Friday, June 23, 2017

Commentary: Once Passed, Medicaid Cuts Won’t Be Easily Reversed [feedly]

Commentary: Once Passed, Medicaid Cuts Won't Be Easily Reversed
http://www.cbpp.org/health/commentary-once-passed-medicaid-cuts-wont-be-easily-reversed

Despite promises that the emerging Senate health bill will moderate the health coverage cuts in the House-passed American Health Care Act (AHCA), the Senate not only is retaining the House bill's fundamental restructuring of the Medicaid program — a "per capita cap" on federal funding — but is deepening the cuts under the per capita cap beginning around 2025.[1] Because the per capita cap wouldn't take effect until 2020 and the Senate's further cuts wouldn't kick in until five years after that, some suggest that policymakers might later undo the per capita cap itself or indefinitely delay the deeper cuts under pressure from state leaders, the public, providers, and others. This confidence is unwarranted; it ignores both recent history and the legislative constraints that would make it difficult or impossible to undo the deep Medicaid cuts.

THOSE STRUCTURAL CHANGES WOULD CREATE A POLITICAL DYNAMIC THAT COULD LEAD TO EVEN LARGER CUTS IN THE FUTURE. Once Congress both changes Medicaid's basic structure and enacts large annual savings, those cuts are highly unlikely to be reversed. In fact, those structural changes would create a political dynamic that could lead to even larger cuts in the future:

  • History suggests that structural changes to Medicaid would be very difficult to reverse. The basic concept behind the per capita cap is to impose a cap on federal funding per beneficiary, replacing the existing commitment of the federal government to pay a fixed share of state Medicaid costs. Experience with other programs suggests that such radical structural changes won't be reversed. The conversion of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) entitlement program to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant in 1996 is instructive: TANF's block grant structure has not only persisted but also led to a continuing erosion of the program's funding and effectiveness.[2]

    Indeed, the history of block grants (the closest analogy to a per capita cap) is that this structure enables deep cuts over time.  Since 2000, funding for the 13 major housing, health, and social services block grants has fallen by 27 percent, after adjusting for inflation (and 37 percent after adjusting for inflation and population growth).[3]   

  • Experience shows that spending cuts are also difficult to undo – due to both legislative and political constraints. Commentators have analogized the future increase in the Medicaid cuts to expiring tax provisions or cuts to Medicare payments to physicians under the "sustainable growth rate" (SGR) formula — measures that threatened sudden and painful cuts or tax increases, which Congress repeatedly delayed and ultimately largely reversed due to their political unpopularity. But recent history suggests that planned spending cuts aren't easy to undo. Unlike expiring tax provisions, both congressional rules and Republican demands may require "pay-fors" to offset the cost of reversing planned spending cuts. To reverse the spending cuts without offsetting the cost would likely require support from congressional leadership in both houses, 60 votes in the Senate, and support from the President.

    Indeed, while canceling the planned SGR cuts was highly popular and supported by a vocal and powerful interest group, for nearly 20 years — almost without exception — Congress either offset the cuts with other cuts (frequently other health cuts) or let them take effect. The automatic "sequestration" cuts passed in 2011 to force further deficit reduction are another example: a significant share of the cuts have taken effect, and sequestration relief has required substantial offsets.

    Reversing Medicaid cuts would require both a political consensus that they shouldn't have been enacted and sufficient congressional support to either waive budget rules or find painful offsets to achieve them. To be sure, Medicaid has broad-based support and affects a wide range of seniors, people with disabilities, and families with children.  But reversing these cuts would require mobilizing support not just for a low-income program but also for the revenue increases to pay for it.

  • The cuts under a per capita cap would grow substantially over time — making them harder to undo. That's true for both the destructive House cap and the even more destructive version under consideration by the Senate. Estimates suggest that the long-run cuts to Medicaid from a per capita cap indexed to general inflation, as under the Senate bill, could be several times larger or more than those under the House cap. That difference likely amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars of additional federal cuts in the subsequent decade.[4]  As a result, if offsets are needed to undo the Medicaid cuts, they would need to be far larger than those required to undo the past SGR cuts — and would grow substantially after the current ten-year budget window. Indeed, reversing all of the AHCA's tax breaks wouldn't pay for undoing the Medicaid cuts.
  • States would have to plan for cuts in advance — meaning they'd have no choice but to act pre-emptively, even if Congress eventually mitigated the damage. The magnitude of the cuts under a per capita cap, plus the difficulty of undoing them, would leave states with no choice but to act in advance. Even while lobbying Congress to reverse the cuts, they would pre-emptively limit Medicaid eligibility and services and cut provider payment rates to avoid the possibility that they'd have to drop coverage suddenly if the cuts took effect.[5]

Finally, it's worth noting that the Senate's changes illustrate another serious problem with a per capita cap: it gives policymakers an easy way to make deeper cuts to Medicaid whenever they need budget savings. Just as the Senate dialed down the growth rate of future Medicaid spending in order to meet the AHCA's overall deficit targets, future Congresses would have a strong incentive to make seemingly technical tweaks to the cap that generate large savings by further lowering the growth rate. Indeed, Congress may find it especially appealing to enact cuts that take effect several years down the line in order to offset more immediate costs, as the Senate is effectively doing with its changes.

Thus, while pundits may be right that the bill's Medicaid cuts will unfold differently over time than anticipated today, the cuts would likely end up bigger, not smaller, than those enacted now.

End Notes

[1] Edwin Park, "Senate Bill's Medicaid Cuts Would Be Even Deeper than House Cuts," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, June 20, 2017, http://www.cbpp.org/blog/senate-bills-medicaid-cuts-would-be-even-deeper-than-house-cuts.

[2] Liz Schott, "Lessons from TANF: Block-Granting a Safety-Net Program Has Significantly Reduced Its Effectiveness," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, February 22, 2017, http://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/lessons-from-tanf-block-granting-a-safety-net-program-has.

[3] David Reich et al., "Block-Granting Low-Income Programs Leads to Large Funding Declines Over Time, History Shows," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, February 22, 2017, http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/block-granting-low-income-programs-leads-to-large-funding-declines-over-time.

[4] Park.

[5] Edwin Park, "Medicaid Per Capita Cap Would Shift Costs and Risks to States and Harm Millions of Beneficiaries," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised February 27, 2017, http://www.cbpp.org/research/health/medicaid-per-capita-cap-would-shift-costs-and-risks-to-states-and-harm-millions-of.


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East Asia’s Real Lessons [feedly]

East Asia's Real Lessons
http://triplecrisis.com/east-asias-real-lessons/

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

International recognition of East Asia's rapid economic growth, structural change and industrialization grew from the 1980s. In Western media and academia, this was seen as a regional phenomenon, associated with some commonality, real or imagined, such as a supposed "yen bloc."

Others had a more mythic element, such as "flying geese," or ostensible bushido and Confucian ethics. Every purported miracle claims a mythic element, invariably fit for purpose. After all, miracles are typically attributed to supernatural forces, and hence, cannot be emulated by mere mortals. Hence, to better learn from ostensible miracles, it is necessary to demystify them.

The World Bank's 1993 East Asian Miracle (EAM) volume is the most influential document on the subject. It identified eight high-performing Asian economies: Japan, Hong Kong, three first-generation newly industrialized economies, namely South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, and three second-generation South East Asian newly industrializing countries, viz, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. Despite a title implying geo-spatial commonality, the study denied the significance of geography and culture, and specifically excluded China, the elephant in the region.

Strategic interventions?

The book identified six state interventions as important, approving of four "functional" interventions, but skeptical of two "strategic" interventions. Functional interventions supposedly compensated for market failures, while strategic interventions were deemed more market-distortive.

These two "strategic" interventions are in the areas of finance, specifically what it calls directed (targeted) and subsidized credit, and international trade, particularly what is often referred to as "industrial policy," or more rarely as "investment and technology policy."

Careful consideration of the accelerated East Asian growth and transformation experiences underscore that such interventions were mainly responsible for the superior performance of the Northeast Asian HPAEs compared to their Southeast Asian counterparts.

Industrial investments

Debates over Northeast Asian industrialization continue, but the pioneering work of American political economists Chalmers Johnson and Alice Amsden was undoubtedly seminal. Both showed that Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese government measures were quite different from typical World Bank development policy advice.

Successful finance ministry and central bank efforts to keep interest rates positive, but low, were crucial for accelerating industrial investments. From the mid-1970s, more orthodox Western economists began to characterize this as constituting "financial repression," for depressing interest rates, the incentive to save and funds available for investment.

Only later did other Western economists explain this Korean anomaly in terms of "financial restraint" to overcome financial market failures. But few have noted that savings rates actually follow, rather than determine investment rates. Meanwhile, cultural explanations have also been invoked to explain East Asia's high savings and investment rates.

Ownership matters

Subsidized and directed (or targeted) credit also promoted desired investments. Fiscal and other policies also encouraged reinvestment of profits, rather than maximizing "shareholder value," while other incentives encouraged desired investments. Where private investments were not forthcoming, the governments themselves made needed investments despite active discouragement by international development banks.

Strict controls on capital outflows, especially when foreign exchange resources were still scarce, also served to discourage capital flight. Northeast Asian economies were also careful to distinguish between long-term foreign direct investment (FDI) and short-term portfolio investment, or "hot money."

Perhaps owing to Bank preference for FDI, ostensibly to close both the "savings-investment" and "foreign exchange" gaps, the EAM also favoured FDI and did not consider ownership important. However, during the early decades of high growth before the 1990s, Northeast Asian governments encouraged national ownership of industrial enterprises.

This policy served to promote vertically and horizontally integrated industrial conglomerates in the case of Korean chaebol and Japanese keiretsu. (Zaibatsu were suppressed after the Second World War as they were held responsible for the pre-war Japanese military industrial complex.) Instead of FDI, South Korea encouraged licensing and, if necessary, joint-ventures to promote technology transfer.

Singapore and Malaysia in Southeast Asia have especially sought to attract FDI, initially for political reasons. Singapore desired strong Western support after establishing a new state in 1965. Since then, FDI has been attracted as part of a pro-active technology policy complemented by government policies, including investments. Attracting FDI to accelerate technology development is quite different from capital account liberalization enabling short-term financial inflows.

Trade policies

The Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese governments pursued import substituting industrialization policies from the 1950s, but later encouraged export orientation as well. Infant industries were provided with effective protection conditional on export promotion, effectively requiring firms to quickly become internationally competitive.

By protecting firms temporarily, depending on the product to be promoted, and by requiring certain output shares be exported within pre-specified periods, discipline was imposed on firms in return for the support provided. Such policies forced firms to achieve greater economies of scale and accelerate learning to reduce production costs quickly.

Requiring exports has also meant producers have had to achieve international consumer quality standards quickly, which accelerated progress in product and process technology. This "carrot and stick" approach induced many firms to rapidly become internationally competitive.

Thus, the very industrial, trade and financial policies rejected by the Bank were in fact necessary for East Asia's achievements. Some policies were inappropriately and prematurely undermined or terminated, e.g., with Japan's financial "big bang," with disastrous consequences.

Originally published by Inter Press Service.

Triple Crisis welcomes your comments. Please share your thoughts below.


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Links: Recession risks; the really, really bad Senate GOP health plan; see ya later… [feedly]

Links: Recession risks; the really, really bad Senate GOP health plan; see ya later…
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/links-recessions-risks-the-really-really-bad-senate-gop-health-plan-see-ya-later/

A few links to check out, both over at WaPo.

First, no one knows when the next recession will hit though it's closer now than when I started writing this sentence. But I've got two recessionary concerns: one, fiscal policy, both discretionary and automatic will be thoroughly insufficient due to the toxic mix of Congressional dysfunction and austerity; two, financial deregulation will raise the likelihood of another bubble.

Second, the Senate health care plan is worse than the House plan. Specifically, it's pretty much the House plan but with much deeper Medicaid cuts over the long term.

Finally, I'm outta here, headed for the far-east for a few weeks, and I'm gonna do my best not to cast my gaze westward. You know what that means, right? It means that you, OTE'ers, have to keep the forces of economic darkness from gaining any ground in my absence. Be assured, I'll hold you personally responsible if the sh__ goes south while I go east.

Best,
JB


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Links for 06-23-17 [feedly]

Thursday, June 22, 2017

Free markets need equality [feedly]

...an amusing take, but it needs a game theory backing -- some descendant of the Prisoner's Dilemma -- that can MODEL the payoffs and trade-offs that iterate more toward the equality enhancing outcomes, as opposed to the opposite. If there were such a credible model, or models, it would be a good policy framework for managing a mixed economy tilted toward cooperative strategies for sustainable societies.

Free markets need equality
http://stumblingandmumbling.typepad.com/stumbling_and_mumbling/2017/06/free-markets-need-equality.html

These are dark times for free marketeers. Voters are only lukewarm about the virtues of capitalism; the Grenfell disaster is widely regarded as showing the case for greater regulation; and, as Sam Bowman says, even the Tories "have totally failed to make a broad-brush case for free markets."

I share some of their disquiet. Flawed as they are, markets have virtues as selection and information-aggregation mechanisms.

What, then, can be done to strengthen the case for markets?

There's one thing that's crucial – equality of power. For free markets to have public acceptance, the worst-off must have bargaining power. Without this, "free" markets merely become a device for exploitation.

Imagine, for example, that we had overfull employment and/or high out-of-work benefits. Workers would then be able to reject low wages and bad working conditions. Market forces would then deliver higher wages and good, safer, conditions simply because employers that didn't offer these wouldn't have any workers. Equally – though it's harder to imagine – if we had an abundance of housing, landlords who offered shoddy or dangerous accommodation would either have to refurbish their property to acceptable standards or suffer a lack of tenants.

We wouldn't, therefore need "red tape." The market would raise working and living standards.

We don't need thought experiments to see this. We have empirical evidence too.

Philippe Aghion and colleagues have shown that there's a negative correlation across countries between unions density and minimum wage laws. Countries with strong unions have less stringent minimum wage laws – because greater bargaining power reduces the need for such laws. Remember that the UK adopted minimum wages in the 1990s, when unions had been emasculated. In the 60s and 70s, when unions were strong, the market raised wages.

Also, there is a negative correlation across developed countries between inequality (as measured, imperfectly, by Gini coefficients) and business freedom. Egalitarian Denmark and Sweden, for example, score better on the Heritage Foundation's index of freedom than the unequal US. There's a simple reason for this. Working people want what they regard as a fair deal. If they can't get it through bargaining in free markets, they'll seek it through politics and regulation.

The inference here is, for me, obvious. If you are serious about wanting free markets you must put in place the conditions which are necessary for them – namely, greater bargaining power for tenants, customers and workers. This requires not just strong anti-monopoly policies but also policies such as a high citizens income, full employment and mass housebuilding.

In short, free markets require egalitarian policies. Free marketeers who don't support these are not the friends of freedom at all, but are merely shills for exploiters.


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Harsh Tradeoff at Core of GOP Health Bill: Keep Medicaid Expansion or Cut Taxes for Wealthy? [feedly]

Harsh Tradeoff at Core of GOP Health Bill: Keep Medicaid Expansion or Cut Taxes for Wealthy?
http://www.cbpp.org/research/health/harsh-tradeoff-at-core-of-gop-health-bill-keep-medicaid-expansion-or-cut-taxes-for

Tracking Reports About the Emerging Senate Bill to Repeal the Affordable Care Act

JUNE 12, 2017

The House-passed health bill to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA) — the American Health Care Act (AHCA) — would slash programs that help people get health coverage and use most of the savings to pay for tax cuts for high-income households and corporations. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the bill would increase the number of uninsured by 23 million people and make coverage worse or less affordable for millions more.

Now, the Senate is working on its version of the AHCA. Despite initial claims that the Senate would start over and develop its own legislation, Senate leaders have said, "the practical matter is that 80 percent of what the House did we're likely to do." This page tracks reports of how the Senate may change the House bill and analyzes whether the reported tweaks would meaningfully alter the House bill's effects. So far, the reported changes easily fit within Senate leadership's 80 percent framework: they would result in a Senate bill with virtually the same overall harmful impacts as the House bill.

Major ProvisionsWhat the House Bill DoesReported Senate ChangesLong-Run Impact of Reported Changes
Medicaid expansionEffectively ends expansion, which extended coverage to 11 million low-income adultsEnds expansion a little more slowly: ACA expansion funding may phase out over several years, versus ending in 2020None
Medicaid per capita capCaps and cuts Medicaid for seniors, people with disabilities, and families with childrenNo major changes reported; some senators continue to push for even deeper cuts, or other harmful changesNone or minimal — or potentially deeper cuts
Individual market changesSlashes marketplace premium tax credits and eliminates cost-sharing assistance while raising premiums by eliminating the individual mandateUnknown, but past discussions have focused on restoring less than one-third of House bill's subsidy cutsAt best small improvements: coverage would still be unaffordable for people who are older, lower-income, and live in high-cost states
State grantsProvides $138 billion over ten years that's supposed to solve problems ranging from individual market premium increases to Medicaid cutsMay add modest additional funding for opioid treatmentMinimal: even with modest funding increases, grants would still offset only a small fraction of bill's $1.1 trillion total coverage cuts and wouldn't get people treatment they need
Consumer protectionsLets states waive the ACA's standards for what services plans have to cover and its prohibition on charging people with pre-existing conditions higher premiumsMay "only" let states waive benefit standards, which CBO found could lead plans in half the country to drop coverage for mental health, substance use, maternity care and other benefitsMinimal: people with pre-existing conditions still wouldn't have access to the services they need
Tax cutsCuts taxes by more than $600 billion, with most benefits going to high-income households and corporationsMay delay certain tax cuts — but no discussion of dropping major tax cuts in order to restore coverageNone

Ending the ACA Medicaid Expansion

What the House bill does: The House bill effectively ends the ACA's Medicaid expansion, which has allowed 31 states and the District of Columbia to extend coverage to 11 million low-income adults. Starting in 2020, states would have to pay three to five times as much as they do now to cover new expansion enrollees, forcing most or all states to end their expansions. That would reverse gains in coverage, access to care, health, and financial security; sharply increase uncompensated care costs for states and hospitals; and set back state efforts to combat the opioid epidemic.

What the Senate is reportedly considering: The Senate bill will reportedly phase down federal funding for expansion over several years, starting in 2020 — but it would still effectively eliminate the Medicaid expansion in the long run, leaving millions of low-income adults uninsured. As we've explained, expansion states won't be able to absorb a $35 billion hit to their budgets, no matter when it occurs. And poor and near-poor people losing Medicaid coverage won't be able to afford individual market premiums that would often exceed a quarter, half, or even their entire incomes, even after taking tax credits into account.

The reported Senate "compromise" wouldn't even have much effect in the short run. At least eight Medicaid expansion states — Arkansas, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Washington — have expansion "trigger laws" under which their Medicaid expansions automatically end if the federal matching rate for expansion enrollees falls at all. Under the reported Senate proposal to phase down expansion funding, these state triggers would still go off in 2020 — just like under the House bill. Moreover, even non-trigger states would see their costs for new expansion enrollees rise significantly starting in 2020. Few state legislatures will choose to come up with extra funding to keep their expansions going when the federal funding cuts, and required state funding increases, will keep rising each year. Thus, even non-trigger states would likely freeze enrollment in their expansions starting in 2020 — just like under the House bill.  

Cutting and Capping Medicaid for Seniors, People with Disabilities, and Families with Children

What the House bill does: The House bill would also end Medicaid as we know it for tens of millions of seniors, people with disabilities, and families with children. Today, Medicaid is a federal-state partnership, with the federal government covering a fixed share of states' Medicaid costs. The House bill would convert virtually the entire program to a per capita cap: an arbitrary cap on per-enrollee federal Medicaid funding, which would cover a falling share of states' actual costs over time. What's more, the cuts under a cap would be deepest precisely when need is greatest, since federal Medicaid funding would no longer increase automatically in response to public health emergencies like the opioid epidemic or to a new costly breakthrough treatment or drug.

What the Senate is reportedly considering: Based on press accounts, some senators are still pursuing an effort to lower the per capita cap growth rate, which would deepen the House bill's Medicaid costs. And the Senate is reportedly also considering a more modest change that could make the cap even worse, forcing states to make even deeper cuts over time.

For more on efforts to deepen the House bill's per capita cap Medicaid cuts, see: Toomey-Lee Proposal Would Significantly Expand House Bill's Already Deep Medicaid Cuts
For more on the reported Senate changes to the House bill's per capita cap, see: Senate Change to Medicaid Per Capita Cap Could Deepen Federal Funding Cuts

Raising Premiums and Deductibles, and Slashing Tax Credits

What the House bill does: The House bill cuts about $300 billion from subsidies that currently help moderate-income people afford individual market coverage, slashing tax credits that help people afford their premiums and eliminating subsidies that help low-income people pay deductibles, copays, and coinsurance. It also increases "sticker price" premiums starting next year by repealing the ACA's individual mandate. In total, the bill would raise out-of-pocket costs (premiums, deductibles, copays, and coinsurance) by an average of $3,600 in 2020 for people who buy health insurance through the ACA marketplace — and by far more for older people, lower-income people, and people in high-cost states.

What the Senate is reportedly considering: According to press accounts, Senate Republicans have not settled on an approach to modifying the House bill's tax credits, but they may be considering a proposal from Senator John Thune to increase tax credits for older consumers. When we analyzed an earlier proposal that would have increased tax credits in the House bill for older consumers from $4,000 to nearly $6,000, we found it made little difference to the affordability problems the House bill created. Out-of-pocket costs for marketplace consumers would still rise by an average of $2,900 in 2020 — more than 80 percent as much as under the House bill. And older consumers would still be hit the hardest.

Removing Protections for People with Pre-Existing Conditions

What the House bill does: The House bill removes key market reforms and consumer protections that the ACA put in place nationwide. Under the House bill, states could choose to let individual market plans go back to excluding key services, charging people with pre-existing conditions unaffordable premiums, or both.

What the Senate is reportedly considering: The Senate will reportedly "only" let states waive the "essential health benefit" standards for what plans have to cover, while maintaining the ACA's ban against charging people with pre-existing conditions higher premiums. But that distinction would make little difference to people with pre-existing conditions or others with serious medical needs. CBO found that, if states are allowed to waive essential health benefits standards, individual market health plans in half of the country could go back to excluding coverage for mental health, substance use treatment, maternity care, and other key services. It concluded, "out-of-pocket spending on maternity care and mental health and substance abuse services could increase by thousands of dollars in a given year for the nongroup enrollees who would use those services."

What's more, eliminating essential health benefits standards would weaken other core ACA protections, including some that apply to people who work for large employers. That's because the ACA's prohibitions on annual and lifetime limits — and the requirement for most employer plans to cap enrollees' out-of-pocket spending each year — are tied to the essential health benefits standards. These protections are especially critical to people with costly pre-existing conditions. Before the ACA, such people often faced unaffordable out-of-pocket costs, even if they had health insurance through their jobs.

For more on the reported Senate changes to the House bill consumer protections provisions, see: If Senate Republican Health Bill Weakens Essential Health Benefits Standards, It Would Harm People with Pre-Existing Conditions

Cutting Taxes for the Wealthy, Insurers, and Drug Companies

What the House bill does: The House bill uses most of the savings from cutting marketplace subsidies and Medicaid to pay for about $660 billion in tax cuts that go primarily to the wealthy, insurers, and drug companies. By 2025, tax cuts would average over $50,000 per year for households with annual incomes exceeding $1 million.

What the Senate is reportedly considering: Senate Republicans are reportedly considering delaying some of the House bill's tax cuts. But they do not appear to be open to dropping major tax breaks in order to restore coverage for some of the millions who would otherwise lose it.

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Bloomberg: The Wrong Kind of Entrepreneurs Flourish in America

The Wrong Kind of Entrepreneurs Flourish in America

Crony capitalists seek to generate profits without producing anything of value.
65

Crony capitalism at work.

 
Photographer: Meridith Kohut/Bloomberg

When most people use the word "rent," they mean the price paid to live in a house or apartment. But when economists say "rent," they mean money that one person extracts from another without producing anything of value. When the government taxes people to give subsidies to companies, those subsidies are a form of rent. A monopoly generates rents from being able to jack up prices without being threatened by competition. Sometimes the government allows companies to get a certain amount of rent -- for example, the royalties from patents, which we protect in an attempt to encourage innovation.

Because it's just a transfer from one person to another, rent doesn't necessarily make an economy less efficient -- it's just often unfair. But Robert Litan and Ian Hathaway, writing in Harvard Business Review, have a more dire hypothesis. They surmised that many American entrepreneurs are no longer looking for ways to produce more useful stuff, and are instead looking for new techniques for extracting money from each other and from the government. In other words, crony capitalism may be slowly cannibalizing productive capitalism.

Litan and Hathaway draw on an argument by the late economist William Baumol, who warned of the possibility that entrepreneurs could turn their energies toward useless rent-seeking. As examples, Baumol cited historical cases of businesspeople who found novel ways to sue their competitors out of existence. Litan and Hathaway, noting a slowdown in U.S. entrepreneurship, fear that something similar might be happening  today. If big companies are using new and creative ways to crush the competition, it's bad news for economic dynamism -- it means fewer new products will be brought to market, and fewer hidebound old industries will be disrupted.

It could also mean that U.S. industries have been getting more concentrated across the board:

Industrial concentration, also known as oligopoly, tends to lead to higher prices and less economic output. It can also increase inequality and shift income from workers to company owners. There are a number of reasons the economy could be entrenching a smaller and smaller number of big corporations, but crony capitalism could definitely be part of the story. The rent-seeking entrepreneurship that Baumol warns about could easily be carried out by big companies.

So which companies are sucking rents out of the productive economy? Litan and Hathaway don't point fingers, but it's easy to make an educated guess. In an influential 2014 paper, Thomas Philippon speculated that financial industry profits and salaries rose spectacularly since 1980 because banks, securities firms and fund-management companies found new methods for extracting rent. There are a number of ways this could happen, from the implicit bailout guarantees given to too-big-to-fail banks to high-frequency trading systems designed to beat the competition by nanoseconds. I suspect that hidden money-management fees might be another mammoth source of rents.

Patents might also be playing a role. Economists such as Alex Tabarrok, as well as many others from politics and industry, have been arguing that the U.S. patent system has changed from a healthy facilitator of scientific breakthroughs to a heavy hand of government regulation that shelters dominant corporate giants. Patenting of software, business processes and product design has reached absurd levels -- in 1999, Amazon.com Inc. won a patent for the "innovation" of one-click online shopping, and in 2012 Apple Inc. received a patent for the idea of rectangular handheld devices with rounded corners. Big companies are shelling out increasingly big bucks for patents, just to shield them against competitors' lawsuits. Against that amount of cash, plucky startups have no chance.

Regulation could be a big drag as well. Eager both to shield workers from obsolescence and to appease corporate lobbyists, many U.S. states have enacted laws to protect established industries from new market entrants. Some states forbid car companies from selling directly to buyers, while others protect credit-card companies by banning retailers from passing on swipe fees. Though one study has cast doubt on federal regulation's role in reduced entrepreneurial dynamism, state regulation could be a much bigger deal.

Another source of rent is corporate subsidies. Local governments often pay companies to keep their offices and factories close by. This may help keep production in the U.S., but it's a form of rent all the same. And if different U.S. states or cities compete against each other in bidding wars when a business relocates or plans a new factory or office, it's a zero-sum game that merely sucks money out of taxpayers' pockets and delivers it to corporate coffers.

This isn't an exhaustive list of all the ways that companies can use the government to siphon money from individual Americans and crush their small young competitors. But it should be enough to demonstrate that crony capitalism is a threat to U.S. productivity as well as fairness. In theory, liberals and conservatives should both oppose crony capitalism, since it hurts average Americans and reduces economic freedom at the same time. Let's hope legislators can put aside the rancor of this hyperpartisan age and work to end the favoritism that gives well-connected businesses an unwarranted advantage.

    To contact the author of this story:
    Noah Smith at nsmith150@bloomberg.net

    To contact the editor responsible for this story:
    James Greiff at jgreiff@bloomberg.net


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    John Case
    Harpers Ferry, WV

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