Wednesday, July 15, 2020

Dean Baker: Ross Douthat Shows Trouble With Arithmetic In New York Times Column on China’s “Decade” [feedly]

omigod: Baker is becoming a China watcher too, like me, and questioning the NYT/Post liberal line....


Ross Douthat Shows Trouble With Arithmetic In New York Times Column on China's "Decade"

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/beat_the_press/~3/DkmZZ5JxCGo/

Ross Douthat has good news for folks who don't like China. His NYT columnyesterday told us that China's economy will run out of steam in a decade and that the U.S. will again be able to reclaim world leadership after 2030. The problem is that the piece presents nothing to support this claim.

After telling readers that China is passing the U.S. for world leadership due to the inept presidency of Donald Trump, Douthat gets to the meat of his piece:

"It's possible that we're nearing a peak of U.S.-China tension not because China is poised to permanently overtake the United States as a global power, but because China itself is peaking — with a slowing growth rate that may leave it short of the prosperity achieved by its Pacific neighbors, a swiftly aging population, and a combination of self-limiting soft power and maxed-out hard power that's likely to diminish, relative to the U.S. and India and others, in the 2040s and beyond.

"Instead of a Chinese Century, in other words, the coronavirus might be ushering in a Chinese Decade, in which Xi Jinping's government behaves with maximal aggression because it sees an opportunity that won't come again."

The problem is that the cited piece for "China's slowing growth rate" still has China growing close to 4.0 percent annually. That is almost 2.0 percentage points faster than the 2.1 percent growth rate projected for the U.S. in the last five years of the decade.

Furthermore, the U.S. economy is starting from a much lower base. In 2019 China's economy was already more than 25 percent larger than the U.S. economy, while the U.S. economy is projected to shrink by 5.5 percent this year, China's is expected to grow by 1.8 percent. It is hard to see how an economy that is starting from a lower level and growing at a slower pace, will pass a larger economy that is growing more rapidly. I guess it takes an NYT columnist to figure that one out.

One final point, there seems to be an obsession in the media with China's lower birth rate and likely declining population. While the idea that this is a big problem for China is repeated endlessly, it really lead to the obvious question, why?

So the country will have fewer people. This will likely mean fewer people working in very low productivity jobs in agriculture and the service sector. And why exactly would this be a problem for China?

The post Ross Douthat Shows Trouble With Arithmetic In New York Times Column on China's "Decade" appeared first on Center for Economic and Policy Research.


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Tuesday, July 14, 2020

The Kansas City Approach to Modern Money Theory [feedly]

The Kansas City Approach to Modern Money Theory
http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/?docid=2682

Modern money theory (MMT) synthesizes several traditions from heterodox economics. Its focus is on describing monetary and fiscal operations in nations that issue a sovereign currency. As such, it applies Georg Friedrich Knapp's state money approach (chartalism), also adopted by John Maynard Keynes in his Treatise on Money. MMT emphasizes the difference between a sovereign currency issuer and a sovereign currency user with respect to issues such as fiscal and monetary policy space, ability to make all payments as they come due, credit worthiness, and insolvency. Following A. Mitchell Innes, however, MMT acknowledges some similarities between sovereign and nonsovereign issues of liabilities, and hence integrates a credit theory of money (or, "endogenous money theory," as it is usually termed by post-Keynesians) with state money theory. MMT uses this integration in policy analysis to address issues such as exchange rate regimes, full employment policy, financial and economic stability, and the current challenges facing modern economies: rising inequality, climate change, aging of the population, tendency toward secular stagnation, and uneven development. This paper will focus on the development of the "Kansas City" approach to MMT at the University of Missouri–Kansas City (UMKC) and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.  

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Reconstructing internationalism [feedly]

Reconstructing internationalism
https://www.lemonde.fr/blog/piketty/2020/07/14/reconstructing-internationalism/

Can we restore positive meaning to the idea of internationalism? Yes, but on condition that we turn our backs on the ideology of unfettered free trade which has till now guided globalisation and adopt a new model for development based on explicit principles of economic and climatic justice. This model must be internationalist in its final aims but sovereignist in its practical modalities, in the sense that each country, each political community must be able to determine the conditions for the pursuit of trade with the rest of the world without waiting for the unanimous agreement of its partners. The task will not be simple and it will not always be easy to distinguish this sovereignism with a universalist vocation from nationalist-type sovereignism. It is therefore particularly urgent to indicate the differences.

Lets us suppose that one country, or a political majority within it, considers it would be desirable to set up a highly progressive tax on top income and wealth holders to bring about a major redistribution in favour of the poorest socioeconomic groups while at the same time financing a programme for social, educational and ecological investment. To move in this direction, this country is considering a taxation at source on corporate profits and most importantly a system of financial registry that would enable the identification of the ultimate owners of the shares and dividends and thus the application of the desired progressive tax rates at individual level. The whole package could be completed by an individual carbon card thus encouraging responsible behaviour, while taxing the highest emissions heavily ; those who benefit from the profits of the most polluting firms would also be taxed. Once again this would demand a knowledge of the owners.

Unfortunately, a financial registry of this type has not been provided for by the Treaties for the free circulation of capital established in the 1980s-1990s, in particular in Europe in the framework of the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992), texts which have strongly influenced those adopted thereafter throughout the world. This ultra-sophisticated legal architecture, still in force today, has de facto created a quasi-sacred right to get rich by using the infrastructures of one country, then by one click on a laptop, transferring one's assets to another jurisdiction, with no possibility provided for the community to find any trace of it. Following the crisis in 2008, as the excesses of financial deregulation came to light, agreements on the automatic exchange of banking information have been developed within the OECD, true. But these measures, established on a purely voluntary basis, do not contain the slightest sanction for recalcitrant countries.

Let us suppose therefore that a country wishes to accelerate the movement and sets up a redistributive form of taxation and a financial registry. Now, let's imagine that one of its neighbours does not share this point of view and applies a ridiculously small profit tax and carbon tax on firms based on its territory (whether in actual fact or fictiously), while refusing to transmit the information as to their owners. In these circumstances, the first country should in my view impose commercial sanctions on the second ; the amount would vary, depending on the firm and the extent of the fiscal and climatic damage caused. Recent research has shown that sanctions of this type would bring in substantial revenues and would encourage other countries to co-operate. Of course, we would have to plead that these sanctions are merely correcting unfair competition and the non-respect of the climate agreements. But the latter are so vague and, on the contrary, the treaties on the free circulation of goods and capital are so sophisticated and absolute, particularly at European level, that a country which adopts this approach stands a considerable risk of being condemned by European or International bodies (The Court of Justice of the European Union, the World Trade Organisation). If such were the case, the country should leave the Treaties in question unilaterally, while at the same time suggesting new ones.

What is the difference between the social and ecological sovereignism which I have just outlined and nationalist sovereignism (for example, of the Trump, Chinese, Indian or, tomorrow, the French or European variety) based on the defense of identity of a specific civilisation and of interests deemed to be homogenous within it ?

There are two. Firstly, before taking possible unilateral measures, it is crucial to propose to other countries a model for cooperative development based on universal values : social justice, reduction of inequality, conservation of the planet. It is also important to describe in detail the transnational assemblies (such as the French-German Agreement created last year, but with real powers) which ideally would be in charge of global public property and common policies for fiscal and climatic justice.

Then, if these social-federalist proposals are not taken up at the moment, the unilateral approach should nevertheless remain incentive-based and reversible. The aim of sanctions is to encourage other countries to exit from fiscal and climatic dumping ; the aim is not to establish permanent protectionism. From this point of view the sectoral measures with no universal basis such as the GAFA tax should be avoided because they easily lend themselves to ratcheting up sanctions (wine taxes versus digital taxes, etc.)

To claim that this type of path is easy to follow and well sign-posted would be absurd : it all still has to be invented. But historical experience demonstrates that nationalism can only lead to exacerbating inegalitarian and climatic tensions and that there is no future for unfettered free trade. One more reason for thinking, as from today, about the conditions for a new internationalism.

Note. For a first estimate of the possible amount of anti-dumping sanctions, see Ana Seco Justo, « Profit Allocation and Corporate Taxing Rights: Global and Unilateral Perspectives« , PSE 2020.


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Equitable Growth: understanding-the-importance-of-monopsony-power-in-the-u-s-labor-market

Definition of Monopsony:
monopsony occurs when a firm has market power in employing factors of production (e.g. labour). A monopsony means there is one buyer and many sellers. It often refers to a monopsony employer – who has market power in hiring workers. This is a similar concept to monopoly where there is one seller and many buyers.  

https://equitablegrowth.org/understanding-the-importance-of-monopsony-power-in-the-u-s-labor-market/

There are many obstacles in finding a job in the United States. Some of these obstacles are socially constructed, such as more household responsibilities shouldered by women compared to men. Other obstacles are the result of a long discriminatory past, especially the immense inequality in household wealth between racial and ethnic groups. These obstacles inhibit workers from moving freely between jobs and thus give employers monopsony power—the power to push down wages when workers have few suitable outside options. 

Because these obstacles more commonly confront women and non-White workers, employers have more power over such workers, which means employers can push their wages down more compared to White men workers. In a new working paper, we demonstrate how these racialized and gendered wealth disparities reinforce discriminatory pay penalties by examining how workers search for jobs. We find that institutional support for worker power—in the form of greater protections for collective action and a more pro-worker National Labor Relations Board that facilitates organizing through overseeing union elections and hearing unfair labor practice charges—can limit the ability of employers to exploit workers based on their gender or race and ethnic backgrounds.

But first, let's look at the corollary history of racial and gender wage gaps, which have been remarkably persistent. The gender wage divide converged somewhat in the 1970s and 1980s, but since the early 1990s, those gains have stalled. As of 2018, White women only earn around 79 percent of equivalent White men. And since at least the 1980s, the wage gap has widened between equivalent Black and White workers. 

Furthermore, evidence suggests that wage disparities faced by Black women workers and Latinx women workers is greater than the sum of their racial-ethnic and gender components. These disparities demonstrate the existence of intersectional wage gaps.

The predominant model in economics to explain these differences is the human capital model, in which differences in earnings are presumed to reflect differences in "capital" allotments that result in productivity differences between workers. Yet this model is insufficient when describing changes over time and as human capital investments among groups of workers has changed. The failure of the human capital model to explain outcomes in the real economy is evident in the higher discriminatory wage penalties for Black workers compared to White workers with similarly higher levels of educationAudit studies likewise demonstrate how pay and hiring discrimination persists for equivalently productive workers.

Employers' wage-setting power, or monopsony power, may explain some of these persistent differences and how they have changed over time. Applying the original application of monopsony pioneered by the late British economist Joan Robinson to gender wage gaps explains why different rates of unionization between men and women affected wages. Robinson showed that employers are less able to extract monopsony rents for primarily male unionized workers. Limited subsequent research also found differences in labor supply elasticity between men and women and between Black and White workers.

Yet no theoretical extension of the monopsony model has been developed to illuminate the underlying dynamics that result in these outcomes. Our new working paper develops a theoretical monopsony model to explain these dynamics—a model that shows pre-existing disparities in individual wealth influence job search behavior. Workers with greater wealth are more able to navigate potential money shortfalls in the job search process and are thus more responsive to market signals. Conversely, lower levels of wealth decrease the level of the so-called reservation wage, or the wage level that is just enough to incentivize the worker to take a new job. Thus, more wealth among job candidates reduces employers' ability to push down their wages.

White workers, of course, are more likely to have access to more wealth due to the persistent wealth gap in the United States. In contrast, individuals with less household wealth, predominantly workers of color, are less able to weather potential household financial crises that could result from switching jobs.

Likewise, if women workers are constrained in their geographic job search due to household responsibilities, then fewer suitable job prospects will also reduce their ability to search for jobs. Thus, employers can exploit workers with lower household wealth and more household responsibilities more intensely, and it is profit maximizing to do so.

Empirical research demonstrates this multiplicative intersectional wage gap, and our theoretical model shows how these constraints to job search are greater than the sum of their parts, reducing wages offered to women of color workers under monopsony. Thus, the wages these workers receive represent discriminatory pay because two elements—systemic racism and misogyny—confront workers in the U.S. economy and American society in general.

Yet these wage disparities, and monopsony power more broadly, are moderated by workers' ability to act collectively as a countervailing force, and that kind of worker power is a function of institutional supports for collective action. Thus, policies that reduce monopsony power also will limit the ability of employers to exploit workers based on their race, ethnicity, gender, and other socially salient identities correlated with average wealth.

Our model is extended to include varying government support for collective action, in parallel with the model by one of the co-authors of our working paper, Mark Stelzner, along with Mark Paul at the New College of Florida, in the Equitable Growth working paper "How does market power affect wages? Monopsony and collective action in an institutional context." In our working paper, "Discrimination and Monopsony," we show that institutional support for organized labor is able to offset employers' monopsony power along racial, ethnic, gender, and intersectional lines.

In practice, proposed policies—such as the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (passed by the U.S. House of Representatives but stalled in the Senate in early 2020) that would expand the ability of unions to organize workers alongside institutions, including a more effective National Labor Relations Board, which upholds current U.S. labor organizing laws but is largely ineffectual—would limit employers' ability to exploit workers along multiple axes. The need for more pro-labor policies is increasingly evident as employers' monopsony power mounts, partially due to an anti-labor policy and institutional environment since the 1970s, and as racial and gender wage disparities remain persistent and are likely to worsen due to differences in unemployment amid the coronavirus pandemic.

In addition to policies aimed at balancing worker power, broader policies that reduce racial and gender wealth disparities and household constraints facing women workers also would increase the ability of workers to search for and match into better jobs at higher levels of pay. One of the most sweeping ideas for addressing racial wealth disparities are proposals for reparations, which would be targeted at wealth redistribution among the descendants of enslaved Black Americans, who continue to be negatively impacted not just by the devastating legacy of slavery but also by barely less violent and oppressive post-Civil War discrimination.

Family economic security policies are another pro-worker set of policies that help families manage care responsibilities, such as paid leave and accessible quality childcare. As long as women continue to take responsibility for the lion's share of family caretaking, these polices can increase women's ability to search more broadly for jobs and help reduce the gender wage gap.

Our model demonstrates how a variety of factors intersect to result in discriminatory wage outcomes for workers along the lines of race, ethnicity, and gender, and likewise shows that a suite of policies in tandem that address these broad constraints would lead to more efficient outcomes and higher levels of social welfare. Amid the life-altering circumstances brought about by the coronavirus recession and the subsequently swift shift in work-life balances among women frontline workers and workers of color in particular, pro-labor policies to strengthen collective action by workers in the United States is of paramount importance.

Some Background about Police Shootings [feedly]

A lot of useful data here, from several studies summarized by Tim Taylor. I think it still misses the level of corruption and racism, and thus the need for many departments to be torn down first and built up again with some of these reforms, and others related to community controls, in place.

Some Background about Police Shootings

https://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2020/07/some-background-about-police-shootings.html

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science devoted its January 2020 issue to a set of 14 articles on the theme of   "Fatal Police Shootings: Patterns, Policy, and Prevention." I'll post a Table of Contents for the issue below. Here, I'll just note some of the lessons one might take away from a few of the papers in the issue.

Franklin Zimring lays out some useful background (citations omitted): 
Police shoot and kill about a thousand civilians each year, and other types of conflict and custodial force add more than one hundred other lives lost to the annual total death toll. This is a death toll far in excess of any other fully developed nation, and the existing empirical evidence suggests that at least half and perhaps as many as 80 percent of these killings are not necessary to safeguard police or protect other citizens from life-threatening force. ... 

One reason why U.S. police kill so many civilians is that U.S. police themselves are vastly more likely than police in other rich nations to die from violent civilian attacks. In Great Britain or Germany, the number of police deaths from civilian attack most years is either one or zero. In the United States—four or five times larger—the death toll from civilian assaults is fifty times larger. And the reason for the larger danger to police is the proliferation of concealable handguns throughout the social spectrum. When police officers die from assault in Germany or England, the cause is usually a firearm, but firearms ownership is low, and concealed firearms are rare. There are, however, at least 60 million concealable handguns in the United States and the firearm is the cause of an officer's death in 97.5 percent of intentional fatal assaults, an effective monopoly of life-threatening force even though more than 95 percent of all assaults against police and an even higher fraction of those said to cause injury are not gun related. ... 
A theme that runs loosely through a number of these essays is that police-citizen interactions can involve "tight coupling," which is organizational behavior jargon for an interrelated system with lots of stresses and little slack. A "tightly coupled" system is bad at dealing with unexpected shocks, which can cause catastrophic breakdowns. A situation where a police officer is feeling threatened and stress, and as if there is a need for immediate urgent action, is also a situation where racial prejudices about who poses a danger and what actions are justified in response more easily boil to the surface. 

An implication of this insight is that focusing just on the situations where a breakdown (in this case, a policy shooting) occurs runs a risk of missing the point, which is that the system is fragile and prone to failure. Thus,  Zimring points out both that criminal prosecutions in cases of police shooting are extremely low--indeed, so low as to raise concerns that justice is not being done in many cases--but also to argue that while responding after-the-fact with prosecutions of police who kill someone can be a useful step in some cases, it misses the broader point. He writes:
One important problem in the governmental control of unnecessary police use of deadly force is the fact that police officers have been operating with near impunity when efforts are made by citizens or law enforcement to prosecute police officers for criminal misuse of their lethal weapons. The thousand or so killings of civilians by police officers in the United States each year have in recent history produced about one felony conviction of a uniformed officer per year. According to research by Philip Stinson of Bowling Green University, there were in the years 2000 to 2014 an average of 4.4 cases per year in the United States where police killings resulted in murder or manslaughter charges against one or more officers, and the prospects for obtaining felony conviction in these cases were low. The odds of a death producing a felony conviction were close to one in one thousand. ...

If the high death rates generated by police activity in the United States were for the most part the result of blameworthy activity by a few bad cops, then criminal law would make sense as a primary control strategy. But the problems are a mix of ineffective administrative controls, vague regulations, and the absence of administrative policy analyses and incentives for reducing death rates. It is hard to pin 100 percent of the blame for this mess on one or two officers. ... The critical problem with reform priorities in the first years after Ferguson, Missouri, was the exclusive emphasis on criminal prosecutions and criminal prosecutors. Ineffective police administrators—and the vague and permissive nonspecificity of their deadly force standards—have been unjustly spared in the reexamination of why the epidemic of civilian deaths is a chronic part of our national experience.
So what is to be done to adjust the system of policing. There are a number of There are a number of proposals for improving police performance across-the-board, including a hoped-for reduction in the number of shootings. But the evidence in support of the efficacy of these steps is somewhere between weak and nonexistent. Robin S. Engel, Hannah D. McManus, Gabrielle T. Isaza write: "Of the litany of recommendations believed to reduce police shootings, five have garnered widespread support: body-worn cameras, de-escalation training, implicit bias training, early intervention systems, and civilian oversight. These highly endorsed interventions, however, are not supported by a strong body of empirical evidence that demonstrates their effectiveness." 

They review the partial and limited evidence on these policies. They point out that when it comes to public policy, it isn't always possible or desirable to wait for years of study to be sure that something works. As the social scientists say, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Instead, jurisdictions that are trying these policies should also be trying to couple new policies with rigorous evaluation. They describe the experience of the University of Cincinnati Department of Public Safety, which works closely with the Cincinnati police: 
This is the approach we used to facilitate the reform efforts within the UCPD. Our first step was to redesign data collection systems to include the data necessary to evaluate the impact of our work. Our executive team modified existing data collection processes and also mandated the collection of new data. Changes in data collection instruments and practices resulted in new data generated during traffic and pedestrian stops, during the citizen complaint process, through the review and cataloging of BWC footage, during potential use-of-force encounters (e.g., when officers draw their Tasers or firearms but do not deploy them), along with multiple citizen and officer surveys. Each of these data collection changes required an accompanying change in policy, training, and supervisory oversight to ensure that the data were being properly collected and used. The UCPD is now in a better position to test specific propositions about the effectiveness of our own reform efforts.
What other factors might matter? Greg Ridgeway writes in his essay: 
Using data from the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the Major Cities' Chiefs Association (MCCA), the analysis finds that police officers who join the NYPD later in their careers have a lower shooting risk: for each additional year of their recruitment age, the odds of being shooters declines by 10 percent. Both officer race and prior problem behavior (e.g., losing a firearm, crashing a department vehicle) predict up to three times greater odds of shooting, yet officers who made numerous misdemeanor arrests were four times less likely to shoot.
Laurie O. Robinson adds: 
When President Obama asked my White House Task Force cochair, Chuck Ramsey, and me if there was one area we would have delved into if given more time, we said that area was recruitment. American policing in the future will be shaped by the men and women now coming into the police academies, yet at a time when there are calls for advancing a "guardian" culture in policing, many training academies are still organized as military-style boot camps emphasizing a "warrior" approach ...... 
Robinson also notes that there have been lots of changes in use-of-force policies in major police departments. As she writes: 
Larger police agencies are, in fact, taking steps to revise their use of force policies, and it is having an impact. According to a survey of forty-seven of the largest law enforcement agencies in the United States from 2015 to 2017 conducted by the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) and the National Police Foundation, 39 percent of the departments changed their use of force policies and revised their training to incorporate de-escalation and beef up scenario-based training approaches. Significantly, officer-involved shootings during this period dropped by 21 percent in the agencies surveyed ...
The editor of the volume, Lawrence W. Sherman, suggests in an essay near the close of the volume that there are three proposals "that seem to have the greatest chance of winning a political consensus, and then winning implementation." He writes: 
These proposals are
  1. to empower police to seize guns without a court order, as may appear necessary to them in a "split-second decision";
  2. to develop the core tactics underlying systems that seek to reduce "tight coupling" that creates "split-second decisions" and leave too little time to save lives; and
  3. to equip police with more powerful first aid strategies, from hi-tech bandages in every police car to policies enabling police to "scoop and run" with every shooting or stabbing victim.
But ultimately, a fundamental problem is that there are something like 18,000 police departments across the United States, and when a police shooting occurs, the US system of government often assumes that the same local law enforcement mechanisms that include the police in a central role will also be able to investigate the police. It's not a surprise that this often doesn't work well. In some cases, the state steps in, but as Zimring points out: "The unit of government that maintains authority in many other criminal justice operations—the state level—usually has no concern with and little statutory authority about policing."

Thus, Zimring suggests that there could be a national-level Office of Police Conduct, which can serve as a clearinghouse for complaints, reports, and information He writes: 
There is also one important foreign model of a national fact-gathering institution that could also be incorporated into the U.S. government's Department of Justice, perhaps in the civil rights division. Police departments in England and Wales have decentralized administrations, not unlike the United States. But the United Kingdom also created an Independent Office for Police Conduct (formerly known as the Independent Police Complaints Commission) that has become a statistical and analysis resource that is worthy of emulation on this side of the Atlantic ... 

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The US Dollar in the Global Economy [feedly]

Tim Taylor and a primer on the role of the dollar in the world economy

The US Dollar in the Global Economy

https://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-us-dollar-in-global-economy.html


The two left-hand red bars in this table show the US share of global trade and the US share of the global economy. The other blue bars show the role of the US dollar in cross-border loans, international debt securities, foreign exchange transaction volume, official foreign exchange reserves, invoicing of international trade, and payments made through the international network (mainly but not all banks) called SWIFT.  
The CGFS report goes into considerable detail on the role of the US dollar in each of these areas. But here's an overview of pluses and minuses for the world economy: 
Global economic and financial activity depends on the ability of US dollar funding to flow smoothly and efficiently between users. The broad international use of a dominant funding currency generates significant benefits to the global financial system, but also presents risks. Benefits arise from economies of scale and network effects, which reduce the costs of transferring capital and risks around the financial system. At the same time, financial globalisation, coupled with the dominant role of the US dollar in international markets, may have led to a more synchronised behaviour of actors in the global financial system, at least in part because many international investors and borrowers are exposed to the US dollar. As a consequence, it is possible that shocks stemming from US monetary policy, US credit conditions or general spikes in global risk aversion get transmitted across the globe. These dynamics increase the need for participants to manage the risk of a retrenchment in cross-border flows.
In short, having a currency that can be widely used around the global economy--whether directly or as a fallback whenever needed--is a huge benefit. But one tradeoff is that many players in global markets around the world are dependent on having access to a continuing supply of US dollars (say, to make payments or repay loans). This may not be a problem in many cases--for example, perhaps the party in question has a US dollar credit line at a big bank. But many other parties around the world may not have direct access to US dollars when needed. 

In addition, when someone who is in an economy that doesn't use US dollars promises to make payments in US dollars, there is always a danger that if exchange rates shift, that payment may become more difficult to make. 

And also in addition, if there was for whatever reason a shortage of US dollar financing for the global economy as a whole, the problems would hit in all kinds of locations and markets all at once. Because of the global dependence on US dollars, any actions of the  Federal Reserve or the US banking authorities can have outsized and unexpected effects on the rest of the global economy. As a policy response, the Federal Reserve has set up "swap lines" with a number of central banks around the world, where the Fed agrees in advance to swap US dollars for the currency of that central bank during a time of crisis, so that the other central bank, in turn, could make sure those US dollars were available in its own economy. 

Problems along these lines arose during the global financial crisis from 2007-2009, and again during the crisis in European sovereign debt markets in 2010. Although the main focus of this report is an overall perspectives on international US dollar funding, it does include some discussion of how these issues erupted in March 2020 as concerns over COVID-19 erupted. Financial and corporate actors around the world had an increased desire to hold US dollars, as a safety precaution in uncertain times. The foreign exchange value of the dollar appreciated about 8% in a couple of weeks. Those who had been planning to trade in US dollars or borrow in US dollars, around the world, found that it was more difficult and costly to do so. The report notes: 
The prospect of a severe economic downturn drove a significant increase in demand for US dollar liquidity. Many businesses around the globe, anticipating sharp declines in their revenues, sought to borrow funds (including US dollars) to meet upcoming expenses such as paying suppliers or servicing debts. US dollars were in particularly high demand given the dollar's extensive international use in the invoicing of trade, short-term trade finance and long-term funding ... Faced with uncertainty about how large such needs would be, many firms, as a precaution, chose to draw on any source of US dollar funding they could obtain.
The activities of NBFIs [non-bank financial institutions] also appear to have contributed to strong demand for US dollar liquidity. In recent years, non-US insurers and pension funds have funded large positions in US dollar assets by borrowing US dollars on a hedged basis ... The appreciation of the US dollar meant that these NBFIs in some jurisdictions were required to make margin payments, potentially adding to demand for US dollar funding. ... At the same time, US dollar funding became much more difficult to obtain in global capital markets as suppliers of funding shifted into cash and very liquid assets. ...

Finally, EMEs [emerging market economies] that raise US dollar funding have faced particular strain. Over the past decade, corporations, banks and sovereigns in EMEs had issued large volumes of US dollar debt securities, partly owing to a shift away from bank-intermediated funding ... The pandemic has seen fund managers substantially shift their portfolios away from US dollar bonds issued by EME borrowers ...  At the same time, many EME governments and corporations have an increased demand for funding (across currencies), owing to fiscal expansions and sharply lower revenues, including from commodity exports. Together, these pressures have contributed to a spike in US dollar bond yields for EME sovereigns and corporations ...
 The US Federal Reserve worked with central banks around the world to make sure that the flow of US dollar financing was only hindered in a way that gave it a reasonable chance to adjust, not harshly interrupted. With the widespread use of the US dollar around the world, and the interconnections of the world economy, the Fed has little choice but to accept some responsibility for the availability of US dollars not just in the US economy, but around the world. a

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Monday, July 13, 2020

China Is Winning the Trillion-Dollar 5G War [feedly]

China Is Winning the Trillion-Dollar 5G War
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/china-is-winning-the-trillion-dollar-5g-war/2020/07/12/876cb2f6-c493-11ea-a825-8722004e4150_story.html?utm_source=feedly&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=wp_business

China is building tens of thousands of 5G base stations every week. Whether it wins technological dominance or not, domestic supply chains may be revived and allow the country to maintain – and advance — its position as the factory floor of the world, even as Covid-19 forces a rethink in how globalization is done. 

By the end of this year, China will have more than half a million of these towers on its way to a goal of 5 million, a fast climb from around 200,000 already in use, enabling faster communication for hundreds of millions of smartphone users. By comparison, South Korea has a nearly 10% penetration rate for 5G usage, the highest globally. The much-smaller country had 115,000 such stations operating as of April.

The towers are part of a raft of projects that the State Council announced last week to boost industrial innovation under the "New Infrastructure" campaign aimed at furthering "the deep integration of the Internet of Things" and the real economy. With an aim of spending $1.4 trillion by 2025, the aggressive buildup toward a more automated industrial landscape will give China a renewed advantage where it already dominates: manufacturing. 

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The coronavirus shut down factories and industrial sectors, triggering a rethink of supply chains – away from China. What analysts are calling "peak" globalization and the rise of factory automation could shift production to higher-cost countries in North America and Southeast Asia. It will take a while, but the global dependence on China will come down, the thinking goes. Still, with trade ravaged by Covid-19, other countries and telecom operators will struggle to match China's spending.For China, there's an opportunity to clear the way to forcefully implement its industrial policy agenda, without interference from criticism over subsidies and unfair competition. The so-called Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission, headed by President Xi Jinping, has approved a three-year plan to give state-owned enterprises yet more sway in the economy.

Beijing's ambitious programs are still in the construction phase. Macro base stations are the nuts and bolts of building out 5G networks, and will exceed their 4G predecessors by almost 1.5 times. Capital expenditure could peak at $30 billion this year, according to Goldman Sachs Group Inc. analysts, up from $5 billion last year. Beijing wants more local governments and companies to get involved. Each station costs around 500,000 yuan ($71,361) and has a long value chain that includes electrical components, semiconductors, antenna units and circuit boards. The vast number of companies spawned by the project are all contributing to China's push to get ahead. 

For the industrial complex, the onset of 5G will enable greater connectivity between machines and much more data transfer and collection. Fifth-generation technology is expected to have a big impact through increasingly efficient and automated factory equipment, and tracking the movement of inventory and progress of production lines and assets. Manufacturing is expected to account for almost 40% of 5G-enabled industry output, according to  Bernstein Research analysts.

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From sensors and data clouds, to chips and collaborative robots and computer-controlled machinery, a whole universe of little-known Chinese companies is coming to the fore. Memory chip maker Gigadevice Semiconductor (Beijing) Inc. has ridden the trend, as has Yonyou Network Technology Co., China's version of Salesforce.com Inc. For some of these companies, government subsidies are a significant part of earnings, as my colleague Shuli Ren has noted. Stock prices have surged in recent months for firms like Shennan Circuits Co., which makes printed circuit boards, and Maxscend Microelectronics Co., a manufacturer of radio frequency chips. Some are seeing their market capitalization values balloon by billions of dollars as Beijing has upped the ante on new infrastructure.  

To be sure, it isn't hard to imagine a hinterland speckled with ghost towers and base stations in coming years as China's propensity to overbuild beyond any reasonable capacity kicks in. The past shows that questions of quality will arise when too many sub-par manufacturers crop up, incentivized by the state's largesse. Nonetheless, this is the technology of the not-so-distant future, and building up the basic infrastructure isn't misguided.  

As Covid-19 absorbs the world's attention, Beijing's steady focus on implementing this industrial policy may make China the manufacturer of parts that most countries will need – soon. In other words, it will yet again become the factory floor, mastering the production of all things 5G.

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This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Anjani Trivedi is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering industrial companies in Asia. She previously worked for the Wall Street Journal.

For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinion

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