Wednesday, January 18, 2017

The Transition from Obama to Trump Brings a Nosedive in Public Approval for the President-Elect [feedly]

The Transition from Obama to Trump Brings a Nosedive in Public Approval for the President-Elect
http://prospect.org/article/transition-obama-trump-brings-nosedive-public-approval-president

Demonstrators protest outside of the Trump Hotel during a march in downtown Washington in opposition of President-elect Donald Trump, Sunday, January 15, 2017.

Numbers can help put a change in administration into perspective. The contrast in the style of leadership between outgoing President Barack Obama and incoming President-elect Donald Trump is obvious. Six decades of polling from Gallup show something additional: the most abrupt decline ever recorded of public approval of the person in the White House.

As judged by popular opinion at the end of his term, President Obama is regarded about as well as Presidents John F. Kennedy and George H.W. Bush, and nearly as well as Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan, who historians rank in the top quartile of presidents. And Bill Clinton actually topped all recent outgoing presidents in popularity.

                                                                  

We won't have a job approval number for Trump yet until he is sworn in. But we do have a closely related survey number, his personal approval. Trump has the lowest approval rating of any incoming president in decades. In the past, presidents started out with majority approval—that even includes Richard Nixon, who is remembered for his ignominious ending in the Watergate scandal. Now, for the first time, fewer than half of Americans—43 percent—approve of the president-elect. Nixon ended up with lower approval—but Trump is not president yet, so he still has time to break that record.

The change from Obama to Trump, a drop of 14 percentage points, is a rare instance of a decrease in approval, and it is the largest decline on record. (The only transition that comes close is the 12-point drop from Reagan to the first President Bush.) Trump's low approval cuts across Republican, independent, and Democratic voters. Usually, new presidents pick up near-unanimous support from their own party and muster close to one-third of the opposition. But Trump is lagging by 10 to 20 percentage points in all three groups. Perhaps it is for this reason that Trump says that his support among Democrats "will only get higher."

Many people attribute Trump's victory to Hillary Clinton's low personal favorability. However, her low numbers reflect a more general trend that is not specific to her: The net favorability of major-party candidates, defined as favorable minus unfavorable, has declined precipitously over the last 60 years among both winners and losers.

From 1952 to 1976, candidates had a median rating of 58 percent net favorable, which means that with only a few exceptions, both winning and losing candidates still had the public's high regard. But from 2004 to 2012, that regard deteriorated: Candidates dropped to a median of 23 percent net favorable. And in 2016, for the first time, both the Democratic and Republican candidate had higher unfavorable than favorable numbers—a negative net favorability.

This decline is a major symptom of the polarization that has gripped U.S. politics for decades. Increasingly, voters see the opposition as totally unacceptable. Under such conditions, it becomes harder to detect genuine differences in candidates or to act upon them. High negatives make crossover voting unthinkable.

Consider the public's view of the two most recently defeated major-party presidential candidates. As measured by Gallup, the public viewed both Mitt Romney and Clinton, who both lost by only narrowly margins, as negatively as it viewed Barry Goldwater in 1964 and George McGovern in 1972, who both lost by wide margins. Under today's polarized conditions, a losing presidential candidate in a close election faces as much public disapproval as yesterday's landslide loser.

Obama's high approval ratings today are especially impressive in light of the general decline in favorability of partisan political leaders. But Obama may be looking better to people as they contemplate Trump's move into the Oval Office.

Half of Americans are skeptical about Trump's readiness for the presidency. This is a 30-point decrease in confidence from the public's view of the three previous presidents-elect, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama. Majorities express doubt about Trump's ability to prevent major scandals, use military force wisely, or handle an international crisis. In contrast, substantial majorities of Americans thought Hillary Clinton did have these abilities—but Trump still won enough votes to scratch out an electoral win.

Elections are supposed to produce presidents who at least start out with majority public support. This year, Americans are getting a president with the shakiest base of public approval in modern history. If those low ratings continue or worsen, it will be interesting to see how Congress deals with a president who enjoys so little trust from the public at large.

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Summers: Public Infrastructure Investment in the National Interest [feedly]

Public Infrastructure Investment in the National Interest
http://larrysummers.com/2017/01/16/public-infrastructure-investment-in-the-national-interest/

On Monday, I gave a speech at Brookings and then had a discussion with my Harvard colleague Ed Glaeser on aspects of infrastructure investment.  Here are the links to the video and transcript.  While for reasons described below I believe the Trump campaign proposals are wholly ill conceived, I remain convinced that an increased and improved program of public infrastructure investment would be very much in the American national interest.  The case for public investment today rests largely on grounds of long run policy and microeconomic efficiency given the sub-5 percent unemployment rate.

My remarks and conversation with Ed focused on five main issues.

First, improved infrastructure has benefits that go well beyond what is picked up in standard rate of return on investment calculations.  Because infrastructure is integrative, we often fail to fully understand the benefits of investment.

Nonquantitative historians are convinced that the Transcontinental railroad played a crucial role in American history.  They believe it permitted the integration of the West and more broadly drew our nation together. This idea was famously challenged by Nobel Prize economist Robert Fogel in his doctoral dissertation.  Fogel pointed out that transport was only a small percent of GDP and that the railroad was only a certain percent cheaper than canals so the contribution to economic growth had to be small.  I suspect this calculation, which mirrors the ones usually done in evaluating infrastructure projects like high-speed rail, misses the benefits of integrative infrastructure in spurring investment and promoting agglomeration by increasing the range over which the best firms can expand and compete.  My bet is that the railroad project in fact was very important for the American economy.  I suspect something similar can be said on a global basis about the Suez or Panama Canal projects.

There is a broader point as well.  Investments in a location can be divided between those that have "spill-out consequences" and those that have "pull-in" effects.  Investments in new science for example has benefits that spread out widely, as do investments in educating children some of whom inevitably migrate.  Investments in infrastructure on the other hand have benefits that are local to where the investment takes place and are likely to attract other investments. For example Dulles airport and its successive expansions has been a huge spur to the economic development of Northern Virginia.  At a time of resurgent interest in the national dimension of economic success, infrastructure projects have the virtue that their benefits are very much concentrated where the investments take place.

Second, there is a particularly compelling case for maintenance investment.  Ed and I agreed that there was a presumption that this should be the case since all of the incentives facing political decision makers work against adequate maintenance.  Deferred maintenance liabilities are largely unmeasured, unnoticed and passed on to subsequent generations of elected officials.  No one can name a maintenance project.  The desire to come in on budget discourages what might be called "pre-maintenance," such as when the high return insulation investments got stripped out at the last moment of Harvard building projects.

The examples are pretty stark.  The American Society of Civil Engineers, who are admittedly an interested party, estimate that extra repairs costs for American automobiles each year have a cost that is the equivalent of a 75 cent a gallon gasoline tax.  As I have said many times, look at La Guardia or Kennedy airport.  I was struck many years ago by the young teacher who approached me in Oakland after as Secretary of the Treasury I gave a speech about the importance of education. She said "Secretary Summers—that was a great speech.  But the paint is chipping off the walls of this school, not off the walls at McDonald's or the movie theatre. So why should the kids believe this society thinks their education is the most important thing"  I had no good answer.

As with potentially collapsing bridges, prevention is cheaper than cure and in many cases the return on "un-derferring" maintenance far exceeds government borrowing rates.  Borrowing to finance maintenance should not be viewed as incurring a new cost but as shifting from the fast compounding liability of maintenance to the slowly compounding liability of explicit debt.  It should also be noted that inevitably one maintains what has been used, so maintenance investment is much less likely to turn out a white elephant than new infrastructure investment.

My guess is that the United States could profitably spend an additional 0.5 percent of GDP or about $1.25 trillion over the next decade on maintenance of its infrastructure.

Third, there are important new infrastructure investment projects that almost certainly have high rates of return.  I have previously used as an example the renewal of the US air traffic control system.  While vacuum tubes are no longer in use in our system, radar technology of the kind used during World War II is pervasive, and there is essentially no role for GPS in our current architecture.  The result is greater than necessary threats to safety, substantial unnecessary emission of greenhouse gases as planes circle to maintain greater than necessary distances between themselves, pervasive delays during peak travel times, and inefficient usage of airport capacity.  Current plans do not involve a satisfactory system being fully implemented until the mid 2030s.  The Treasury Department recently released a study identifying 40 projects with a combined cost in the range of $200 billion and cost-benefit ratios in the range of 2 to 10.  This does not take account for projects that take account of new technological progress.  For example, autonomous vehicle technology will create new possibilities for very high speed travel lanes.  And new developments in energy storage and transmission create potential for infrastructure technologies that will yield large social benefits by facilitating the adoption of renewable energy technologies like solar and wind, where intermittency is an important issue.  I suspect also that pervasive fast wireless will create benefits that are currently unimaginable in the same way that the Transcontinental Railroad did.

I would be very surprised if another 0.5 percent of GDP could not be profitably invested in new infrastructure over the next decade.  A $2.5 trillion program would still leave public investment at levels that are low by the standards of the post-World War II period in the United States or other countries.  Given how much less we are now spending–on the order of 3 percent of GDP — on national defense compared to the above 5 percent we spent for much of the post-War period, it is not plausible to assert that we cannot afford these investments as a nation.  Indeed, if over time infrastructure investments yield a return of even 6 percent and if government can capture even 1/6 of that return in increased tax collections, they will pay for themselves at current low levels of real interest rates.

Fourth, better infrastructure investment is as important as more infrastructure investment.  Quality is as important as Quantity.  Progressives are right to decry the inadequate level of public investment in the United States.  Conservative complaints about regulatory obstacles, problems in project selection, inefficient procurement, and inattention to the use of pricing in assuring the efficient use of infrastructure are equally valid.  The short 300 foot bridge outside my office connecting Cambridge and Boston has been under repair with substantial traffic delays for nearly 5 years. Julius Caesar built from scratch a bridge 7x as long spanning the Rhine in 9 days! Famously, it has taken longer to repair the eastern span of the Bay Bridge in San Francisco than took to build the original.  Yes, Robert Moses and his contemporaries were too heedless of the environment and the interests of local communities.  But we can surely find ways of coming to far more rapid decisions with far less promiscuously distributed veto power than is the case in much of the United States today.

There is too much pork barrel and too little cost-benefit analysis in infrastructure decision making.  Projects should be required to pass cost-benefit tests and proposals like a national infrastructure bank that would insulate a larger portion of decision-making from politics should be seriously considered.  Ed Glaeser is right that new infrastructure investment in declining areas is often a terrible idea as declining population means that these areas have if anything too much infrastructure.  And Field of Dreams— "build it and they will come" approaches do not have a very good track record.  Ways should be found to make the costs of procrastination on maintenance more salient and to institutionalize resistance to low-ball cost estimates from advocates of more visionary projects.

The goal of building rapidly at minimum cost should be the primary objective in infrastructure procurement.  Deviations from this principle should take place only with compelling justification.

Crucially, modern technology makes possible much more pricing of infrastructure usage than was once the case.  In particular, transponder technology means that usage of roads can be priced with sensitivity to exact location and time much as power is priced today.  To date, congestion pricing has been very difficult politically.  My hope is that in the same way that pricing in the environmental area was once decried as "purchased licenses to pollute" and is today quite widely accepted,  formulas can be found to introduce congestion pricing.  The benefits are potentially very large.  And it should be possible to find formulas that assure that losers are compensated.

To assert that current public investment decision-making is highly flawed should not be taken as a blanket endorsement of private sector reliance.  While there are areas where public-private partnerships are desirable, these should be approached with great caution.  The private sector often demands rates of return far greater than public sector borrowing costs, especially in the current low interest rate environment.  Insisting on private participation could well substantially raise costs without addressing major problems.

The proposals of Trump advisors Peter Navarro and Wilbur Ross to rely on tax credits to augment infrastructure investment are a textbook case of the dangers of knee-jerk private sector reliance.  These benefits would (i) largely go to developers and contractors for infrastructure projects like new pipelines that would  happen even without new incentives and so be highly regressive; (ii) raise costs by failing to reach the tax-free pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and international investors who are the most plausible sources of incremental infrastructure finance; (iii) not encourage at all the highest return maintenance projects like fixing potholes that do not yield a pecuniary return for investors; and (iv) by offering credits at an unprecedented 82 percent rate, invite all kinds of tax shelter abuse.

Fifth, while the case for expanded infrastructure investment does not depend on Keynesian stimulus or aggregate demand considerations, secular stagnation risks reinforce the argument for increased public investment.  As the previous points illustrate, there is a compelling case (wholly apart from any ideas about aggregate demand) for increased infrastructure investment.  To the extent that, as I have argued elsewhere, the industrial world is likely to be prone to a chronic excess of saving over private investment in the years ahead, this case is reinforced.  Excess saving means that very low real interest costs are likely to persist, reducing the capital cost of infrastructure investment.  While the evidence is far from conclusive, my guess is that low real borrowing costs raise the risk of bubbles and financial instability.  This argues for a shift in the policy mix, from monetary policy towards fiscal policy.  And to the extent that, because of constraints on how low interest rates can go, recessions are more frequent and protracted in the years ahead, the case for expansionary fiscal policy is reinforced.  To be clear, I do not believe that infrastructure investment can be turned on and off in response to cyclical fluctuations without big efficiency losses.  And I do not believe that there is a case for make-work projects that cannot be justified on microeconomic grounds.  There is however a case for expanded public investment on a sustained basis with financing from borrowing or taxes that varies with cyclical conditions.

There is also the consideration that infrastructure investment is likely to disproportionately benefit groups like middle-aged men with limited education who face a major structural employment problem.  One way of thinking about this is that it means the real cost of investment is lower because those working on infrastructure would otherwise have been unemployed and perhaps collecting unemployment or disability benefits. Another is to simply note that even if the economy does not face a chronic shortage of demand overall, it does face a shortage of demand for certain types of labor and policies that address this shortfall are other things equal desirable.

While President-Elect Trump's plans for infrastructure stimulus are I think misguided and likely harmful, I agree with the incoming Administration on one thing: the case for a substantially increased program of public infrastructure is undeniable.


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“Superwaiver” Would Grant Executive Branch And Governors Sweeping Authority To Override Federal Laws [feedly]

"Superwaiver" Would Grant Executive Branch And Governors Sweeping Authority To Override Federal Laws
http://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/superwaiver-would-grant-executive-branch-and-governors-sweeping

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CBO: 32 Million People Would Lose Health Coverage Under ACA Repeal [feedly]

CBO: 32 Million People Would Lose Health Coverage Under ACA Repeal
http://www.cbpp.org/blog/cbo-32-million-people-would-lose-health-coverage-under-aca-repeal

Repealing much of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) would cause 32 million people to lose coverage by 2026 and roughly double premiums in the individual insurance market, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated today.

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Trump’s Coal Plan Must Face Market Realities [feedly]

Trump's Coal Plan Must Face Market Realities
http://www.wvpolicy.org/trumps-coal-plan-must-face-market-realities/

he State Journal – Since the Nov. 8 election, visiting West Virginia has become a requirement for reporters and pundits wanting to set the baseline for measuring the success of President Donald Trump's economic policies. Read.

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Bernstein: Dr. King and full employment: some evidence [feedly]

Dr. King and full employment: some evidence
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/dr-king-and-full-employment-some-evidence/

I wanted to add some quantitative analysis to my WaPo piece from yesterday, which argued for remembering the importance Dr. King's "institutional" analysis, which gives a far greater role to power and systemic norms than your basic market-forces analysis.

I noted that Dr. King became increasingly committed to full employment—the slide below is from the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom—as evidence developed in the 1960s and 1970s was beginning to show the importance of very tight labor markets for African-Americans.

Source: History.com

Here's a bit of empirical backup. The first figure shows the Census Bureau's series of black and white real median family incomes against the unemployment rate. The cyclicality of the series is evident, but there are only a few episodes wherein very low unemployment persisted for a few years: mainly in the 1960s and 1990s, periods associated with rising median incomes for blacks and whites.

Sources: Census, BLS

In fact, a simple regression of the log change in real black median income on a flexible specification for the unemployment rate (at t, t-1, and squared) explains 39 percent of the variance in the dependent variable (results for whites are similar), more than you might expect given the fact that income formation is a pretty complex phenomenon.

Turning to low incomes, Census also provides 20th percentile family incomes by race, though the data for blacks begins in the mid-1960s. Not only did black incomes shoot up in the full employment 1990s, but they grew faster than white low incomes, partially closing the racial income gap at the 20th percentile.

Source: Census

Applying the same model just noted to black 20th percentile real incomes and forecasting the series based only on unemployment shows a remarkably good fit given the simplicity of the model (the forecast is "dynamic," meaning the forecast using predicted, not actual, values for changes in the DV, a tougher test of the model's accuracy).

Source: Census, BLS, my analysis

OK, some caveats. One reason many economic indicators for blacks were so positive in the 1990s had to do with the disproportionate share of working-age African-Americans in prison, and thus left out of the data (a "selection bias"). And as I stressed in the WaPo piece, tight job markets make it more costly to discriminate; they don't eradicate discrimination.

This final chart provides a simple way to underscore this last point. It is widely known that the black unemployment rate tends to be twice that of the white rate, but many assume that this is largely due to the lower educational attainment of African-Americans. In fact, black unemployment is higher for every education group. The relative difference is somewhat larger for high-school or less, but the figure reminds us that even were blacks to achieve education parity with whites, their jobless rates would likely remain higher.

Source: BLS

These are both highly relevant caveats re the impact of discrimination and the criminal justice system, but they do not change the fact that it takes persistently very tight labor markets to give black workers the bargaining clout they need to get ahead, a fact Dr. King picked up on long ago.

Especially as team Trump takes the field, it's especially important for the Federal Reserve to keep these racial dynamics forefront in their plans for balancing full employment and price pressures. Preemptive rate hikes may well dampen or even reverse the real gains blacks (and whites) just started making, as can be seen at the end of the above figures.

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