds constantly seeking competitive advantage so they can find a career, not just a job, a career that may value those same finagling, manipulative transactional skills they're honing in school?

I doubt that is what any parent wants, but those are the pressures being put on us by the increasing distance between good jobs and bad jobs based on educational attainment.  Parents should not have to prioritize between good grades and good character.  We need to attack our growing inequalities with higher wages and better conditions for all the bad jobs that do much of the work we all depend upon.  In the long run, even most winners can't really win in a winner-take-all society.

Negotiating Opportunities is full of carefully observed interactions among kids, parents, and teachers nearly all of whom are trying to do their best most of the time. But they're doing it within a socioeconomic structure where trying to build character and maintain personal integrity can increase your chances of having low wages and lousy working conditions, while in order to gain decent working and living environments and some discretionary income, you may have to trim your concern for character and integrity and to get really good at treating human relationships as simply transactional.

Jack Metzgar


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Intangibles, and wealth in human capital, moving East...

Making Tariffs Corrupt Again [feedly]

Making Tariffs Corrupt Again
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/opinion/tariffs-trump-corrupt.html

Trump has perverted the process and undermined U.S. credibility.

By Paul Krugman

Opinion Columnist

Sept. 20, 2018


President Trump has imposed tariffs, seemingly on whim, on about $300 billion worth of imports.CreditCreditDoug Mills/The New York Times

In normal times, Donald Trump's announcement of tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, bringing us closer to an all-out trade war, would have dominated headlines for days. Things being as they are, it was a below-the-fold story, drowned out by all the other scandals underway.

Yet Trump's tariffs really are a big, bad deal. Their direct economic impact will be modest, although hardly trivial. But the numbers aren't the whole story. Trumpian trade policy has, almost casually, torn up rules America itself created more than 80 years ago — rules intended to ensure that tariffs reflected national priorities, not the power of special interests.

You could say that Trump is making tariffs corrupt again. And the damage will be lasting.

Until the 1930s, U.S. trade policy was both dirty and dysfunctional. It wasn't just that overall tariffs were high; who got how much tariff protection was determined through a free-for-all of horse-trading among special interests.

The costs of this free-for-all went beyond economics: They undermined U.S. influence and damaged the world as a whole. Most notably, in the years after World War I, America demanded that European nations repay their war debts, which meant that they had to earn dollars through exports — and at the same time America imposed high tariffs to block those necessary exports.



But the game changed in 1934, when F.D.R. introduced the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Henceforth, tariffs would be negotiated via deals with foreign governments, giving export industries a stake in open markets. And these deals would be subject to up-or-down votes, reducing the ability of interest groups to buy themselves special treatment.

This U.S. innovation became the template for a global trading system, culminating in the creation of the World Trade Organization. And tariff policy went from being famously dirty to remarkably clean.

Now, the creators of this trading system knew that it needed some flexibility to remain politically viable. So governments were given the right to impose tariffs under a limited set of circumstances: to give industries time to cope with import surges, to respond to unfair foreign practices, to protect national security. And in the U.S. the power to impose these special-case tariffs was vested in the executive branch, on the understanding that this power would be used sparingly and judiciously.

Then came Trump.

So far, Trump has imposed tariffs on about $300 billion worth of U.S. imports, with tariff rates set to rise as high as 25 percent. Although Trump and his officials keep claiming that this is a tax on foreigners, it's actually a tax hike on America. And since most of the tariffs are on raw materials and other inputs into business, the policy will probably have a chilling effect on investment and innovation.

But the pure economic impact is only part of the story. The other part is the perversion of the process. There are rules about when a president may impose tariffs; Trump has obeyed the letter of these rules, barely, but made a mockery of their spirit. Blocking imports from Canada in the name of national security? Really?


Even the big China announcement, supposedly a response to unfair Chinese trade practices, was basically a put-up job. China is often a bad actor in the international economy. But this kind of retaliatory tariff is supposed to be a response to specific policies, and offer the targeted government a clear way to satisfy U.S. demands. What Trump did was instead to lash out based mainly on a vague sense of grievance, with no end game in sight.

In other words, when it comes to tariffs, as with so many other things, Trump has basically abrogated the rule of law and replaced it with his personal whims. And this will have a couple of nasty consequences.

First, it opens the door for old-fashioned corruption. As I said, most of the tariffs are on inputs into business — and some businesses are getting special treatment. Thus, there are now substantial tariffs on imported steel, but some steel users — including the U.S. subsidiary of a sanctioned Russian company —were granted the right to import steel tariff-free. (The Russian subsidiary's exemption was reversed after it became public knowledge, with officials claiming that it was a "clerical error.")

So what are the criteria for these exemptions? Nobody knows, but there is every reason to believe that political favoritism is running wild.

Beyond that, America has thrown away its negotiating credibility. In the past, countries signing trade agreements with the United States believed that a deal was a deal. Now they know that whatever documents the U.S. may sign supposedly guaranteeing access to its market, the president will still feel free to block their exports, on specious grounds, whenever he feels like it.

In short, while the Trump tariffs may not be that big (yet), they have already turned us into an unreliable partner, a nation whose trade policy is driven by political cronyism, and which is all too likely to default on its promises whenever it's convenient. Somehow, I don't think that's making America great again.
 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Can Trade Agreements Be a Friend to Labor? [feedly]

This is an important discussion, and is an even broader arena than discussed here because there is an inescapable link between trade inequities with respect to labor and immigration. Dani hits one of the key points: Focus on the establishment of elementary labor rights, not "standards" that may be simply impossible to negotiate or obtain solidarity across borders and the uniqueness of each nations' history, laws and customs.  The standards issues -- e.g.minimum wage, property qualifications work classifications, etc -- can work against unity, and also against nations with large public stakes in inputs to enterprises.

Also important: the Golden Rule of International Relations: Do not demand your partner make concessions you yourself would not accept in a similar situation.

**************************************


Can Trade Agreements Be a Friend to Labor?
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trade-agreement-labor-provisions-small-practical-effect-by-dani-rodrik-2018-09
Sep 14, 2018 DANI RODRIK

To date, labor clauses in trade agreements have remained a fig leaf, neither raising labor standards abroad nor protecting them at home. Real change would require a significantly different approach, including how trade agreements uphold and enforce workers' rights.

CAMBRIDGE – Labor advocates have long complained that international trade agreements are driven by corporate agendas and pay little attention to the interests of working people. The preamble of the World Trade Organization Agreement mentions the objective of "full employment," but otherwise labor standards remain outside the scope of the multilateral trade regime. The only exception is a clause, left over from the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the precursor to the WTO), which permits governments to restrict imports that are produced with prison labor.



Regional trade agreements, by contrast, have long taken labor standards aboard. The linkage in these agreements between preferential market access and adherence to core labor rights has become increasingly explicit. In the original North American Free Trade Agreement, signed in 1992, labor standards were shunted to a side agreement. Since then, US trade agreements have typically included a labor chapter.1

According to its proponents, the Trans-Pacific Partnership would have required Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei to improve their labor practices significantly – and Vietnam to recognize independent trade unions. And US President Donald Trump's administration claims that its revamped agreement with Mexico contains the strongest labor provisions of any trade agreement.

Developing countries have generally resisted inclusion of labor standards in trade agreements for fear that advanced countries will abuse such provisions for protectionist purposes. This fear can be justified when the requirements go beyond core labor rights and make specific wage and other material demands. For example, the new US-Mexico agreement requires that 40-45% of a car be made by workers earning at least $16 per hour.

Auto companies can certainly afford to pay higher wages, and this provision on its own may not undermine employment prospects in Mexico. But it is not an altogether salutary precedent either, insofar as it sets an unrealistic wage floor – many multiples higher than the average for the Mexican manufacturing sector as a whole.

On the other hand, developing countries have little reason to reject labor standards that address bargaining asymmetries in the workplace and fundamental human rights. Core labor standards such as freedom of association, collective bargaining rights, and prohibition of compulsory labor are not costly to economic development; in fact, they are essential to it.



In practice, the problem with trade agreements' labor provisions is not that they are too restrictive for developing countries; it is that they may remain largely cosmetic, with little practical effect. A key concern is enforcement. For one thing, charges of labor-rights violations can be brought only by governments, not by trade unions or human rights organizations. By contrast, investment disputes can be launched by corporations themselves.

Critics rightly worry that governments that are not particularly friendly to labor causes will not be keen to follow through. To date, there has been only a single instance of labor rights being pursued under a trade agreement's dispute settlement procedures, and the outcome is hardly encouraging.

Following two years of complaints by US and Guatemalan trade unions, the US government formally launched a case against Guatemala in 2010. When a final decision was announced in 2017, nearly a decade after the initial grievances were aired, the arbitration panel decided against the US, but not because Guatemala lived up to its labor rights obligations under its own laws. The panel did find violations of Guatemalan labor laws. For example, court orders against employers who had dismissed workers for engaging in union activities were not enforced. But it ruled that such violations did not have an effect on Guatemala's competitive advantage and exports, and therefore were not covered by the trade agreement!

There are two reasons to care about labor standards. First, we may have a humanitarian desire to improve working conditions everywhere. In this case, we should have equal regard for workers in the domestic economy and those employed in export industries. Focusing on the latter may even backfire, by deepening dualistic labor-market structures.

In principle, we could expand enforceable labor clauses in trade agreements to cover working conditions in the entire economy. But it seems odd to have the linkage in the first place: why should labor rights be left to trade negotiators and the commercial interests sitting around the table, and remain hostage to negotiations couched in terms of market access?

If we are serious about improving working conditions everywhere, we should resort to experts on human rights, labor markets, and development, and raise the profile of the International Labor Organization instead. The objectives of both domestic labor unions and international human-rights advocates are served better through other means.

One argument for linkage with trade is that it gives countries a real incentive to reform labor-market practices. But foreign aid agencies have long experience with conditionality, and they know that it is effective only under special conditions. The desire for change must come from within the country and be demonstrated by prior actions. Achieving reform by threatening to suspend material benefits – aid or market access – is unlikely to work.

Alternatively, the concern about labor standards may be narrower: upholding working conditions at home and preventing a race to the bottom. In this case, we should seek domestic remedies, as with safeguards against import surges. What is required is a mechanism against "social dumping" that prevents poor labor practices in exporting countries from spilling over to the importing country.

Such a scheme, if poorly designed, might deliver excessive protectionism. Yet even the overtly protectionist anti-dumping measures allowed under existing trade rules have not been overly damaging to trade, while providing an escape valve for political pressure. A well-designed safeguard against social dumping should do no worse.

Labor rights are too important to leave to trade negotiators alone. To date, labor clauses in trade agreements have remained a fig leaf, neither raising labor standards abroad nor protecting them at home. Real change would require a significantly different approach. We can start by treating labor rights as being on a par with commercial interests, rather than being an adjunct to them.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed