John Case has sent you a link to a blog:
Blog: EPIC Radio Podcasts
Post: Apologies for Down Time -- Get Ready for Little FEAT tonite, and Philo-Religion tomorrow
Link: http://podcasts.enlightenradio.org/2017/02/apologies-for-down-time-get-ready-for.html
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Saturday, February 25, 2017
Friday, February 24, 2017
Robots, or automation, are not the problem: Too little worker power is [feedly]
Robots, or automation, are not the problem: Too little worker power is
http://www.epi.org/publication/robots-or-automation-are-not-the-problem-too-little-worker-power-is/
-- via my feedly newsfeed
http://www.epi.org/publication/robots-or-automation-are-not-the-problem-too-little-worker-power-is/
The fear of job-stealing robots has been recently stoked in the media and pundits frequently refer to automation as a key driver of long-term middle-class wage stagnation. But are robots actually transforming the labor market at an unprecedented pace? Nope—in fact, the opposite is true. First, it's important to note that technology and automation have consistently transformed the way work gets done. So, technology itself is not a problem. Robots and automation allow us to increase efficiency by making more things for less money. When goods and services are cheaper, consumers can afford to buy more robot-made stuff, or have money left over to spend on other things. When consumers spend their leftover cash on additional goods and services, it creates jobs. These new jobs help compensate for the jobs lost to automation.
But are robots now eroding jobs and replacing human labor at a faster pace that the economy can't absorb? Again, no. Perhaps surprisingly to some, the data on investments and productivity do not reveal worrisome footprints of accelerated robot activity: in fact, in recent years the growth of labor productivity, capital investment and, particularly, investment in information equipment and software has strongly decelerated in the 2000s. There is no basis for believing that robots or automation are having an unusual transformative effect on the labor market.
The first chart below shows that productivity and capital investment did indeed accelerate during the late 1990s tech boom. But productivity and capital investments were much slower in the recovery from 2002–2007, and decelerated further in the period since the Great Recession.
The second chart looks more closely at two components of capital investment, information processing equipment investment (mainly computers and communications equipment), and software investment. Information processing equipment investment grew at a 8.0 percent annual rate over the 2002–2007 period, roughly half the 15.6 percent rate of the 1995–2002 period, and grew even more slowly (4.8 percent annually) after 2007. If technology were rapidly transforming our workplaces, we would expect to see exactly the opposite—a surge in the use of information equipment and software in the production of goods and services. That is what occurred in the late 1990s, but it is not happening now.
Economic Snapshot
We need to give the robot scare a rest. Robots are not leading to mass joblessness and are not the cause of wage stagnation or growing wage inequality. Recently, the New York Times referred to the robot scare as a "distraction from real problems and real solutions." Instead, we should focus on policy choices that lead to things that truly threaten workers and their families like eroding labor standards, declining unionization, elevated unemployment, unbalanced globalization, and declining top tax rates.
-- via my feedly newsfeed
Charles Blow: The death of compassion, and commentary
Apologies again for the link without text -- NYTimes prevents even subscribers from copying text.
I imagine Blow's argument will resonate with many. It sounds militant. The working class Trump voters are looking more like horses asses every day that passes. And no one feels all that proud as the Building Trades leaders appear servile begging Trump for pipeline and "make america great again" construction jobs.
Yet, imagine reading Blow to an American union audience of carpenters of mixed races, genders, nationalities, faiths, ages and skills, and political persuasions. "Hey -- you guys that voted for Trump -- fuck you!" would be the short version of the article -- and the main thing message people would hear. A union officer set on that message might as well skip the meeting and just liquidate the local union.
I suppose this is OK with much, probably most, of the so-called Left, that doesn't understand unionism anyway, and these days has less and less opportunity to gain that understanding. Apparently, many progressives can't imagine themselves reduced to begging for a job. Many have the ability to "choose" to avoid immoral work for a pipeline, and cannot comprehend DAPL workers not falling on their swords and abandoning their jobs rather than tread on sacred water.
Blow is wrong even when he is right. Same with those who assert fundamental class and economic inequality trends are not the essence of the Trump catastrophe, and also are the foundation of putting together a decisive majority to drive a stake in Trumpism's rotten Fascist, heart. Liberalism's failure in the past 40 years to reverse unending austerity regimes for the working class, and the Left's sectarian fantasies and dogmas appear to disarm both. There are many "special" grievances that the sectarian spirit inflames.
Historically, the best argument the Left seemed to be able to mount was a "unity against common enemies" tactical themes. It works in big waves in social movements. But its nearly worthless as a governing philosophy. No philosophy is worth shit if it does not credibly point to path out of austerity. And any such path MUST have an ECONOMICS to make policy or planning even possible. That economics is more, not less, socialism; more, not less, public goods in health, education, retirement and services; smarter, more representative, less corrupt governance in both corporate and public spheres; more, not less, empowerment of working people, to ensure more, not less, equitable distributions of economic wealth both domestically and through trade
Stick to the basics: jobs, rising standards of living, internationalism in culture, sustainable growth, health care, retirement, and equity -- equal pay for equal work -- and Paying the Losers in economic and social change enough to become winners --- on these grounds all those who do the work of the world can be united....
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV
Harpers Ferry, WV
The Winners and Losers Radio Show
7-9 AM Weekdays, The EPIC Radio Player Stream,
Sign UP HERE to get the Weekly Program Notes.
Check out Socialist Economics.
Check out The EPIC Radio website
NYtines: What Americans Do for Work
What Americans Do For Work
Apologies for the link. I hate the nytimes paywall that prevents text copying of any kind.....but this is an important article:
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/magazine/the-new-working-class.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0
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John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV
Harpers Ferry, WV
The Winners and Losers Radio Show
7-9 AM Weekdays, The EPIC Radio Player Stream,
Sign UP HERE to get the Weekly Program Notes.
Check out Socialist Economics.
Check out The EPIC Radio website
Dan Little: DIVIDED
Divided ...
Dan Little from Understanding Society
Why is part of the American electoral system so susceptible to right-wing populist appeals, often highlighting themes of racism and intergroup hostility? Doug McAdam and Karina Kloos address the causes of the radical swing to the right of the Republican Party in Deeply Divided: Racial Politics and Social Movements in Postwar America. Here is the key issue the book attempts to resolve:
If the general public does not share the extreme partisan views of the political elites and party activists and, more to the point, is increasingly dismayed and disgusted by the resulting polarization and institutional paralysis that have followed from those views, how has the GOP managed to move so far to the right without being punished by the voters? Our answer — already telegraphed above — is that over the past half century social movements have increasingly challenged, and occasionally supplanted, parties as the dominant mobilizing logic and organizing vehicle of American politics. (Kindle location 303-307).
Not surprisingly given McAdam's long history in the social movements research field, McAdam and Kloos argue that social movements are commonly relevant to electoral and party politics; they suggest that the period of relatively high consensus around the moderate middle (1940s and 1950s) was exceptional precisely because of the absence of powerful social movements during these decades. But during more typical periods, national electoral politics are influenced by both political parties and diffuse social movements; and the dynamics of the latter can have complex effects on the behavior and orientation of the former.
McAdam and Kloos argue that the social movements associated with the 1960s Civil Rights movement and its opposite, the white segregationist movement, put in motion a political dynamic that pushed each party off of its "median voter" platform, with the Republican Party moving increasingly in the direction of white supremacy and preservation of white privilege.
This historical analysis gives an indication of an even more basic political factor in American politics: the polarizing issues that surround race and the struggle for racial equality. The Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was a widespread mobilization of large numbers of ordinary citizens in support of equal rights for African Americans in terms of voting, residence, occupation, and education. Leaders like Ralph Abernathy or Julian Bond (or of course, Martin Luther King, Jr.) and organizations like the NAACP and SNCC were effective in their call to action for ordinary people to take visible actions to support greater equality through legal means. This movement had some success in pushing the Democratic Party towards greater advocacy of reforms promoting racial justice. And the political backlash against the Democratic Party following the enactment of civil rights legislation spawned its own grassroots mobilizations of people and associations who objected to these forms of racial progress. And lest we imagine that progressive steps in the struggle for racial justice largely derived from the Democratic Party, the authors remind us that a great deal of the support that civil rights legislation came from liberal Republicans:
But their account suggests a more complicated causal story of the evolution of American electoral politics as well. M&K make the point convincingly that the dynamics of party competition by themselves do not suffice to explain the evolution of US politics to the right, towards a more and more polarized relationship between a divided electorate. They succeed in showing that social movements of varying stripes played a key causal role in shaping party politics themselves. So explaining American electoral politics requires analysis of both parties and movements. But they also inadvertently make another point as well: that there are underlying structural features of American political psychology that explain much of the dynamics of both movements and parties, and these are the facts of racial division and the increasingly steep inequalities of income and wealth that divide Americans. So structural facts about race and class in American society play the most fundamental role in explaining the movements and alliances that have led us to our current situation. Social movements are an important intervening variable, but pervasive features of inequality in American society are even more fundamental.
Or to put the point more simply: we are divided politically because we are divided structurally by inequalities of access, property, opportunity, and outcome; and the mechanisms of electoral politics are mobilized to challenge and defend the systems that maintain these inequalities.
McAdam and Kloos argue that the social movements associated with the 1960s Civil Rights movement and its opposite, the white segregationist movement, put in motion a political dynamic that pushed each party off of its "median voter" platform, with the Republican Party moving increasingly in the direction of white supremacy and preservation of white privilege.
More accurately, it is the story of not one, but two parallel movements, the revitalized civil rights movement of the early 1960s and the powerful segregationist countermovement, that quickly developed in response to the black freedom struggle. (lc 1220)The dynamics of grassroots social movements are thought to explain how positions that are unpalatable to the broad electorate nonetheless become committed platforms within the parties. (This also seems to explain the GOP preoccupation with "voter fraud" and their efforts at restricting voting rights for people of color.) The primary processes adopted by the parties after the 1968 Democratic convention gave a powerful advantage to highly committed social activists, even if they do not represent the majority of a party's members.
This historical analysis gives an indication of an even more basic political factor in American politics: the polarizing issues that surround race and the struggle for racial equality. The Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was a widespread mobilization of large numbers of ordinary citizens in support of equal rights for African Americans in terms of voting, residence, occupation, and education. Leaders like Ralph Abernathy or Julian Bond (or of course, Martin Luther King, Jr.) and organizations like the NAACP and SNCC were effective in their call to action for ordinary people to take visible actions to support greater equality through legal means. This movement had some success in pushing the Democratic Party towards greater advocacy of reforms promoting racial justice. And the political backlash against the Democratic Party following the enactment of civil rights legislation spawned its own grassroots mobilizations of people and associations who objected to these forms of racial progress. And lest we imagine that progressive steps in the struggle for racial justice largely derived from the Democratic Party, the authors remind us that a great deal of the support that civil rights legislation came from liberal Republicans:
The textbook account also errs in typically depicting the Democrats as the movement's staunch ally. What is missed in this account is the lengths to which all Democratic presidents—at least from Roosevelt to Kennedy—went to placate the white South and accommodate the party's Dixiecrat wing. (kl 411)
The important point is that as long as the progressive racial views of northern liberal Democrats were held in check and tacit support for Jim Crow remained the guiding—if unofficial—policy of the party, the South remained solidly and reliably in the Democratic column. (lc 1301)So M&K are right -- issues and interests provide a basis for mobilization within social movements, and social movements in turn influence the evolution of party politics.
But their account suggests a more complicated causal story of the evolution of American electoral politics as well. M&K make the point convincingly that the dynamics of party competition by themselves do not suffice to explain the evolution of US politics to the right, towards a more and more polarized relationship between a divided electorate. They succeed in showing that social movements of varying stripes played a key causal role in shaping party politics themselves. So explaining American electoral politics requires analysis of both parties and movements. But they also inadvertently make another point as well: that there are underlying structural features of American political psychology that explain much of the dynamics of both movements and parties, and these are the facts of racial division and the increasingly steep inequalities of income and wealth that divide Americans. So structural facts about race and class in American society play the most fundamental role in explaining the movements and alliances that have led us to our current situation. Social movements are an important intervening variable, but pervasive features of inequality in American society are even more fundamental.
Or to put the point more simply: we are divided politically because we are divided structurally by inequalities of access, property, opportunity, and outcome; and the mechanisms of electoral politics are mobilized to challenge and defend the systems that maintain these inequalities.
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV
Harpers Ferry, WV
The Winners and Losers Radio Show
7-9 AM Weekdays, The EPIC Radio Player Stream,
Sign UP HERE to get the Weekly Program Notes.
Check out Socialist Economics.
Check out The EPIC Radio website
Eastern Panhandle Independent Community (EPIC) Radio:The Friday Lineup on EPIC Radio -- Paris on the Potomac, Labor Beat, old time radio, jazz
John Case has sent you a link to a blog:
Blog: Eastern Panhandle Independent Community (EPIC) Radio
Post: The Friday Lineup on EPIC Radio -- Paris on the Potomac, Labor Beat, old time radio, jazz
Link: http://www.enlightenradio.org/2017/02/the-friday-lineup-on-epic-radio-paris.html
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Blog: Eastern Panhandle Independent Community (EPIC) Radio
Post: The Friday Lineup on EPIC Radio -- Paris on the Potomac, Labor Beat, old time radio, jazz
Link: http://www.enlightenradio.org/2017/02/the-friday-lineup-on-epic-radio-paris.html
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