Populism's base [feedly]

Populism's base
http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2018/01/populisms-base.html

Steve Bannon may have lost his perch in the White House and Breitbart; but the themes of white supremacy, intolerance, bigotry, and anti-government extremism that drive radical nationalist populism survive his fall. In The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality Justin Gest attempts to explain how this movement has been able to draw support from white working class men and women -- often in support of policies that are objectively harmful to them. Here is how he describes his central concern:

In this book, I suggest that these trends [towards polarization] intensify an underlying demographic phenomenon: the communities of white working class people who once occupied the political middle have decreased in size and moved to the fringes, and American and European societies are scrambling to recalibrate how they might rebuild the centrist coalitions that engender progress.

The book makes use of both ethnographic and survey research to attempt to understand the political psychology of these populations of men and women in Western Europe and the United States -- low-skilled workers with limited education beyond secondary school, and with shrinking opportunities in the economies of the 2000s.

A particularly interesting feature of the book is the ethnographic attempt Gest makes to understand the mechanisms and content of this migration of political identity. Gest conducted open-ended interviews with working class men and women in East London and Youngstown, Ohio in the United States -- both cities that were devastated by the loss of industrial jobs and the weakening of the social safety net in the 1970s and 1980s. He calls these "post-traumatic cities" (7). He addresses the fact that white working class people in those cities and elsewhere now portray themselves as a disadvantaged minority.

There and elsewhere, the white working class populations I consider are consumed by a nostalgia that expresses bitter resentment toward the big companies that abandoned their city, a government that did little to stop them from leaving, and a growing share of visible minorities who are altering their neighborhoods' complexion. (10)

The political psychology of resentment plays a large role in the populations he studies -- resentment of government that fails to deliver, resentment of immigrants, resentment of affirmative action for racial minorities. The other large idea that Gest turns to is marginality -- the idea that these groups have that their voices will not be heard and that the powerful agents in society do not care about their fates.

Rather, this is to say that—across the postindustrial regions of Western Europe and North America—white working class people sense that they have been demoted from the center of their country's consciousness to its fringe. And many feel powerless in their attempts to do something about it. (15)

And resentment and marginality lead for some individuals to a political stance of resistance:

Unimpressed with Labour's priorities, profoundly distrustful of government, and unwilling to join forces with working class immigrants, Barking and Dagenham's working class whites are now engaged in a largely unstructured, alternative form of minority politics. They tend to be focused on local affairs, fighting for scarce public resources and wary of institutionalized discrimination against them. The difficulty has been having their claims heard, and taken seriously. (71)

The resentments and expressions of marginality in Youngstown are similar, with an added measure of mistrust of large corporations like the steel companies that abandoned the city and a recognition of the pervasive corruption that permeates the city. Here is Evelyn on the everyday realities of political corruption in Youngstown:

The more I saw, the more I realized that money can buy your way out of anything. Then you see your sheriff get indicted, your congressman dishonored, our prosecutor in prison, and a mayoral nominee with a cloud over his head. The Valley has been embroiled in political corruption for a long time, and people just look out for themselves. It makes you sick. You don't see it firsthand, the corruption, but you know it's there. (128)

The overriding impression gained from these interviews and Gest's narrative is one of hopelessness. These men and women of Youngstown don't seem to see any way out for themselves or their children. The pathway of upward mobility through post-secondary education does not come up at all in these conversations. And, as Case and Deaton argue from US mortality statistics (link), social despair is associated with life-ending behaviors such as opioids, alcohol abuse, and suicide.

Gest's book lays the ground for thinking about a post-traumatic democratic politics -- a politics that is capable of drawing together the segments of American or British society who genuinely need progressive change and more egalitarian policies if they are to benefit from economic progress in the future. But given the cultural and political realities that Gest identifies among this "new minority", it is hard to avoid the conclusion that crafting such a political platform will be challenging.

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The second American revolution [feedly]

The second American revolution
http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2018/01/the-second-american-revolution.html

The first American Revolution broke the bonds of control exercised by a colonial power over the actions and aspirations of a relatively small number of people in North America in 1776 -- about 2.5 million people. The second American Revolution promises to affect vastly larger numbers of Americans and their freedom, and it is not yet complete. (There were about 19 million African-Americans in the United States in 1960.)

This is the Civil Rights revolution, which has been underway since 1865 (the end of the Civil War); which took increased urgency in the 1930s through the 1950s (the period of Jim Crow laws and a coercive, violent form of white supremacy); and which came to fruition in the 1960s with collective action by thousands of ordinary people and the courageous, wise leadership of men and women like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. When we celebrate the life and legacy of MLK, it is this second American revolution that is the most important piece of his legacy.

And this is indeed a revolution. It requires a sustained and vigilant struggle against a powerful status quo; it requires gaining political power and exercising political power; and it promises to enhance the lives, dignity, and freedoms of millions of Americans.

This revolution is not complete. The assault on voting rights that we have seen in the past decade, the persistent gaps that exist in income, health, and education between white Americans and black Americans, the ever-more-blatant expressions of racist ideas at the highest level -- all these unmistakeable social facts establish that the struggle for racial equality is not finished.

Dr. King's genius was his understanding from early in his vocation that change would require courage and sacrifice, and that it would also require great political wisdom. It was Dr. King's genius to realize that enduring social change requires changing the way that people think; it requires moral change as well as structural change. This is why Dr. King's profoundly persuasive rhetoric was so important; he was able to express through his speeches and his teaching a set of moral values that almost all Americans could embrace. And by embracing these values they themselves changed.

The struggle in South Africa against apartheid combined both aspects of this story -- anti-colonialism and anti-racism. The American civil rights movement focused on uprooting the system of racial oppression and discrimination this country had created since Reconstruction. It focused on creating the space necessary for African-American men and women, boys and girls, to engage in their own struggles for freedom and for personal growth. It insisted upon the same opportunities for black children that were enjoyed by the children of the majority population.

Will the values of racial equality and opportunity prevail? Will American democracy finally embrace and make real the values of equality, dignity, and opportunity that Dr. King expressed so eloquently? Will the second American revolution finally erase the institutions and behaviors of several centuries of oppression?

Dr. King had a fundamental optimism that was grounded in his faith: "the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice." But of course we understand that only long, sustained commitment to justice can bring about this arc of change. And the forces of reaction are particularly strong in the current epoch of political struggle. So it will require the courage and persistence of millions of Americans to these ideals if racial justice is finally to prevail.

Here is an impromptu example of King's passionate commitment to social change through non-violence. This was recorded in Yazoo City, Mississippi in 1966, during James Meredith's March against Fear.

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Everybody Knows About Alabama [feedly]

Everybody Knows About Alabama
https://workingclassstudies.wordpress.com/2018/01/15/everybody-knows-about-alabama/

"You don't have to live next to me
Just give me my equality
Everybody knows about Mississippi
Everybody knows about Alabama
Everybody knows about Mississippi goddam, that's it"

                                                   "Mississippi Goddamn" Nina Simone

The Arena Stage production of Nina Simone: Four Women

We saw the play with music, Nina Simone: Four Women, on the same day Simone was named as an inductee to Rock'n' Roll Hall of Fame. That alone gave the play extra meaning. But the experience was made even richer by an unusual convergence of culture and politics: the day before, Doug Jones won a special election in Alabama to become that state's first Democratic Senator in a long while. While Jones's prosecution of two of the KKK members responsible for the 1963 bombing of the 16^th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham helped him win support in this year's election, the bombing also influenced Simone. Along with the murder of Medgar Evans, it inspired her to begin writing protest songs, including what she called her first civil rights song, Mississippi Goddam, in which she angrily exposes the violations of human rights in Southern states and challenges the Civil Rights movement's gradualism.

Playwright Christina Ham sets her play in the bombed-out church in the days after four adolescent girls were killed there. Drawing on Simone's 1966 song, "Four Women," Ham imagines the fear and anger of four Black women with different stories and perspectives, including different class backgrounds and experiences with political activism. The play explores how the women might have responded to the bombing, using dialogue as well as Simone's songs, including "To Be Young, Gifted, and Black"; "Sinnerman"; and "Four Women," as well as "Mississippi Goddamn."

The play presents a diverse quartet: the dark-skinned struggling Aunt Sarah; "high yellow" Saffronia, caught between the worlds of her rich white father and her less-privileged African American mother; the prostitute Sweet Thing; and—in place of Peaches, the last of the four women in the song—Nina Simone herself, who rages as she writes the song and argues with the other three characters. Their responses to the bombing and to the battles of the civil rights movement generally reflect their different experiences. Aunt Sarah is cautious about resisting, Saffronia supports Dr. King's nonviolent and reasoned approach, while Sweet Thing doesn't think the movement has much to do with her. Through it all, Nina Simone argues for more active, even violent resistance.

The memory of the Civil Rights era also drove opposition to Republican candidate Roy Moore, who  told a supporter who asked him when America was last "great" was during the period of slavery. Many younger Alabama voters, especially African Americans, found comments like this – perhaps even more than Moore's reported pedophilia – frightening. As Bryan Stevenson, founder of the Equal Justice Initiative, said "There's no state in America where black people recognize the horrors of turning back the clock more than the State of Alabama." Richard Fausset and Campbell Robertson reported in the New York Times, that Black voters, especially, were "motivated" by concerns about specific policies that Moore might support, but "they also voted out of a more general concern that the country, in the Trump era, was going back to a place best left in the past."

Those concerns were most visible in the strong turnout among African-American women in Alabama, 98% of whom voted for Jones, as did 92% of African-American men. While more than 60% of younger voters between 18 and 44 chose Jones, white men and women without college degrees – the poll data often used as a stand-in for working class — voted for Moore by over 75%. Among all white voters, only 34% of white women and 26% of white men voted for the Democrat.

While commentators have made much of Black women's strong opposition to Moore, we would also do well to attend to Nina Simone and to Ham's version of "Four Women." In the play, the four women fight among themselves about their own identities and choices. For example, Simone dismisses Saffronia by calling her "good hair," while Simone and Saffronia both goad Aunt Sara to take a more activist stand. These battles emphasize the way class, education, sexuality, experience, and ideas create points of tension even among people whom others might see as part of a single, well-defined group. That they stand together at the end of the play is not a given. It reflects a hard-won and tenuous solidarity.

What lessons can we take from the Alabama election and Ham's play about the centrality of race and gender in American politics? The election reminds us that Democratic candidates will not attract the votes they need solely through campaigns focused on economics. They must attend to racial injustice and, perhaps more now than ever before, to sexism. Yet as the play reminds us, discussions of race and gender cannot ignore class. While the conflicts among the women in the play are rooted in multiple sources, education, colorism, and social class are central points of tension.

At the same time, the play suggests the power of a shared sense of injustice and frustration to foster solidarity across differences. As 2017 nears its end, many Americans but perhaps especially women, poor and working-class people, LGBTQ people, and people of color are angry about the injustice of the Republicans' tax bill and their promises to cut Social Security and other programs that so many people rely on for survival. Many of us are worried about the current Administration's non-legislative actions – cutting regulations, stacking the courts, backing out of the Paris climate change accords, and more.  And we are frustrated that, so far, Trump does not seem to be paying any cost for his racist, sexist, xenophobic attitudes, much less for his persistent lies.

But will we be able to do what Simone's four women do at the end of Ham's play: recognize the our common ground matters more than our particular wounds? Will we let fear and resentment obstruct solidarity? In December, culture and politics came together. What would it take for that to happen again in 2018?

Sherry Linkon and John Russo

A version of this commentary appeared on the American Prospect website.

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Guidance on Medicaid Work and Community Engagement Requirements Raises Many Important Questions [feedly]

Guidance on Medicaid Work and Community Engagement Requirements Raises Many Important Questions
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/guidance-medicaid-work-and-community-engagement-requirements-raises-many-important-questions The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued guidance on Jan. 11, 2018, allowing states to require Medicaid beneficiaries to engage in "work or other community engagement" activities to maintain their coverage. This is a dramatic departure from Medicaid policy over the past 50 years. Given that CMS is approving work and community engagement requirements through waivers designed to test new provisions in Medicaid, we propose important questions for careful consideration by states and CMS. Since most Medicaid enrollees are already working or would likely be exempt from the new requirements, it will be important to consider the full costs and benefits of the policy change.

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Beginning to Gauge Maria’s Effect on Puerto Rico’s Economy [feedly]

Beginning to Gauge Maria's Effect on Puerto Rico's Economy
http://ritholtz.com/2018/01/beginning-gauge-marias-effect-puerto-ricos-economy/

Beginning to Gauge Maria's Effect on Puerto Rico's Economy

January 16, 2018 5:00am by Guest Author

Beginning to Gauge Maria's Effect on Puerto Rico's Economy
Jason Bram and Lauren Thomas
Liberty Street Economics, January 12, 2018

 

 

 

Just two weeks after most of Puerto Rico dodged the proverbial bullet, missing the brunt of Hurricane Irma, the island was devastated by Maria—one of the ten strongest Atlantic hurricanes on record. Making landfall on September 20, 2017, the storm caused not only massive physical destruction and tragic loss of life but also widespread and persistent power outages, shortages of potable (and even nonpotable) running water, and disruptions to telecommunications and travel, among other issues. With the storm boosting costs and disrupting activity, the short-term economic impact is clearly significant. But an even greater concern is that the adverse short-term effects of the storm, overlaid on an already shrinking economy, may evolve into long-term adverse effects. In this post, we focus on the magnitude, duration, breadth and nature of the economic disruptions, as measured mostly by employment.

Based on what we've learned from past natural disasters in other regions, we consider how Puerto Rico's economy might be affected in the longer run. Still, it is important to note a few unique features of this disaster that complicate comparisons with other natural disasters. First, while electricity has gradually been restored to parts of the island, the power outage has lasted much longer than has been the case after comparable disasters. Second, Puerto Rico's dire fiscal situation, heading into the storm, is somewhat unprecedented. Third, while the economies of most islands in the hurricane-prone Caribbean are driven by tourism, Puerto Rico's is much more diversified. These and other issues make it harder to predict Puerto Rico's post-hurricane prospects based on history.

Damage to Infrastructure and Capital
When we talk about the economic "cost" of a disaster, we are usually thinking of two components: physical damage and lost (forgone) economic output. Estimates of the physical (capital) damage wrought by Maria—to infrastructure, businesses, homes, and personal property—vary widely at this point. In late September, Moody's estimated the capital loss at up to $55 billion, part of an overall cost estimate ranging from $45-95 billion. In contrast, the Puerto Rican consulting firm Estudios Técnicos has estimated the capital loss in the range of $16-20 billion. In short, while capital losses are in principle clearly defined and measurable, it often takes a good deal of time to tally them up with any degree of accuracy—especially after a disaster of this magnitude. We will not address these costs further in this blog post.

Lost Economic Output
The other major loss component, lost economic output (or income), is harder to define but can be roughly estimated based on incoming economic data. Moreover, history shows that short-term trends in a local economy after a major disaster can give us a clue about the long-term economic impact. Usually, preliminary estimates of the economic fallout from such disasters have turned out to be overly pessimistic—as noted in this 1994 study. A more recent example of initial economic cost estimates turning out to be too high occurred after Hurricane Sandy. Such disasters—including numerous hurricanes that have devastated Caribbean islands—have rarely derailed a regional or local economy for more than a year.

However, one exception to this was New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. That disaster does appear to have had a long-lasting adverse effect on the local economy—employment in the New Orleans metro area fell by roughly 30 percent after Katrina and even now, more than a decade later, has only made up three-quarters of that drop, with employment still more than 7 percent below its pre-Katrina level.

Now that Puerto Rico is struggling to rebound from Maria, many are concerned about its long-term prospects. This concern is amplified by the fact that the Commonwealth had already been struggling with a weak economy and a fiscal crisis before the storm. While the U.S. Virgin Islands and many other Caribbean islands have seen comparable devastation from hurricanes, Puerto Rico has not—at least not in modern times. Hurricane Georges in 1998 caused significant damage in Puerto Rico but barely had a measurable effect on the overall economy.

So how can we estimate a storm's economic cost? Economic output, as well as income, typically declines more sharply than employment in the immediate wake of major disasters and disruptions—for example, a manufacturer, wholesaler, or restaurateur that has to shut down for a week or two is unlikely to lay off most or any of their workers. But what happens to businesses that have to stay closed longer, because of severe damage or a persistent lack of electricity? Only time will tell. Nevertheless, employment is probably the most timely and accurate indicator of sustained drops in activity. Thus, analyzing incoming employment data and comparing them with historical benchmarks (employment data after past hurricanes) can give us a sense of how bad the economic fallout has been, and may even provide a clue as to how quickly Puerto Rico's economy is likely to recover. Will it look like post-Katrina New Orleans or will it follow the more usual pattern?

Employment Trends in October and November
In October, Puerto Rico's payroll employment is estimated to have fallen by about 4 percent (seasonally adjusted)—a huge drop, but not unusually large after a hurricane. Encouragingly, employment rebounded about 1 percent in November. To put this in perspective, we compare it with three somewhat similar precedents: the U.S. Virgin Islands after Hurricane Hugo (1989) and again after Hurricane Marilyn (1995), and metro New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (2005). As shown in the chart below, Puerto Rico's recent job loss appears comparable in magnitude to the Virgin Islands' in 1995, but somewhat less severe than the Virgin Islands' in 1989 and significantly less than New Orleans' in 2006 and beyond.

A look at the profile of job losses by industry also reveals close similarities with these earlier hurricanes. As is typically the case, the sharpest job losses have occurred at restaurants, bars, hotels, and retailers. In normal economic rebounds from disasters, employment in those same industries tends to recover gradually over the course of the next nine to twelve months, while other industries bounce back more quickly. There were also steep job losses in wholesale trade and health and education services, whereas sectors like professional and business services, manufacturing, construction, and finance did not see significant declines. If history is any guide, construction employment is likely to rise sharply in the months ahead, partially offsetting lingering weakness in some sectors. While the available employment data exclude Puerto Rico's farm sector, it should be noted that extensive crop damage has reportedly taken a huge toll on the island's farmers and $1 billion agricultural industry.

One might understandably be skeptical of the monthly employment numbers cited above, figures based on a survey of businesses. It is conceivable that many of the hardest-hit businesses were unable to respond to the October and even November surveys, in which case the employment data may understate the true severity of the job losses. However, a look at weekly initial unemployment insurance claims—a complete count, not a survey—seems to confirm the rough magnitude of the initial job loss. Specifically, the total number of incremental claims (over and beyond pre-Maria levels) filed since late September add up to about 39,000 or just under 4.5 percent of employment, which is quite comparable to the net job loss reported from August to October.

Another source of timely information comes from the the Institute of Statistics' monthly survey of purchasing managers in Puerto Rico's manufacturing sector. That survey showed a steep drop-off in production activity in September and October but a fairly sturdy rebound in November.

Which Parts of Puerto Rico Were Hit Hardest?
Partly owing to the trajectory of the storm, the northern and eastern parts of the island tended to be hit somewhat harder (headwinds) than the southern and western parts (tailwinds). The local employment data within Puerto Rico do not show dramatic local differences but do indicate somewhat steeper losses in the San Juan area (northeast) than in the Mayaguez (west) or Ponce (south) areas.

Perhaps the most problematic lingering issue has been widespread power outages across the island. Given that lights are sometimes used as a proxy measure of economic activity, data on the intensity of nighttime light emissions (recorded daily by satellites) provide a particularly useful tool for monitoring the recovery across the island. The maps below show night lights across Puerto Rico in August (pre-Maria), October, and November. The relative dimness throughout the island in October underscores the severity and breadth of the power outage. The moderate improvement in November—more notable in the south and west than in the north and east—illustrates that the power situation has improved somewhat, though it remains fairly dire over much of the island.

Puerto Rico is divided into 78 municipios of varying sizes, with populations ranging from 400,000 (San Juan) to just under 2,000 (Culebra). Among the twenty brightest (and therefore the most densely populated) municipios, the change in brightness between August and November ranged from a 10 percent drop in Hormigueros, in the west, to a 74 percent decline in Humacao, on the southeastern coast. The reduction in night lights varied widely across the island; the areas with the quickest recoveries were found in the south and west of Puerto Rico, including Ponce and Mayaguez, whereas the eastern coast saw the greatest fall in lighting. Thus, Puerto Rico's local variation in night lights recovery closely parallels both the losses in employment found across the island and the trajectory of the storm—as Maria passed from east to west, the north received the stronger headwinds while the south and west experienced less severe tailwinds. A notable exception can be found in and around San Juan—despite being hit hard by the storm, these municipiosfell near the middle in terms of light loss; as the capital and largest city in Puerto Rico, electricity may have been restored more quickly there than in more rural areas.

The Outlook
While the initial economic fallout from a disaster is not necessarily a predictor of the long-term effect, historically the two do seem to have been correlated. That is, the steeper the initial loss of jobs (and population), the longer it tends to take a local economy to recover. Puerto Rico's population had already been trending down at about 2 percent per year before Maria. Given Maria's huge adverse effect on the general quality of life—power outages, shortage of potable water, health issues, transportation and communication disruptions—there has been much concern that the rate of population loss could accelerate sharply and create a vicious spiral: people emigrating, businesses closing, tax base shrinking, cuts in services and tax hikes leading to still more out-migration, and so on. In spite of the storm's devastating initial impact, that worst-case scenario for the island's economy appears to have been averted—at least thus far. We will continue to monitor the situation.

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this post are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors. 

---

Jason Bram is a research officer in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Research and Statistics Group.

Lauren Thomas is a senior research analyst in the Bank's Research and Statistics Group.

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Democracy in question [feedly]

Democracy in question
http://stumblingandmumbling.typepad.com/stumbling_and_mumbling/2018/01/democracy-in-question.html

Nigel Farage and Arron Banks are starting to agree with many Remainers that there should be a second referendum. Both sides, of course, do so for the same motive – the belief they would win.

What this misses is that the first referendum was, as Robert Harris said, "the most depressing, divisive, duplicitous political event of my lifetime." It was dominated by lies and by ignorance of basic facts. The result in effect went simply to the highest bidder. There's no reason to suppose that a second referendum will be any better.

Worse still, the result conveyed very little information. What sort of Brexit did voters want? Why did they want it? Was it because they regarded increased sovereignty as an intrinsic good for which they are willing to sacrifice some income? Or did they believe that Brexit would make them better off? Or did they regard Brexit as a means of controlling immigration? If so, why did they want such controls. Was it as a means of raising wages in which case might there be better ways of achieving that goal? Or was it because of cultural concerns? If so, are these justified and are they worth paying for? Or was Brexit just a way of signalling discontent with elites? If so, are there more effective ways of getting elites to change, if change they should?

The referendum told us nothing about these questions, though opinion polls might have. We learned less from it than Tesco learns from a shopper's most quotidian visit to one of its stores.

Before having a second referendum we should ask: how can decisions be better informed and more informative? This poses important questions. What organizational changes do we need to reduce plutocracy and achieve the democratic ideal of equal say? How can we get better decisions, informed by evidence? How can we ensure that experts are respected servants of the people rather than (seen as?) out-of-touch elites? How can we get a better media? (The BBC falls far short here, not just because it makes a fetish of a deformed conception of impartiality but because too many of its current affairs shows are merely the bantz of posh mediocrities – people who are the problem not the solution.)

And underpinning these questions is a deeper one: is healthy deliberative democracy even compatible with (actually-existing) capitalism?

With the very honourable exceptions of people like Paul Cotterill and Paul Evans, however, hardly anybody is asking these questions.

Politics has become like a game of football in which the only thing that matters is that our side wins and nobody cares about the quality or even basic honesty of the game. Most of us have forgotten that we are citizens as well as partisans.

In this sense, we are all neoliberals now. For me, one feature of neoliberalism is the elevation of what MacIntyre called external goods – power, wealth and fame – over internal goods of excellence. Almost everybody wants the external good of winning power to the neglect of the internal one of arriving at good decisions. Even many people who claim to oppose neoliberalism have, paradoxically, unthinkingly accepted one of its tenets.

The stakes here might be higher than generally supposed. As Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt point out, we cannot take the survival of democracy for granted. Democracies, they say, "die slowly, in barely visible steps." Constitutions and institutions are insufficient protection against this. What we also need, they say, are "norms of mutual toleration." These, though, are weakening. As Edward Luce writes, democracy "is only as good as the people who uphold it." And we must question whether they (we) are good enough.

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Economic Update - Capitalism and Addiction: The Opioid Epidemic - 01.14.18 [feedly]

Economic Update - Capitalism and Addiction: The Opioid Epidemic - 01.14.18
http://economicupdate.podbean.com/e/economic-update-capitalism-and-addiction-the-opioid-epidemic-011418/

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