Saturday, March 11, 2017

Fwd: Malignant



Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: Stewart Acuff <acuff.stewart@gmail.com>
Date: March 11, 2017 at 11:33:48 AM EST
To: Stewart <acuff.stewart@gmail.com>
Subject: Malignant

The malignant, malicious presidency didn't just begin

It's roots are not just in our lifetime

It is an ongoing struggle for what America is and when

Our America will celebrate real freedom and justice with a chime

From an eternal bell

That will loudly sound joy well

For as long as our time

Is to be.

Let us remember those who've already fought and who could see

Frederick Douglass and a Garrison who challenged a nations conscience

And Ol Abe who wandered alone through deaths awful dance

Let us remember Harriet Tubman singing out in the night--Keep On

And Susan Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton

Let us remember A. Philip Randolph and the always struggle of Black men for dignity

And Harvey Milk and the struggle still of gay and trans folks for equality

And please don't let us forget Joe Hill and Cesar Chavez and Dr. King (perhaps the greatest)

Who all remind us now

America is as just as our struggle is strong

And as free as we keep our vow

Freedom from Tyranny

Justice for All.



Sent from my iPhone

Daniel Little: Divided ... [feedly]

Divided ...
http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2017/02/divided.html

Why is part of the American electoral system so susceptible to right-wing populist appeals, often highlighting themes of racism and intergroup hostility? Doug McAdam and Karina Kloos address the causes of the radical swing to the right of the Republican Party in Deeply Divided: Racial Politics and Social Movements in Postwar America. Here is the key issue the book attempts to resolve:
If the general public does not share the extreme partisan views of the political elites and party activists and, more to the point, is increasingly dismayed and disgusted by the resulting polarization and institutional paralysis that have followed from those views, how has the GOP managed to move so far to the right without being punished by the voters? Our answer — already telegraphed above — is that over the past half century social movements have increasingly challenged, and occasionally supplanted, parties as the dominant mobilizing logic and organizing vehicle of American politics. (Kindle location 303-307). 
Not surprisingly given McAdam's long history in the social movements research field, McAdam and Kloos argue that social movements are commonly relevant to electoral and party politics; they suggest that the period of relatively high consensus around the moderate middle (1940s and 1950s) was exceptional precisely because of the absence of powerful social movements during these decades. But during more typical periods, national electoral politics are influenced by both political parties and diffuse social movements; and the dynamics of the latter can have complex effects on the behavior and orientation of the former.

McAdam and Kloos argue that the social movements associated with the 1960s Civil Rights movement and its opposite, the white segregationist movement, put in motion a political dynamic that pushed each party off of its "median voter" platform, with the Republican Party moving increasingly in the direction of white supremacy and preservation of white privilege.
More accurately, it is the story of not one, but two parallel movements, the revitalized civil rights movement of the early 1960s and the powerful segregationist countermovement, that quickly developed in response to the black freedom struggle. (lc 1220)
The dynamics of grassroots social movements are thought to explain how positions that are unpalatable to the broad electorate nonetheless become committed platforms within the parties. (This also seems to explain the GOP preoccupation with "voter fraud" and their efforts at restricting voting rights for people of color.) The primary processes adopted by the parties after the 1968 Democratic convention gave a powerful advantage to highly committed social activists, even if they do not represent the majority of a party's members.

This historical analysis gives an indication of an even more basic political factor in American politics: the polarizing issues that surround race and the struggle for racial equality. The Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was a widespread mobilization of large numbers of ordinary citizens in support of equal rights for African Americans in terms of voting, residence, occupation, and education. Leaders like Ralph Abernathy or Julian Bond (or of course, Martin Luther King, Jr.) and organizations like the NAACP and SNCC were effective in their call to action for ordinary people to take visible actions to support greater equality through legal means. This movement had some success in pushing the Democratic Party towards greater advocacy of reforms promoting racial justice. And the political backlash against the Democratic Party following the enactment of civil rights legislation spawned its own grassroots mobilizations of people and associations who objected to these forms of racial progress. And lest we imagine that progressive steps in the struggle for racial justice largely derived from the Democratic Party, the authors remind us that a great deal of the support that civil rights legislation came from liberal Republicans:
The textbook account also errs in typically depicting the Democrats as the movement's staunch ally. What is missed in this account is the lengths to which all Democratic presidents—at least from Roosevelt to Kennedy—went to placate the white South and accommodate the party's Dixiecrat wing. (kl 411)
The important point is that as long as the progressive racial views of northern liberal Democrats were held in check and tacit support for Jim Crow remained the guiding—if unofficial—policy of the party, the South remained solidly and reliably in the Democratic column. (lc 1301)
So M&K are right -- issues and interests provide a basis for mobilization within social movements, and social movements in turn influence the evolution of party politics.

But their account suggests a more complicated causal story of the evolution of American electoral politics as well. M&K make the point convincingly that the dynamics of party competition by themselves do not suffice to explain the evolution of US politics to the right, towards a more and more polarized relationship between a divided electorate. They succeed in showing that social movements of varying stripes played a key causal role in shaping party politics themselves. So explaining American electoral politics requires analysis of both parties and movements. But they also inadvertently make another point as well: that there are underlying structural features of American political psychology that explain much of the dynamics of both movements and parties, and these are the facts of racial division and the increasingly steep inequalities of income and wealth that divide Americans. So structural facts about race and class in American society play the most fundamental role in explaining the movements and alliances that have led us to our current situation. Social movements are an important intervening variable, but pervasive features of inequality in American society are even more fundamental.

Or to put the point more simply: we are divided politically because we are divided structurally by inequalities of access, property, opportunity, and outcome; and the mechanisms of electoral politics are mobilized to challenge and defend the systems that maintain these inequalities.

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Mayors See Right Through the American Health Care Act [feedly]

Mayors See Right Through the American Health Care Act
http://prospect.org/article/mayors-see-right-through-american-health-care-act

House Speaker Paul Ryan makes his case on March 9 for the GOP's repeal-and-replace plan for the Affordable Care Act.

It's difficult to underestimate the relief provided by the Affordable Care Act to American cities and their mayors. Mayors, after all, hear about local health issues from everyone—from first responders and uninsured constituents to doctors and hospital executives. As the mayors see it, Obamacare has reduced the numbers of uninsured people using hospital emergency rooms, provided the benefits of 21st-century medicine to people who never had access to it, and created thousands of jobs in metropolitan regions.

Unlike Republican members of Congress, mayors do not have luxury of fighting ideological cage matches with politicians of different persuasions until they can cudgel them into submission with an ill-advised, hastily crafted bill to replace reforms pulled together by a Democratic African American president. If Obamacare had been McCaincare or Romneycare the Sequel, the nation would be engaged in a different conversation.

Mayors, on the other hand, have to get stuff done, so facing down angry constituents in town meetings and compromising with political opponents is hard-wired into their daily existence. In a late February U.S. Conference of Mayors press conference phone call with reporters, New Orleans's Mitch Landrieu laid out the likely consequences of the Republicans' "repeal and reform" handiwork. "The message to the states and the people," he said, "is you are on your own." 

Like most mayors, Landrieu, the vice president of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, preferred a fix-and-repair strategy to deal with ACA flaws, including preservation of the Medicaid expansion that provided uninsured people with insurance and allowed health-care providers to expand programs in areas like mental health and substance abuse.

"Without a suitable replacement [we are] going to feel this at all local levels," said Boston Mayor Marty Walsh, who was also on the call.

According to Landrieu, Medicaid expansion funds support more than 50 New Orleans primary health-care clinics. More than 350,000 people have secured access to health insurance in the last year, after Louisiana expanded Medicaid.

In Boston, there has been a similar multiplier effect. Area teaching hospitals have received about $23 billion in federal funding, Walsh said. Losing those dollars would put jobs and research programs at risk. Hundreds of thousands of people in both states stand to lose coverage under the current Republican plan.

Most mayors are immersed in the finer details of budget-making and want to know what the fiscal and economic ramifications of any federal proposal are, especially one that is a major departure from previous policies. With House Republicans unwilling to wait for the Congressional Budget Office to weigh in on costs, it is not surprising that the U.S. Conference of Mayors has castigated the bill's lack of transparency on its costs and the number of people it would cover.

Where President Trump sees a proposal that "will end with a beautiful picture," the U.S. Conference of Mayors sees a plan that is "bad for cities, bad for people who live in cities and bad for people who provide healthcare in cities." But while some of the nation's Republican governors have been vocal opponents of the House plan and have likely moved the needle in the Senate, there are fewer Republican mayors who can exert comparable leverage.

The 2016 Menino Survey of Mayors found that that city leaders have developed a "partisan immunity" to many of the polarizing issues like immigration, race, health care, and poverty that that too many members of Congress view as having only one correct answer—theirs. Poverty is a problem of titanic dimensions for cities, and a national health-care policy that backpedals on Obamacare's support for coverage for the poor bodes ill for the health-care and economic challenges that mayors confront daily.

Congressional Republicans view any number of historically federal programs, most particularly health-care financing for the poor, as a state prerogative, one they argue gives patients more control over their own medical choices. Mayors, by contrast, see health care as a basic human right, not a privilege to be granted or denied depending on the whims of members of Congress or state lawmakers. Local officials fear returning to the time when poor people were compelled to rely on emergency room doctors to treat such routine ailments as flu in adults and ear infections in toddlers.

Under Speaker Paul Ryan's proposal to kill Medicaid as a guarantee of coverage to the poor, federal health dollars would flow instead into state capitals, subjecting the allocation of those funds to the kind of intrastate political wheeling and dealing that may not mesh with better health-care outcomes for residents. Even if states are controlled by progressives, the level of funding the feds would provide would be sharply reduced from those provided under the ACA.

"Everybody knows that when you give [funding] to governors, they have to parse it around the state based mostly on politics and not necessarily on science and health care," Landrieu said. Without substantial revisions to the Republican plan, mayors will find themselves hemmed in between Washington's intransigence and their state's own political turf wars.


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How capitalist power works [feedly]

How capitalist power works
http://stumblingandmumbling.typepad.com/stumbling_and_mumbling/2017/03/how-capitalist-power-works.html

The two main news stories this morning both gave us an insight into how capitalist power works.

The first item is the increase in NICs despite repeated Tory promises not to do so. It would be nice to think this will lead to a backlash against the Tories. But it might not. People don't like to admit even to themselves that they were stupid enough to let themselves be conned. One trick to protect their egos is to adopt naïve cynicism towards politicians in general: "they're all the same, aren't they?". As the Economist put it:

It is tempting to think that, when policies sold on dodgy prospectuses start to fail, lied-to supporters might see the error of their ways. The worst part of post-truth politics, though, is that this self-correction cannot be relied on. When lies make the political system dysfunctional, its poor results can feed the alienation and lack of trust in institutions that make the post-truth play possible in the first place.

But who benefits from this lack of trust?

Capitalists, that's who. Collective action, exercised in part through state politics, is a potential constraint upon capitalist power. The less trust people have in politicians, the less this constraint will be used. Colin Crouch has said:

An atmosphere of cynicism about politics and politicians…suits the agenda of those wishing to rein back the active state, as in the form of the welfare state and Keynesian state, precisely in order to liberate and deregulate…private power (Post-Democracy, p23)

Our second item is the news that BlackRock is paying George Osborne £650,000 a year. What are they buying? It's not his economic expertise – he'd struggle to get a minimum wage job on that account – nor even his contacts. Instead, BlackRock is offering an incentive to the world's finance ministers. It's telling them that they too can get big money if they behave themselves in office*.

Such behaviour consists of giving the industry a favourable tax regime, lightish regulation, and ensuring a good flow of easy money. Osborne's policy of fiscal conservatism and monetary activism had the effect of boosting asset prices (pdf), to the benefit of firms like BlackRock**.

It's through mechanisms like this that capitalists gain undue influence over the state: there of course several other mechanisms, not all of which are exercised consciously or deliberately.

This influence isn't perfect – we'd probably not have had Brexit if it were – but it exists. The idea that democracy means equality of political power is a fiction in capitalism.

You might think this is a Marxist point. I prefer, however, to think of it as a Cohenist one:

Everybody knows the fight was fixed 
The poor stay poor, the rich get rich

Except that not everybody does know the fight is fixed, because the question of how capitalist power is exercised – like other questions such as whether capitalism impedesproductivity or whether hierarchy is justifiable – is not on the agenda. But then, the issue of what gets to be a prominent political question and what doesn't is another way in which power operates to favour capitalists.

* I'm not saying this is BlackRock's motive – but it certainly looks like the effect of its decision.

** You might think the revolving door between banks and regulators serves a similar function. This, though, is less clear.


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Robots are wealth creators and taxing them is illogical [feedly]

Robots are wealth creators and taxing them is illogical
http://larrysummers.com/2017/03/07/robots-are-wealth-creators-and-taxing-them-is-illogical/

March 5, 2017

Governments can offset lost jobs by investing in education and retraining

I usually agree with Bill Gates on matters of public policy and admire his emphasis on the combined power of markets and technology. But I think he went seriously astray in a recent interview when he proposed, without apparent irony, a tax on robots to cushion worker dislocation and limit inequality.

The Microsoft co-founder is right about the gravity of the problem and need for action, but he is profoundly misguided in his proposed solution – and in ways that point up problems with the current public debate.

First, I cannot see any logic to singling out robots as job destroyers. What about kiosks that dispense aeroplane boarding passes? Word processing programmes that accelerate the production of documents? Mobile banking technologies? Autonomous vehicles? Vaccines that, by preventing disease, destroy jobs in medicine?

There are many kinds of innovation that allow the production of more or better output with less labour input. Why pick on robots? Does Mr Gates think anyone, let alone the US Congress, the Trump administration or a commission comprised of his fellow technocrats, can distinguish labour-saving activities from labour-enhancing ones?

Surely even if experts could draw such distinctions, the ability of the US Internal Revenue Service to administer them is in doubt.

Second, much innovative activity, even of a robot-like variety, involves producing better goods and services rather than simply extracting more output from the same input.

Autonomous vehicles, for example, will probably be safer than ones driven by humans. Robotics already help surgeons perform certain operations better than they can on their own. Online reservation systems are faster and more convenient than travel agents.

Moreover, because of emulation and competition, innovators capture only a small part of the benefit of their innovation. It follows that there is as much a case for subsidising as taxing types of capital that embody innovation.

Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, why tax in ways that reduce the size of the pie rather than ways that assure that the larger pie is well distributed? Imagine that 50 people can produce robots who will do the work of 100. A sufficiently high tax on robots would prevent them from being produced.

Surely it would be better for society to instead enjoy the extra output and establish suitable taxes and transfers to protect displaced workers?

It is hard to see why shrinking the pie, rather than enlarging it as much as possible and then redistributing, is the right way forward.

This last point has long been standard in international trade theory. Indeed, it is common to point out that opening a country up to international trade is just like giving it access to a technology for transforming one good into another. The argument, then, is that since one surely would not regard such a technical change as bad, neither is trade, and so protectionism is bad. Mr Gates' robot tax risks essentially being protectionism against progress.

None of this is to minimise the problem of job destruction and rising inequality (although it is a major paradox that we seem to be seeing unprecedentedly rapid job destruction by machinery while at the same time observing extraordinarily low productivity growth).

Rather, it is to suggest that staving off progress is a poor strategy for helping less-fortunate workers. In addition to difficulties of definition and collateral costs, there is the further problem that in an open world, taxes on technology are likely to drive production offshore rather than create jobs at home.

There are many better approaches. Governments will, however, have to concern themselves with problems of structural joblessness. They likely will need to take a more explicit role in ensuring full employment than has been the practice in the US.

Among other things, this will mean major reforms of education and retraining systems, consideration of targeted wage subsidies for groups with particularly severe employment problems, major investments in infrastructure and, possibly, direct public employment programmes.

This will be a major debate that I suspect will define a large part of the politics of the industrial world over the next decade. Little is certain. But we will do better going forward than backward.

That means making America even greater, not great again. And it means embracing rather than rejecting technological progress.


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Revoking trade deals will not help American middle classes [feedly]

Here is what is annoying about this article to me: Arguing that there was an aggregate gain from  trade, and trade agreements is a no brainer. Of course there are gains from trade. But who got them? The typical worker has got nothing but spit and horseshit from both trade and technology for 40 years. the 1% got it all.

Summers is a genius. You can tell just listening to him speak, which I have on several occasions. Why can't he see this? There's trade. There's technology. Then there's CLASS With very few exceptions, wage and salary workers went nowhere, or down for almost 3 generations. 


Revoking trade deals will not help American middle classes
http://larrysummers.com/2017/02/06/revoking-trade-deals-will-not-help-american-middle-classes/

February 6, 2017

The advent of global supply chains has changed production patterns in the US
 
Trade agreements have been central to American politics for some years. The idea that renegotiating trade agreements will "make America great again" by substantially increasing job creation and economic growth swept Donald Trump into office.

More broadly, the idea that past trade agreements have damaged the American middle class and that the prospective Trans-Pacific Partnership would do further damage is now widely accepted in both major US political parties.

As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan once observed, participants in political debate are entitled to their own opinions but not their own facts. The reality is that the impact of trade and globalisation on wages is debatable and could be substantial. But the idea that the US trade agreements of the past generation have impoverished to any significant extent is absurd.

There is a debate to be had about the impact of globalisation on middle class wages and inequality. Increased imports have displaced jobs. Companies have been able to drive harder bargains with workers, particularly in unionised sectors, because of the threat they can outsource. The advent of global supply chains has changed production patterns in the US.

My judgment is that these effects are considerably smaller than the impacts of technological progress. This is based on a variety of economic studies, experience in hypercompetitive Germany and the observation that the proportion of American workers in manufacturing has been steadily declining for 75 years. That said I acknowledge that global trends and new studies show that the impact of trade on wages is much more pronounced than a decade ago.

But an assessment of the impact of trade on wages is very different than an assessment of trade agreements. It is inconceivable that multilateral trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, have had a meaningful impact on US wages and jobs for the simple reason that the US market was almost completely open 40 years ago before entering into any of the controversial agreements.

American tariffs on Mexican goods, for example, averaged about 4 per cent before Nafta came into force. China had what was then called "most favoured nation" trading status with the US before its accession to the World Trade Organization and received the same access as other countries. Before the Korea Free Trade Agreement, US tariffs on Korea averaged a paltry 2.8 per cent.

The irrelevance of trade agreements to import competition becomes obvious when one listens to the main arguments against trade agreements. They rarely, if ever, take the form of saying we are inappropriately taking down US trade barriers.

Rather the naysayers argue that different demands should be made on other countries during negotiations – on issues including intellectual property, labour standards, dispute resolution or exchange rate manipulation. I am sympathetic to the criticisms of TPP, but even if they were all correct they do not justify the conclusion that signing the deal would increase the challenges facing the American middle class.

The reason for the rise in US imports is not reduced trade barriers. Rather it is that emerging markets are indeed emerging. They are growing in their economic potential because of successful economic reforms and greater global integration.

These developments would have occurred with or without US trade pacts, though the agreements have usually been an impetus to reform. Indeed, since the US does very little to reduce trade barriers in our agreements, the impetus to reform is most of what foreign policymakers value in them along with political connection to the US.

The truth too often denied by both sides in this debate is that incremental agreements like TPP have been largely irrelevant to the fate of middle class workers. The real strategic choice Americans face is whether the objective of their policies is to see the economies of the rest of the world grow and prosper. Or, does the US want to keep the rest of the world from threatening it by slowing global growth and walling off products and people?

Framed this way the solution appears obvious. A strategy of returning to the protectionism of the past and seeking to thwart the growth of other nations is untenable and would likely lead to a downward spiral in the global economy. The right approach is to maintain openness while finding ways to help workers at home who are displaced by technical progress, trade or other challenges.


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Trade Deals and Alternative Facts: No Longer Fresh at Project Syndicate [feedly]

Trade Deals and Alternative Facts: No Longer Fresh at Project Syndicate
http://www.bradford-delong.com/2017/03/trade-deals-and-alternative-facts-no-longer-fresh-at-project-syndicate.html

Project Syndicate: Trade Deals and Alternative Facts: BERKELEY – In a long recent Vox essay outlining my thinking about US President Donald Trump's emerging trade policy, I pointed out that a "bad" trade deal such as the North American Free Trade Agreement is responsible for only a vanishingly small fraction of lost US manufacturing jobs over the past 30 years. Just 0.1 percentage points of the 21.4 percentage-point decline in the employment share of manufacturing during this period is attributable to NAFTA, enacted in December 1993.

A half-century ago, the US economy supplied an abundance of manufacturing jobs to a workforce that was well equipped to fill them. Those opportunities have dried up. This is a significant problem: a BIGLY problem. But anyone who claims that the collapse of US manufacturing employment resulted from "bad" trade deals like NAFTA is playing the fool. A BIGLY fool. Read MOAR at Project Syndicate

I had promised Ezra Klein and company 5000 words by late September. I delivered 8000 words in late January. The 8000 words I delivered did only a third of what I had wanted them to. I had wanted to:

  1. show the irrelevance of "bad trade deals" in terms of the causes of the problem of loss and lack of opportunity.
  2. present what our trade—in fact, our industria—policy should be with respect to manufacturing.
  3. explain why the fixation—from both left and right—on "bad trade deals". As I told union executives, members, and lobbyists in large numbers back in 1993: this energy from you is profoundly lacking on all the much more important issues on which we can agree. And I asked why that was…

I failed. Ezra Klein and company published it anyway, at excessive length. I am very grateful to them.

The third remains a mystery to me. The best partial explanation I have seen starts from Ernest Gellner's cruel observation that left-wing academics were gobsmacked by the fact that History had delivered the goods to the wrong address: that political energy and organizing mojo were supposed to focus around class, but instead they focus around nation and ethnicity. Political actors seeking to summon the lightning of populist energy thus find themselves summoning hate of foreigners and aliens, thus supping with the devil without any spoon at all. But I do not find that adequate.

Some of the second was covered in my book with Stephen Cohen, Concrete Economicshttp://amzn.to/2kylcA1: sensible and pragmatic attention to the value of communities of engineering practice and to forward and backward linkages from them should guide industrial policy. The rest is that the United States ought to be acting like a normal rich country: funding the industrialization of the rest of the world via capital export and a trade surplus. It isn't, and it hasn't been since the destructive macroeconomic policies of Ronald Reagan.

I did, however, deliver on the first. The U.S. went from 30% of its nonfarm employees in manufacturing to 12% because of rapid growth in manufacturing productivity and limited demand? The U.S. went from 12% to 9% because of stupid and destructive macro policies—the Reagan deficits, the strong-dollar policy pushed well past its sell-by date, too-tight monetary policy—that diverted it from its proper role as a net exporter of capital and finance to economies that need to be net sinks rather than net sources of the global flow of funds for investment. The U.S. went from 9% to 8.7% because of the extraordinarily rapid rise of China. And the U.S. went from 8.7% to 8.6% of its nonfarm employees in manufacturing because of NAFTA.

As Larry Summers https://www.ft.com/content/f710909f-7f26-399f-a135-e24a91c9063band Barry Eichengreen https://www.ft.com/content/2a01d6c2-de6f-11e6-86ac-f253db7791c6 both observed last week, Donald Trump's policy initiatives, such as they are—or such as we think they are, because far less is clear than usual at this stage in a transition—are as if designed to further reduce employment in manufacturing in America. It is the strong dollar that sends manufacturers the signal that they are not wanted in America. And Trump's tax cuts, his urging the Fed to raise interest rates, and his proposed changes to the tax code will all work to strengthen the dollar.

But, of course, the strength of the dollar will be blamed not on incoherent and counterproductive policies, but on the Chinese. And the Mexicans.

And Trump is not alone. The American political system right now is blaming all, 100%, every piece of that decline from 30% to 8.6%, and every problem that can be laid at its door, on brown people from Mexico.

That is a problem. It is a problem for the United States. It is a problem for the world. It is a BIGLY problem.

Housekeeping:

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