Tuesday, August 14, 2018

This Trade Data goes All the Way Back to 1800. Here's What it Tells Us [feedly]

This Trade Data goes All the Way Back to 1800. Here's What it Tells Us
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/14/08/2018/trade-data-goes-all-way-back-1800-heres-what-it-tells-us

Giovanni Federico and Antonio Tena-Junguito introduce findings from a new research project on historical trade data.

Since 2007, the apparently unstoppable growth of world trade has come to a halt, and the openness of the world economy has been stagnating, or even declining. The recent prospect of a trade war is fostering pessimism for the future. Some people are hinting at a repetition of the Great Depression. These historical parallels are fascinating, although somewhat risky. At the very least, one should know exactly what happened to trade in the past (Eichengreen and O'Rourken 2012). This is fairly easy for recent years, but the series available for the pre-1938 period are incomplete, obsolete, and sometimes just wrong. For this reason, we have started a research project on world trade from 1800 onwards. We reported a first set of results in a number of papers (Federico and Tena-Juanquito 2017a, 2017b, 2018a), also summing them up in two previous columns here at VoxEU.org (Federico and Tena-Juanquito 2016a, 2016b). In a nutshell, we have found that:

Trade grew very fast in the 'long 19th century' from Waterloo to WWI, recovered from the wartime shock in the 1920s, and collapsed by about a third during the Great Depression. It grew at breakneck speed in the Golden Age of the 1950s and 1960s and again, after a slowdown because of the oil crisis, from the 1970s to the outbreak of the Great Recession in 2007. The effect of the latter on trade growth is sizeable but almost negligible if compared with the joint effect of the two world wars and the Great Depression. However, the effects might become more and more comparable if the current trade stagnation continues.The distribution of world exports by continent and level of development remained fairly stable until WWI. During the Great Depression, Europe lost more than the rest of the world, and the peripheral countries (and Japan) gained, but these changes were largely reversed during the Golden Age of the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, by 1972 European countries and the 'old rich' (North Western European countries and the US) still accounted for over a half of world exports. Since then, changes in world shares have been large and, at least so far, permanent. The share of Asia rose from about a sixth to a third, at the expense of all other continents. Contrary to a widely held view, the current level of openness to trade is unprecedented in history. The export/GDP ratio at its 2007 peak was substantially higher than in 1913 and the difference is much larger if the denominators include only tradables (i.e. it is the value added in agriculture and industry). Furthermore, openness increased from 1830 to 1870 (the true first period of globalisation) and again from the mid-1970s to 2007, while it broadly stagnated both in the decades during the so-called first globalisation (1870-1913) and during the Golden Age. Needless to say, openness collapsed during the Great Depression, back to the mid-19thcentury level.The trends in gains from trade, as measured with the Arkolakis et al. (2012) formula, mirror quite closely the movement of openness, with peaks in 1913 (6.3% of GDP, for 36 polities) and 2007 (11.5%). These figures are surely a lower bound of total (static) gains, and in all likelihood the difference between estimated and actual gains was larger in 2007 than in 1913.

For the period after 1950, we rely on standard UN data for both GDP and trade, while for pre pre-war years we use our own newly compiled databases. We collected all the available series of GDP at current prices and estimated series of exports and imports by 'polity' (i.e., independent countries' colonies and the corresponding native territories before Western colonisation). Twelve export series start in 1800, and three additional ones in 1813. The number jumps to 28 in 1816 and again to 62 in 1823 and rises to 89 in 1830. The number of import series grows as well, but remains lower in the first half of the 19thcentury (nine in 1800, 23 in 1823, and 50 in 1830). From 1850 to 1938, the database is complete – i.e. it includes series of imports and exports for all existing polities, with few and insignificant exceptions. Their number varies according to the changes in the political map, ranging between 125 and 130 until 1918, and jumping to around 140 after the Versailles treaty.

After 1850, we compute world trade by summing exports by polity, but this method would yield upwardly biased results for the first half of the century. Thus, we extrapolate the 1850 level backwards to 1800 by linking three series for as many time-invariant samples, for 1800–1821 (12 polities), 1823–1829 (62 polities), and 1830–1849 (89 polities). Even the first sample, though small, is representative (62.3% of world exports in 1850), as it includes France, the UK, and the US. The 1823 and 1830 samples are fully representative, accounting respectively for 81.4% and 95.7% of world trade in 1850. None of the previously available series extend so far back in time (they go back, at most, to 1850), nor do they comprehensively cover peripheral countries.

These series, and all data by polity, are now freely available in the Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database.

 

Figure 1 The Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database

 

 

Image: Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database.

 

For each polity (a total of 149) we provide a separate Excel file, which can be easily retrieved from the website by clicking the corresponding button in the Google map (see Figure 2). It is thus possible to study the trade performance of a single polity or of any group of polities of interest.

 

Figure 2 Image of the Web Map

Image: Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database

 

The set includes eight series, for exports and imports at current and constant (1913 dollars) prices at current and constant borders, for a total of 13,075 yearly data for imports and 14,399 for exports and 109,896 observations. We describe in detail the methods and sources of our estimates and assess their reliability in Federico and Tena-Junguito (2016). This paper refers to our main estimate, which was completed in 2014. Since then, we have revised some series to correct errors and to take into account new research made available to us in the meanwhile (information on these changes can be found here). We intend to periodically update the database to correct mistakes and incorporate the results of future research on trade. The next revision is scheduled for October 2020 and we would be grateful for any suggestions.

The estimation of polity series has required the collection of a number of additional series, which we also publish on the website. In particular, we publish series of 'international' prices for 190 products, as proxied by prices in London or, for manufactures, unit prices of British exports, from 1850 to 1938; of 48 freights rates by product/route from 1800 to 1838; and of exchange rates for diverse years from 1800 to 1938, for 132 countries.

Although our main interest is in aggregate trade, we have collected a substantial amount of information about the composition of trade from a number of different sources. Unfortunately, few recent works group products according to modern categories, while contemporary sources use widely different criteria which prevent any analysis of composition beyond the simple distinction between primary products and manufactures. We estimated series of the share of primary products on imports and exports for a growing number of polities, from 25 in 1820, to 110 after 1850. We use these data to estimate a series of world share of primary products from 1820 to 1938, by linking trade-weighted averages for three different time-invariant samples, starting in 1820 ('1820 sample', with 23 polities), 1830 ('1830 sample', 32 polities) and 1850 ('full sample', with 90-110 polities).

Figure 3 Share of primary products on exports, baseline series, 1820–1938

 

Image: VoxEU

 

The share of primary products (Figure 3) has been drifting downwards, from about 65% in the 1820s to slightly above 55% on the eve of WWI, with an acceleration of the trend around 1860. This decline continued, albeit very slowly, in the 1920s, while the share rebounded after 1929 back to the level of the early 1910s. As Figure 4 shows, the aggregate share of primary products on exports declined for both rich countries and the rest of the world.

 

Figure 4 Share of primary products for export and imports in rich and poor countries

 

Image: VoxEU

 

Image: VoxEU

 

Before 1913, the trend by polity was mixed, but the worldwide share declined because of the change in the specialisation of the US. Primary products accounted for four-fifths of American exports before the Civil War and for a third on the eve of WWI and in the interwar years. If the share of primary products on US exports had remained constant since 1850, in 1913 the overall one would have been 62.7% rather than 62.3% – with an increase of 0.45 percentage points instead of the actual decline by 6.3 points. The decline in the share on exports by polity continued in most countries until 1938 – the increase in the worldwide share reflects the growing share of world exports of primary producing polities.

Figure 4 highlights another significant divergence from the conventional wisdom. World trade during the first globalisation was not a simple vertical exchange of primary products from the periphery with manufactures from the core countries. As expected, primary products accounted for most exports of poor countries (on average 86.1% from 1850 to 1938) and for most imports of rich countries (73.6%), but they accounted for about a third of exports from rich countries (38.0%) and for slightly less than half of imports of poor countries (45.5%).

Of course, an analysis based only on the aggregate share of primary products barely scratches the surface of the issue. Unfortunately, estimating the changes in composition of world trade, even at the simplest one-digit level, would need a massive research effort. While we await this, our database and the parallel database on aggregate bilateral trade (RICARDO) offer scholars a very valuable resource for historical quantitative analyses of trade – historical comparisons might be useful for understanding current and future trade trends.

 

 

Giovanni Federico, professor of Economic History, University of Pisa. Antonio Tena-Junguito.

This first appeared in the Agenda blog.

Image credit: Fondo Antiguo de la Biblioteca de la Universidad de Sevilla via Flickr (CC BY 2.0)

FacebookTwitterGoogle+Share
 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Monday, August 13, 2018

The US Becomes an Oil Economy [feedly]

PetroChina Is Said to Mull Suspending US LNG Purchases [feedly]

PetroChina Is Said to Mull Suspending US LNG Purchases
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-12/petrochina-is-said-to-mull-temporary-halt-of-u-s-lng-purchases

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Links (8/13/18) [feedly]

Saturday, August 11, 2018

Globalization with Chinese Characteristics [feedly]

Globalization with Chinese Characteristics
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/globalization-chinese-characteristics-by-barry-eichengreen-2018-08

Globalization with Chinese Characteristics

Aug 10, 2018 BARRY EICHENGREEN

The Trump administration's "America First" policies have done more than disqualify the United States from global leadership. They have also created space for other countries to re-shape the international system to their liking.

BERKELEY – US President Donald Trump's erratic unilateralism represents nothing less than abdication of global economic and political leadership. Trump's withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement, his rejection of the Iran nuclear deal, his tariff war, and his frequent attacks on allies and embrace of adversaries have rapidly turned the United States into an unreliable partner in upholding the international order.


GLOBALIZATION WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

Aug 10, 2018 BARRY EICHENGREENsuggests three ways Donald Trump's "America First" policies will reshape the world economy.



But the administration's "America First" policies have done more than disqualify the US from global leadership. They have also created space for other countries to re-shape the international system to their liking. The influence of China, in particular, is likely to be enhanced.

Consider, for example, that if the European Union perceives the US as an unreliable trade partner, it will have a correspondingly stronger incentive to negotiate a trade deal with China on terms acceptable to President Xi Jinping's government. More generally, if the US turns its back on the global order, China will be well positioned to take the lead on reforming the rules of international trade and investment.

So the key question facing the world is this: what does China want? What kind of international economic order do its leaders have in mind?

To start, China is likely to remain a proponent of export-led growth. As Xi put it at Davos in 2017, China is committed "to growing an open global economy." Xi and his circle obviously will not want to dismantle the global trading system.

But in other respects, globalization with Chinese characteristics will differ from globalization as we know it. Compared to standard post-World War II practice, China relies more on bilateral and regional trade agreements and less on multilateral negotiating rounds.



In 2002, China signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It has subsequently negotiated bilateral free-trade agreements with 12 additional countries. Insofar as China continues to emphasize bilateral agreements over multilateral negotiations, its approach implies a diminished role for the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The Chinese State Council has called for a trade strategy that is "based in China's periphery, radiates along the Belt and Road, and faces the world." This suggests that Chinese leaders have in mind a hub-and-spoke system, with China the hub and countries on its periphery the spokes. Others foresee the emergence of hub-and-spoke trading systems centered on China and also possibly on Europe and the United States – a scenario that becomes more likely as China begins to re-shape the global trading system.

The government may then elaborate other China-centered institutional arrangements to complement its trade strategy. That process has already begun. The authorities have established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, headed by Jin Liqun, as a regional alternative to the World Bank. The People's Bank of China has made $500 billion of swap lines available to more than 30 central banks, challenging the role of the International Monetary Fund. Illustrating China's leverage, in 2016 the state-run China Development Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China provided $900 million of emergency assistance to Pakistan, helping its government avoid, or at least delay, recourse to the IMF.

A China-shaped international system will also attach less weight to intellectual property rights. While one can imagine the Chinese government's attitude changing as the country becomes a developer of new technology, the sanctity of private property has always been limited in China's state socialist system. Hence intellectual property protections are likely to be weaker than in a US-led international regime.

China's government seeks to shape its economy through subsidies and directives to state-owned enterprises and others. Its Made in China 2025 plan to promote the country's high-tech capabilities is only the latest incarnation of this approach. The WTO has rules intended to limit subsidies. A China-shaped trading system would, at a minimum, loosen such constraints.

A China-led international regime would also be less open to inflows of foreign direct investment. In 2017, China ranked behind only the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia among the 60-plus countries rated by the OECDaccording to the restrictiveness of their inward FDI regimes.

These restrictions are yet another device designed to give Chinese companies space to develop their technological capabilities. The government would presumably favor a system that authorizes other countries to use such policies. In this world, US multinationals seeking to operate abroad would face new hurdles.

Finally, China continues to exercise tight control over its financial system, as well as maintaining restrictions on capital inflows and outflows. While the IMF has recently evinced more sympathy for such controls, a China-led international regime would be even more accommodating of their use. The result would be additional barriers to US financial institutions seeking to do business internationally.

In sum, while a China-led global economy will remain open to trade, it will be less respectful of US intellectual property, less receptive to US foreign investment, and less accommodating of US exporters and multinationals seeking a level playing field. This is the opposite of what the Trump administration says it wants. But it is the system that the administration's own policies are likely to beget.


Barry Eichengreen is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former senior policy adviser at the International Monetary Fund. His latest book is The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern
 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Friday, August 10, 2018

Supply Chains and Trade War [feedly]

Supply Chains and Trade War
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2018/08/supply-chains-and-trade-war.html

Paul Krugman:

Supply Chains and Trade War (Very Wonkish): ...last month the IGM Forum weighed in on the issue of supply chains and trade war — the issue that the current trade war, unlike previous trade conflicts, is taking place in a world where much trade consists, not of shipments of consumer goods, but of shipments of inputs used in production. The panelists more or less unanimously agreed that the prevalence of global supply chains increases the cost of trade war. But is the consensus right?
Well, although I yield to nobody in condemning the stupidity and corruption behind Trump trade policy, I'm a bit skeptical about the supply chain concern. Or maybe the best way to say this is that there are three possible stories about how supply chains might increase the costs of trade war, and while two of them are right, I suspect that many economists are buying into the third, which isn't.
So, what difference does a supply-chain trading system make?
One thing it does is create the possibility that protectionism will be bad mercantilism— that even in its first-round effects it will actually destroy more domestic jobs than it creates, because it creates a competitive disadvantage for domestic downstream producers. ...
Another thing the rise of global supply chains has done is to increase both total trade and the gains from trade. As a result, there is more to lose from a trade war than there was a generation ago.
But what I think many economists have in mind is something more than that.
Standard trade theory tells us that the costs of a tariff — the reduction in real income — may be calculated, approximately, as
Real income loss = 0.5*tariff rate*reduction in imports
This formula suggests only moderate costs even from a major trade war. Suppose that worldwide tariff were to rise to 40 percent, and world trade were to fall by 15 percent of world GDP, a 50% reduction. Even so, world real income would fall only 3 percent.
Now, what I think many economists are suggesting is that this kind of analysis understates the losses when much of that trade is in intermediate goods. But I'm pretty sure they're wrong, at least in the medium to long run.
Let me sketch out a model here....
That said, a trade war in a supply-chain world would cause a lot of disruption, because it would lead over time to a major restructuring of industry. This would create a lot of losers, as well as some winners, perhaps more than a trade war would have in the past. But I don't think the notion that the total loss in real income would be bigger than conventional analysis suggests holds up. Trump's policy moves are destructive, based on ignorance, but we shouldn't overstate their cost.

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

How the U.S. Military Protects and Enriches Multinational Speculators [feedly]

How the U.S. Military Protects and Enriches Multinational Speculators
http://dollarsandsense.org/blog/2018/08/how-the-u-s-military-protects-and-enriches-multinational-speculators.html

By Polly Cleveland

At a 1972 economics conference, at the height of the Vietnam war, Mason Gaffney presented an invited paper blandly entitled "The Benefits of Military Spending." The paper so shocked the conference organizer that he refused to include it in the conference volume. Gaffney couldn't find another publisher willing to touch it. Now, only 46 years later, here's that paper (draft version), updated by Cliff Cobb, and published in the American Journal of Economics and Sociology (March 2018). What so offended the economics establishment?

In dry economese laced with even drier humor, Gaffney laid out the fundamental land economics underlying U.S. military spending. The logic resembles that of urban sprawl: For a few bucks, John Bigshot buys Old MacDonald's farm way out in the boonies. Then he visits his pals on the city council of Anytown. They in turn vote to incorporate MacDonald Luxury Estates into greater Anytown, which means the town improves the road, extends water and sewer, police and fire protection, and other benefits to the property. With little personal investment (maybe a suitcase of cash), Mr. Bigshot has acquired a multimillion dollar parcel at the expense of Anytown taxpayers.

In similar fashion, multinational corporations go to third world countries where they acquire concessions for a song—mineral rights, broadcast rights, bank licenses, timber rights, harbor and airport rights, rights of way, or large tracts of agricultural land. Often they have bribed the local ruler, or "cacique" as Gaffney calls him. When angry locals threaten to overthrow the cacique, the multinationals can call in the U.S. government to protect their sacred property rights. The United States may provide guns and aircraft to the cacique, or establish a military base, or finance infrastructure like dams and ports and highways. Alternatively, the United States can support an opponent who promises to uphold those concessions. A small initial overseas investment can yield decades of lucrative return flows to the multinationals.

Documenting dozens of such arrangements, including the original deals for oil in Saudi Arabia and Iran, Gaffney takes a sly poke at the conventional economic treatment of "defense" spending as a benign "public good" equally benefitting all citizens of the homeland. The real-life benefits go to a small wealthy international minority with no particular loyalty to the United States, while ordinary U.S. citizens pay—as consumers, taxpayers, and especially as soldiers.

When I first read an unpublished version of the paper in 1992, 20 years after Gaffney wrote it, I felt a jolt of recognition. I was a Foreign Service brat. My dad served as Economics Officer; what was he doing? Arranging deals for U.S. investors. Everywhere we were posted or traveled there were U.S. military bases. What were they doing? (We FS types looked down on the military, because they didn't try to learn the local language or culture, and shopped only at the PX.)

I felt the same jolt years later reading John Perkins' Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. Perkins' employers sent him out to convince local third world rulers to undertake wildly overambitious, environmentally destructive infrastructure projects to be built by multinational engineering companies like Bechtel and Haliburton. These projects usually failed to deliver the promised economic benefits, leaving the locals in hock to U.S. and European banks and subject to U.S. control. The original excuse for U.S. intervention on behalf of such caciques was that they provided us with a bulwark against "Communism." Today they provide us with a bulwark against "Terrorism," but it's the same pattern.

The United States has dominated this game since World War II, taking over from Great Britain. The Chinese are now bent on doing us one better with military bases in the China Sea, rail and road systems across Eurasia, seaports around the world, and vast soy plantations in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa. It's the same pattern.

Looking back to 1972, I think Gaffney's analysis so shocked conventional economists precisely because his method was so conventional. No hint of Marxism. Just good old-fashioned marginal analysis applied deadpan to an array of undisputed historical facts. Even worse, Gaffney poked subtle fun at received economic wisdom. No way could such subversion see the light of print—until now.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed