Friday, January 12, 2018

The Philosophy of Social Evolution Part 5: Cultural inclusive fitness? [feedly]

The Philosophy of Social Evolution Part 5: Cultural inclusive fitness?
http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/12/01/2018/philosophy-social-evolution-part-5-cultural-inclusive-fitness

The Philosophy of Social Evolution Part 5: Cultural inclusive fitness?

Jonathan Birch - 12th January 2018

Jonathan Birch considers the development of large-scale human cooperation.

The scale of human cooperation

If you start with the assumption that biological altruism evolves because the benefits fall on genetic relatives, the scale of human social organization is puzzling. We cooperate with huge numbers of individuals who are not genetic kin – large-scale modern societies depend on it.

Not all of this cooperation is altruistic – a lot of it is mutually beneficial. We do it for the immediate returns, or to avoid punishment, or for long-term returns mediated by reciprocity and reputation. But all of this mutually beneficial cooperation rests on a basic platform that must have evolved at a relatively early stage in human social evolution, and that calls for explanation in its own right: namely, a tendency to interact peacefully by default with strangers.

To see what I mean, consider what happens when a chimpanzee strays into the territory of a rival group. Given the chance, a patrol from the home group will attack and kill the intruder without a moment's hesitation. This is why chimps do not have tribes. Their territorial aggression towards outsiders restricts them to small residential groups of 15 to 150 individuals. These groups never aggregate to form the much larger, "tribal" units of thousands of individuals characteristic of human social organization in stateless societies.

Something happened in human evolution to change this situation. Individuals, rather than acting aggressively by default towards members of neighbouring residential groups (or "bands"), came to interact peacefully with them. Larger, tribal units composed of many bands became possible – units that often waged war on each other, but in an organized way that involved a remarkable level of intra-tribal cooperation among large numbers of genetic non-relatives. In one of the most important transitions in human evolution, the pacification of inter-group relations at small scales brought a new level of organization – the "tribal" level – into existence.

This non-violence towards members of neighbouring groups began, I suspect, as a form of biological altruism. In a population in which the default is to kill outsiders, to spare one confers an obvious benefit on the recipient. But there is also a cost to the actor, in the form of a risk that the spared individual will injure or kill you or one of your relatives, or make off with food or other resources. This is a risk that chimps are not willing to take.

From genes to culture

We don't know why this form of altruism first evolved. Genetic relatedness may have had some role: when there is significant interbreeding between groups, individuals in different bands may still be genetic relatives to some degree, even if they are strangers to each other.1 But I doubt whether genetic relatedness would have been high enough. Studies of present-day hunter-gatherers by Kim Hill and colleagues suggest that, because there is so much migration between bands, genetic relatedness is actually very low indeed.

A different possibility is that human prosocial dispositions are products of cultural evolution. In recent years, many theories and models of cultural evolution – that is, the evolution of beliefs, values, skills, and other 'cultural variants' – have been developed. The field is thriving, and the concept of "cultural group selection" in particular is gaining traction. But concepts of inclusive fitness and relatedness, despite being incredibly valuable for understanding genetic social evolution, are notable by their absence.

In Chapter 8 of The Philosophy of Social Evolution, I consider the prospects for a theory of cultural inclusive fitness, and I ask whether might it be able to provide a better account of the origin of large-scale human cooperation than the traditional genetic version.

Cultural inclusive fitness: the basic idea

Just as the basic idea of inclusive fitness is easiest to understand by adopting a gene's eye perspective (without it thereby being equivalent to this perspective), the basic idea of cultural inclusive fitness is easiest to understand by positing memes in Richard Dawkins's sense – discrete, gene-like units of cultural inheritance – and adopting a "meme's eye view" on cultural evolution.

Suppose, then, that you are a meme in a population in which cultural transmission is exclusively parental and entirely unbiased – that is, people only ever acquire memes from their biological parents, and they get a random sample of their parents' memes. These are not realistic assumptions (see below), but they make the analogy with genetic inheritance as close as possible.

Like a gene, you have two ways to achieve your goal of increasing your representation in future generations. One is to promote the reproductive success of your host. The other is to increase the number of offspring of others who are more likely than average to possess copies of you. In the right circumstances, it may be in your interests to help others at a cost to your own bearer, if the total number of copies you leave in future populations is thereby increased.

This case is exactly analogous to a traditional case of kin selection. Note, though, that the likelihood of two individuals sharing a particular meme may differ from their likelihood of sharing a particular gene. Cultural inheritance, even when exclusively parental, is still a different process from genetic inheritance, and it may lead to different correlations between relatives. In principle, cultural relatedness could be high even though genetic relatedness is low, or vice versa.

In this process, the condition for the spread of a cultural variant is given by a cultural analogue of Hamilton's rule. It's a rule with the same "rb c" form, but now r is cultural relatedness rather than genetic relatedness – it's a formal measure of the cultural similarity, not genetic similarity, between social partners.

Blending inheritance

Although the rationale for the cultural analogue of Hamilton's rule is easiest to see by looking at cultural evolution from the perspective of an imaginary meme, the mathematical result does not rely on a meme-like conception of cultural inheritance. The result still holds even if beliefs, skills, values, etc. are modelled as quantitative traits that are not at all meme-like, but rather blend together – in other words, the result still holds if your children inherit a messy blend of your beliefs, skills, values, etc. rather than a high-fidelity copy.

In short, memes are a ladder we can kick away. A more general notion of cultural relatedness – a measure of the statistical association between the quantitative "cultural variants" of interacting agents – is a more useful concept that does not assume particulate cultural inheritance. This is the key advantage of cultural inclusive fitness over memetics – it requires no assumption of particulate inheritance, and aims to derive results that still hold on the assumption of blending inheritance.

Humans and microbes

Obviously, our original assumption that cultural transmission is exclusively parental and entirely unbiased – an assumption we made to get the closest possible analogy with genetic kin selection – is an unrealistic assumption. Cultural transmission is not exclusively parental: people acquire beliefs and values from others who are not their biological parents. And it is far from unbiased: some cultural traits are much more likely to be transmitted than others.

Crucially, though, the tools we develop to accommodate these complications in the case of microbial evolution (see Part 3) can also be usefully applied to the human case. Humans have rediscovered something that is widespread in bacteria, but that went missing for a few hundred million years of animal evolution—we have rediscovered horizontal transmission. Ways of incorporating horizontal transmission into models of microbial evolution also help us incorporate it into models of human evolution.

The upshot is that I think the prospects are good for a theory of cultural inclusive fitness, based on something like the diachronic concept of relatedness I developed for use in the case of bacterial evolution (see Part 3). In Chapter 8 of The Philosophy of Social Evolution, I take some initial steps towards developing such a theory. But the theory is at an early stage and there is much left to do.

Cultural inclusive fitness in human evolution

Let's now return to the puzzle I introduced earlier. How did the scope of human altruism come to extend beyond the limits of the immediate residential camp or band, to encompass an extended "tribal" social network of hundreds, and eventually thousands, of individuals?

The currently popular theory of cultural group selection seems to struggle with this puzzle: the large "tribal" groups presupposed by cultural group selection models do not yet exist (how they come to exist is what needs explaining), and group selection at the level of the band will not select for cooperation between members of distinct bands.

Cultural inclusive fitness, however, may be of use. Patterns of migration between bands create extended networks of acquaintance, friendship and kin relations – each individual has a large network centred on itself, consisting not just of immediate friends and kin, but of friends of friends and kin of kin. Many of the "strangers" in neighbouring groups will be friends of friends or kin of kin. If present-day chimpanzees are any guide, the common ancestor of humans and chimps would have treated all members of other bands with hostility. However, a process of "cultural kin selection" might favour a reduction of inter-band aggression.

Why? Because strangers from adjoining bands would have been culturally related. A study of present-day hunter-gatherer social networks by Coren Apicella and colleagues shows that cultural variants, including tendencies towards prosocial behaviour, are correlated across two degrees of separation. Your friends' friends, who may be unfamiliar to you, live far away from you and be genetically unrelated to you, will nevertheless tend to have beliefs and values that are correlated with yours.

This is probably due to a mix of conformist bias (people tend to conform to the average beliefs and values of their social network) and assortative network formation (people tend to interact more often with people culturally similar to themselves). Whatever the cause, the result is that, when you meet strangers from neighbouring camps, they are probably your cultural relatives, and it may increase your cultural inclusive fitness to help them, or least to refrain from hurting them.

This can lead to the selection of prosocial beliefs and values under a process of cultural selection. In such a process, prosocial beliefs, such as the belief that one should not harm members of a neighbouring camp, spread for fundamentally the same reason genes for altruism spread – because the benefits they generate fall differentially on other bearers of the same belief.

This is a hypothesis about how multi-band, "tribal" social groupings originally got started. It is a speculative and unconfirmed hypothesis. It relies on cultural correlations existing in extended social networks between individuals who are more or less strangers to each other – and there is evidence of this. But the evidence is far from sufficient to call the hypothesis confirmed.

Still, it is enough to show that there is serious work for a theory of cultural inclusive fitness to do. We don't know how large-scale social organization began in the human lineage. We don't know how the scope of human altruism and prosociality came to extend so far beyond the network of one's genetic kin – bucking the trend in the rest of the natural world. The concept of cultural inclusive fitness may help us develop a solution to that puzzle.

 

 

Jonathan Birch is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, specializing in the philosophy of the biological sciences. Most of his work concerns the evolution of social behaviour. He is also interested in the evolution of morality, animal sentience, and the relation between sentience and welfare.

Image credit: The Cuevas de Las Manos, Argentina (Photograph by Mariano at Wikimedia Commons, CC-BY-SA 3.0 licensed)



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Dani Rodrik: How to Combat Populist Demagogues [feedly]

How to Combat Populist Demagogues
http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/08/01/2018/how-combat-populist-demagogues

How to Combat Populist Demagogues

Dani Rodrik - 8th January 2018

Dani Rodrik suggests that the best way to combat populist demagogues is a re-imagining of the national interest. 

We will never know whether greater honesty on the part of mainstream politicians and technocrats would have spared us the rise of nativist demagogues like Donald Trump in the US or Marine Le Pen in France. What is clear is that lack of candor in the past has come at a steep price.

At a recent conference I attended, I was seated next to a prominent American trade policy expert. We began to talk about the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which President Donald Trump has blamed for American workers' woes and is trying to renegotiate. "I never thought NAFTA was a big deal," the economist said.

I was astonished. The expert had been one of the most prominent and vocal advocates of NAFTA when the deal was concluded a quarter-century ago. He and other trade economists had played a big part in selling the agreement to the American public. "I supported NAFTA because I thought it would pave the way for further trade agreements," my companion explained.

A couple of weeks later, I was at a dinner in Europe, where the speaker was a former finance minister of a eurozone country. The topic was the rise of populism. The former minister had left politics and had strong words about the mistakes he thought the European policy elite had made. "We accuse populists of making promises they cannot keep, but we should turn that criticism back on ourselves," he told us.

Earlier during the dinner, I had discussed what I describe as a trilemma, whereby it is impossible to have national sovereignty, democracy, and hyper-globalization all at once. We must choose two out of three. The former politician spoke passionately: "Populists are at least honest. They are clear about the choice they are making; they want the nation-state, and not hyper-globalization or the European single market. But we told our people they could have all three cakes simultaneously. We made promises we could not deliver."

We will never know whether greater honesty on the part of mainstream politicians and technocrats would have spared us the rise of nativist demagogues like Trump or Marine Le Pen in France. What is clear is that lack of candor in the past has come at a price. It has cost political movements of the center their credibility. And it has made it more difficult for elites to bridge the gap separating them from ordinary people who feel deserted by the establishment.

Many elites are puzzled about why poor or working-class people would vote for someone like Trump. After all, the professed economic policies of Hillary Clinton would in all likelihood have proved more favorable to them. To explain the apparent paradox, they cite these voters' ignorance, irrationality, or racism.

But there is another explanation, one that is fully consistent with rationality and self-interest. When mainstream politicians lose their credibility, it is natural for voters to discount the promises they make. Voters are more likely to be attracted to candidates who have anti-establishment credentials and can safely be expected to depart from prevailing policies.

In the language of economists, centrist politicians face a problem of asymmetric information. They claim to be reformers, but why should voters believe leaders who appear no different from the previous crop of politicians who oversold them the gains from globalization and pooh-poohed their grievances?

In Clinton's case, her close association with the globalist mainstream of the Democratic Party and close ties with the financial sector clearly compounded the problem. Her campaign promised fair trade deals and disavowed support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but was her heart really in it? After all, when she was US Secretary of State, she had strongly backed the TPP.

This is what economists call a pooling equilibrium. Conventional and reformist politicians look alike and hence elicit the same response from much of the electorate. They lose votes to the populists and demagogues whose promises to shake up the system are more credible.

Framing the challenge as a problem of asymmetric information also hints at a solution. A pooling equilibrium can be disrupted if reformist politicians can "signal" to voters his or her "true type."

Signaling has a specific meaning in this context. It means engaging in costly behavior that is sufficiently extreme that a conventional politician would never want to emulate it, yet not so extreme that it would turn the reformer into a populist and defeat the purpose. For someone like Hillary Clinton, assuming her conversion was real, it could have meant announcing she would no longer take a dime from Wall Street or would not sign another trade agreement if elected.

In other words, centrist politicians who want to steal the demagogues' thunder have to tread a very narrow path. If fashioning such a path sounds difficult, it is indicative of the magnitude of the challenge these politicians face. Meeting it will likely require new faces and younger politicians, not tainted with the globalist, market fundamentalist views of their predecessors.

It will also require forthright acknowledgement that pursuing the national interest is what politicians are elected to do. And this implies a willingness to attack many of the establishment's sacred cows – particularly the free rein given to financial institutions, the bias toward austerity policies, the jaundiced view of government's role in the economy, the unhindered movement of capital around the world, and the fetishization of international trade.

To mainstream ears, the rhetoric of such leaders will often sound jarring and extreme. Yet wooing voters back from populist demagogues may require nothing less. These politicians must offer an inclusive, rather than nativist, conception of national identity, and their politics must remain squarely within liberal democratic norms. Everything else should be on the table.



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Economic Update - The Economy from 2017 to 2018 - 01.07.18 [feedly]

Economic Update - The Economy from 2017 to 2018 - 01.07.18
http://economicupdate.podbean.com/e/economic-update-the-economy-from-2017-to-2018-010718/

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Economic Update - Public Service vs Private Profit - 12.24.17 [feedly]

Economic Update - Public Service vs Private Profit - 12.24.17
http://economicupdate.podbean.com/e/economic-update-public-service-vs-private-profit-122417/

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Corporations Are Trying To Sell The GOP’s Narrative On Tax Cuts [feedly]

Corporations Are Trying To Sell The GOP's Narrative On Tax Cuts
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/corporations-are-trying-to-sell-the-gop-s-narrative-on-tax-cuts

Corporations Are Trying To Sell The GOP's Narrative On Tax Cuts

Dean Baker
HuffPost, December 21, 2017

See article on original site

The Republican lawmakers have sold the corporate portion of their tax cuts with the claim that it is actually about helping workers. Their argument is that the corporate tax cut will lead to so much growth that the increase in wages will actually be considerably larger than the tax cut itself. The GOP's story is that lower corporate taxes inevitably mean more investment, which means higher wages for more workers, as well as increased imports and greater productivity.

The vast majority of economists have questioned this basic logic, because in the past, investment has not been highly responsive to after-tax rates of profit. But that didn't stop the Republican-controlled Congress from passing the tax bill. And now, in an effort to build public support for the corporate tax cut, several major corporations have been announcing bonuses and pay raises for workers.

AT&T announced that it would give a one-time bonus of $1,000 to 200,000 workers. Its rival Comcast also promised a $1,000 bonus for 100,000 workers. Fifth Third Bancorp promised a $1,000 bonus for 13,500 employees, while raising its minimum wage to $15 an hour. Wells Fargo said it would raise its minimum wage to $15 an hour, too. Boeing announced a $300 million fund to be spent on training workers, upgrading facilities and matching workers' charitable contributions.

While the employees getting these increases will undoubtedly be pleased, there are a few caveats that must be kept in mind.

First, many of these announcements refer to one-time bonuses, not permanent pay hikes. This is not what the GOP promised. The corporate tax cuts were made permanent on the grounds that companies needed the expectation of higher future after-tax profits in order to justify greater investment today. If the economy is following the course predicted by the Republicans, all these pay increases should be permanent, too.

The second caveat is that some of the increases may have little to do with the tax cut. They can be attributed instead to the tightening labor market, along with higher minimum wage laws. This is especially true of Wells Fargo, which is based in California. The state has already passed into law a $15 minimum wage, which is scheduled to be fully phased in by 2022.

Wells Fargo will be getting there a bit more quickly if it adopts its $15 minimum in 2018. It will also be applying that hike in parts of the country where the federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour still sets the standard, but even in these other areas, a tightening labor market is putting upward pressure on wages. Last summer, Target announced that it would get to a minimum wage of $15 an hour by 2020. That announcement had no obvious connection to any expectation of a corporate tax cut.

Third, but perhaps most significantly, these pay hikes are not especially large relative to the size of the corporate tax cut. Take the example of AT&T: In 2016, the company reported operating income, net of interest, of $19.4 billion. It paid $6.5 billion in taxes, which means an effective tax rate of 33.5 percent.

If it had instead paid the 21 percent tax rate in the new bill, AT&T's savings would be $2.4 billion. The promised bonus for 200,000 employees comes to $200 million, or less than one-tenth the size of the tax cut. This is very much in line with the expectations of tax bill critics, who predicted that the overwhelming majority of the money that corporations now get to keep will end up as higher profits paid out to shareholders, not as permanently higher wages for workers.

But the real question is not the immediate split between wages and payouts to shareholders. The Republican story of tax cut blessings rests on a great surge in investment. We should begin to know if that is going to happen very soon. After all, companies were obviously following the tax cut debate over the last two months and presumably began to make plans as to what they would do if the bill passed.

So if there is going to be the huge upsurge in investment predicted by tax cut supporters, it should be showing up in the data on orders for capital goods almost immediately. And it should be a very large upturn, not just the normal increase to be expected in an economy that has been strengthening for the last eight years.

Until we get those data, we have little basis to judge whether the tax cut will deliver the economic growth and pay increases the Republicans said would happen. This display of corporate beneficence to workers and communities is nice, but it has to be understood as part of a public relations campaign. It tells us nothing about whether the tax cut will ultimately deliver to workers the gains promised by its proponents.



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Big Tax Game Hunting: Employer-Side Payroll Taxes [feedly]

Big Tax Game Hunting: Employer-Side Payroll Taxes
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/big-tax-game-hunting-employer-side-payroll-taxes

Big Tax Game Hunting: Employer-Side Payroll Taxes

Dean Baker
Truthout, January 8, 2018

See article on original site

The Republican Congress gave themselves and their contributors a huge Christmas present with the tax cut bill they pushed through at the end of last year. They decided to cover the costs in part by whacking Democratic states like California and New York, which have relatively high state and local taxes.

The big hit was limiting the amount of state and local taxes that could be deducted. As a result, many upper-middle-class families and rich families will be paying thousands more in taxes each year.

While most of these people probably can and should pay more in taxes, this tax increase was explicitly designed to make it more expensive for progressive states to provide services like health care and education to their people. In this context, it's time to take the gloves off. These states absolutely should look to fight back by finding ways to avoid the tax increase.

Fortunately, there is a way. States can look to replace much of their income tax with an employer-side payroll tax. This will effectively preserve the tax deductibility of the income tax and even extend this benefit to people who don't itemize.

To take a simple case, suppose that a state has a 5 percent flat income tax. A person earning $200,000 a year would pay $10,000 a year in taxes. Under the former system, this $10,000 was fully deductible from federal income taxes, under the theory that this was money they never saw: The state taxed it away.

Now, much of this could be taxable, since the new law limits total deductions for state and local taxes, including property taxes, to $10,000. Depending on how much this person paid in property taxes and other deductible taxes, they may be able to deduct little or none of the money they pay in state income taxes.

Suppose we replace the 5 percent income tax with a 5 percent employer-side payroll tax. The person's employer will now have to pay 5 percent of the worker's salary or $10,000 to the state.

Economists usually think that employer-side payroll taxes are taken pretty much dollar-for-dollar out of workers' wages. The idea is that if an employer is willing to pay $200,000 to hire a worker, they don't especially care whether they are paying that money to the worker or to the government. If the company now has to pay the government a $10,000 payroll tax, they will look to lower the worker's pay to $190,000.

It is worth noting that this adjustment may not apply everywhere and typically is not going to happen immediately. In other words, we wouldn't expect that employers will suddenly cut their workers' pay by 5 percent. Rather, workers might see smaller pay increases than would otherwise be the case so that after two or three years their pay ends up being 5 percent less than otherwise would have been the case. (Actually, since employers just got a big tax cut, it would be nice to see them eat some of this payroll tax and let workers enjoy some real wage gains.)

Anyhow, this matters for federal taxes, because after this adjustment takes place this worker would only have $190,000 of taxable income, rather than $200,000. This worker is left with the same amount of money after paying their state taxes as when they had the income tax, but their federal tax burden will be substantially less. If this person is in the 25 percent tax bracket, this little trick saves them $2,500 a year on their taxes.

This benefit even goes to people who don't itemize. Imagine a more middle-income person who earned $60,000 a year before the employer-side payroll tax was put into effect. They would see their taxable income fall to $57,000. If they are in the 22 percent tax bracket, they will save $660 a year from this switch.

There will be some complications from this policy. Many people work in one state and live in another. We would want to make sure that this means neither that they escape state taxation nor get taxed by two states. This will require some work, but it is a problem that already exists under the current system.

There also is a problem of preserving progressivity. For many reasons it is best to keep a flat payroll tax, but we would want lower-income people to pay a smaller share of their income and higher-income people to pay a larger share. This can be addressed with an Earned Income Tax Credit, which many states already have, and maintaining an income tax for high earners, as well as for income from stocks and other property.

There are undoubtedly other details that have to be worked through and the end product will surely not be perfect. But an employer-side payroll tax is a great way for progressive states to fight back against this Republican tax scam.



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Dean Baker: Diverting Class Warfare Into Generational Warfare: Round LVIII [feedly]

Diverting Class Warfare Into Generational Warfare: Round LVIII
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/diverting-class-warfare-into-generational-warfare-round-lviii


Diverting Class Warfare Into Generational Warfare: Round LVIII

Dean Baker
Truthout, December 26, 2017

See article on original site

With the Republicans having just passed a $1.5 trillion tax cut, the bulk of which goes to the richest one percent, it was inevitable that the generational warriors would come out of the woodwork and resume the attack on Social Security and Medicare. Generational warriors try to divert attention away from how our economy has redistributed income upwards over the last four decades, and convince a large portion of today's workers that their real problems stem from their parents' and grandparents' overly generous retirement benefits.

The opening shot in this new round of generational warfare showed up earlier this month in The Atlantic Magazine. It told the classic story about how seniors are getting too much money back from Social Security and Medicare, the same thing we've been seeing for decades. (There is little expectation of originality if you're in the business of promoting generational warfare.)

In fact, middle-income seniors will get somewhat less back from Social Security than they paid into the system. The cost of Medicare benefits does exceed their taxes, but this is because Americans pay twice as much for our doctors, drugs, medical equipment and other health care items than people in other wealthy countries.

The real problem is high-income people in the health care sector making too much money, not the country being too generous to its seniors. But, the folks promoting generational warfare aren't interested in clamping down on the rich doctors and drug companies; they want us to go after retired school teachers and retail clerks.

Even if Social Security and Medicare were more generous, it would still say almost nothing about generational equity. While the generational warriors would like to have everyone focus on the cost of programs that primarily serve the elderly, paying for these programs has a trivial impact on the well-being of the working population. Policies that affect the distribution of income within generations are vastly more important.

To make this point as simple as possible, suppose that we had a huge increase in payroll taxes to cover projected shortfalls in Social Security and Medicare. Imagine a combined increase of 4.0 percentage points, which would be more than sufficient to leave both programs fully funded throughout their 75-year planning horizon.

dean living standards 2017 12 26

This would undoubtedly be a big hit to working people who have to pay this tax. But, let's compare this to the upward redistribution of income over the last four decades. This has primarily been an upward redistribution within the wage distribution, from ordinary workers to CEOs, Wall Street trader-types, and highly paid professionals like doctors and dentists. In the last decade there has also been a substantial redistribution from wages to profits.

The result of this upward redistribution has carved a large gap between productivity growth and wage growth. The hourly pay of a typical worker has risen by roughly 6.0 percent from 1979 to 2017. Even if we take a broader measure of compensation that includes health care and other benefits, the increase would be less than 20 percent.

By comparison, productivity has risen by more than 60 percent, even after making adjustments for technical factors like differences in deflators and net versus gross measures of output. This means that the upward redistribution over this period has reduced wage growth by more than 40 percentage points. In short, our children are 40 percent poorer than they would otherwise be because of the money going to people like Bill Gates and Steve Zuckerberg rather than ordinary workers.

So by very conservative estimates, a typical person in their twenties or thirties has seen their income reduced by more than 40 percent because of all the money redistributed to those at the top. However, the generational warriors want young people to be upset about the possibility that a bit more than one-tenth of this amount could be used to pay for their parents' and their own Social Security and Medicare. (This upward redistribution is also responsible for about half of the projected shortfall in Social Security, as more income going to profits and high-income workers escapes the Social Security tax.)

It is also important to understand that government action was at the center of this upward redistribution. Without government-granted patent monopolies for Windows and other Microsoft software, Bill Gates would probably still be working for a living.

We spent over $450 billion on prescription drugs in 2017. Without government-granted patent monopolies we would probably have spent less than $80 billion. The difference of $370 billion is equal to an increase of a 5.0 percentage point increase in the Social Security payroll tax. But the generational warriors don't want anyone talking about how much money our children to pay drug companies with government-granted patent monopolies.

In fact, the generational warriors have directly cost our children more than 10 percent of their paychecks with their harebrained fiscal policies. They insisted on a smaller stimulus and austerity following the collapse of the housing bubble in 2007 to2009. This slowed the recovery, reducing both employment and investment, leaving the economy permanently poorer.

But no, we're not supposed to talk about any of the items that will hurt the living standards of our children and grandchildren. The generational warriors insist that our children's problem is their parents' Social Security and Medicare. Their argument doesn't make much sense, but you can get lots of money for saying it, and you can count on getting your stale recycled arguments printed in the nation's leading publications.



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