Wednesday, April 12, 2017

Larry Summers: The most important economic challenge that China poses

The most important economic challenge that China poses


Larry Summers (via WAPO)


President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping have now completed their first summit. Observers on both sides seem to be relieved. If no diplomatic breakthroughs on major issues were achieved, it is also the case that there were no outward displays of truculence from either side. Neither high hopes nor great fears have been realized.

This leaves the question of where economic relations between the United States and China are going and where the United States should want to take them. As important as the resolution of any specific issue is the definition of the challenges that will be the focus of economic diplomacy going forward. Having recently returned from China, where I had a chance to meet a number of senior officials, I have become convinced that the issues that preoccupy many Americans are either invalid or of secondary importance. Meanwhile, the most important economic challenge posed by China is receiving far less attention than it deserves.

Discussions by the United States of China's alleged currency ma­nipu­la­tion in the economic realm are what discussions of changing the one-China policy are in the geopolitical realm — unconstructive at best and possibly dangerous. While there is a case for the proposition that China manipulated its currency in an unreasonable way during the decade after 2005, by no stretch of any imagination is China today manipulating the renminbi downward for competitive advantage. Indeed, in terms of the volumes of reserves expended and the extent of capital controls imposed, few countries in recent years have done as much to try to prop up their currency as has China.



More broadly, the United States' economic future is shaped much more by policy choices made in Washington than those made in Beijing. To the extent that China trade has caused disruption in the United States, it is the result of China's remarkable growth and increase in capacity to produce, not unfair trade policies.

So focusing on China's trade deficit with the United States is largely misguided. Yes, China subsidizes various exports to the rest of the world in a number of ways. But if the United States succeeds in stopping the subsidies or blocking the subsidized products, the result will be that companies will shift production to Vietnam and other low-wage countries—not create good jobs in the United States. Likewise, reducing Chinese trade barriers to products produced by American companies will indeed help these companies, but only a small part of the extra production will take place in the United States. American firms have valid complaints about requirements that they share intellectual property with Chinese partners when they invest in China, but if such concerns were resolved the result would likely be more outsourcing of production to China, not less.

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If currency issues are invalid and commercial diplomacy is unlikely to have much positive effect on the U.S. economy, what should be the focus of economic policy with respect to China?

It is difficult to overestimate the extent to which China is seeking to project soft power around the world by economic means. Xi's speech in Davos , Switzerland, in January, quoting Abraham Lincoln and laying out a Chinese vision for the global economic system at a time when the United States is turning inward, was the rhetorical edge of a concerted strategy.

Of course there is Xi's "One Belt, One Road" initiative, which envisions infrastructure investment and foreign aid to connect China and Europe. In a little-noticed development, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a Chinese-sponsored competitor to the World Bank, has announced that it will invest all over the world. Already, Chinese investment in Latin America and Africa significantly exceeds that by the United States, the World Bank and relevant regional development banks. And China will soon be the leading exporter of clean energy technologies.

This investment will, over time, secure Chinese access to raw materials, allow Chinese firms to gain economies of scale and help China to win friends. The United States has chosen not to join the Asian infrastructure bank, to undermine rather than lead global cooperation on climate change and, if the president gets his way, to sharply cut back foreign aid. In doing so, it is accelerating a loss of its preeminence in the global competition for prestige and influence. Perhaps this development is inevitable, but it is a mistake to accelerate it.

A truly strategic U.S.-China economic dialogue would revolve around the objectives of global cooperation and the respective roles of the two powers. It is important that such a dialogue start soon, but this move will require the United States to focus less on specific near-term business interests and more on what historians will remember a century from now.

--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV

The Winners and Losers Radio Show
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Links for 04-12-17 [feedly]

Enlighten Radio:Cordelia Gaffar, Bill Fletcher, Crazy Talk, Resistance Tak, and Food Talk -- Wednesday on Enlighten Radio

John Case has sent you a link to a blog:



Blog: Enlighten Radio
Post: Cordelia Gaffar, Bill Fletcher, Crazy Talk, Resistance Tak, and Food Talk -- Wednesday on Enlighten Radio
Link: http://www.enlightenradio.org/2017/04/cordelia-gaffar-bill-fletcher-crazy.html

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Tuesday, April 11, 2017

Enlighten Radio:Exxon President Goes to War on Best of the Left

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Blog: Enlighten Radio
Post: Exxon President Goes to War on Best of the Left
Link: http://www.enlightenradio.org/2017/04/exxon-president-goes-to-war-on-best-of.html

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Sunday, April 9, 2017

NYTimes: Boom or Bust: Stark Partisan Divide on How Consumers View Economy

Boom or Bust: Stark Partisan Divide on How Consumers View Economy https://nyti.ms/2nW9PzZ

Bernstein: Jobs report for March: A tale of two surveys (but not of a jobs slump) [feedly]

Jobs report for March: A tale of two surveys (but not of a jobs slump)
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/jobs-report-for-march-a-tale-of-two-surveys-but-not-of-a-jobs-slump/

The monthly survey of workplaces revealed a slower pace of job growth in March, as payrolls grew by 98,000, the lowest gain since last May, and down from the pace in recent months, while downward revisions reduced payroll gains from the first two months in the quarter by 38,000. The survey of households, however, told a more robust story of the March labor market, with unemployment down to a cyclical low of 4.5%, and for the right reasons: job seekers finding work, not giving up and leaving the labor market.

That's the lowest unemployment rate since May 2007, while the underemployment rate–a more encompassing measure of labor demand important gauge–fell from 9.2% in February to 8.9% in March, its lowest rate since December 2007.

While some news sources will be tempted by this below-trend payroll number to declare a slump in employment growth–"if it bleeds, it leads"–that would be a mistake. One month does not a new trend make. The monthly confidence interval for change in payrolls is 120,000 (meaning that there is a 90 percent chance that the true change in payroll employment for the month of March lies between about -20,000 and 220,000; that's the statistical noise I'm always going on about), the underlying trend remains solid, weather effects may have been in play in March, and the household survey looks strong.

It is not unusual for the two surveys released on jobs day to tell somewhat different stories, and the key point to keep in mind re these monthly numbers is that they are noisy. Therefore, we want to be careful not to over-interpret one month's results. Instead, we should look at the underlying trends.

Our monthly smoother helps amp up the payroll signal by averaging out some of the noise in the monthly data, taking averages of monthly payroll gains over 3-, 6-, and 12-month spans. Over the past three months, payrolls added 178,000 jobs on average, close to the underlying trend for the past year of 182,000. Given the size and growth of the US labor force, these averages represent a solid pace of job gains that is clearly and steadily moving the job market to full employment. It is, however, a slower pace of monthly payroll gains compared to earlier in the recovery (a year ago, the 12-month average was 229,000).

Source: BLS, Author's calculations

Still, today's lower-than-average (and lower-than-expected) payroll number does not alter my assessment that the job market is closing in on full employment. Of course, if future months show a clear deceleration of the ongoing trend–say, a downshift from close to 200K/month to 100K/month, this would signal a decline in hiring activity and could (I'd argue "should") slow the Federal Reserve's plans to raise rates.

Meanwhile, tighter job markets provide wage earners with more bargaining power. On average, as the next figure shows, average wage growth has accelerated in recent months, from around 2% to a pace north of 2.5% (March came in at 2.7%). A few caveats, however, are notable. First, inflation has also picked up in recent months, partially due to normalizing energy costs, and was growing most recently at about the pace of hourly wage growth, implying flat real hourly earnings. Also, on an annualized quarterly basis, wage growth was 2.4% in 2017q1, below its recent trend. Given data volatility, this doesn't yet imply a slowdown, but we'll track this going forward.

Source: BLS, Author's calculations

A few other notable results:

–The employment rate for prime-age workers, a closely watched measure to see if the labor market recovery is pulling working-age persons into the job market, was 78.5% last month, up half-a-percentage point over the past year, and another sign of progress. These 25-54 year-old workers have clawed back 3.7 out of 5.5 percentage points, or two-thirds, of their losses since the big downturn. It is thus extremely important to heavily discount reports that such workers are out of the reach of a strong labor market. Some surely are, but many others are clearly not. Be very careful, my friends, not to conflate the cyclical with the structural!

–The decline in the underemployment rate reflects the monthly tick down of about 150,000 involuntary part-timers. Over the past year, that measure of slack is down by about half-a-million workers (6.1 million last March to 5.6 million this March). The figure shows a steady, improving trend in the number and employment share of part-timers who'd prefer full-time work, though the series is not quite back to pre-recession levels.

Source: BLS, Author's calculations

–Fans of seasonal adjustment were concerned that the March payroll number would be biased down due to weather effects, specifically unseasonably warm weather that raised February's job gains and, conversely, a winter storm in March that blanketed parts of the Northeast and Midwest during the week in which the job surveys are in the field. But BLS data on absences from work due to weather show a huge spike in full-timers who had to work part-time due to weather (the largest on record for March with data back to the 1970s), but not much of one for people not at work at all. Still, the part-time issue could have dampened March's payroll count, yet another reason not to worry yet about slumping job creation.

In sum, moderate, steady GDP growth amidst low productivity continues to equal solid job creation that is squeezing slack out of the labor market. The overall pace of job gains has probably slowed a bit but that is not unusual as we move towards full employment and face utilization constraints. However, there's still room to run on the supply side of the job market, as the prime-age employment rates and involuntary-part-time series reveal. Also, it will be very important for the Fed to carefully track the wage growth point I made above regarding the slower quarterly rate. If that sticks, they'll want to be very careful not to shut down wage gains just as they're catching on.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Tim Taylor: Six Patterns Behind the US Productivity Slowdown

Six Patterns Behind the US Productivity Slowdown

Tim Taylor via the conversable economist

A couple of recent reports review the evidence about the productivity slowdown. Gustavo Adler, Romain Duval, Davide Furceri, Sinem Kiliç Çelik, Ksenia Koloskova, and Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro have written an IMF Discussion Note called "Gone with the Headwinds: Global
Productivity (April 2017, SDN/17/04). Over at the McKinsey Global Institute, James Manyika, Jaana Remes, Jan Mischke, and Mekala Krishnan have written a Discussion Paper on  "The Productivity Puzzle: A Closer Look at the United States" (March 2017). Both reports offer an overview of the productivity slowdown, along with discussion of possible causes and policy recommendations.

At least for me, the underlying causes of the productivity slowdown, which has now been going on for more than a decade, are not yet clear. Thus, my approach is to compile a bunch of patterns and try turn them over in my mind, trying to figure out a sensible way in which they fit together. In a similar spirit, the authors of the McKinsey report write:

"We identify six characteristics that provide further insight into the productivity growth slowdown: declining value-added growth, a shift in employment toward lower productivity sectors, a relatively small number of sectors experiencing jumps in productivity, weak capital intensity growth across all types of capital, uneven rates of digitization across sectors (especially the large and often relatively low-productivity ones), and slowing business dynamism."

Here's some additional description of these six factors: of course, the McKinsey report has more detail.

1) Productivity is output divided by a measure of inputs, like labor hours worked. Changes in the growth rate of productivity can be driven by either the numerator or the denominator. The most recent productivity slowdown seems to be a numerator problem.

"Looking closely at productivity growth, we find differences in the role the denominator, hours-worked growth, and the numerator, value-added growth, have played in recent years. For example, the period between 1995 and 2004 is considered an era of high growth with annual productivity growth averaging about 3 percent. However, we have found two  distinct periods within this decade. The first is from 1995 to 2000 when productivity growth spiked, driven primarily by an increase in growth of real value-added output. Value-added output growth for the total economy, which averaged 3.4 percent annually from 1991 to 1995, increased to 4 percent from 1995 to 2000, a period of booming consumer and IT spending. As a result, productivity growth increased from 1.4 percent to 2.0 percent. The subsequent era of 2001 to 2004 was a period of continued high productivity growth, averaging 3.6 percent a year. However, the underlying driver was a decline in hours-worked growth, which fell to negative 0.2 percent partly as a result of the tech crash and the restructuring wave in manufacturing of the early 2000s. So while these two periods are typically treated as a single period of booming productivity growth, we prefer to separate them as the implications for investment, industry evolution, and job expansion are very different. ...

"What is striking about productivity growth after the recession ended in 2009 has been low value-added output growth compared with past periods.32 Growth in real value-added output has declined to 2.2 percent between 2009 and 2014. This compares to growth of roughly 3 to 4 percent in prior time periods."

2) A shift of the economy to sectors with slower productivity growth "reduced productivity growth by 0.2 percentage points every year for the private business sector between 1987 and 2014, as employment transitioned from high-productivity manufacturing sectors to lower-productivity sectors such as health care and administrative and support services."

Of course, this raises a question about how well the "output" of these service sector jobs are measured: for example, perhaps certain jobs in health care care do more to improve health than they did 30 years ago, but that benefit is probably not well-captured in the economic statistics.

3) The productivity slowdown has been a time with relatively few sectors showing a rising level of productivity growth--and most of those seem to be in energy extraction.

"The productivity boom of 1995 to 2000 was characterized by an exceptional combination of sectors experiencing a productivity acceleration: large employment sectors such as retail and wholesale experienced accelerating productivity at the same time as rapid productivity growth was occurring in sectors such as computer and electronic products. ...  During the  boom, the number of accelerating sectors for many years was above 20 out of 60 sectors analyzed, in some years making up as much as 30 to 40 percent of total hours worked. In 1995, for example, these included sectors such as retail trade, wholesale trade, finance, and computer and electronic products. Recently only six sectors recorded significant productivity growth acceleration, and those sectors made up only 2 to 7 percent of total  hours worked, and 5 to 8 percent of value added. These sectors included oil and gas extraction, petroleum and coal manufacturing, and transportation."

4) The slowdown of productivity growth has been accompanied by a slowdown in investment.

"In the period from 1995 to 2004, there was a boom in capital intensity growth across most assets, particularly in information capital and software. This period is associated with high labor productivity growth. What is striking is that the most recent period, 2009 to 2014, coincides with both exceptionally low productivity growth and low capital intensity growth across all types of assets. Thus, this period has not only been exceptional due to the lack of accelerating productivity sectors, but the low pace at which capital services per hour worked has been rising, across all forms of capital."

A slowdown across all types of suggests that the underlying causes are not about a certain kind of technology or industry, but rather are broader in scope.

5) Many low-productivity sectors also lag in digitalization, which tends to be associated with higher productivity.

"[W]e calculate that the US economy is realizing only about 18 percent of its digital potential with large sectors lagging behind. Our use of the term digitization and our measurement of it encompasses: the digitization of assets, including infrastructure, connected machines, data, and data platforms; the digitization of operations, including processes, payments and business models, customer and supply chain interactions; and the digitization of the workforce, including worker use of digital tools, digitally-skilled workers, and new digital jobs and roles. While the information and communication technology, media, financial services, and professional services sectors are rapidly digitizing, other sectors such as education and health care are not ... Indeed, the largest sectors by output and employment, and often those with relatively low productivity growth, tend to be the ones lagging in digitization.  ... Frontier sectors today have four times the level of digitization of frontier sectors 20 years ago. Yet the rest of the economy continues to significantly lag behind even historical digitization levels of frontier sectors; their level of digitization is only 60 percent that of leading sectors 20 years ago."


6) The US economy seems to be less dynamic, in the sense that it is doing a less good job of reallocating jobs and capital away from slower-growth sectors and toward higher-growth sectors.

"Productivity growth can increase if the share of employment and output in more productive firms increases even while employment and output fall in less productive firms. However, Decker and coauthors find that such a reallocation is happening to a lesser extent in the post-2000 period, particularly in the high-tech sector, with implications for overall productivity growth. Beyond the decline in overall dynamism, there is evidence that the gaps between high- and low-performing companies are widening. Analysis by the OECD finds growing divergence in productivity levels of global frontier firms relative to others since 2001, which the OECD interprets as a symptom of slower productivity diffusion. According to their analysis, frontier firms have continued to raise their productivity levels. This suggests it is a lack of diffusion of best practices that is driving the slowdown in productivity growth, rather than a lack of innovation of the productivity frontier.  ...

"Likewise, digital trends vary widely across firms. Companies are using digital tools to raise the bar in operational efficiency, customer engagement, innovation, and workforce productivity. But they vary widely in how they are pursuing such opportunities, which could be driving large differences in productivity across firms. A McKinsey survey of 150 large companies evaluated respondents on 18 practices related to digital strategy, capabilities, and culture to arrive at a metric called the "Digital Quotient". The distribution curve of this quotient reveals a striking gap between the digital leaders and laggards. Putting the above findings together would suggest that while the productivity gap between firms has been widening, the reallocation of labor from less to more productive firms has waned."

--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV

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