Friday, October 28, 2016

How to tell apart trade agreements that undermine democratic principles from those that don't [feedly]

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How to tell apart trade agreements that undermine democratic principles from those that don't
// *Dani Rodrik's* weblog

I discussed in an earlier post on Brexit how to think about international agreements and the constraints on state action they entail in terms of democratic legitimacy. Since that discussion has relevance beyond Brexit, I've pasted the relevant part here below. The basic point is this: the fact that an international rule is negotiated and accepted by a democratically elected government does not inherently make that rule democratically legitimate.

The optimistic argument has been best formulated by the political scientists Bob Keohane, Steve Macedo and Andy Moravcsik. They point there are various ways in which global rules can enhance democracy -- a process that they call “democracy enhancing multilateralism.” Democracies have various mechanisms for restricting the autonomy or the policy space of decision makers. For example, democratically elected parliaments often delegate power to independent or quasi-independent autonomous bodies. Central banks are often independent and there are various other kinds of checks and balances in constitutional democracies. Similarly, global rules can make it easier for national democracies to attain the goals that they pursue even if they entail some restrictions in terms of autonomy. Keohane at al. discuss three specific mechanisms: global rules can enhance democracy by offsetting factions, protecting minority rights, or by enhancing the quality of democratic deliberation.

However, just because globalization can enhance democracy does not mean that it always does so. In fact there are many ways in which global governance works in quite the opposite way from that described by Keohane et al. Anti-dumping rules, for example, augment protectionist interests. Rules on intellectual property rights and copyrights have privileged pharmaceuticals companies and Disney against the general interest. Similarly, there are many ways in which globalization actually harms rather than enhances the quality of democratic deliberation. For example, preferential or multilateral trade agreements are often simply voted up or down in national parliaments with little discussion, simply because they are international agreements. Globalization-enhancing global rules and democracy-enhancing global rules may have some overlap; but they are not one and the same thing.

More broadly, international commitments can be used to tie the hands of governments in both democratically legitimate and illegitimate ways. External discipline can be sought in two different kinds of settings--one of which is much more defensible on the traditional democratic delegation grounds than the other.

Consider first the case where the government faces a "time-inconsistency" problem. It would like to commit to free trade or to fiscal balance, but realizes that over time it will give in to pressure and deviate from what is its optimal policy ex ante. So it chooses to tie its hands through external discipline. This way, when protectionists and big spenders show up at its door, the government says: "sorry, the WTO or the IMF will not let me do it." Everyone is better off, save for the lobbyists and special interests. This is the good kind of delegation and external discipline.

Now consider the second kind. Here, the government fears not its future self, but its future opponents: the opposition party (or parties). The latter may have different views on economic policy, and if victorious in the next election, may well choose to shift course. Now when the incumbent government enters an international agreement, it does so to tie the hands of its opponents. From an ex-ante welfare standpoint, this strategy has much less to recommend itself. The future government may have better or worse ideas about government policy, and it is not clear that restricting its policy space is a win-win outcome. This kind of external discipline has much less democratic legitimacy because, once again, it privileges one set of interests against others.

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Prospects for the Spanish Left [feedly]

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Prospects for the Spanish Left
// TripleCrisis

William Saas, Jorge Amar, David Glotzer, and Scott Ferguson

This is the first part of a three-part series on Spain’s economic crisis, the program of the new leftist political party Podemos, and both the limitations and potential of the Spanish left today. The authors point to the importance of employment policy (and especially a job guarantee) for pulling Spain out of the crisis, the necessity of a “left exit” (lexit) from the euro, and the relevance of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) in transcending conventional balanced-budget thinking.

William O. Saas is an assistant professor of rhetoric at Louisiana State University. His work has appeared in symplokē and Rhetoric & Public Affairs.

Jorge Amar is a Spanish economist, president of Asociación por el Pleno Empleo y la Estabilidad de Precios, or Full Employment and Price Stability Association), and a doctoral candidate in applied economics at the Universidad Valencia. Recently, Amar served as economic advisor for Spain’s Unidad Popular party.

David Glotzer is a valuation analyst at Solidifi, and freelance writer whose background is in Economics and Mathematics. His writings have appeared in CounterPunch, Investig’Action, Strategic Culture Foundation, and Young Progressive Voices.

Scott Ferguson is an assistant professor of humanities and dultural studies at the University of South Florida. He is also a Research Scholar at the Binzagr Institute for Sustainable Prosperity. His essays have appeared in CounterPunch, Naked Capitalism, and Flassbeck Economics International.

They are beautiful sights, the public squares of Madrid—open spaces, lush gardens, and sparkling fountains, all surrounded by striking architecture dating from the city’s days as seat of a colonial empire. These ornate public spaces now serve as makeshift residences for a growing number of Spanish dispossessed. After nearly a decade of austerity, depression, chronic unemployment, and perpetual political submission to the dictates of the Troika (the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, and European Commission), thousands displaced from work and home are left with little choice but to seek refuge in the few parcels of public infrastructure that remain available to them.

Improvisation is the name of the game for members of the new Spanish precariat. At Madrid’s main square, the Plaza Mayor, newly homeless citizens (some highly educated) rise early for work busking or selling scrap metal. Throughout the country, members of the growing reserve army of ninis—or “neither nors,” the quarter of the young Spanish who are neither in school, nor employed, nor in training programs—forage for food to take home to their squatted apartments. Los irrecuperables (“unrecoverables”), the more than half of long-term unemployed Spanish over age 50, are meanwhile forced to figure out how to subsist on severely reduced pensions and the charity of their fellows.

The homeless, ninis, and irrecuperables are not alone in their plight. Indeed, stability and security elude even the employed afortunados in austerian Spain. Recent labor law reforms, first passed by the center-left (and resolutely neoliberal) Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and then expanded by the conservative People’s Party (PP), have eroded workers’ rights and enabled employers to seize an even larger share of national income. Wages and benefits are taking a beating, too. Total worker compensation fell from about €523 million in 2007 to less than €510 million in 2015. Even as unemployment has risen, total spending on unemployment benefits has fallen more than 25%. Temporary work is replacing traditional employment, with the average length of contract falling from 77 days in 2008 to 57 by 2014. (Formal contracts between employer and employee are legally required in Spain.) Part-time work constitutes one third of all labor contracts. Finally, the percentage of unpaid overtime rose from less than 40% in 2008  to over 55% in 2015—a sum equal to the lost income of approximately 87,000 full-time jobs.

Nearly 30% of the Spanish population is currently classified by the Unión General de Trabajadores (General Union of Workers, or UGT) as “at risk” of poverty. Any may consider joining the estimated 700,000 Spaniards who have fled the country to find marginal employment elsewhere. Most will opt to stay, however, knowing full well that that they are not welcome in other EU countries, and that their prospects would not improve by much in any of those countries, anyway.

What relief does the Spanish left have to offer a population so imperiled? The simple answer is: not much. On the one hand, the PSOE has consistently—if not exclusively—made things worse for Spain over the last decade. That the PSOE is presently in the throes of a slow and torturous death spiral is no consolation for the years of impoverishment and despair that resulted from the party’s servile deference to the Troika’s commands. On the other hand, the slick façade of the only-slightly-further-left Podemos makes poor cover for the purple party’s own orthodox underbelly. In the face of all evidence to the contrary, Podemos leadership appears convinced that “balanced budgets” are the best remedy for Spain’s economic ills. As recent elections have demonstrated, Spanish voters were less than inspired by Podemos’ master plan to squeeze more euros out of domestic businesses and middle-class families in order to facilitate increases in public spending. A similar plan—to transcend austerity through more efficient tax collection—has clearly not worked out well for Syriza and the Greeks. Spaniards simply want—and deserve—better.

The far left coalition, the United Left (UL), would give it to them, were it in a position to do so. While Podemos’ top economist Nacho Álvarez advocates for better tax enforcement as the key to achieving a more symmetrical balance sheet, Eduardo Garzón, economic advisor to UL and researcher at the Fundación por la Europa de los Ciudadanos, argues that a municipal jobs guarantee program is the only viable path to renewed Spanish prosperity. For Álvarez, the vital first steps to recovery are to “reduce the deficit more slowly” and to “broaden the tax base.” For Garzón, deficits and taxes are secondary to the need for “construction of a new alternative economic model that puts the current economy at the service of the people.” The disparity of ambition between the proposals of Álvarez and Garzón—an archaic and conservative accounting target for the former, a progressive full-employment agenda for the latter—is stark. Of the two, only one bears any real chance of achieving meaningful relief for the Spanish working class. Unfortunately, the force of Garzón’s rejoinder to Álvarez’s plan for functional-in-name-only finance is presently attenuated by UL’s minority position in the Podemos-led Unidos Podemos (“United We Can”) coalition, where the spirit of “sound finance” otherwise prevails unabated. Moreover, the very public conflict between Podemos’ top officials—“number one” Pablo Iglesias and “number two” Íñigo Errejón—makes for splashier headlines than does news of disagreement within the coalition regarding how best to escape from austerity.

The Jobs Guarantee

A “jobs guarantee” program is the best political tool for breathing new life into the Spanish economy. A proposal of this kind was presented to the Spanish parliament in 2014. Designed by Eduardo Garzón and presented to parliament by his brother, Alberto Garzón, the jobs guarantee program would have put a large portion of the ninis, irrecuperables, and the homeless back to work. As opposed to the current system, under which the last to be fired is the first to be hired, the Spanish jobs guarantee program sought to put most idle labor to work immediately, involving Spain’s dispossessed in socially meaningful and adequately compensated communal projects. In accordance with MMT, meanwhile, financing for Spain’s full employment economy would not be contingent upon tax revenues or government borrowing. Unlike the short-term and revenue constrained New Deal programs deployed in the United States during the 1930s, the Spanish jobs guarantee program should be financed through direct government authorization and appear as a fixed charge on the federal balance sheet.

Garzón’s proposal suffered a resounding defeat in 2014. Deluded by the poor logic of the neoliberal consensus and a punishing phantom gold standard, opponents of the program ignored Garzón’s arguments and voted against the bill without comment (here the Spanish saying, “no hay mayor desprecio que no hacer aprecio” or, there is no bigger contempt than not listening at all, is apt). It is also worth noting that, had the jobs guarantee been implemented under the aegis of the EU’s budget rules, the policy’s overall impact would have been severely limited by the fiscal straitjacket of Maastricht.

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TRIPS: The Story of How Intellectual Property Became Linked to Trade [feedly]

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TRIPS: The Story of How Intellectual Property Became Linked to Trade
// TripleCrisis

This is the first part of a seven-part series with Peter Drahos, a Professor in the RegNet School of Regulation and Global Governance at the Australian National University. He holds a Chair in Intellectual Property at Queen Mary, University of London and is a member of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia. In 2004 he and his co-author Professor John Braithwaite won the Grawemeyer Award in Ideas Improving World Order for their book Global Business Regulation. Prof. Drahos is interviewed by Lynn Fries, producer at The Real News Network.

Full text below the break.

PETER DRAHOS: Think for a moment about the history of mathematics. The rules of arithmetic were created, invented, discovered many, many centuries ago in ancient civilizations in Persia, in Greece, in Egypt and later in the Great Islamic Empires. Europe was something of a late-comer, actually, to mathematics. Many Europeans of course benefit from these profound discoveries in mathematics. Imagine if Europe had to pay licensing fees to these earlier societies. How would that have affected Europe’s development?Think of the rules of addition, or the rules of division. These are things that you learned as a child – multiplication tables. They’re driven by algorithms. The rule of arithmetic – lying behind them – are algorithms. So think of an algorithm of addition, for example, X + O = X. Every day we use that rule. We do mental calculations in our head. Everyday trillions of calculations are performed by computers using the algorithm of addition. An intellectual property owner could lay claim to an algorithm. So the social consequences of creating a private property right in something as important as the algorithms for addition are very, very profound.

LYNN FRIES: Welcome to TRN, I’m LF in Geneva. That was a clip from a talk on Understanding IP by Peter Drahos. How intellectual property rights got linked to trade is the story of TRIPS. Current trade deals like the Transpacific Partnership, TTIP, CETA are TRIPS-plus. So what’s TRIPS? The most important IP agreement of the 20th century, TRIPS was a trade agreement. TRIPS stands for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, a World Trade Organization agreement; Two key words being, trade related which in one fell swoop, integrated intellectual property into the world system of trade and so globalized intellectual property rights. On the first of January, 1995 TRIPS literally came into force as it criminalized any infringement of its IP standards. Standards that define knowledge as private property needing criminal protection from theft, much like a car. TRIPS-plus trade deals push harder & further for more & more. Peter Drahos says the role of free trade agreements is to expand intellectual property’s empire.Joining us from Australia to explain the story of IP linked to trade is Peter Drahos. Peter Drahos is a Professor at the Australian National University, the School of Regulation & Global Governance. He holds the Chair in Intellectual Property at Queen Mary, the University of London. Peter Drahos is co-author with John Braithewaite of Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? and the award winning Global Business Regulation. Welcome Peter.

DRAHOS: Thank you Lynn. I’m very glad to be here.

FRIES: Let’s start with some big picture context on TRIPS.

DRAHOS: Yes, intellectual property or TRIPS was part of a much broader agenda. And this agenda had really been laid out by the OECD back in the 1960s and early 1970s. In which a lot of these ideas for transforming the world economy were thought about and written about.The idea was really to free the world in terms of capital investment. So the idea was that capital could move wherever it liked and obtain the most favorable circumstances that it could. Now the problem with that is that a lot of regulation has to be removed along the way in order for that to happen. Because obviously not all countries are equally wealthy. Some countries for example regulate prices of patents. That was something that the pharmaceutical industry was opposed to. They really wanted unregulated patent prices. And of course the effect of that is to raise the price of medicines. So if you are really committed to the idea of capital moving freely throughout the world without any restrictions the implication for national sovereignty is pretty profound.TRIPS is probably the most significant agreement of the 20th century. There were a lot of them but TRIPS really created a global platform for multinationals. Every country that joins the WTO, the World Trade Organization, has to comply with TRIPS.The TRIPS case study I think it’s a very important study in how a trade negotiation fails citizens. Because it was conducted in secrecy. Consumers weren’t present but even more importantly it was drafted by the corporations themselves because corporations have a lot of technical expertise. That have patent attorneys. They have intellectual property lawyers that are advising them. And so they were actually able to draft clauses, in fact, there was an entire draft agreement that was tabled by the Intellectual Property Committee before negotiators in the late 1980s. And essentially multinationals from Japan and from Europe and from the United States said to world governments this is what we want.So it’s not just a case of simple lobbying. It’s a very sophisticated form of global networking in which actual text produced to influence what are ultimately public laws. So the idea that private power drafts laws that we all have to abide by is something that should worry people in democracies.

FRIES: You’ve written extensively that a corporate elite has played the knowledge game for over a century but wanted to change the rules of the game several decades back. And that the appointment of Edmund Pratt to Pfizer as CEO in the 1970s was a key event in making it happen. Talk about that.

DRAHOS: Well I think the Pfizer story is a really interesting story about how one can change the world. How individuals can change the world. So we often talk about globalization as this abstract thing but what we don’t realize is that individuals have important ideas. Now in the case of Pfizer & Edmund Pratt as well as the consultants that he hired or that gave him advise their big idea was to stick intellectual property into trade agreements. It’s a simple but very, very powerful idea. So the whole significance of this story in a way lies in the fact that individuals change the rules of the game. Globalization is not just an abstract force. People make our world and they make it in response to certain values or goals that they have.

FRIES: Talk about the key players and their agenda.

DRAHOS: The key players were the pharmaceutical industry because they were amongst the first companies to internationalize. They saw the possibility of markets in poorer countries like India & China. But aside from pharmaceutical companies there were also telecommunications companies or what we now broadly understand to be information technology companies because they could see the importance of global markets. Agricultural companies, companies that related in farm related activities like Monsanto. But as well automotive and manufacturing companies such as General Electric. Companies that essentially took out a lot of patents. And of course, then there were the cultural industries. So the movie industry for example where obviously the United States had a lot of important interests because of its very strong motion picture industry.So there were a range of industries that came to understand that they would do better if they could strengthen their monopolies. It’s not that they didn’t already have intellectual property rights. They did. But what they wanted was to strengthen them far more. They essentially wanted to turn knowledge which is a public good into a private good. It’s a kind of simple but powerful idea.A way to think about it is say look knowledge is inherently a public good. Knowledge basically just diffuses throughout the world. It has for most of human history. The reason we have the equality in the world that we do is because knowledge has moved around. People have learned how to do things from other people.So TRIPS was really about eliminating competitors. So for example, the Indian generic industry was able to manufacture high quality products that people all around the world benefited from. So the idea that the US pharmaceutical industry had was that it could use TRIPS to impose product patents on Indian pharmaceutical manufacturers. The motion picture industry saw a way of strengthening copyright. And very importantly the big advantage of sticking intellectual property rights into a trade agreement was that the GATT or the WTO as we now know it had an enforcement mechanism. So that you basically had a means of enforcing these rights if countries did not comply with the standards. That was the real power behind the idea. That you basically could retaliate against countries using your trade defense tools. Whatever they happen to be.

FRIES: So US corporate leaders were the key players?

DRAHOS: It wasn’t just the United States that was ultimately involved in TRIPS because to impose a set intellectual property rights on the entire world when most countries are going to be losers from intellectual property rights, I mean not many poor people are going to gain from high priced text books in places like Pakistan or Vietnam or some of the really poor countries in the world. You are really raising the cost of education for these countries. You are raising the cost of medicines for these countries. You’re increasing inputs into farming. I mean why on earth would countries take on a deal like that?So these corporate leaders in the United States needed the help, the assistance of their European counterparts. So it wasn’t just US pharmaceutical companies that got in on the game. It wasn’t just US agricultural companies & US IT companies. And the same is true for Japan. I mean Japan also had pretty strong interests. We forget that Japan was the second biggest economy in the world by this stage. And so it’s really these three countries that come together and have interests.So it wasn’t that the United States had it all its own way. It had to compromise. It had to recognize European interests. But we can essentially talk about this as a sort of Anglo-American hegemony in which Japan assisted. And they essentially then inflicted this agreement on the rest of the world who were profound losers.

FRIES: We are going to break and be back with Part 2. Please join us as we continue this series on IP linked to trade with Peter Drahos. Peter Drahos, thank you.

DRAHOS: Thank you.

FRIES: And thank you for joining us on the Real News Network.

Originally posted at The Real News Network.

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Strong across-the-board wage growth in 2015 for both bottom 90 percent and top 1.0 percent [feedly]

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Strong across-the-board wage growth in 2015 for both bottom 90 percent and top 1.0 percent
// Economic Policy Institute Blog

Annual inflation-adjusted earnings of the top 1.0 percent of wage earners grew 2.9 percent in 2015, and the top 0.1 percent’s earnings grew 3.4 percent, according to our analysis of the latest Social Security Administration wage data. What is relatively unique about 2015 was that the 3.4 percent wage growth for the bottom 90 percent matched that of the top 0.1 percent. This strong wage growth for the bottom 90 percent reflects both the lull in inflation (up just 0.1 percent) and the failure of wage inequality to continue its growth in 2015. Annual wages of the bottom 90 percent now stand 3.5 percent above what they were pre-recession in 2007, with all of that growth essentially occurring in 2015. The top 1.0 percent’s earnings have surpassed their previous high point, attained in 2007, by a mere 0.2 percent, recovering from the steep 15.6 percent fall during the financial crisis from 2007–09. High earners between the 90th and 99.9th percentile have seen the strongest growth since 2007, with earnings rising 7.7 percent. It’s only the earnings of the top 0.1 percent that remain below 2007 levels (down 5.1 percent).

Wage inequality has grown tremendously over the longer-term period from 1979 through 2015. The annual earnings of the top 1.0 percent rose 156.7 percent from 1979 to 2015 while the very top 0.1 percent enjoyed earnings growth of 338.8 percent. In contrast, the bottom 90 percent of wage earners had annual earnings grow by just 16.7 percent over the 1979–2007 period and an additional 3.5 percent between 2007 and 2015 for a cumulative annual earnings growth of 20.7 percent over the thirty-six years from 1979 to 2015.

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Oregon Measure 97 would provide short and long-run boost to Oregon economy [feedly]

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Oregon Measure 97 would provide short and long-run boost to Oregon economy
// Economic Policy Institute Blog

The national recovery since the end of the Great Recession has been needlessly held back by spending cuts at all levels of government. Figure A below compares the growth in per capita spending by federal, state, and local governments in this recovery with previous recoveries.

Figure A

As tight as federal spending growth has been in recent years, the bulk of the differences between the current recovery and previous ones shown in Figure A actually stems from state and local spending decisions. These state-level spending cutbacks have held down growth substantially.

States, unlike the federal government, are generally constrained in their ability to boost spending by the need to raise revenue. But as a general rule, government spending boosts economic activity in a weak economy more than tax cuts drag on activity. (In economist jargon, spending increases have higher “multipliers” than revenue increases.)

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Eastern Panhandle Independent Community (EPIC) Radio:Paris, on the Potomac, Oct 28

John Case has sent you a link to a blog:



Blog: Eastern Panhandle Independent Community (EPIC) Radio
Post: Paris, on the Potomac, Oct 28
Link: http://www.enlightenradio.org/2016/10/paris-on-potomac-oct-28.html

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Tuesday, October 25, 2016

White House issues call to action on non-compete clauses [feedly]

White House issues call to action on non-compete clauses
http://www.epi.org/blog/white-house-issues-call-to-action-on-non-compete-clauses/

Labor mobility is fundamental to the ability to earn good wages. The improvement in incomes and living standards over the centuries is tied tightly to the growing ability of workers to quit the job they have and take another. And it is a timeless truth that employers will try to find new ways to hamper their employees' legal right to leave. Increasingly, they are turning to non-compete clauses that they slip into the fine print of employment contracts. Thirty million U.S. employees, many of them relatively low wage workers, are bound by non-competes.

Peasants in medieval times were generally not permitted to leave the land on which they were born, and throughout Europe and Russia they were essentially owned by the owner of the land, their lord and master. The use of indentured servitude in the cities was a less onerous but still heavy burden on young workers, who were forced to work for years with little or no compensation for a single master, whose abuse or mistreatment usually had no remedy.

Slavery is the most extreme example of a legal limitation on labor mobility and the most destructive. Slavery in the United States not only brutalized and impoverished the enslaved, it dragged down the wages of anyone forced into competition with them. Slavery's effects on free labor were an additional reason beyond simple morality for Abraham Lincoln and the free soil movement to oppose slavery. How could free construction workers, for example, demand higher wages if their employer's competitor was using unpaid, enslaved labor?

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