Sunday, January 15, 2017

Krugman: "Infrastructure Delusions" [feedly]



---- http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2017/01/krugman-infrastructure-delusions.html?m=1


Krugman: "Infrastructure Delusions"
// Calculated Risk

From Professor Krugman: Infrastructure Delusions

Ben Bernanke has a longish post about fiscal policy ... Notably, Bernanke, like yours truly, argues that the fiscal-stimulus case for deficit spending has gotten much weaker, but there's still a case for borrowing to build infrastructure:

When I was Fed chair, I argued on a number of occasions against fiscal austerity (tax increases, spending cuts). The economy at the time was suffering from high unemployment, and with monetary policy operating close to its limits, I pushed (unsuccessfully) for fiscal policies to increase aggregate demand and job creation. Today, with the economy approaching full employment, the need for demand-side stimulus, while perhaps not entirely gone, is surely much less than it was three or four years ago. There is still a case for fiscal policy action today, but to increase output without unduly increasing inflation the focus should be on improving productivity and aggregate supply—for example, through improved public infrastructure that makes our economy more efficient or tax reforms that promote private capital investment.

But he gently expresses doubt that this kind of thing is actually going to happen:

In particular, will Republicans be willing to support big increases in spending, including infrastructure spending? Alternatively, if Congress opts to reduce the deficit impact of an infrastructure program by financing it through tax credits and public-private partnerships, as candidate Trump proposed, the program might turn out to be relatively small.

Let me be less gentle: there will be no significant public investment program, for two reasons.

CR Note: Just after the election, I noted that members of Mr. Trump's team had been talking about a $1 trillion infrastructure plan. However the infrastructure proposal really was a proposal for about $100 billion in tax credits to spur private investment in infrastructure. The $1 trillion in infrastructure investment was the projected size of the private investment, not the proposed government spending. This proposal is actually very modest in terms of a fiscal boost. Also, if this becomes a privatization scheme, then there might be a modest short term boost, but the long term impact would be negative.
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Cost of Vice? [feedly]

http://ritholtz.com/2017/01/forbidden-cost-vice/

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Cost of Vice?
// The Big Picture

Interesting tally of the world's cheapest and most expensive places to buy drugs, alcohol, weed, etc.:   click for ginormous graphic Source: Bloomberg  

The post Cost of Vice? appeared first on The Big Picture.


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Americans support Bernie Sanders economic policies

Friday, January 13, 2017

A tale of two states (and what it tells us about so-called “right-to-work” laws) [feedly]


http://www.epi.org/blog/a-tale-of-two-states-and-what-it-tells-us-about-so-called-right-to-work-laws/
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A tale of two states (and what it tells us about so-called "right-to-work" laws)
// Economic Policy Institute Blog

In 2011 and 2012 two states, New Hampshire and Indiana, debated the same bill: so-called "right-to-work" legislation, pushed by corporate lobbyists and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), designed to weaken unions financially and pave the way for greater corporate dominance of state politics. New Hampshire's governor vetoed the bill in 2011. Indiana, by contrast, enacted it in 2012. It is instructive to compare the two states. By almost any measure, the economy of New Hampshire is stronger and its citizens are better off, on average, than the citizens of Indiana. Right-to-work did not improve the Indiana economy relative to New Hampshire's, and no one should be fooled into thinking that passing right-to-work now will improve the New Hampshire economy.

So-called "right-to-work" laws prohibits unions and employers from agreeing to collective bargaining agreements that require employees covered by the agreement to pay their fair share of the costs of negotiating and enforcing it. The only right that "right-to-work" creates is the right for free riders to get the benefit of higher union wages and protections against unfair discipline without contributing any dues or fees for that privilege.

EPI published two reports critical of the New Hampshire legislation, one in 2011 and another in 2012, pointing out that the only real purpose and effects of these laws are lowering wages and weakening unions. As the figure below suggests, such laws do nothing to create jobs, and they don't give anyone a right to work, but they are associated with lower wages—lower on average by more than 3 percent, or $1,500 per worker.

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Sen. Tom Cotton misses the mark on immigration and wages [feedly]



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Sen. Tom Cotton misses the mark on immigration and wages
// Economic Policy Institute Blog

http://www.epi.org/blog/sen-tom-cotton-misses-the-mark-on-immigration-and-wages/

Senator Tom Cotton's (R-Ark.) recent NY Times op-ed on immigration—"Fix Immigration. It's What Voters Want."—gets a few things right, but the ultimate analysis is off the mark. Cotton's thesis is that immigrants have flooded the labor market to such an extent that immigration is primarily to blame for decades of wage stagnation. Immigration does sometimes have negative impacts on American workers—and we need to be clear about who the economic winners and losers are—but contrary to Cotton's claims, there is scant evidence that immigration overall has kept wages low. Furthermore, Cotton ignores the real reasons wages have failed to rise for so many American workers.

But first, credit where credit is due.

Sen. Cotton deserves credit for calling out businesses that warn of looming labor shortages in low-skilled jobs despite any observable evidence that this is imminent (while research shows the opposite has been true during at least the past decade). Cotton claims, however, that these businesses mainly support immigration so that they can add additional workers to the labor market in order to lower wages. There's a kernel of truth in that, but in reality, employers care more about hiring workers without power or a voice in the workplace; that's what puts downward pressure on wages in low-skilled jobs.

Most Americans do want immigration fixed. They reject a system that leaves families terrified of separation because they fear deportation of undocumented moms, dads, brothers, and sisters, even if they've resided in the United States for decades and have jobs and (otherwise) clean criminal records. Cotton doesn't mention any of this. He instead laments a "generation-long influx of low-skilled immigrants that undermines American workers."

The real problem isn't immigration, it's a legal framework that leaves all low-wage workers and millions of migrant workers—both authorized and unauthorized—vulnerable to wage theft and exploitation. We have allowed employers to race to the bottom toward lower and lower labor standards.

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Re: [socialist-econ] Re: Past doesn't have to be prologue to future

Sam my friend, please don't drag Bernie down this rabbit hole of condemnation of the "left" where you recall what you think is bad behavior by a few and ascribe to all. 

Bernie had nothing to do with Hillary's loss. 

NOTHING!!!!!

All Bernie did was highlight inequality and define the interests of most Americans including class interests and wake up a new progressive constituency. 

We've been working for the movement Bernie brought to life. 

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 13, 2017, at 3:16 PM, John Case <jcase4218@gmail.com> wrote:

Unfortunately, the  horse Sam is beating is Sam. And left wing finger pointing is all this post is itself about. It's feet are firmly planted in that five or six word long multi-thingy "coalition" fiction that has as much substance as a passing rain cloud of thought patterns. From the raincloud, allegedly a "wide-angle" viewpoint, only Hillary's campaign passed muster as a standard-bearer against the ultra right, while Bernie is now openly blamed as the too-class-conscious "weakness" that drained support from Hillary. A shameful position,. IMO, I won't bother to debate. O, and no more "class against class", "them and us", or walking picket lines, like Bernie does. From the multi-thingy raincloud of thought patterns perspective, even Piketty, and the immense data accumulating on the ravages and dynamics of inequality are all wet, and opaque. 

SUMMARY: From a "coalition" position firmly planted in mid air, Sam says : stay behind Hillary's 70 million voters.





On Jan 13, 2017 1:41 PM, "Samuel Webb" <swebb1945@gmail.com> wrote:
Here is a new post (http://samwebb.org/). Attempt to raise some questions of a strategic nature.  Likely more than a few will disagree with its direction. Would be curious to hear what you think.

Anyway, have a good weekend. Sam

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The Fed and fiscal policy [feedly]



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The Fed and fiscal policy
// Ben Bernanke's Blog

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2017/01/13/the-fed-and-fiscal-policy/

Markets have responded strongly to Donald Trump's election victory, pushing up equities, longer-term interest rates, and the dollar. While many factors influence asset prices, expectations of a much more expansionary fiscal policy under the new administration—higher spending, lower taxes, and larger deficits—appear to be an important driver of the recent market moves.

The Federal Reserve's reaction to prospective fiscal policy changes has been much more cautious than that of the markets, however. Janet Yellen in December described the central bank as operating under a "cloud of uncertainty," and the forecasts of Fed policymakers released after the December FOMC meeting showed little change in either their economic outlooks or their interest-rate projections for the next few years. How does the Fed take fiscal policy into account in its planning? What explains the large difference between the reactions of the Fed and the markets to the change in fiscal prospects since the election? I'll discuss these questions in this post, concluding that the Fed's cautious response to the possible fiscal shift makes sense, given what we know so far.

Incorporating possible fiscal policy changes into the economic forecast

As a general matter, Fed policymakers view economic or policy developments through the prism of their economic forecast. Developments that push the forecasted path of the economy away from the Fed's employment and inflation objectives require a compensating policy response; other changes do not. Consequently, to assess the appropriate monetary response to a new fiscal program, Fed policymakers first have to evaluate the likely effects of that program on the economy over the next couple of years.

Fiscal policy influences the economy through many channels. The econometric models used at the Fed for constructing forecasts tend to summarize fiscal effects in terms of changes in aggregate demand or aggregate supply. For example, a rise in spending on public infrastructure, or a tax cut that prompts consumers to spend more, increases demand. Fiscal policies also affect aggregate supply, for example, through the incentives provided by the tax code. To project the impact of a proposed fiscal package on the economy, Fed modelers and policymakers must assess the size and timing of these demand and supply effects, which they do based both on theory and historical experience. 

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The effects of a fiscal program also depend on the state of the economy when the program is put in place. When I was Fed chair, I argued on a number of occasions against fiscal austerity (tax increases, spending cuts). The economy at the time was suffering from high unemployment, and with monetary policy operating close to its limits, I pushed (unsuccessfully) for fiscal policies to increase aggregate demand and job creation. Today, with the economy approaching full employment, the need for demand-side stimulus, while perhaps not entirely gone, is surely much less than it was three or four years ago. There is still a case for fiscal policy action today, but to increase output without unduly increasing inflation the focus should be on improving productivity and aggregate supply—for example, through improved public infrastructure that makes our economy more efficient or tax reforms that promote private capital investment.

The Fed's reaction to the prospective fiscal program

While it's hard to know how much of the market's optimism reflects expected policy changes under the new administration, the rise in equities, interest rates, and the dollar since the election is precisely the configuration that standard macroeconomics would predict in anticipation of a Trump-backed fiscal expansion. (A similar pattern occurred in the early Reagan years, which was dominated by tax cuts, increased military spending, higher deficits, and rate increases by the Federal Reserve.) According to the minutes of the December 13-14 Fed meeting, monetary policymakers were quite aware of the market's expectations for fiscal policy, and the staff included in its forecast a "provisional assumption" of a more expansionary fiscal stance. And yet, in the Summary of Economic Projections, meeting participants made few changes to their economic outlook. Notably, at the median, expected real growth was raised by only 0.1 percent for 2017, relative to the September projection, and no change was made for expected growth in 2018. No change at all was made to the median inflation projections for 2017 or 2018. The median path for the Fed's policy interest rate included just one additional rate increase over the next two years—a small adjustment, probably reflecting changes by only a few participants.

Why was the Fed's reaction to the prospective fiscal changes so limited, in contrast to the ebullience of the markets? The minutes, as well as subsequent comments by Fed speakers, suggest several reasons:

1. In the face of substantial uncertainty, Fed policymakers often opt for a cautious approach.

As a general matter, Fed policymakers prefer not to whipsaw markets if at all possible. Consequently, and reasonably enough, FOMC participants want to have a strong rationale before signaling a change in their strategy, even tentatively. At this point, the outlook for fiscal policy is much too hazy to prompt such a shift.

Indeed, the format of the Summary of Economic Projections encourages a cautious approach. As I discussed here, FOMC projections are for modal or "most likely" scenarios. Perhaps FOMC participants saw a big fiscal program as a possible outcome but not the most likely scenario.[1] Consistent with that, in December, meeting participants saw increased "upside risks" to their projections. Since asset prices generally reflect an average of possible outcomes rather than just the most likely possibility, the focus of Fed projections on modal outcomes can help explain at least some part of the discrepancy between the apparent caution of monetary policymakers and the surge in asset prices.

2. Based on what is known now, it's not clear that the near-term macroeconomic effects of fiscal changes will be large, even if major legislation passes.



Author



Ben S. Bernanke

Distinguished Fellow in Residence - Economic Studies

BenBernanke

For assessing the effects of a fiscal program on near-term growth, the details—few of which are currently available—matter a lot. According to the minutes, FOMC participants in the December meeting expressed considerable uncertainty about the "timing, size, and composition" of a prospective fiscal package. But I suspect that in thinking through possible fiscal scenarios, Fed policymakers saw many as suggesting a fiscal program with less near-term economic impact than markets appear to be assuming.

Regarding the size and composition of the program: One key source of uncertainty is political. Passage of new fiscal measures will be made more likely by the facts that Republicans control both the House and the Senate, and that under some circumstances budget bills can pass the Senate with only a simple majority. Still, there are questions. For example, many congressional Republicans have been vocal deficit hawks; will they accept a big fiscal package, if it results in a substantial increase in the federal budget deficit? In particular, will Republicans be willing to support big increases in spending, including infrastructure spending? Alternatively, if Congress opts to reduce the deficit impact of an infrastructure program by financing it through tax credits and public-private partnerships, as candidate Trump proposed, the program might turn out to be relatively small.

Significant tax cuts do seem likely this year, but again the details matter. Structural reforms of the corporate tax codes are being considered, but the range of possible outcomes is wide. Based on what we've heard both from Trump and from congressional Republicans, personal tax cuts, especially for higher-income households, are likely to be a big part of the program, and probably the easiest part on which to reach agreement. However, whatever the longer-term benefits of tax reform, high-income consumers may save much of any tax cut they receive, implying that the effects on demand of such cuts are likely to be smaller than the effects of direct government spending.

Regarding timing: No one knows at this point how long Congress will take to pass legislation—fiscal changes can be both complex and contentious. And, once passed, fiscal programs can take a while to have their effect (infrastructure programs, for example, can take a number of years to build out). Consequently, the impact of new fiscal measures may be felt in 2018 or 2019, rather than this year. Of course, that gives the Fed more time to assess the program and determine an appropriate response.

3. Other policy changes will also have economic effects, which may reinforce or offset the fiscal effects.

The president-elect proposed policy changes in many areas, not just in fiscal policy. Some proposed changes, such as plans for deregulation, seem to have been positive for business and market sentiment, but others may work in the opposite direction. For example, the possibility of new trade barriers or even trade wars concerns some businesspeople, and changes to health care policy are likely to create both winners and losers. Overall, according to the December minutes, some of the business contacts consulted by Fed policymakers "thought that their businesses could benefit from possible changes in federal spending, tax, and regulatory policies, while others were uncertain about the outlook for significant government policy changes or were concerned that their businesses might be adversely affected by some of the proposals under discussion."

The minutes are not explicit, but it's possible that FOMC participants also considered the international implications—and the resulting feedback effects on the US—of Trump policy proposals. For example, the Mexican peso and stock prices have already been adversely affected by concerns about prospective US trade and immigration policies. Heightened international stresses would have implications for the US growth outlook as well.

4. Asset price changes may limit the effects of a fiscal program on the pace of growth.

Financial markets are forward-looking, and, as I've discussed, asset prices have already built in expectations of a strongly expansionary fiscal stance in the next few years. However, the changes in asset prices themselves may partially offset the effects of the eventual fiscal program on economic growth. For example, all else equal, the increase in longer-term interest rates since the election may reduce investment spending, including home construction, and the stronger dollar could prove a headwind for exports. (On the other hand, higher equity prices would tend to support higher rates of consumer and business spending.) In the Fed staff forecasts for the December meeting, according to the minutes, the positive effects of assumed fiscal changes on growth and inflation were "substantially counterbalanced" by the restraining effects of higher longer-term interest rates and the stronger dollar.

Overall, there appear to be good reasons for the Fed to remain cautious about incorporating a major new fiscal expansion into the economic outlook, and thus anticipating more-rapid increases in short-term interest rates than previously projected. Because of uncertainty about the timing, size, and composition of the fiscal package, and the resulting uncertainty about its likely economic effects, Fed policymakers are, for now, sticking to their baseline forecast and treating a big fiscal program as an "upside risk." As the outlines of the Trump administration's fiscal policy become clear, the Fed's projections—and its actual policy—will adjust accordingly.

[1] Indeed, according to the minutes, only about half of the FOMC participants assumed any fiscal changes at all in their baseline projections.

Comments are welcome, but because of the volume, we only post selected comments. 

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