Friday, July 28, 2017

Another study confirms mountaintop removal’s impacts on Appalachian water quality [feedly]

Another study confirms mountaintop removal's impacts on Appalachian water quality
http://blogs.wvgazettemail.com/coaltattoo/2017/07/14/another-study-confirms-mountaintop-removals-impacts-on-appalachian-water-quality/

Earlier this week, former West Virginia University researcher Michael Hendryx was explaining the findings of his many studies of mountaintop removal's public health impacts to a National Academy of Sciences panel examining the issue … but this week also saw the publication of yet another report that details the environmental impacts of large-scale strip mining.

The latest study, published in the peer-reviewed journal Environmental Science and Technology, reports that mountaintop removal mining causes many streams and rivers in Appalachia to run consistently saltier for up to 80 percent of the year. The scientists, from the University of Wyoming and Duke University, examined water quality in four watersheds that flow into the Mud River basin, the site of extensive mountaintop removal over several decades.

Fabian Nippgen, assistant professor of ecosystem science and management at the University of Wyoming, explained:

Over time, alkaline salts and other contaminants from the coal residue and crushed rocks in these valley fills leach into nearby streams and rivers, degrading water quality and causing dramatic increases in salinity that are harmful to downstream ecosystems.

These significant alterations are likely to lead to saltier and more perennial streamflows throughout Appalachia, where at least 7 percent of the land has already been disturbed by mountaintop-removal mining. It's not just the mountains that are being changed.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

AI leads to reward function engineering [feedly]

AI leads to reward function engineering
http://www.digitopoly.org/2017/07/26/ai-leads-to-reward-function-engineering/

[co-authored with Ajay Agrawal and Avi Goldfarb; originally published on HBR.org on 26th July 2017]

With the recent explosion in AI, there has been the understandable concern about its potential impact on human work. Plenty of people have tried to predict which industries and jobs will be most affected, and which skills will be most in demand. (Should you learn to code? Or will AI replace coders too?)

Rather than trying to predict specifics, we suggest an alternative approach. Economic theory suggests that AI will substantially raise the value of human judgment. People who display good judgment will become more valuable, not less. But to understand what good judgment entails and why it will become more valuable, we have to be precise about what we mean.

What AI does and why it's useful

Recent advances in AI are best thought of as a drop in the cost of prediction. By prediction, we don't just mean the future—prediction is about using data that you have to generate data that you don't have, often by translating large amounts of data into small, manageable amounts. For example, using images divided into parts to detect whether or not the image contains a human face is a classic prediction problem. Economic theory tells us that as the cost of machine prediction falls, machines will do more and more prediction.

Prediction is useful because it helps improve decisions. But it isn't the only input into decision-making; the other key input is judgment. Consider the example of a credit card network deciding whether or not to approve each attempted transaction. They want to allow legitimate transactions and decline fraud. They use AI to predict whether each attempted transaction is fraudulent. If such predictions were perfect, the network's decision process is easy. Decline if and only if fraud exists.

However, even the best AIs make mistakes, and that is unlikely to change anytime soon. The people who have run the credit card network know from experience that there is a trade-off between detecting every case of fraud and inconveniencing the user. (Have you ever had a card declined when you tried to use it while traveling?) And since convenience is the whole credit card business, that trade-off is not something to ignore.

This means that to decide whether to approve a transaction, the credit card network has to know the cost of mistakes. How bad would it be to decline a legitimate transaction? How bad would it be to allow a fraudulent transaction?

Someone at the credit card network needs to assess how the entire organization is affected when a legitimate transaction is denied. They need to trade that off against the effects of allowing a transaction that is fraudulent. And that trade-off may be different for high net worth individuals than for casual card users. No AI can make that call. Humans need to do so. This decision is what we call judgment.

What judgment entails

Judgment is the process of determining what the reward to a particular action is in a particular environment.

Judgment is how we work out the benefits and costs of different decisions in different situations.

Credit card fraud is an easy decision to explain in this regard. Judgment involves determining how much money is lost in a fraudulent transaction, how unhappy a legitimate customer will be when a transaction is declined, as well as the reward for doing the right thing and allowing good transactions and declining bad ones. In many other situations, the trade-offs are more complex, and the payoffs are not straightforward. Humans learn the payoffs to different outcomes by experience, making choices and observing their mistakes.

Getting the payoffs right is hard. It requires an understanding of what your organization cares about most, what it benefits from, and what could go wrong.

In many cases, especially in the near term, humans will be required to exercise this sort of judgment. They'll specialize in weighing the costs and benefits of different decisions, and then that judgment will be combined with machine-generated predictions to make decisions.

But couldn't AI calculate costs and benefits itself? In the credit card example, couldn't AI use customer data to consider the trade-off and optimize for profit? Yes, but someone would have had to program the AI as to what the appropriate profit measure is. This highlights a particular form of human judgment that we believe will become both more common and more valuable.

Setting the right rewards

Like people, AIs can also learn from experience. One important technique in AI is reinforcement learning whereby a computer is trained to take actions that maximize a certain reward function. For instance, DeepMind's AlphaGo was trained this way to maximize its chances of winning the game of Go. Games are often easy to apply this method of learning because the reward can be easily described and programmed – shutting out a human from the loop.

But games can be cheated. As Wired reports, when AI researchers trained an AI to play the boat racing game, CoastRunners, the AI figured out how to maximize its score by going around in circles rather than completing the course as was intended. One might consider this ingenuity of a type, but when it comes to applications beyond games this sort of ingenuity can lead to perverse outcomes.

The key point from the CoastRunners example is that in most applications, the goal given to the AI differs from the true and difficult-to-measure objective of the organization. As long as that is the case, humans will play a central role in judgment, and therefore in organizational decision-making.

In fact, even if an organization is enabling AI to make certain decisions, getting the payoffs right for the organization as a whole requires an understanding of how the machines make those decisions. What types of prediction mistakes are likely? How might a machine learn the wrong message?

Enter Reward Function Engineering. As AIs serve up better and cheaper predictions, there is a need to think clearly and work out how to best use those predictions.

Reward Function Engineering is the job of determining the rewards to various actions, given the predictions made by the AI.  

Being great at it requires having an understanding of the needs of the organization and the capabilities of the machine. (And it is not the same as putting a human in the loop to help train the AI.)

Sometimes Reward Function Engineering involves programming the rewards in advance of the predictions so that actions can be automated. Self-driving vehicles are an example of such hard-coded rewards. Once the prediction is made, the action is instant. But as the CoastRunners example illustrates, getting the reward right isn't trivial. Reward Function Engineering has to consider the possibility that the AI will over-optimize on one metric of success, and in doing so act in a way that's inconsistent with the organization's broader goals.

At other times, such hard-coding of the rewards is too difficult. There may so be many possible predictions that it is too costly for anyone to judge all the possible payoffs in advance. Instead, some human needs to wait for the prediction to arrive, and then assess the payoff. This is closer to how most decision-making works today, whether or not it includes machine-generated predictions. Most of us already do some Reward Function Engineering, but for humans — not machines. Parents teach their children values. Mentors teach new workers how the system operates. Managers give objectives to their staff, and then tweak them to get better performance. Every day, we make decisions and judge the rewards. But when we do this for humans, prediction and judgment are grouped together, and the distinct role of Reward Function Engineering has not needed to be explicitly separate.

As machines get better at prediction, the distinct value of Reward Function Engineering will increase as the application of human judgment becomes central.

Overall, will machine prediction decrease or increase the amount of work available for humans in decision-making?  It is too early to tell.  On the one hand, machine prediction will substitute for human prediction in decision-making.  On the other hand, machine prediction is a complement to human judgment. And cheaper prediction will generate more demand for decision-making, so there will be more opportunities to exercise human judgment.  So, although it is too early to speculate on the overall impact on jobs, there is little doubt that we will soon be witness to a great flourishing of demand for human judgment in the form of Reward Function Engineering.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Senate Health Bill (BCRA) Would Hit West Virginia Hardest [feedly]

Senate Health Bill (BCRA) Would Hit West Virginia Hardest
http://www.wvpolicy.org/senate-health-bill-bcra-would-hit-west-virginia-hardest/

While it is unclear what version of the legislation the U.S. Senate will plan to take up on Tuesday (7/25) when they vote to proceed to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the revised version of the Better Care Reconciliation Act (BCRA) would be particularly harmful to West Virginians.

updated report from the national Center on Budget and Policy Priorities shows that West Virginia would be among the hardest hit states in the nation. Not only would the number of uninsured West Virginians grow by nearly 300% – the largest increase in the nation (See Map) – but it would reduce federal Medicaid/CHIP spending by half or $1.8 billion by 2022. Last-ditch efforts by Senate leadership to offer more money to Medicaid expansion states won't fix this bill either. Below is a quick summary of BCRA's impact on West Virginia and here's a one-page fact sheet.

West Virginia Would Sustain Huge Coverage Losses

  • 211,000 West Virginians would lose coverage by 2022 if BCRA is passed.
  • The BCRA would increase West Virginia's non-elderly uninsured rate from 5% to over 19%, a 299% increase, more than any other state.
  • 1 out of 7 non-elderly West Virginians who would have coverage under the ACA would lose it because of the BCRA

West Virginia's Medicaid and CHIP Programs Would Cut in Half

  • The BCRA would cut West Virginia's CHIP program by 47% by 2022 (compared to 26 percent nationally)
  • The number of people enrolled in Medicaid would fall by more than half by 2022, or 263,000 people.

 BCRA Would Drastically Increase West Virginia's Costs to Maintain Medicaid Expansion

  • The state's cost to maintain expansion would rise by 50% by 2021, 100% by 2022, and 150% by 2023.

 BCRA Would Make Access to Substance Use Disorder Treatment Less Available

  • West Virginia has the highest drug overdose death rate in 2015.
  • The share of West Virginians with substance use or mental health disorders who were hospitalized but uninsured fell from 23 percent in 2013 to 5 percent in 2014.
  • Rolling back expansion would roll back coverage for the 33% of West Virginia expansion enrollees who used mental health or substance use disorder services in 2014.

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Dylan Matthews’ critique of my UBI view is mistaken, but here’s a better one [feedly]

Dylan Matthews' critique of my UBI view is mistaken, but here's a better one
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/dylans-matthews-critique-of-my-ubi-view-is-mistaken-but-heres-a-better-one/

In pushing back on an argument against Universal Basic Income (UBI) plans, Dylan Matthews engages in a curious non-sequitur. Let me point out where he's wrong but offer him a more salient contradiction in my position.

Matthews, in defending the idea that "every American gets a basic stipend from the government," quotes me as follows: "If we instead choose to use our resources on people who don't need them, we won't be able to build on the progress we've made."

He then argues, based on a paper by Wiederspan et al, that UBI's aren't as expensive as I suggest. The problem, however, is the paper he cites isn't about UBI. It's about a means-tested, non-universal program that phases out at (in Matthews' favored version) twice the poverty threshold, which excludes the majority of American families (68 percent; i.e., 32 percent are below twice poverty).

By shifting from UBI to this targeted approach, Matthews is implicitly agreeing with me. One of my major objections to UBI ideas that don't cost a lot more than the current system of taxes and transfers, like the one proposed by Charles Murray, is that by consolidating all our social welfare spending and then essentially giving those resources to everyone as a per-capita UBI, poverty will go up. The anti-poverty impact of the current system will be diluted by spreading the same money over millions more people.

In fact, Wiederstan et al clearly recognize this cost constraint, suggesting that if the phase-out threshold is set too high, "the program will be exorbitantly expensive."

These authors, and Matthews, are thus arguing for something other than a UBI. By dropping the U, they raise a different, albeit still interesting, question. They're no longer asking if we should have what Matthews describes as a "basic stipend from the government" for every American. They're instead suggesting that the poor and near poor might be better served if instead of the existing collection of anti-poverty programs, we consolidated them all and just gave them the cash.

This obviates the concern raised in my quote above: turning anti-poverty programs into a cash grant to poor and near-poor people doesn't squander resources on those who don't need them. In fact, as Matthews points out, the cost of the Wiederstan et al version he prefers (~$220 billion) amounts to about what we spend on non-health, anti-poverty programs.

This idea, however, raises other concerns. While I like the consumer sovereignty (I very much like that part), simplicity, and scope of the idea, I worry that a sole, stand-alone, anti-poverty fund would be a lot more open to attack than the many existing programs that meet specific needs. My strong sense is that it's easier for conservatives to reduce cash support than in-kind support. EG, I'll bet one thing that tanked the Republican health care replacement plans was taking away poor and moderate-income people's health coverage to pay for tax cuts for the rich.

This, however, is really a political call, and I could be wrong. The idea Matthews touts here, though not a UBI, is an NIT—a negative income tax—which oldsters like myself remember being introduced by conservative icon Milton Friedman and embraced by President Nixon, of all people.

Getting back to actual UBIs, however, I do think there's a coherent critique of my beef about the U in UBI. If I were debating me on this point, I'd hit me with this: "So, I guess you're also against Social Security, which is very much a universal cash income program."

Of course, I'm not (against Soc Sec), but I can maybe wiggle out by pointing out that while Social Security has UBI characteristics, it's targeted at elderly retirees (I'm just talking about the retirement program, not the disability one, which is quite different in this context). In this sense, it addresses a market failure of sorts, which is the risk of poverty in retirement. In fact, Social Security reduces elderly poverty from about 40 to about 10 percent!

But while its benefit structure (pay-ins relative to pay-outs) is progressive, why does it have to be universal? The answer has always been: to stave off political attack. And there's something to that. But I also like the intergenerational contract inherent in the program. Today's retirees bequeathed today's economy to today's workforce. In return, we're going to shave some of the productivity gains off the top for those past their working years. It's kind of a "circle of life" thing; cue the music, Disney!

But UBI'ers might say I'm being too narrow in where I see market failures. They often argue, against the evidence, I'd say, that the UBI is necessary as technological unemployment is or will be rampant. So, if my criterion for universality is a pervasive market failure, like aging out of your working years, then the lack of jobs certainly qualifies. (FTR, I have argued for a guaranteed jobs program.)

But it may be the case that this whole sort of thinking—we intervene where the market fails—is not shared by UBIers and may demarcate older from younger people in this space. My approach is pretty "neo-classical" (though to be clear, I see market failures around many more corners than the median economist of my generation) and I think many younger people, to their credit, are looking at economics' track record in recent years and concluding that we need a whole new paradigm.

In other words, there are many interesting currents swirling around right now. But as we try to make sense of them, we should, for clarity's sake, be disciplined in our analysis and not conflate UBIs with NITs.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Yes, the “skinny repeal” is just a play to get to conference. But it’s also terrible policy. [feedly]

Yes, the "skinny repeal" is just a play to get to conference. But it's also terrible policy.
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/a-quick-note-on-the-mind-numbingly-weird-moment-in-health-care-policy/

Readers know I've been deeply engaged in the healthcare debate, and highly critical of the efforts thus far to repeal and replace, demean and deface, disgust and disgrace, etc.

But I haven't weighed in on up to the minute changes in part because they're changing fast and because the journalists who follow this are doing a good job of tracking developments in the Senate.

In sum, Senate R's have failed to pass any of the repeal and/or replace bills they've come up with so far. At this point, McConnell looks to be counting on getting to 50 votes with "skinny repeal," which gets rid of the individual and employer mandates, along with a tax on medical devices.

At one level, this is high strategery. His play is to get to conference, i.e., once both chambers have passed bills, the R's convene a committee that tries to agree on a plan that R majorities in both houses will support. There's no requirement that what comes out of conference looks like what went in, and that means they're most likely to go right back to the full, draconian repeal-and-replace cuts that would lead to tens of millions losing coverage.

Would Senate "moderates" who've blocked these bills thus far backtrack and vote for stuff they've heretofore opposed, like huge cuts to Medicaid or ending coverage of pre-existing conditions, maternal care, mental health, substance abuse treatment, etc.? They might, but it's worth remembering that the debate on the conference bill is constrained, no amendments are allowed, and leadership will be in full arm-twisting mode.

People are calling the skinny repeal a Trojan Horse but it's really more of a stalking horse. The Trojan Horse was supposed to be something good on the outside with something bad on the inside. But this damn thing is just all bad.

In fact, the skinny repeal should make even less sense to Republican voters (and yes, I know that trying to make sense out of any of this is a waste of time). While the Medicaid expansion has proven to be extremely important in expanding affordable coverage, the part of Obamacare that conservatives have consistently screamed the most about is the alleged collapsing of the non-group market.

That's phony too, of course, as I've written in many places, and, in fact, that part of the market was beginning to stabilize. From one of my earlier pieces on this:

After a few years of the experience with the ACA, private insurers are figuring out how to profitably price coverage. But many moving parts make this process an ongoing challenge for them. Some of that was expected, like the phaseout of reinsurance subsidies. But others, like the Trump administration's flirting with the loss of cost-sharing subsidies that private insurers depend on to hold down premium charges, are pure sabotage.

These payments reduce deductibles and copays for low- and moderate-income people, and their loss could lead the average premium for a benchmark plan to go up almost 20 percent. Just as they're getting the pricing calibrated, the uncertainty around whether the government will continue to make these payments has surfaced as one of the main reasons that private insurers are asking themselves whether it makes sense to continue to offer coverage in the exchanges.

Let's pause on the irony here for a moment. Conservatives' flawed ideology (explained below) that the private sector is the most efficient delivery mechanism for health coverage kept a public option out of the ACA. But the private insurers themselves said at the time, and maintain to this day, that they can't serve the exchanges without government subsidies. Now, Republicans want to block those subsidies, because … you guessed it … the private market blah, blah, yada, yada.

To pile irony on top of irony, the skinny repeal doesn't go after Medicaid, but it's a great tool to further destabilize the non-group market. Once you end the mandates, you invite the adverse selection that undermines risk pooling. Healthy people opt out, leaving more expensive people behind. Premium rise–2o%, according to CBO–leading the next healthiest tier to leave, and so on (the budget office also predicts this plan will leave 16 million fewer people with health coverage).

Which is why, according to the Times, Blue Cross Blue Shield warned senators "against repealing the mandate that almost everyone have insurance without something to take its place."

BTW, depending on how much of the rest of the ACA remains intact, higher premium subsidies will help many consumers offset these higher coverage costs, meaning not only will skinny repeal cover fewer people at higher costs, but the government will have to make up some of the difference. Great work, R's!

Given the just plain mean and ill-founded hostility of Republicans towards the poor and Medicaid, I at least understood their motive for the deep cuts they proposed (supported by Trump, who lied about this in the campaign, promising not to cut the program). Yet now, they're tactically stripping down their repeal plans down to parts that exclusively make purchasing health care in the private marketplace a lot more expensive, the very thing they've whined about for years.

I know I should be totally used to it by now, but I'm still taken aback by the hypocrisy of these politicians, and by their willful failure to try to meet the needs of anyone who isn't one of their rich donors.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Links for 07-24-17 [feedly]

Links for 07-24-17
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2017/07/links-for-07-24-17.html

VISI
 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Stiglitz: Why Tax Cuts for the Rich Solve Nothing


Joseph Stglitz

NEW YORK – Although America's right-wing plutocrats may disagree about how to rank the country's major problems – for example, inequality, slow growth, low productivity, opioid addiction, poor schools, and deteriorating infrastructure – the solution is always the same: lower taxes and deregulation, to "incentivize" investors and "free up" the economy. President Donald Trump is counting on this package to make America great again.

It won't, because it never has. When President Ronald Reagan tried it in the 1980s, he claimed that tax revenues would rise. Instead, growth slowed, tax revenues fell, and workers suffered. The big winners in relative terms were corporations and the rich, who benefited from dramatically reduced tax rates.

Trump has yet to advance a specific tax proposal. But, unlike his administration's approach to health-care legislation, lack of transparency will not help him. While many of the 32 million people projected to lose health insurance under the current proposal don't yet know what's coming, that is not true of the companies that will get the short end of the stick from Trump's tax reform.

Here's Trump's dilemma. His tax reform must be revenue neutral. That's a political imperative: with corporations sitting on trillions of dollars in cash while ordinary Americans are suffering, lowering the average amount of corporate taxation would be unconscionable – and more so if taxes were lowered for the financial sector, which brought on the 2008 crisis and never paid for the economic damage. Moreover, Senate procedures dictate that to enact tax reform with a simple majority, rather than the three-fifths supermajority required to defeat an almost-certain filibuster by opposition Democrats, the reform must be budget-neutral for ten years.

This requirement means that average corporate-tax revenue must remain the same, which implies that there will be winners and losers: some will pay less than they do now, and others will pay more. One might get away with this in the case of personal income tax, because even if the losers notice, they are not sufficiently organized. By contrast, even small businesses in the United States lobby Congress.

Most economists would agree that America's current tax structure is inefficient and unfair. Some firms pay a far higher rate than others. Perhaps innovative firms that create jobs should be rewarded, in part, by a tax break. But the only rhyme or reason to who gets tax breaks appears to be the effectiveness of supplicants' lobbyists.

One of the most significant problems concerns taxation of US corporations' foreign-earned income. Democrats believe that, because US corporations, wherever they operate, benefit from America's rule of law and power to ensure that they are not mistreated (often guaranteed by treaty), they ought to pay for these and other advantages. But a sense of fairness and reciprocity, much less national loyalty, is not deeply ingrained in many US companies, which respond by threatening to move their headquarters abroad.

Republicans, partly out of sensitivity to this threat, advocate a territorial tax system, like that used in most countries: taxes should be imposed on economic activity only in the country where it occurs. The concern is that, after imposing a one-off levy on the untaxed profits that US firms hold abroad, introducing a territorial system would generate a tax loss.

To offset this, Paul Ryan, the speaker of the US House of Representatives, has proposed adding a tax on net imports (imports minus exports). Because net imports lead to job destruction, they should be discouraged. At the same time, so long as US net imports are as high as they are now, the tax would raise enormous revenues.

But there's the rub: the money must come from someone's pocket. Import prices will go up. Consumers of cheap clothing from China will be worse off. To Trump's team, this is collateral damage, the inevitable price that must be paid to give America's plutocrats more money. But retailers such as Walmart, not just its customers, are part of the collateral damage, too. Walmart knows this – and won't let it happen.

Other corporate tax reforms might make sense; but they, too, imply winners and losers. And so long as the losers are numerous and organized enough, they are likely to have the power to stop the reform.

A politically astute president who understood deeply the economics and politics of corporate tax reform could conceivably muscle Congress toward a reform package that made sense. Trump is not that leader. If corporate tax reform happens at all, it will be a hodge-podge brokered behind closed doors. More likely is a token across-the-board tax cut: the losers will be future generations, out-lobbied by today's avaricious moguls, the greediest of whom include those who owe their fortunes to scummy activities, like gambling.

The sordidness of all of this will be sugarcoated with the hoary claim that lower tax rates will spur growth. There is simply no theoretical or empirical basis for this, especially in countries like the US, where most investment (at the margin) is financed by debt and interest is tax deductible. The marginal return and marginal cost are reduced proportionately, leaving investment largely unchanged. In fact, a closer look, taking into account accelerated depreciation and the effects on risk sharing, shows that lowering the tax rate likely reduces investment.


In a country with so many problems – especially inequality – tax cuts for rich corporations will not solve any of them. This is a lesson for all countries contemplating corporate tax breaks – even those without the misfortune of being led by a callow, craven plutocrat.Small countries are the sole exception, because they can pursue beggar-thy-neighbor policies aimed at poaching corporations from their neighbors. But global growth is largely unchanged – the distributive effects actually impede it slightly – as one gains at the expense of the other. (And this assumes that the other does not respond and fuel a race to the bottom.)


--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV

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