Wednesday, July 24, 2019

Some Snapshots of University Endowments [feedly]

Some Snapshots of University Endowments
http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2019/07/some-snapshots-of-university-endowments.html

  How much money do major universities and colleges have in their endowments? How are they investing the money? What returns are they earning? The National Association of College and University Business Officers does a survey of these questions each year, and here are some results for 2018. 

Here's a list of the 40 largest endowments for institutions of higher education. Harvard tops the list. It should be noted that these total endowments don't adjust for number of students. For example, the University of Richmond, which is #40 on this list, has an endowment of $686,000 per student, while the University of Pennsylvania, #7 on this list, has an endowment of $602,000 per student. Princeton has the highest endowment per student at $3.1 million.
How concentrated are endowments among the big institutions? Total endowments for all universities and colleges sum to $616 billion. The top 10 on the list above account for more than one-third of total endowments. The 104 institutions with endowments of more than $1 billion account for more than three-quarters of total endowments. More than two-thirds of all endowments are at private institutions.
How do these institutions invest their endowments? Institutions with big endowments are much more likely to use "alternative strategies," and less likely to be in domestic stocks. "Alternative" refers "Private equity (LBOs, mezzanine, M&A funds, and international private equity); Marketable alternative strategies (hedge funds, absolute return, market neutral, long/short, 130/30, and event-driven and derivatives); Venture capital; Private equity real estate (non-campus); Energy and natural resources (oil, gas, timber, commodities and managed futures); and Distressed debt."

On average, institution with endowments above $1 billion also earn higher returns. However, as the rows at the bottom show, any college which had invested its endowment completely in the S&P 500 10 years ago would have done considerably better than the average over any of the time horizons shown here.


Of course, it's always easy to note in retrospect that some alternative investment choice would have performed better.  Back int 2008, it certainly wasn't clear to many investors how much stock markets would rebound if and when the Great Recession ended. Moreover, a number of large-endowment Ivy League school had had great success with alternative investment categories in the 1990s and into the early 2000s. For a useful discussion of college endowment returns from 1992-2005, I recommend Josh Lerner, Antoinette Schoar, and Jialan Wang on "Secrets of the Academy: The Drivers of University Endowment Success," which appeared in the Summer 2008 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives

But it still seems worth noting that college endowments--which often hire high-priced talent to make these decisions--have substantially underperformed the S&P 500 benchmark for the last decade. If they had consistently overperformed the benchmark, I'm sure we'd be hearing a lot more about their investment strategies!


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Payments from China for Foreign Intellectual Property [feedly]

Tim Taylor takes apart the foreign intellectual property debate down to the nub - guess what? Negotiation, not trade war, is warranted...

Payments from China for Foreign Intellectual Property

http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2019/07/payments-from-china-for-foreign.html

Payments from China for Foreign Intellectual Property

It seems clear that China's government and firms have been aggressive in their pursuit of intellectual property from firms in other countries. Sometimes this aggressiveness comes from government rules that if a foreign firm wished to sell or produce in China, it needs to have a Chinese firm as a partner and to share technology with that firm. There are also widespread allegations of technology theft. I once chatted with a group of California tech executives who did business in China, and they all said that if they take a computer or a phone to China, they only take one where the memory has been previously wiped clean.

Measuring the total amount of technology transfer to China is, in its nature, hard to do. But one approach is to look at royalty payments from China to outside firms.  Ana Maria Santacreu and Makenzie Peake of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis offer some data in "A Closer Look at China's Supposed Misappropriation of U.S. Intellectual Property" (Economic Synopses, 2019, No. 5).

The top panel shows China's payments for use of US intellectual property, which have risen sharply,  The second panel shows that this growth in China's payments has been faster than the growth of China's GDP.

Of course, the rise in payments doesn't mean that the appropriate level of payments is being made. Annual payments from China to the US of about $8 billion for intellectual property don't seem extraordinarily high. And given that China's economy has been shifting from reliance on low-wage labor to an economy based more in technology and services, the pattern of intellectual property payments rising faster than GDP is the pattern one would expect.

Here's some additional data from Nicholas Lardy at the Peterson Institute for Economic Economics (April 20, 2018). This This figure shows the rise total payments from China to all countries for the use of foreign intellectual property.
Chinese payments for the use of foreign intellectual property, 1997รข€

This figure, also from Lardy, shows countries ranked by how much they pay in intellectual property fees. This figure illustrates something rather odd: the two countries that pay the highest charges for intellectual property are the relatively small economies of Ireland and Netherlands. As Lardy explains: "However, licensing fees in Ireland and the Netherlands are paid mostly by foreign holding companies that are legally domiciled in these countries for tax reasons. Since the subsidiaries of these holding companies using the licensed foreign technology are located in other jurisdictions worldwide, China probably ranks second globally in the magnitude of licensing fees paid for technology used within national borders." (A few years ago, I offered a description of the famous "Double Irish Dutch Sandwich" technique for multinational firms to reduce their tax liabilities.) 

Top 15 countries paying highest charges for the use of foreign intellectual property, 2016

It may well be true that China should be paying more to other countries, including the US, for use of intellectual property. But the numbers in these tables suggest that in purely economic terms, a negotiated solution would be affordable and therefore possible. If a set of trade negotiations led to China doubling its royalty payments to the world as a whole, that additional $27 billion or so would certainly not cripple China's $13.6 trillion (converted at the current US dollar exchange rate) economy. On the other side, while this shift would be a nice windfall for some multinational companies around the world, it's not an amount that is likely to change the course of the $20.5 trillion US economy, either. Also, if the rules for making payments for foreign intellectual property were tightened up, it's likely that US firms already making such payments (as shown in the figure above) would see those payments rise, as well.

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Monday, July 22, 2019

Reducing Carbon Emissions Must Not Be Done on the Backs of the World’s Poorest [feedly]

Reducing Carbon Emissions Must Not Be Done on the Backs of the World's Poorest
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/reducing-carbon-emissions-must-not-be-done-on-the-backs-of-the-world-s-poorest

By all appearances, the economic positions of the world's poorest people have improved considerably over the most recent three decades. Households living on $1.90 per capita per day have — on average — seen their real (inflation-adjusted) incomes grow approximately 4.2 percent per year for the last 30 years. Consequently, less than 10 percent of the world's population lives in extreme poverty today, compared to about 40 percent in 1989. Going forward, we must both understand how this came about and remove barriers to continued progress. Specifically, poverty reduction requires the world to address the threat of climate change— to open up additional space for growth in the Global South without making the entire planet uninhabitable to humans.

Considering that this fall in the poverty rate was about twice that in the three decades prior, this ought to feel like quite a victory. And yet, something feels off. One reason: $1.90 per day is a terribly low threshold by which to define poverty. More than half the world's population still lives on less than $7.40 per day — a mere $2,700 annually. Another reason is that almost all the accelerated poverty reduction took place in China and India.

These are very populous countries, and most of the world's poor lived in these two countries during this period. What about poor people residing elsewhere? Over the last 30 years, their incomes grew at an average of only 2 percent per year — certainly an improvement over the 1980s when their incomes grew less than 0.2 percent per year, but far from the more dramatic income growth enjoyed by their peers in China and India.

Indeed, outside of China, the world saw almost no progress in reducing the rate of extreme poverty between the late 1970s and early 1990s. But the rise of China masked this broader failure. Most interestingly, China's rise bucked the neoliberal "Washington Consensus." As I wrote in a recent piece, "The History of Poverty Worldwide":

the Chinese government played a central role in managing the economy. True, China has opened up to foreign investment; but it has done so with strong capital controls and foreign exchange management, imposition of myriad demands on would-be investors including significant transfer of technology, and lax enforcement of foreigners' so-called intellectual property rights. Nor can China's acceleration be attributed to neoliberal policy in the United States — see the negative economic experiences that most Latin American countries have seen with their increased exposure to the United States economy. Mexico, for example, had a higher poverty rate, and stagnant wages, after 20 years of NAFTA.

The rest of the world did eventually return to reasonable economic growth rates by the mid-2000s. By then, China had further accelerated its rate of growth, and — critically — amplified the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty, bringing its poverty rate down toward 50 percent. Furthermore, India joined China in comparatively rapid economic growth, also pulling large numbers of people out of extreme poverty.

However, as the number of extremely poor people in these countries dwindles, global progress in poverty reduction necessarily slows. The world's remaining poor should not be left behind, nor should we be content to have such a huge percentage of the world's population living just above this poverty line. Rich countries would be outraged if significant numbers of their own people struggled with a mere $700 per month— let alone $700 per year. The very least bit of economic justice will allow the world's poor to increase their consumption, more fully reducing extreme poverty and lifting more of the world's poor out of poverty. This will mean either continued economic growth, a genuinely radical redistribution of global incomes, or some combination of the two.

Still, neither approach is sustainable without decarbonizing the world economy as rapidly as possible, with the intent to stave off catastrophe. As fast as carbon emissions have increased in the last half century, they must be cut twice as fast over the next two decades, and to zero by 2060, to keep the total increase in global warming above preindustrial levels under 1.5°C (2.7°F). Thereafter, we will need to remove — on net — carbon from the atmosphere. Because large-scale carbon capture technology is still out of reach, we must act immediately to minimize the damage by reducing emissions quickly and effectively.

It is possible for the world economy to continue growing without additional carbon emissions, but energy from coal, and thereafter petroleum, must be phased out as rapidly as possible. This means helping developing countries to invest heavily in renewable energy sources and to shift to less carbon-intensive forms of consumption. Land must be managed with an eye toward reducing emissions. (This means, for example, finding ways for Brazil to grow without permitting mining interests to deforest the Amazon.)

Finally, we may be able to extend gains in poverty reduction by slowing economic growth among the rich. The most productive economies in Europe compare favorably to the United States, but have lower emissions. In part, this is due to a social choice favoring leisure over consumption — converting productivity gains into longer vacations and shorter workweeks rather than bigger incomes in order to buy more goods. In the United States, this may also mean reducing inequality and addressing the high and rising cost of health care so that the bottom half of Americans see improvements in their standards of living.

This may buy us some time, but the time is now to address climate change head on and give developing countries space to grow and lift their populations out of poverty.


David Rosnick is an economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (www.cepr.net) in Washington, DC. He holds a Ph.D. in Computer Science from N.C. State, a B.S. in Computer Science and Engineering Physics from the University of Illinois, and an M.A. in Economics from George Washington.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

The Stock-Buyback Swindle [feedly]

Good summary and review of this latest bandit CE0 scam....

by Jerry Useem

The Stock-Buyback Swindle
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/08/the-stock-buyback-swindle/592774/?utm_source=feed

In the early 1980s, a group of menacing outsiders arrived at the gates of American corporations. The "raiders," as these outsiders were called, were crude in method and purpose. After buying up controlling shares in a corporation, they aimed to extract a quick profit by dethroning its "underperforming" CEO and selling off its assets. Managers—many of whom, to be fair, had grown complacent—rushed to protect their institutions, crafting new defensive measures and lodging appeals in state courts. In the end, the raiders were driven off and their moneyman, Michael Milken, was thrown in prison. Thus ended a colorful chapter in American business history.

Or so it seemed. Today, another effort is under way to raid corporate assets at the expense of employees, investors, and taxpayers. But this time, the attack isn't coming from the outside. It's coming from inside the citadel, perpetrated by the very chieftains who are supposed to protect the place. And it's happening under the most innocuous of names: stock buybacks.

You've seen the phrase. It glazes the eyes, numbs the soul, makes you wonder what's for dinner. The practice sounds deeply normal, like the regularly scheduled maintenance on your car.

It is anything but normal. Before the 1980s, corporations rarely repurchased shares of their own stock. When they started to, it was typically a defensive move intended to fend off raiders, who were drawn to cash piles on a company's balance sheet. By contrast, according to Federal Reserve data compiled by Goldman Sachs, over the past nine years, corporations have put more money into their own stocks—an astonishing $3.8 trillion—than every other type of investor (individuals, mutual funds, pension funds, foreign investors) combined.

Corporations describe the practice as an efficient way to return money to shareholders. By reducing the number of shares outstanding in the market, a buyback lifts the price of each remaining share. But that spike is often short-lived: A study by the research firm Fortuna Advisors found that, five years out, the stocks of companies that engaged in heavy buybacks performed worse for shareholders than the stocks of companies that didn't.

One class of shareholder, however, has benefited greatly from the temporary price jumps: the managers who initiate buybacks and are privy to their exact scope and timing. Last year, SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson Jr. instructed his staff to "take a look at how buybacks affect how much skin executives keep in the game." This analysis revealed that in the eight days following a buyback announcement, executives on average sold five times as much stock as they had on an ordinary day. "Thus," Jackson said, "executives personally capture the benefit of the short-term stock-price pop created by the buyback announcement."

This extractive behavior has rightly been decried for worsening income inequality. Some politicians on the left—Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, Chuck Schumer—have lately gotten around to opposing buybacks on these grounds. But even the staunchest free-market capitalist should be concerned, too. The proliferation of stock buybacks is more than just another way of feathering executives' nests. By systematically draining capital from America's public companies, the habit threatens the competitive prospects of American industry—and corrupts the underpinnings of corporate capitalism itself.

The rise of the stock buyback began during the heyday of corporate raiders. In the early 1980s, an economist named Michael C. Jensen presented a paper titled "Reflections on the Corporation as a Social Invention." It attacked the conception of corporations that had prevailed since roughly the 1920s—that they existed to serve a variety of constituencies, including employees, customers, stockholders, and even the public interest. Instead, Jensen asserted a new ideology that would become known as "shareholder value." Corporate managers had one job, and one job alone: to increase the short-term share price of the firm.

The philosophy had immediate appeal to the raiders, who used it to give their depredations a fig leaf of legitimacy. And though the raiders were eventually turned back, the idea of shareholder value proved harder to dispel. To ward off hostile takeovers, boards started firing CEOs who didn't deliver near-term stock-price gains. The rolling of a few big heads—including General Motors' Robert Stempel in 1992 and IBM's John Akers in 1993—drove home the point to CEOs: They had better start thinking about shareholder value.

If their conversion to the enemy faith was at first grudging, CEOs soon found a reason to love it. One of the main tenets of shareholder value is that managers' interests should be aligned with shareholders' interests. To accomplish this goal, boards began granting CEOs large blocks of company stock and stock options.

The shift in compensation was intended to encourage CEOs to maximize returns for shareholders. In practice, something else happened. The rise of stock incentives coincided with a loosening of SEC rules governing stock buybacks. Three times before (in 1967, '70, and '73), the agency had considered such a rule change, and each time it had deemed the dangers of insider "market manipulation" too great. It relented just before CEOs began acquiring ever greater portfolios of their own corporate stock, making such manipulation that much more tantalizing.

Too tantalizing for CEOs to resist. Today, the abuse of stock buybacks is so widespread that naming abusers is a bit like singling out snowflakes for ruining the driveway. But somebody needs to be called out.

So take Craig Menear, the chairman and CEO of Home Depot. On a conference call with investors in February 2018, he and his team mentioned their "plan to repurchase approximately $4 billion of outstanding shares during the year." That day, he sold 113,687 shares, netting $18 million. The following day, he was granted 38,689 new shares, and promptly unloaded 24,286 shares for a profit of $4.5 million. Though Menear's stated compensation in SEC filings was $11.4 million for 2018, stock sales helped him earn an additional $30 million for the year.

By contrast, the median worker pay at Home Depot is $23,000 a year. If the money spent on buybacks had been used to boost salaries, the Roosevelt Institute and the National Employment Law Project calculated, each worker would have made an additional $18,000 a year. But buybacks are more than just unfair. They're myopic. Amazon (which hasn't repurchased a share in seven years) is presently making the sort of investments in people, technology, and products that could eventually make Home Depot irrelevant. When that happens, Home Depot will probably wish it hadn't spent all those billions to buy back 35 percent of its shares. "When you've got a mature company, when everything seems to be going smoothly, that's the exact moment you need to start worrying Jeff Bezos is going to start eating your lunch," the shareholder activist Nell Minow told me.

Then there's Merck. The pharmaceutical company was a paragon of corporate excellence through the second half of the 20th century. "Medicine is for people, not for profits," George Merck II declared on the cover of Time in 1952. "And if we have remembered that, the profits have never failed to appear." In the late 1980s, then-CEO Roy Vagelos, rather than sit on a drug that could cure river blindness in Africa but that no one could pay for, persuaded his board of directors to manufacture and distribute the drug for free—which, as Vagelos later noted in his memoir, cost the company more than $200 million. More recently, Merck has been using its massive earnings (its net income for 2018 was $6.2 billion) to repurchase shares of its own stock. A study by the economists William Lazonick and ร–ner Tulum showed that from 2008 to 2017 the company distributed 133 percent of its profits, through buybacks and dividends, to shareholders—including CEO Kenneth Frazier, who has sold $54.8 million in stock since last July. How is this sustainable? "It's not," Lazonick says. Merck insists it must keep drug prices high to fund new research. In 2018, the company spent $10 billion on R&D—and $14 billion on share repurchases and dividends.

Finally, consider the executives at Applied Materials, a maker of semiconductor-manufacturing equipment. As is the case at many companies, its CEO receives incentive pay based on certain metrics. One is earnings per share, or EPS, a widely used barometer of corporate performance. Normally, EPS is lifted by improving earnings. But EPS can be easily manipulated through a stock buyback, which simply reduces the denominator—the number of outstanding shares. At Applied Materials, earnings declined 3.5 percent last year. Yet the company still managed to eke out EPS growth of 1.9 percent. How? In part, by taking more than 10 percent of its shares off the market via buybacks. That move helped executives unlock more incentive compensation—which, these days, usually comes in the form of stock or stock options.

Corporations offer a variety of justifications for the practice of repurchasing stock. One is that buybacks are a more "flexible" way of returning money to shareholders than dividends, which (it's true) once raised are very hard to reduce. Another argument: Some companies just make more money than they can possibly put to good use. This likewise has a smidgen of truth. Apple may not have $1 billion worth of good bets to make or companies it wants to acquire. Though, if this were the real reason companies are repurchasing stock, it would imply that biotechnology, banking, and big retail—sectors that hold some of the biggest practitioners of buybacks—are nearing a dead end, idea-wise. CEOs will also sometimes make the case that their stock is undervalued, and that repurchases represent an opportunity to buy low. But in reality, notes Fortuna's Gregory Milano, companies tend to buy their stock high, when they're flush with cash. The 10th year of a bull market is hardly a time for bargain-hunting.

Capitalism takes many forms. But the variant that propelled America through the 20th century was, at its heart, a means of pooling resources toward a common endeavor, whether that was building railroads, developing new drugs, or making microwave ovens. There used to be a healthy debate about which of their stakeholders corporations ought to serve—employees, stockholders, customers—and in what order. But no one, not even Michael Jensen, ever suggested that a corporation should exist solely to serve the interests of the people entrusted to run it.

Many early stock certificates bore an image—a factory, a car, a canal—representing the purpose of the corporation that issued them. It was a reminder that the financial instrument was being put to productive use. Corporations that plow their profits into buybacks would be hard-pressed to put an image on their stock certificate today, other than, perhaps, the visage of their CEO.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Sunday, July 21, 2019

Chris Dillow: UK Centrists' failure [feedly]

(UK)Centrists' failure
https://stumblingandmumbling.typepad.com/stumbling_and_mumbling/2019/07/centrists-failure.html

 Simon's claim that Corbyn is the lesser of two evils has had a lot of pushback. Some say Corbyn is more antisemitic than we think, others that we do indeed have other choices*. All this, however, raises the question: how have we gotten into the position where the choices of future Prime Minster are so poor? The worse you think Corbyn is, the more force this question has.

The answer, to a large extent, is that centrists have failed. They had the ball - New Labour and the LibDems were in office for 18 years – and they dropped it. Johnson and Corbyn have risen as centrism has fallen. Centrists show an astounding lack of self-awareness about their own abject failure.

Corbyn is popular – insofar as he is – not because he is a political genius (he's not) nor because many of us have become antisemites or have lost our minds. His popularity – especially with young graduates – rests upon material economic conditions. The degradation of professional occupations and huge gap between the top 1% and others have radicalized young people in erstwhile middle-class jobs; financialization has made housing unaffordable for youngsters; and a decade of stagnant real wages – the product of inequality and the financial crisis - has increased demands for change.

There's nothing inevitable about young people being radical: in the 1987 election the Tories won the 25-34 year-old vote and only narrowly lost among 18-24 year-olds. Young people's support for Corbyn is because capitalism as it currently exists has failed them - and it has done so because centrists have let it.

The same can be said of Brexit. Austerity, at the margin, tipped the balanceagainst Remainers. The marginal Brexit voter wasn't some gammon who thinks Dambusters should the role model for our relations with the EU. It is someone who was cheesed off with living in a run-down area and being ignored by the (centrist) elite.

Centrists are oblivious to all this. The tiggers or cukkers or whatever they call themselves today have no awareness of the reality of capitalist stagnation, let alone have an answer to it. Corbyn became Labour leader because his rivals (with the partial exception of Liz Kendall) had no worthwhile material programme to offer. The LibDems acquiesced in the austerity that led to both Brexit and Corbynism. And the centre right merely wags its finger at voters to tell them they got it wrong, whilst showing no awareness that its own policies are responsible for Brexit, and no appreciation that the slogan "take back control" had so much power for so many voters.

Leftists often accuse centrists of being Blairite. This is a slur upon Blair. His genius was to recognise in the 1990s that the world had changed and that new policies were needed for new times. Centrists today are innocent of such insight. They are stuck in a 1990s timewarp. It is Corbyn who is the true heir to Blair, as he sees – albeit perhaps in the same way that a stuck clock is right twice a day – that our times require new policies. He at least offers a faint shadow of a glimmer of slim hope of an alternative to the neoliberal financialization that got us into this mess. Centrists offer jack-shit.

Even the IMF now acknowledges that inequality is a menace to economies. Whilst some individual centrists get this (I'm looking at you Paddy and Tony) centrist politicians do not. 

Now, some might object here that aspects of the LibDems 2017 manifesto were more redistributive that Labour's, which was insufficiently hostile to the benefit freeze. But LibDem manifestos are a soft currency: the 2010 one said nothing about trebling tuition fees or supporting austerity, benefit cuts and the hostile environment policy. Redistribution is part of the soul of the Labour left; the same cannot be said for the LibDems. As I said in another context, if you've got yourself a reputation for laziness you need to work doubly hard if you are to lose it. The LibDems are not doing so.

You might also object that politics is about more than economics, and that the battleground now is about culture and identity rather than a few quid here or there. This misses the point. The great virtue of economic growth, as Ben Friedman showed, is that it creates a climate in which toleration and openness can thrive. Stagnation, by contrast, gives us closed minds, intolerance and fanaticism. If centrists are sincere in wanting a more civilized and tolerant politics, they must create the material conditions for these. In fact, in office they did the opposite.

It's common to claim that Corbyn has enabled antisemitism. But it is centrists who enabled Corbynism by creating the conditions in which he – and indeed the far right – can thrive. A serious politics requires an awareness that political behaviour has a structural basis and offers a way of creating the structures that generate the ideals they favour. Centrists, however, do none of this. All they have is a sense of their own entitlement to rule and a smug moral superiority.

Rather than wag the finger at those of us who feel compelled to make the tragic choice between two deeply flawed potential Prime Ministers, centrists should show more humility and more cognizance that it is their acquiescence in inequality and austerity that got us into this mess.

* I know we do: I voted Green in the euro elections, but Jonathan Bartley and Sian Berry aren't going to be Prime Minister.  

VISIT WEBSITE


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Saturday, July 20, 2019

Safety and accident analysis: Longford [feedly]

Safety and accident analysis: Longford
http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2019/07/safety-and-accident-analysis-longford.html

Andrew Hopkins has written a number of fascinating case studies of industrial accidents, usually in the field of petrochemicals. These books are crucial reading for anyone interested in arriving at a better understanding of technological safety in the context of complex systems involving high-energy and tightly-coupled processes. Especially interesting is his Lessons from Longford: The ESSO Gas Plant Explosion. The Longford refining plant suffered an explosion and fire in 1998 that killed two workers, badly injured others, and interrupted the supply of natural gas to the state of Victoria for two weeks. Hopkins is a sociologist, but has developed substantial expertise in the technical details of petrochemical refining plants. He served as an expert witness in the Royal Commission hearings that investigated the accident. The accounts he offers of these disasters are genuinely fascinating to read.

Hopkins makes the now-familiar point that companies often seek to lay responsibility for a major industrial accident on operator error or malfeasance. This was Esso's defense concerning its corporate liability in the Longford disaster. But, as Hopkins points out, the larger causes of failure go far beyond the individual operators whose decisions and actions were proximate to the event. Training, operating plans, hazard analysis, availability of appropriate onsite technical expertise -- these are all the responsibility of the owners and managers of the enterprise. And regulation and oversight of safety practices are the responsibility of stage agencies. So it is critical to examine the operations of a complex and dangerous technology system at all these levels.

A crucial part of management's responsibility is to engage in formal "hazard and operability" (HAZOP) analysis. "A HAZOP involves systematically imagining everything that might go wrong in a processing plant and developing procedures or engineering solutions to avoid these potential problems" (26). This kind of analysis is especially critical in high-risk industries including chemical plants, petrochemical refineries, and nuclear reactors. It emerged during the Longford accident investigation that HAZOP analyses had been conducted for some aspects of risk but not for all -- even in areas where the parent company Exxon was itself already fully engaged in analysis of those risky scenarios. The risk of embrittlement of processing equipment when exposed to super-chilled conditions was one that Exxon had already drawn attention to at the corporate level because of prior incidents.

A factor that Hopkins judges to be crucial to the occurrence of the Longford Esso disaster is the decision made by management to remove engineering staff from the plant to a central location where they could serve a larger number of facilities "more efficiently".
A second relevant change was the relocation to Melbourne in 1992 of all the engineering staff who had previously worked at Longford, leaving the Longford operators without the engineering backup to which they were accustomed. Following their removal from Longford, engineers were expected to monitor the plant from a distance and operators were expected to telephone the engineers when they felt a need to. Perhaps predictably, these arrangements did not work effectively, and I shall argue in the next chapter that the absence of engineering expertise had certain long-term consequences which contributed to the accident. (34)
One result of this decision is the fact that when the Longford incident began there were no engineering experts on site who could correctly identify the risks created by the incident. Technicians therefore restarted the process by reintroducing warm oil into the super-chilled heat exchanger. The metal had become brittle as a result of the extremely low temperatures and cracked, leading to the release of fuel and subsequent explosion and fire. As Hopkins points out, Exxon experts had long been aware of the hazards of embrittlement. However, it appears that the operating procedures developed by Esso at Longford ignored this risk, and operators and supervisors lacked the technical/scientific knowledge to recognize the hazard when it arose.

The topic of "tight coupling" (the tight interconnection across different parts of a complex technological system) comes up frequently in discussions of technology accidents. Hopkins shows that the Longford case gives a new spin to this idea. In the case of the explosion and fire at Longford it turned out to be very important that plant 1 was interconnected by numerous plumbing connections to plants 2 and 3. This meant that fuel from plants 2 and 3 continued to flow into plant 1 and greatly extended the length of time it took to extinguish the fire. Plant 1 had to be fully isolated from plants 2 and 3 before the fire could be extinguished (or plants 2 and 3 could be restarted), and there were enough plumbing connections among them, poorly understood at the time of the fire, that took a great deal of time to disconnect (32).

Hopkins addresses the issue of government regulation of high-risk industries in connection with the Longford disaster. Written in 1999 or so, he recognizes the trend towards "self-regulation" in place of government rules stipulating the operating of various industries. He contrasts this approach with deregulation -- the effort to allow the issue of safe operation to be governed by the market rather than by law.
Whereas the old-style legislation required employers to comply with precise, often quite technical rules, the new style imposes an overarching requirement on employers that they provide a safe and healthy workplace for their employees, as far as practicable. (92)
He notes that this approach does not necessarily reduce the need for government inspections; but the goal of regulatory inspection will be different. Inspectors will seek to satisfy themselves that the industry has done a responsible job of identify hazards and planning accordingly, rather than looking for violations of specific rules. (This parallels to some extent his discussion of two different philosophies of audit, one of which is much more conducive to increasing the systems-safety of high-risk industries; chapter 7.) But his preferred regulatory approach is what he describes as "safety case regulation". (Hopkins provides more detail about the workings of a safety case regime in Disastrous Decisions: The Human and Organisational Causes of the Gulf of Mexico Blowout, chapter 10.)
The essence of the new approach is that the operator of a major hazard installation is required to make a case or demonstrate to the relevant authority that safety is being or will be effectively managed at the installation. Whereas under the self-regulatory approach, the facility operator is normally left to its own devices in deciding how to manage safety, under the safety case approach it must lay out its procedures for examination by the regulatory authority. (96)
The preparation of a safety case would presumably include a comprehensive HAZOP analysis, along with procedures for preventing or responding to the occurrence of possible hazards. Hopkins reports that the safety case approach to regulation is being adopted by the EU, Australia, and the UK with respect to a number of high-risk industries. This discussion is highly relevant to the current debate over aircraft manufacturing safety and the role of the FAA in overseeing manufacturers.

It is interesting to realize that Hopkins is implicitly critical of another of my favorite authors on the topic of accidents and technology safety, Charles Perrow. Perrow's central idea of "normal accidents" brings along with it a certain pessimism about the ability to increase safety in complex industrial and technological systems; accidents are inevitable and normal (Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies). Hopkins takes a more pragmatic approach and argues that there are engineering and management methodologies that can significantly reduce the likelihood and harm of accidents like the Esso gas plant explosion. His central point is that we don't need to be able to anticipate a long chain of unlikely events in order to identify the hazard in which these chains may eventuate -- for example, loss of coolant in a nuclear reactor or loss of warm oil in a refinery process. These final events of numerous different possible accident scenarios all require procedures in place that will guide the responses of engineers and technicians when "normal accidents" occur (33).

Hopkins highlights the challenge to safety created by the ongoing modification of a power plant or chemical plant; later modifications may create hazards not anticipated by the rigorous accident analysis performed on the original design.
Processing plants evolve and grow over time. A study of petroleum refineries in the US has shown that "the largest and most complex refineries in the sample are also the oldest ... Their complexity emerged as a result of historical accretion. Processes were modified, added, linked, enhanced and replaced over a history that greatly exceeded the memories of those who worked in the refinery. (33)
This is one of the chief reasons why Perrow believes technological accidents are inevitable. However, Hopkins draws a different conclusion:
However, those who are committed to accident prevention draw a different conclusion, namely, that it is important that every time physical changes are made to plant these changes be subjected to a systematic hazard identification process. ...  Esso's own management of change philosophy recognises this. It notes that "changes potentially invalidate prior risk assessments and can create new risks, if not managed diligently." (33)
(I believe this recommendation conforms to Nancy Leveson's theories of system safety engineering as well; link.)

Here is the causal diagram that Hopkins offers for the occurrence of the explosion at Longford (122).



The lowest level of the diagram represents the sequence of physical events and operator actions leading to the explosion, fatalities, and loss of gas supply. The next level represents the organizational factors identified in Longford's analysis of the event and its background. Central among these factors are the decision to withdraw engineers from the plant; a safety philosophy that focused on lost-time injuries rather than system hazards and processes; failures in the incident reporting system; failure to perform a HAZOP for plant 1; poor maintenance practices; inadequate audit practices; inadequate training for operators and supervisors; and a failure to identify the hazard created by interconnections with plants 2 and 3. The next level identifies the causes of the management failures -- Esso's overriding focus on cost-cutting and a failure by Exxon as the parent company to adequately oversee safety planning and share information from accidents at other plants. The final two levels of causation concern governmental and societal factors that contributed to the corporate behavior leading to the accident.

(Here is a list of major industrial disasters; link.)  

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Krugman: Deficit Man and the 2020 Election [feedly]

Deficit Man and the 2020 Election
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/18/opinion/2020-trump-economy.html

I've seen a number of people suggest that the 2020 election will be a sort of test: Can a sufficiently terrible president lose an election despite a good economy? And that is, in fact, the test we'd be running if the election were tomorrow.

On one side, Donald Trump wastes no opportunity to remind us how awful he is. His latest foray into overt racism delights his base but repels everyone else. On the other side, he presides over an economy in which unemployment is very low and real G.D.P. grew 3.2 percent over the past year.

But the election won't be tomorrow, it will be an exhausting 15 months from now. Trump's character won't change, except possibly for the worse. But the economy might look significantly different.

So let's talk about the Trump economy.

The first thing you need to know is that the Trump tax cut caused a huge rise in the budget deficit, which the administration expects to hit $1 trillion this year, up from less than $600 billion in 2016. This tidal wave of red ink is even more extraordinary than it looks, because it has taken place despite falling unemployment, which usually leads to a falling deficit.

P

ADVERTISEMENT

[For an even deeper look at what's on Paul Krugman's mind, sign up for his weekly newsletter.]

Strange to say, none of the Republicans who warned of a debt apocalypse under President Barack Obama have protested the Trump deficits. (Should we put Paul Ryan's face on milk cartons?) For that matter, even the centrists who obsessed over federal debt during the Obama years have been pretty quiet. Clearly, deficits only matter when there's a Democrat in the White House.

Oh, and the imminent fiscal crisis people like Erskine Bowles used to warn about keeps not happening: Long-term interest rates remain very low.

Now, the evidence on the effects of deficit spending is clear: It gives the economy a short-run boost, even when we're already close to full employment. If anything, the growth bump under Trump has been smaller than you might have expected given the deficit surge, perhaps because the tax cut was so badly designed, perhaps because Trump's trade wars have deterred business spending.

For now, however, Deficit Man is beating Tariff Man. As I said, we've seen good growth over the past year.

But the tax cut was supposed to be more than a short-run Keynesian stimulus. It was sold as something that would greatly improve the economy's long-run performance; in particular, lower corporate tax rates were supposed to lead to a huge boom in business investment that would, among other things, lead to sharply higher wages. And this big rise in long-run growth would supposedly create a boom in tax revenues, offsetting the upfront cost of tax cuts.


ADVERTISEMENT

None of this is happening. Corporations are getting to keep a lot more of their profits, but they've been using the money to buy back their own stock, not raise investment. Wages are rising, but not at an extraordinary pace, and many Americans don't feel that they're sharing in the benefits of a growing economy.

And this is probably as good as it gets.

I'm not forecasting a recession. It could happen, and we're very badly positioned to respond if it does, but the more likely story is just a slowdown as the effects of the deficit splurge wear off. In fact, if you believe the "nowcasters" (economists who try to get an early read on the economy from partial data), that slowdown is already happening. For example, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York believes that the economy's growth was down to 1.5 percent in the second quarter.

And it's hard to see where another economic bump can come from. With Democrats controlling the House, there won't be another big tax cut. The Fed may cut interest rates, but those cuts are already priced into long-term interest rates, which are what matter for spending, and the economy seems to be slowing anyway.

Which brings us back to the 2020 election.

Political scientists have carried out many studies of the electoral impact of the economy, and as far as I know they all agree that what matters is the trend, not the level. The unemployment rate was still over 7 percent when Ronald Reagan won his 1984 landslide; it was 7.7 percent when Obama won in 2012. In both cases, however, things were clearly getting better.

That's probably not going to be the story next year. If we don't have a recession, unemployment will still be low. But economic growth will probably be meh at best — which means, if past experience is any guide, that the economy won't give Trump much of a boost, that it will be more or less a neutral factor.

And on the other hand, Trump's awfulness will remain.

Republicans will, of course, portray the Democratic nominee — whoever she or he may be — as a radical socialist poised to throw the border open to hordes of brown-skinned rapists. And one has to admit that this strategy might work, although it failed last year in the midterms. To be honest, I'm more worried about the effects of sexism if the nominee is a woman — not just the sexism of voters, but that of the news media, which still holds women to different standards.

But as far as the economy goes, the odds are that Trump's deficit-fueled bump came too soon to do him much political good.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We'd like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here's our email: letters@nytimes.com.

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.

Paul Krugman has been an Opinion columnist since 2000 and is also a Distinguished Professor at the City University of New York Graduate Center. He won the 2008 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his work on international trade and economic geography. @PaulKrugman


 -- via my feedly newsfeed