https://www.urban.org/research/publication/how-might-restricting-immigration-affect-social-securitys-finances
-- via my feedly newsfeed
As the advanced economies' post-2008 recession fades into the distant past, global prospects for 2018 look a little better than in 2017. The shift from fiscal austerity to a more stimulative stance will reduce the need for extreme monetary policies, which almost surely have had adverse effects not just on financial markets but also on the real economy.
Must-Read: Martin Wolf writes a better version of my appeals than I have managed to: Martin Wolf: Inequality is a threat to our democracies: "Between 1980 and 2016, the top 1 per cent captured 28 per cent of the aggregate increase in real incomes in the US, Canada and western Europe, while the bottom 50 per cent captured just 9 per cent of it...
...But these aggregates conceal huge differences: in western Europe, the top 1 per cent captured "only" as much as the bottom 51 per cent. In North America, however, the top 1 per cent captured as much as the bottom 88 per cent....
After agriculture (and the agrarian state) was invented, elites were amazingly successful in extracting all the surplus the economy created. The limit on predation was set by the need to let the producers survive. Remarkably, many desperately poor agrarian societies approached this limit....
In the 20th century... when revolutionary regimes softened (or collapsed) or the exigencies of war faded from memory, quite similar processes to those of the old agrarian states took hold. Vastly wealthy new elites emerged, gained political power, and again used it for their own ends. Those who doubt this should look closely at the politics and economics of the tax bill now going through the US Congress. The implication of this parallel would be that, barring some catastrophic event, we are now on the way back to ever-rising inequality....
The big question,,, is whether the pressures for inequality will go on rising and the willingness to offset them generally decline. On the former, it is quite hard to be optimistic. The market value of the work of relatively unskilled people in high-income countries seems very unlikely to rise. On the latter, one can point, optimistically, to a desire to enjoy some degree of social harmony and the material abundance of modern economies, as reasons to believe the wealthy might be prepared to share their abundance.... [But] elites may become more determined to seize whatever they can for themselves. If so, that would augur badly, not just for social peace, but even for the survival of the stable universal-suffrage democracies that emerged in today's high-income countries in the 19th and 20th centuries... "plutocratic populism"....
Mr Scheidel suggests that inequality is sure to rise. We must prove him wrong. If we fail to do so, soaring inequality might slay democracy, too, in the end.
First, I give a primal scream over at WaPo re the tax plan that may well be law by the time you read this.
Next, there's been a lot of writing, including my own, on the question of whether the plan further incentivizes or discourages offshoring of investment and jobs. I've thought so, for a number of reasons, and I'm increasingly convinced that's the case.
However, the writing on this is often quite technical and dense. So I was glad to see this WaPo piece break it down quite simply. Here are some of the main factors that I expect to juice the incentive of to offshore production, with my bold added.
First, a corporation would pay that global minimum tax only on profit above a "routine" rate of return on the tangible assets — such as factories — it has overseas. So the more equipment a corporation has in other countries, the more tax-free income it can earn. The legislation thus offers corporations "a perverse incentive" to shift assembly lines abroad, said Steve Rosenthal of the Tax Policy Center.
Second, the bill sets the "routine" return at 10 percent — far more generous than would typically be the case. Such allowances are normally fixed a couple of percentage points above risk-free Treasury yields, which are currently around 2.4 percent.
As a result, a U.S. corporation that builds a $100 million plant in another country and makes a foreign profit of $20 million would pay roughly $1 million in tax versus $4 million on the same profit if earned in the United States, said Rosenthal, who has been a tax lawyer for 25 years and drafted tax legislation as a staffer for the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Finally, the minimum levy would be calculated on a global average rather than for individual countries where a corporation operates. So a U.S. multinational could lower its tax bill by shifting profit from U.S. locations to tax havens such as the Cayman Islands.
Simply put, the more factories you build abroad, the more you can cut your tax bill. They set the non-taxable foreign profits high enough that even with the lower rate at home, there's still a big incentive to produce abroad. And as long as you book some of your profits in non-tax-haven countries, you can send the rest of them to bask on the beach in the Caymen's.
For a deeper dive, see Gene Sperling, Brad Setser, Kim Clausing.
Why is the other side–the folks who claim the plan will increase onshoring/bringing foreign earnings back home–wrong?
First, some profit repatriation is sure to occur, though there's no reason to expect it to flow into investment and jobs here as opposed to share buybacks and dividend payouts. That's the track record, and its likelihood is significantly boosted in this repatriation round as firms are already sitting on more than enough capital to invest and expand if that's what they wanted to do.
But the main analytic mistake I hear folks making is the use of the wrong delta. That is, they're looking at the change in the statutory corporate rate–35-21 percent, a big 14 point drop–and keying their predicted response off that. But the true delta, especially for multinationals, many of whom are already paying effective rates well below 21%, is a lot smaller than that. And, as Setser and others stress, the fact that they can still play all the transfer pricing games they've long perfected–booking income in low-tax havens; booking deductible costs in higher tax places–along with the three points above from the WaPo piece, suggest more, not less, offshoring.
Trust me, I and others will be keeping a very close eye on this.
"Their disdain for ordinary working Americans as opposed to investors, heirs, and business owners runs so deep that they can't contain it":
Republicans Despise the Working Class, by Paul Krugman, NY Times: You can always count on Republicans to do two things: try to cut taxes for the rich and try to weaken the safety net for the poor and the middle class. ...
But ... something has been added to the mix. ...Republicans ... don't treat all Americans with a given income the same. Instead, their bill ... hugely privileges owners, whether of businesses or of financial assets, over those who simply work for a living. ...
The nonpartisan Tax Policy Center has evaluated the Senate bill, which the final bill is expected to resemble. It finds that the bill would reduce taxes on business owners, on average, about three times as much as it would reduce taxes on those whose primary source of income is wages or salaries. For highly paid workers, the gap would be even wider, as much as 10 to one. ...
If this sounds like bad policy, that's because it is. More than that, it opens the doors to an orgy of tax avoidance. ... We're pitting hastily devised legislation, drafted without hearings over the course of just a few days, against the cleverest lawyers and accountants money can buy. Which side do you think will win?
As a result, it's a good guess that the bill will increase the budget deficit far more than currently projected. ...
So why are they doing this? After all, the tax bill appears to be terrible politics as well as terrible policy. ... The ... public overwhelmingly disapproves of the current Republican plan.
But Republicans don't seem able to help themselves: Their disdain for ordinary working Americans as opposed to investors, heirs, and business owners runs so deep that they can't contain it.
When I realized the extent to which G.O.P. tax plans were going to favor business owners over ordinary workers, I found myself remembering what happened in 2012, when Eric Cantor — then the House majority leader — tried to celebrate Labor Day. He put out a tweet for the occasion that somehow failed to mention workers at all, instead praising those who have "built a business and earned their own success." ...
Cantor, a creature of the G.O.P. establishment if ever there was one, had so little respect for working Americans that he forgot to include them in a Labor Day message.
And now that disdain has been translated into legislation, in the form of a bill that treats anyone who works for someone else — that is, the vast majority of Americans — as a second-class citizen.
On Friday, the Trump administration's appointees to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) once again made it more difficult for workers to join together and form a union, by overturning the Board's standard for determining an appropriate bargaining unit, as established in 2011's Specialty Healthcare case.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, private-sector workers who wish to be represented by a union can petition the NRLB to hold a union election. Federal labor law gives the Board wide discretion to determine the appropriate "bargaining unit," the term for the group of workers that will vote in the election and will be represented by the union. In Specialty Healthcare, the Board established that once an appropriate unit of employees is identified based on the employees' "community of interest," an employer can only petition to add more employees to the unit if the employer can show the additional employees share an "overwhelming community of interest" with the workers who are already in the bargaining unit. This standard is important to prevent employers from attempting to manipulate or gerrymander the bargaining units in order to thwart their employees' union elections. The NLRB's standard for determining an appropriate bargaining unit in Specialty Healthcare has been unanimously upheld in all seven U.S. Courts of Appeals in which it has been challenged.
Since the NLRB issued its decision in Specialty Healthcare corporate special interests have assailed it as inviting the proliferation of "micro" units that will allow unions to form small pockets of unionized employees among an employer's workforces. However, data on the median size of bargaining units disproves the argument that the standard would lead to the proliferation of so-called "micro-units"—the median size of bargaining units has hardly changed since the Board issued its Specialty Healthcare decision in 2011.
Why then were the Chamber of Commerce and other corporate interest groups committed to doing away with the Specialty Healthcare standard? They simply want to make it easier for employers defeat an organizing campaign, by manipulating who is in a bargaining unit. By overturning this rule, the Trump administration has once again shown that it wants to make it harder for workers to organize and join unions.
Yesterday, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) made it more difficult for millions of workers to join together and form a union, by overturning its joint-employer standardestablished in 2015's Browning-Ferris Industries case.
It is hard in today's economy to bargain for higher wages or better working conditions, especially if your direct employer doesn't really make those decisions. Under President Obama, the NLRB tried to make it easier for employees by holding each employer responsible when they co-determine what a worker's wages, hours, and working conditions will be. In yesterday's decision, the Trump NLRB decided to make it harder than ever.
The NLRB's latest decision is bad law resulting from a bad process. Ordinarily, before overturning major precedent, the Board invites the public to comment by filing amicus briefs. However, this time, they did not, and instead announced this reversal with no warning or notice. President Trump's appointees to the Board were so keen to respond to the demands of the franchising industry, which wants a rule that franchisors like McDonald's aren't responsible unless they exercise direct control over a franchisee's labor relations, that they reversed the joint-employer standard in a case where the standard wasn't even an issue, and where the public had no opportunity to weigh in.
What is the joint employer standard? When two or more businesses co-determine or share control over a worker's terms of employment (such as pay, schedules, and job duties), then both businesses may be considered to be employers of that worker, or "joint employers." Consider a common employment arrangement in which a staffing agency hires a worker and assigns her to work at another firm. The staffing agency determines some of the worker's terms of employment (such as her hiring and wages), but the other firm directs her daily tasks and sets her schedule and hours. Because both entities co-determine and share control over the terms and conditions of her employment, both businesses may be found to be joint employers. As joint employers, both companies are responsible for bargaining with the employees under the NLRA.
By weakening its joint-employer standard, the NLRB has made it nearly impossible for working people caught in contracted-out, staffing, or other alternative working arrangements to join together and negotiate for better pay and working conditions. If these workers wanted to negotiate over their work schedules, safety precautions on the job, or pay rates, the staffing agency could simply shrug their shoulders, telling the workers that it is the larger firm that owns and operates the business that determines all of those rules. But if the workers tried to negotiate with the larger firm (where they actually give their labor every day) the larger firm could avoid the bargaining table as well, by claiming that the staffing agency is the workers' only employer.
Even though both the staffing agency and the larger firm jointly determine the workers' conditions of employment, without a strong joint-employer standard, the workers could find themselves stuck in the middle, without any employer to bargain with or address their concerns at work.
Moreover, the only liability employers face under the NLRA is the requirement that they respect their workers' rights to organize, join a union, and negotiate over pay and working conditions. The act does not provide for monetary penalties against an employer. At most, the NLRB can order an employer to bargain with workers, to reinstate an employee fired in violation of the act, to pay back wages to a wrongfully fired employee (reduced by the employee's interim earnings), or to cease and desist from engaging in conduct that violates the act. All this weakened joint-employer standard does is keep the smaller employer on the hook for these labor law violations, and allow the larger company, including franchisors, to escape liability and avoid having to negotiate with workers' unions.
Congress has also tried to further weaken joint-employer standards by introducing the so-called "Save Local Business Act," which would roll back the joint employer standard under both the NLRA and the Fair Labor Standards Act. But this law would do nothing to protect small businesses. Instead, the bill would ensure that small businesses are left with sole responsibility for business practices often mandated by large corporations like franchisors. It would establish a weak joint employer standard that lets big corporations avoid liability for labor and employment violations and leaves small businesses on the hook.
Weakening the joint employer standard hurts working people. By weakening the joint-employer standard, the Trump appointees to the NLRB have given in to the corporate lobbyists seeking to keep the cost of labor low by eroding workers' rights to organize and bargain collectively—letting employers avoid the bargaining table by contracting for services rather than hiring employees directly. Firms will be able to retain influence over the terms and conditions of employment while evading the obligation to bargain with employees under the NLRA.
Since contingent and alternative workforce arrangements (reliance on temporary staffing firms, contractors, and subcontractors to outsource services traditionally performed by in-house workers) have grown dramatically, this change in the law will undercut the ability for millions of workers to form and join unions. The most rigorous recent estimates find that the share of workers engaged in alternative work arrangements was 15.8 percent in late 2015. In today's labor market, that translates into roughly 24 million workers.
The majority of American workers would vote for union representation if they could. However, the intensity with which employers have opposed organizing efforts, and the continuing tilt of the legal and policy playing field against workers seeking to bargain collectively, has led to a decline in union membership. Yesterday's decision makes it clear the Trump board will work to further rig the system against working people.
NEW YORK – A year ago, I predicted that the most distinctive aspect of 2017 would be uncertainty, fueled by, among other things, Donald Trump's election as president in the United States and the United Kingdom's vote to leave the European Union. The only certainty, it seemed, was uncertainty – and that the future could become a very messy place.
Throughout 2017, Trump proved every bit as bombastic and erratic as expected. Anyone who paid attention only to his incessant tweets might think the US was teetering between a trade war and a nuclear war. Trump would insult Sweden one day, Australia the next, and then the EU – and then support neo-Nazis at home. And the members of his plutocratic cabinet rival one another in terms of conflicts of interest, incompetence, and sheer nastiness.
There have been some worrisome regulatory rollbacks, especially concerning environmental protection, not to mention the many hate-driven acts that Trump's bigotry may have encouraged. But, so far, the combination of America's institutions and the Trump administration's incompetence has meant that there is (fortunately) a yawning gap between the president's ugly campaign rhetoric and what he has actually accomplished.
Most important for the global economy, there has been no trade war. Using the exchange rate between Mexico and the US as a barometer, fears for the future of the North American Free Trade Agreement have largely subsided, even as trade negotiations have stalled. Yet the Trump roller-coaster never ends: 2018 may be the year that the hand grenade Trump has thrown into the global economic order finally explodes.
Some point to the US stock market's record highs as evidence of some Trumpian economic miracle. I take it partly as evidence that the decade-long recovery from the Great Recession is finally taking hold. Every downturn – even the deepest – eventually comes to an end; and Trump was lucky to be in the White House to benefit from the work of his predecessor in setting the scene.
But I also take it as evidence of market participants' short-sightedness, owing to their exuberance at potential tax cuts and the money that might once again flow to Wall Street, if only the world of 2007 could be restored. They ignore what followed in 2008 – the worst downturn in three quarters of a century – and the deficits and growing inequality that previous tax cuts for the super rich have brought.
They give short shrift to the deglobalization risks posed by Trump's protectionism. And they don't see that if Trump's debt-financed tax cuts are enacted, the Fed will raise interest rates, possibly setting off a market correction.
In other words, the market is once again showing its proclivity for short-term thinking and pure greed. None of this bodes well for America's long-term economic performance; and it suggests that while 2018 is likely to be a better year than 2017, there are large risks on the horizon.
It's a similar picture in Europe. The UK's decision to leave the EU didn't have the jolting economic effect that those who opposed it anticipated, largely because of the pound's depreciation. But it has become increasingly clear that Prime Minister Theresa May's government has no clear view about how to manage the UK's withdrawal, or about the country's post-Brexit relationship with the EU.
There are two further potential hazards for Europe. One risk is that heavily indebted countries, such as Italy, will find it difficult to avoid crisis once interest rates return to more normal levels, as they likely will. After all, is it really possible for the eurozone to maintain record-low rates for the foreseeable future, even as US rates increase?
Hungary and Poland represent a more existential threat to Europe. The EU is more than just an economic arrangement of convenience. It represents a union of countries with a commitment to basic democratic values – the very values that the Hungarian and Polish governments now disparage.
The EU is being tested, and there are well-founded fears that it will be found wanting. The effects of these political tests on next year's economic performance may be small, but the long-term risks are clear and daunting.
On the other side of the world, Chinese President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative is changing Eurasia's economic geography, putting China at the center, and providing an important stimulus for region-wide growth. But China must confront many challenges as it undergoes a complicated transition from export-led growth to growth driven by domestic demand, from a manufacturing economy to a service-based economy, and from a rural to an urban society. The population is aging rapidly. Economic growth has slowed markedly. Inequality is by some accounts almost as severe as in the US. And environmental degradation poses a growing threat to human health and welfare.
China's unprecedented economic success over the past four decades has been partly based on a system whereby broad consultation and consensus-building within the Communist Party and the Chinese state underpinned each set of reforms. Will Xi's concentration of power work well in an economy that has grown in size and complexity? A system of centralized command and control is incompatible with a financial market as large and complex as China's; at the same time, we know where insufficiently regulated financial markets can lead an economy.
But these are all essentially long-term risks. For 2018, the safe bet is that China will manage its way, albeit with slightly slower growth.
In short, as the advanced economies' post-2008 recession fades into the distant past, global prospects for 2018 look a little better than in 2017. The shift from fiscal austerity to a more stimulative stance in both Europe and the US will reduce the need for extreme monetary policies, which almost surely have had distortionary effects not just on financial markets but also on the real economy.
But the concentration of power in China, the eurozone's failure (thus far) to reform its flawed structure, and, most important, Trump's contempt for the international rule of law, his rejection of US global leadership, and the damage he has caused to democracy's standing all pose deeper risks. Indeed, they threaten not just to hurt the global economy, but also to slow what, until recently, had seemed to be an inevitable march toward greater democracy worldwide. We should not let short-run success lull us into complacency.