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Post: Walt Whitman Joins the Poetry Show --Feb 6, 2017, Storytelling and Sherlock later
Link: http://www.enlightenradio.org/2017/02/walt-whitman-joins-epic-radio-poetry.html
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Sunday, February 5, 2017
Re: [socialist-econ] Do we (ie, most of us) really now live in a “post-factual” culture? [feedly]
Excellent piece.
Sent from my iPhone
Sent from my iPhone
Do we (ie, most of us) really now live in a "post-factual" culture?--
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/do-we-ie-most-of-us-really-now-live-in-a-post-factual-culture/I yield to no one in my disdain for alternative facts. I've been doing what I can from my own little fiefdom to chart a path back to Factville, most recently devoting the debut episode of our new podcast (On the Economy Podcast, co-chaired with Ben Spielberg) to that theme. So consider that bit of street cred as I raise a question stimulated by this interesting, smart read in today's NYT.
The title—Why Nobody Cares the President is Lying—is obviously hyperbole, and the piece focuses on the interaction of the Trump administration with their hard-right supporters and the alt-right media that closes this dangerous circle. No question, that's a real problem and the motivation for the work I noted above.
But it is not clear to me how far down this rabbit hole we've fallen. The oped talks of a "new, post-factual political culture," but is this not ultimately a question of numbers? Really, how many people actually don't care about facts anymore? Did not a majority of jaws drop along with Chuck Todd's when Kellyanne Conway defended the administration's alternative facts? What share of the those paying attention believe Trump's nonsense about the crowds at his inauguration or millions of fraudulent ballots cast against him?
I assure you, I'm not downplaying this problem at all. But attacking the problem requires us to think clearly about its actual nature. Though I don't have the numbers to answer those questions above, my strong suspicion is that our biggest problem when it comes to facts-on-the-run is not that we—meaning most people—live in a post-factual culture. It's that our president lives, flourishes, and has a symbiotic relationship with that minority culture.
Obviously, history brims with examples of how a violent, oppressive minority, can take control and cause terrible, even murderous, damage. And history also reveals that this process is facilitated by a feckless, apathetic opposition, a lazy press, an academic and research community too ensconced in their comfortable sinecures to recognize that the game has changed.
Those are the potentially threatening institution failings that allow for the rise of the oppressor. In this regard, there's hope in what looks like the rise of an extremely energized and nimble opposition, some early evidence that legal checks and balances appear to still be operative, and some clear media willingness to call out lies.
No question, some of live in a post-fact culture fed by falsehoods designed to keep us fighting among ourselves while empowering a non-representative government. But as the popular vote shows, most of us do not. I will continue to try to draw the map back to Factville, but I do not for a moment believe that this is a lonely endeavor. There are way more of us than there are of them.
-- via my feedly newsfeed
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Do we (ie, most of us) really now live in a “post-factual” culture? [feedly]
Do we (ie, most of us) really now live in a "post-factual" culture?
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/do-we-ie-most-of-us-really-now-live-in-a-post-factual-culture/
-- via my feedly newsfeed
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/do-we-ie-most-of-us-really-now-live-in-a-post-factual-culture/
I yield to no one in my disdain for alternative facts. I've been doing what I can from my own little fiefdom to chart a path back to Factville, most recently devoting the debut episode of our new podcast (On the Economy Podcast, co-chaired with Ben Spielberg) to that theme. So consider that bit of street cred as I raise a question stimulated by this interesting, smart read in today's NYT.
The title—Why Nobody Cares the President is Lying—is obviously hyperbole, and the piece focuses on the interaction of the Trump administration with their hard-right supporters and the alt-right media that closes this dangerous circle. No question, that's a real problem and the motivation for the work I noted above.
But it is not clear to me how far down this rabbit hole we've fallen. The oped talks of a "new, post-factual political culture," but is this not ultimately a question of numbers? Really, how many people actually don't care about facts anymore? Did not a majority of jaws drop along with Chuck Todd's when Kellyanne Conway defended the administration's alternative facts? What share of the those paying attention believe Trump's nonsense about the crowds at his inauguration or millions of fraudulent ballots cast against him?
I assure you, I'm not downplaying this problem at all. But attacking the problem requires us to think clearly about its actual nature. Though I don't have the numbers to answer those questions above, my strong suspicion is that our biggest problem when it comes to facts-on-the-run is not that we—meaning most people—live in a post-factual culture. It's that our president lives, flourishes, and has a symbiotic relationship with that minority culture.
Obviously, history brims with examples of how a violent, oppressive minority, can take control and cause terrible, even murderous, damage. And history also reveals that this process is facilitated by a feckless, apathetic opposition, a lazy press, an academic and research community too ensconced in their comfortable sinecures to recognize that the game has changed.
Those are the potentially threatening institution failings that allow for the rise of the oppressor. In this regard, there's hope in what looks like the rise of an extremely energized and nimble opposition, some early evidence that legal checks and balances appear to still be operative, and some clear media willingness to call out lies.
No question, some of live in a post-fact culture fed by falsehoods designed to keep us fighting among ourselves while empowering a non-representative government. But as the popular vote shows, most of us do not. I will continue to try to draw the map back to Factville, but I do not for a moment believe that this is a lonely endeavor. There are way more of us than there are of them.
-- via my feedly newsfeed
Easterly: The European origins of economic development
The European origins of economic development
William Easterly, Ross Levine
03 February 2017
Countries have followed divergent paths of economic development since European colonization. Some former colonies, such as the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, and Tanzania, have experienced little economic development over the last few centuries, with current per capita GDP levels of about $2 per day. Others, including Australia, Canada, and the US, are among the richest countries in the world today, with per capita GDP levels of about $140 per day. Others fall along the spectrum between these extremes.
To explain these divergent paths, many researchers emphasize that the European share of the population during colonization shaped national rates of economic growth through several mechanisms. For example, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) stress that European colonization had enduring effects on political institutions. They argue that when Europeans encountered natural resources with lucrative international markets and did not find the land, climate, and disease environment suitable for large-scale settlement, only a few Europeans settled and created authoritarian political institutions to extract those resources. The institutions created by Europeans in these 'extractive colonies' impeded long-run development. But, when Europeans found land, climate, and disease environments that were suitable for smaller-scale agriculture, they settled, forming 'settler colonies' with political institutions that fostered development.
Other researchers focus less on what Europeans found and more on what Europeans brought. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that Europeans brought human capital and human capital creating institutions that shape long-run economic growth. According to this human capital view, European settlers directly and immediately added human capital skills to the colonies and also had long-run effects on human capital accumulation. These long-run effects emerge because human capital disseminates throughout the population over generations and it takes time to create, expand, and improve schools. Furthermore, this human capital view suggests that having a larger share of Europeans during colonisation could facilitate human capital accumulation across the entire population, both because it would increase interactions among people of European and non-European descent and because it might accelerate expanded access to schools.
These views yield two testable implications: (1) the proportion of Europeans during colonisation will be positively related to the democratic political institutions and human capital development that yield higher levels of economic development today; and (2) the proportion of Europeans during colonisation will matter more for economic development than the proportion of the population of European descent today because of (a) the enduring effects of political institutions, and (b) the slow dissemination of human capital and creation of well-functioning schools. Although the political institutions and human capital views emphasise different mechanisms, they provide closely aligned predictions about the impact of colonial European settlement on current economic development.
Other researchers, either explicitly or implicitly, highlight additional mechanisms through which European migration had positive or negative effects on development. North (1990) argues that the British brought comparatively strong political and legal institutions, which were more conducive to economic development than the institutions brought by other European nations. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) stress that the degree to which the genetic heritage of a colonial population was similar to that of the economies at the technological frontier positively affected the diffusion of technology and thus economic development. Putterman and Weil (2010) and Chanda et al. (2014) emphasise that the experiences with statehood and agriculture of the ancestors of people currently living within countries help to explain cross-country differences in economic success. Comin et al. (2011) find that the ancient technologies of the ancestors of today's populations help predict current levels of per capita income. In all of these papers, the ancestral nature of a population – which was reshaped by European colonisation – helps account for cross-country differences in economic development today.
Although this considerable body of research emphasises the effect of European settlement during colonisation on subsequent rates of economic development, what has been missing in the empirical literature is the key intermediating variable: colonial European settlement. While researchers, including Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), have examined the European share of the population in 1900, this is well after the colonial period in several countries, including virtually all of the Western Hemisphere. To the best of our knowledge, researchers have not directly measured colonial European settlement and examined its association with current economic development.
In a recent paper, we construct a new database on the European share of the population during colonisation and use it to examine the historical determinants of colonial European settlement and the relation between colonial European settlement and current economic development (Easterly and Levine 2016).1 Although we do not isolate the specific mechanisms linking colonial European settlement with current levels of economic development, as emphasised in each of the individual theories discussed above, we do assess the core empirical predictions emerging from the literature on the relationship between European settlement and economic development: namely that (1) the proportion of Europeans during colonisation is positively related to economic development today; and (2) the proportion of Europeans during colonisation is more important, in accounting for cross-country differences in current economic development, than the proportion of the population of European descent today.
We first discover that colonial European settlement is strongly, positively associated with economic development today. As illustrated in Figure 1, countries with a higher share of Europeans in the colonial population tend to have higher levels of GDP per capita today. This relationship holds true, after controlling for many features of the areas and peoples colonised by the Europeans, and for which European country colonised the area. Our results also paint a positive picture of the development impact of minority colonial European settlements, about which the previous literature was ambiguous. We also show that the relationship between economic development today and the proportion of Europeans during colonisation weakens markedly when controlling for either current educational attainment or government quality. This finding is consistent with the view that human capital and political institutions are intermediating mechanisms through which European settlement shaped current economic development.
Figure 1 Distribution of colonial European settlement and median current income
Note: This figure shows the number of countries classified in groups according to their European shares at colonisation (left axis). The median current income (in logs) for each group is also reported (right axis).
Second, we find that the European share of the population during colonisation is more strongly associated with economic development today than the percentage of the population today that is of European descent. This finding is consistent with the view that Europeans brought growth-promoting characteristics – such as institutions, human capital, technology, connections with international markets, and cultural norms – that had enduring effects on economic development. This result de-emphasises the importance of Europeans per se, and instead emphasises the impact of what Europeans brought to economies during the colonial period.
To clarify our contribution, it is crucial to emphasise what we do not do. We do not assess the welfare implications of European colonisation. Europeans often cruelly oppressed, enslaved, murdered, and even committed genocide against, indigenous populations, as well as enslaving captives brought from Africa (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2012 for compelling examples). Thus, GDP per capita today does not measure the welfare effects of European colonisation; it only provides a measure of economic activity today, within a particular geographical area. Although there is no question about European oppression and cruelty during colonisation, there are questions about the net effect of European colonisation on economic development today. We have confirmed the strong association between colonial European settlement and comparative economic development. Indeed, we calculate that 40% of all development that has happened outside Europe is associated with this colonial European settlement. Our findings are a suggestive confirmation of the deep historical roots of today's development outcomes, as well as the importance of the dissemination of institutions, human capital, and technology across borders.
References
Acemoglu, D, S Johnson and J Robinson (2001), "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation", American Economic Review, 91 (5): 1369-1401.
Acemoglu, D, S Johnson and J Robinson (2002), "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution", Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4): 1231-1294.
Acemoglu, D and J Robinson (2012), Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, Crown Publishers: New York.
Chanda, A, C J Cook and L Putterman (2014), "Persistence of Fortune: Accounting for Population Movements, There Was No Post-Columbian Reversal", American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6(3): 1-28.
Comin, D, W Easterly, and E Gong (2010), "Was the Wealth of Nations Determined in 1000 B.C.?", American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(3): 65–97.
Easterly, W and R Levine (2016), "The European origins of economic development", Journal of Economic Growth 21(3): 225-257.
Engerman, S and K Sokoloff (1997), "Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States", in S Haber (ed.), How Latin America Fell Behind, Stanford: Stanford University Press: 260–304
Glaeser, E, R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A Shleifer (2004), "Do Institutions Cause Growth?", Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3): 271-303.
North, D (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Putterman, L and D Weil (2010), "Post-1500 Population Flows and the Long Run Determinants of Economic Growth and Inequality", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(4): 1627-1682
Spolaore, E and R Wacziarg (2009), "The Diffusion of Development", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (2): 469-529.
Endnotes
1 The data and programs used to conduct these analyses are available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10887- 016-9130-y.
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV
Harpers Ferry, WV
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Trump Picks Wall Street Over Main Street [feedly]
Trump Picks Wall Street Over Main Street
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2017/02/trump-picks-wall-street-over-main-street.html
-- via my feedly newsfeed
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2017/02/trump-picks-wall-street-over-main-street.html
Mike Konczal:
Trump Picks Wall Street Over Main Street: President Trump fired the first round in his war against financial regulations by signing two executive orders on Friday.
The first calls for the Treasury secretary to conduct a review over the next 120 days of regulations stemming from the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The second calls for a review of the Department of Labor's "fiduciary rule," which requires investment professionals to act in the best interest of their clients, rather than seek the highest profits for themselves...
Though they don't do too much by themselves to roll back these reforms, the directives do offer important details on how Mr. Trump will approach the financial industry in the next four years — and provide three reasons that people on Main Street should be scared about how Mr. Trump will help Wall Street.
The first is that President Trump, contrary to the hopes of many, has no intention of getting tough with finance. ...
Second, while Mr. Trump wants to repeal the fiduciary rule, he appears to have no interest in a replacement for it. ...
Third, rather than meet with regulators, small businesses or community banks, Mr. Trump met with the titans of Wall Street before announcing the directives. ...
It's no wonder financial stocks have been soaring since Mr. Trump was elected. Voters who hoped he would "drain the swamp" and upset the elite are in for a big surprise. ...
-- via my feedly newsfeed
Saturday, February 4, 2017
Eastern Panhandle Independent Community (EPIC) Radio:EPIC Philosophy and Religion Programming Highlights - Sunday, Feb 5, 2017
John Case has sent you a link to a blog:
Blog: Eastern Panhandle Independent Community (EPIC) Radio
Post: EPIC Philosophy and Religion Programming Highlights - Sunday, Feb 5, 2017
Link: http://www.enlightenradio.org/2017/02/epic-philosophy-and-religion.html
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Blog: Eastern Panhandle Independent Community (EPIC) Radio
Post: EPIC Philosophy and Religion Programming Highlights - Sunday, Feb 5, 2017
Link: http://www.enlightenradio.org/2017/02/epic-philosophy-and-religion.html
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Leadership
Rev. Orange had no church but he ministered to us all
Rev. James Orange held no office but he wielded moral power
He had no base except all of us
He had no power except that of his heart
He walked and talked with those of greatest stature and wealth and with those who had nothing
Rev loved his way through Our South and through our lives
Sent from my iPhone
Rev. James Orange held no office but he wielded moral power
He had no base except all of us
He had no power except that of his heart
He walked and talked with those of greatest stature and wealth and with those who had nothing
Rev loved his way through Our South and through our lives
Sent from my iPhone
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