Friday, March 13, 2020

It’s a MAGA Microbe Meltdown [feedly]

It's a MAGA Microbe Meltdown
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/opinion/trump-coronavirus-economy.html

text only:

For three years Donald Trump led a charmed life. He faced only one major crisis that he didn't generate himself — Hurricane Maria — and although his botched response contributed to a tragedy that killed thousands of U.S. citizens, the deaths took place off camera, allowing him to deny that anything bad had happened.

Now, however, we face a much bigger crisis with the coronavirus. And Trump's response has been worse than even his harshest critics could have imagined. He has treated a dire threat as a public relations problem, combining denial with frantic blame-shifting.

His administration has failed to deliver the most basic prerequisite of pandemic response, widespread testing to track the disease's spread. He has failed to implement recommendations of public health experts, instead imposing pointless travel bans on foreigners when all indications are that the disease is already well established in the United States.

And his response to the economic fallout has veered between complacency and hysteria, with a strong admixture of cronyism.



It's something of a mystery why the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, normally a highly competent agency, have utterly failed to provide resources for widespread coronavirus testing during the pandemic's crucial early stages. But it's hard to avoid the suspicion that the incompetence is related to politics, perhaps to Trump's desire to play down the threat.



According to Reuters, the Trump administration has ordered health agencies to treat all coronavirus deliberations as classified. This makes no sense and is indeed destructive in terms of public policy, but it makes perfect sense if the administration doesn't want the public to know how its actions are endangering American lives.

In any case, it's clear what we should be doing now that there must already be thousands of cases all across the United States. We need to slow the disease's spread by creating "social distance" — banning large gatherings, encouraging those who can to work from home — and quarantining hot spots. This may or may not be enough to prevent tens of millions from getting sick, but even spreading out the pandemic over time would help prevent it from overloading the health care system, greatly reducing the number of deaths.

But there was almost none of this in Trump's speech; he's still acting as if this is a threat foreigners are bringing to America.

And when it comes to the economy, Trump seems to fluctuate day to day — even hour to hour — between assertions that everything is fine and demands for enormous, ill-conceived stimulus.

His big idea for the economy is a complete payroll tax holiday. According to Bloomberg News, he told Republican senators that he wanted the holiday to extend "through the November election so that taxes don't go back up before voters decide whether to return him to office." That is, he apparently said the quiet part out loud.

This would be an enormous move. Payroll taxes are 5.9 percent of G.D.P.; by comparison, the Obama stimulus of 2009-2010 peaked at about 2.5 percent of G.D.P. Yet it would be very poorly targeted: big breaks for well-paid workers, nothing for the unemployed or those without paid sick leave.

Why do it this way? After all, if the goal is to put money in people's hands, why not just send out checks? Apparently Republicans can't conceive of an economic policy that doesn't take the form of tax cuts.

Trump also reportedly wants to provide aid to specific industries, including oil and shale — a continuation of his administration's efforts to subsidize fossil fuels.

Democrats, by contrast, have proposed a package that would actually address the needs of the moment: free coronavirus testing, paid sick leave, expanded unemployment benefits and an increase in federal matching funds for Medicaid programs, which would both help states meet the demands of the crisis and sustain overall spending by relieving the pressure on state budgets.

Notice, by the way, that these measures would help the economy in an election year, and therefore arguably help Trump politically. But Democrats are willing to do the right thing anyway — a stark contrast to the behavior of Republicans after the 2008 financial crisis, when they offered scorched-earth opposition to anything that might mitigate the damage.

The White House, however, is having none of it, with an official accusing Democrats of pushing a "radical left agenda." I guess sick leave equals socialism, even in a pandemic.

So what's going on? What we're seeing here is a meltdown — not just a meltdown of the markets, but a meltdown of Trump's mind. When bad things happen, there are only three things he knows how to do: insist that things are great and his policies are perfect, cut taxes, and throw money at his cronies.

Now he's faced with a crisis where none of these standbys will work, where he actually needs to cooperate with Nancy Pelosi to avoid catastrophe. What we saw in Wednesday's speech was that he's completely incapable of rising to the occasion. We needed to see a leader; what we saw was an incompetent, delusional blowhard.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Thursday, March 12, 2020

Tim Taylor: Some Coronavirus Economics [feedly]

Some Coronavirus Economics
http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2020/03/some-coronavirus-economics.html

Back in the mid-1980s, when I worked for a few years at the San Jose Mercury News as an editorial writer, my boss would sometimes remind us (channeling Murray Kempton): "An editorial writer is someone who comes down from the hills after the battle is over and shoots the wounded." Similarly, authors of books about important events have the luxury of time and distance before they commit themselves to print. But Richard Baldwin and and Beatrice Weder di Mauro, much to their credit,  decided to step into the arena of arguments about an appropriate response to the novel coronavirus while the disputes are ongoing by editing an e-book: Economics in the Time of COVID-19(March 2020, free with registration from VoxEU.com). The very readable book was literally produces over a long weekend: it includes an "Introduction" and 14 short essays, many of them summarizing and drawing on longer work. Here, I'll draw up on some comments from the book as well as my own thoughts. 

1) The hard question is how bad the novel coronavirus will get, and the short answer is that nobody really knows. 

It is already clear that COVID-19 is worse than the SARS outbreak in 2002-3. Worldwide, that ended up being slightly more than 8,000 total cases and slightly less than 800 deaths. The Johns Hopkins School of Medicine maintains a continually updated page on confirmed cases of coronavirus around the world, as well as deaths and recoveries. As I write, it already has more than 120,000 cases and more than 4,000 deaths. 

For some context, the Centers for Disease Control estimates each year the cases and deaths from flu in the US. In the last decade or so, 2011-12 was a low mark for flu-related deaths, with "only" 12,000. Conversely, 2014-15 and  2017-18 were especially bad flu seasons in the US, with 51,000 and 61,000 deaths respectively. The 2009 Avian flu (N1H1) ended up causing between between 151,700 and 575,400 people deaths worldwide (according to Centers for Disease Control estimates), most of them in the US and Mexico. 

Predicting the path of an epidemic is difficult. Baldwin and Weder di Mauro offer a useful diagram, showing that in the early stages, a straight-line prediction will dramatically understate the harms, while in the middle stages, a straight-line prediction will dramatically overstate the harms. They offer a comment from Michael Leavitt, a former head of the US department of Health and Human Services: "Everything we do before a pandemic will seem alarmist. Everything we do
after will seem inadequate." The challenge is to predict the length and peak of the curve --which depends not only on the epidemiology of the disease but also on what public health steps are taken. 
In addition, there is no guarantee that the coronavirus will ever disappear. AsBaldwin and Weder di Mauro note: "[T]he virus might become endemic – that is to say, a disease that reappears
periodically – in which case COVID-19 could become one of humanity's constant
companions, like the seasonal flu and common cold."

2) What are some common estimates of potential economic losses from the coronavirus? In their chapter, Laurence Boone, David Haugh, Nigel Pain and Veronique Salins of the OECD  estimate a base scenario and a downside scenario. 
In a first best-case scenario, the epidemic stays contained mostly in China with limited
clusters elsewhere. ... In this best-case scenario, overall, the level of world GDP is reduced by up to 0.75% at the peak of the shock, with the full year impact on global GDP growth in 2020 being around half a percentage point. Most of this decline stems from the effects of the initial reduction in demand in China. Global trade is significantly affected, declining by 1.4% in the first half of 2020 and by 0.9% in the year as a whole. The impact on the rest of the world depends on the strength of cross-border linkages with China. ...

In the downside scenario, the outbreak of the virus in China is assumed to spread much
more intensively than at present through the wider Asia-Pacific region and the major
advanced economies in the northern hemisphere in 2020. ...  Together, the countries affected in this scenario represent over 70% of global GDP ... Overall, the level of world GDP is reduced by up to 1.75% (relative to baseline) at the peak of the shock in the latter half of 2020, with the full year impact on global GDP growth in 2020 being close to 1.5%.
Warwick McKibbin and Roshen Fernando simulate seven economic scenarios--three where the disease stays mainly in China, three where a pandemic spreads worldwide, and one in which a mild pandemic recurs each year into the future. For a sense of the range, their low pandemic scenario (S04) estimated 15 million deaths globally, with 236,000 in the US. Their most aggressive pandemic scenario (S06) is based on 68 million deaths worldwide, more than 1 million of them in the US. In this scenario, US GDP falls 8.4 percent in 2020, and the world economy falls by a similar amount.  To get a sense of what this scenario means, it is roughly equivalent to half the world's population being infected by the coronavirus, with a mortality rate of 2% for those infected.

3) How will the coronavirus affect the world trading system? Weber di Mauro writes: 
Supply chain disruptions may also turn out to be larger and more extended than is currently evident. Maersk, one of the world's largest shipping companies, has had
to cancel dozens of container ships and estimates that Chinese factories have been
operating at 50-60% of capacity. Shipping goods to Europe from Asia via sea takes
about five weeks, so at the moment goods are still arriving from pre-virus times. The
International Chamber of Shipping estimates that the virus is costing the industry
$350m a week in lost revenues. More than 350 000 containers have been removed
and there have been 49% fewer sailings by container ships from China between mid
January and mid February. ... China has become a major source of demand in the world economy and many core European industries are highly dependent on the Chinese market. Sales in China account for up to 40% of the German car industry's revenues, for example, and they have collapsed over the last weeks.
Richard Baldwin and Eiichi Tomiura write:
There is a danger of permanent damage to the trade system driven by policy and firms' reactions. The combination of the US' ongoing trade war against all of its trading partners (but especially China) and the supply-chain disruptions that are likely to be caused by COVID-19 could lead to a push to repatriate supply chains. Since they supply chains were internationalised to improve productivity, their undoing would do the opposite. We think this would be a misthinking of the lessons. Exclusively depending on suppliers from any one nation does not reduce risk –  it increases it. ...  We should not misinterpret pandemic as a justification for anti-globalism. Redundant dual sourcing from multiple countries alleviates the problem of excess dependence on China, though with additional costs. Japanese multinationals have already begun diversifying the destinations of foreign direct investment away from China in recent years, not foreseeing COVID-19 but prompted by Chinese wage hikes. We hope more intensive use of ICT enables firms to more effectively coordinate global sourcing.
4) Perhaps there will be a separation of global trade, which isn't likely to transmit pandemics, and free movement of people, which is more likely to do so. Joachim Voth raises this question clearly:

Fortunately, many – but not all – of the benefits of globalisation can be achieved without enormous health risks. The free exchange of goods and capital does not have to be restricted; only very few diseases are transmitted by contaminated goods. The free movement of people itself also contributes to the advantages of globalisation, but it is far less important for production. It is not obvious that running the risk of coronavirus outbreaks every few years – or worse – is a price worth paying for multiple annual vacation trips to Paris and Bangkok, say. Severe restrictions may well be desirable and justifiable, bringing to an end a half-century of ever-increasing individual mobility. In addition, specific restrictions could be brought in. For countries where, for example, wild animals are regularly sold and eaten (such as China, until recently), the certification for travel could be withheld without restrictions; anyone who comes or returns from there must undergo a medical examination and possibly spend a few weeks in quarantine. This would not only build a virtual plague wall against the next major outbreak, it would also put pressure on health authorities around the world to restrict dangerous practices that allow pathogens to jump from one species to the next. Even if airlines, hoteliers and tour operators would suffer from such rules in the short term and would complain, the lesson from Wuhan should be that we need a broad discussion within and outside of academia about how much mobility is actually desirable.
Voth also reminds us of some grim historical episodes:
The ship, Grand Saint Antoine, had already come to the attention of the port authority of Livorno. A cargo ship from Lebanon loaded with expensive textiles, it reached the port of Marseille in 1720. The Health Commission had its doubts – the plague was widespread in the eastern Mediterranean. Like all ships from affected regions, the Grand Saint Antoine was placed in quarantine. Normally, the crew and the property would have had to stay on board for 40 days to rule out the possibility of an infectious disease. But a textile fair near Marseille, where the importing merchants hoped for rich business, would soon begin. Under pressure from the rich traders, the health agency changed its mind. The ship could be unloaded, the crew went to town. 
After only a few days it was clear that changing the initial decision had been a mistake. The ship had carried the plague. Now the disease spread like a forest fire in the dry bush. The city authorities in Marseille could not cope with the number of deaths, with corpses piling up in the streets. ... At the behest of the French king and the pope, a plague wall (Mur de Peste) was built in Provence. Tourists can still see parts of it today. The wall was over two meters high and the watchtowers were manned by soldiers. Those who wanted to climb over it were prevented from doing so by force. Although some individuals managed to escape, the last major outbreak of black death in Europe was largely confined to Marseille. While probably 100,000 people – about a third of the population – died in Marseille, the rest of Europe was spared the repeated catastrophe of 1350 when millions of people lost their lives. 


5) Should the economic policies in response to the coronavirus be general or targeted? 

By general policies, I mean policies that refer to cuts in interest rates by central banks, or plans for government to send out checks to everyone (or in a US context, to cut Social Security payroll tax rates). By specific policies, I mean economic policies where the government focuses on specific issues like sick pay for workers not covered by employers, medical bills, support for small/medium firms with cash-flow problems, making sure banks have funds to lend and are not pushing firms into bankruptcy right now, and support for specific hard-hit industries like airlines and tourism.

John Cochrane put it this way:
We need a detailed pandemic response financial plan, sort of like an earthquake, flood, fire, or hurricane plan that (I hope!) local governments and FEMA routinely make and practice. Is there any such thing? Not that I know of, but I would be interested to hear from knowledgeable people if I am simply ignorant of the plan and it's really sitting there under "Break glass in emergency" down in a basement of the Treasury or Fed. Without a pre-plan, can our political system successfully make this one up on the fly, as they made up the bank bailouts of 2008?
Then we have to figure out how to prevent the atrocious moral hazard that such interventions produce. Pandemics are going to be a regular thing. Ex-post bailout reduces further the incentive for ex-ante precautionary saving. Too good a fire department, and people store gasoline in the basement.
This starts down the same bailout and regulate road that suffocates our debt-based banking system. I welcome better ideas.
6) Will manufacturing or services be hit harder? 

Richard Baldwin and Eiichi Tomiura emphasize the problem for manufacturing:

An important point is that manufacturing is special. Manufactured goods are – on the whole – 'postpone-able' purchases. As we saw in the Great Trade Collapse of 2009, the wait-and-see demand shock impacts durable goods more than non-durable goods. In short, the manufacturing sector is likely to get a triple hit.
  1. Direct supply disruptions hindering production since the disease is focused on the world's manufacturing heartland (East Asia), and spreading fast in the other industrial giants – the US and Germany.
  2. Supply-chain contagion will amplify the direct supply shocks as manufacturing sectors in less-affected nations find it harder and/or more expensive to acquire the necessary imported industrial inputs from the hard-hit nations, and subsequently from each other.
  3. Demand disruptions due to (1) macroeconomic drops in aggregate demand, i.e. recessions, and (2) precautionary or wait-and-see purchase delays by consumers, and investment delays by firms.
However, Catherine Mann points out that while manufacturing may be hit more in the short-term, it is also more likely to recoup its losses: 
Manufacturing will show a 'V' or 'U' shape. Manufacturing spillovers from factory closures loom large in the near term, but production will rebound to restock inventories once quarantines end and factories reopen. However, the duration of closures, as well as spillovers through supply chains and through virus cases and closures worldwide, will generate a set of Vs that should take on a U-shape in the global data. Importantly, the loss to global growth momentum will drag on both in individual country data and global rebound economic data, particularly trade and industrial production. Services, on the other hand, will experience an 'L' shape. The shock to tourism, transportation services, and domestic activities generally will not be recovered, and the projected slowing of global growth will further weigh on the L-shape evolution of demand for these non-storable tradeable services. Domestic services also will bear the brunt of the outbreak, depending in part on the responses of authorities, business, and consumers.

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

GAO: 2017 Tax Law Creating New Compliance Challenges for IRS [feedly]

GAO: 2017 Tax Law Creating New Compliance Challenges for IRS
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/gao-2017-tax-law-creating-new-compliance-challenges-for-irs

The already overburdened IRS "may face challenges ensuring compliance" with certain parts of the 2017 tax law, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report finds, particularly the 20 percent deduction for certain "pass-through" business income. That's one more reason why policymakers should boost funding for IRS enforcement and operations to offset nearly a decade of significant budget and staffing cuts.

Even before the 2017 law, tax filers' underreporting of pass-through income (income from sources such as S corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships, which overwhelmingly flows to wealthy households) made up the largest single part of the "tax gap" — the $441 billion-a-year gap between what taxpayers owe and what they voluntarily pay on time. But the 2017 law added complexity to the tax code and arbitrary distinctions between how it treats different kinds of income, which may make it even harder for the IRS to police pass-through tax evasion. Given the steep funding cuts and audit rate drop over the last decade, the IRS may lack the resources to effectively enforce this and other parts of the 2017 law, GAO warns.

The pass-through deduction cut the top tax rate on qualifying income to 29.6 percent, well below the 37 percent top rate on wages and salaries. That gives wealthy taxpayers a big incentive to shift as much of their wage and salary income into pass-through entities as possible. As we've noted, pass-through owners can easily exploit the distinctions between income that qualifies for the deduction and income that doesn't to minimize their taxes.

For instance, the law prohibits the deduction for high-income doctors but may allow it for similarly compensated medical researchers. In another example, the law prohibits the deduction for high-income taxpayers engaged in "brokerage services," but later Treasury regulations allow real estate brokers, insurance brokers, and banks to qualify for it.

Taxpayers self-report much of the information the IRS needs to determine whether income qualifies for the deduction (for example, whether the taxpayer is a doctor who isn't eligible or a medical researcher who is), the GAO report points out. In general, pass-through income faces far less third-party information reporting — that is, information the IRS can use to independently verify information in tax returns — than other types of income, like pensions and Social Security benefits. That makes tax evasion easier: "compliance is far higher when income items are subject to information reporting," according to the IRS.

Without robust reporting, the IRS must rely on costly audits to determine whether taxpayers are complying with the pass-through deduction and other parts of the 2017 tax law. But nearly a decade of budget cuts since 2010 have severely depleted the IRS' enforcement function. Enforcement funding is down by roughly a quarter in inflation-adjusted terms, and enforcement staff have dropped by more than 30 percent. Meanwhile, audit rates have plummeted, especially for high-income people and large corporations.

These trends make auditing pass-through businesses particularly difficult. Accounting Today's recent roundup of "10 major trends in IRS audits" advises, "Want your business to escape audit? Be an S corp or partnership," adding that "audit rates for S corps and partnerships are both 0.22 percent — or, put another way, one in every 455 passthrough entities were examined in 2018."

In a promising development, there's growing bipartisan support for reversing the IRS cuts. The President's 2020 and 2021 budgets proposed a multi-year budget mechanism to provide added enforcement funding that wouldn't count against the annual caps on overall non-defense appropriations; the House last year adopted a similar proposal.

Policymakers should act on this support. They should also close tax loopholes that invite pass-through owners to push the boundaries of tax avoidance — and they can start by repealing the pass-through deduction.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Trump’s payroll tax cuts are a terrible opening bid to address the economic fallout of COVID-19: But employer tax credits can be part of the economic response if they finance direct benefits for workers [feedly]

Trump's payroll tax cuts are a terrible opening bid to address the economic fallout of COVID-19: But employer tax credits can be part of the economic response if they finance direct benefits for workers
https://www.epi.org/blog/employer-tax-credits-can-be-part-of-the-economic-response-to-covid-19-if-they-finance-direct-benefits-for-workers/

Unconditional tax cuts for employers are a terrible policy response to the economic fallout of COVID-19. But employer tax credits that are tied to the provision of specific benefits for workers can be a useful way to deliver emergency help. In the long run, key benefits like paid sick leave and strong unemployment insurance should not rest on employer tax credits, but these credits might be the best way to deliver emergency benefits right now.

The Trump administration has put forward the idea of cutting both employee and employer-side payroll taxes as the centerpiece of an economic response to the COVID-19 epidemic. This is a terrible opening bid. In late 2010, the Obama White House and a Republican-led Congress agreed on a temporary payroll tax cut for employees only as a compromise measure to provide economic stimulus.

But the employee-side payroll tax cut is an even worse potential compromise this time. One reason is that it would not get enough money out the door and into households' pockets quickly enough. A COVID-19 recession will come fast and people will need lots of help quickly. A payroll tax cut will dribble out gradually over time. Another reason is the employee-side payroll tax cut is poorly targeted and sends lots of money to high-income households. A COVID-19 recession is laser-targeted at sectors with lots of low-wage workers, and the response should be too. So, even employee-side payroll tax cuts are a poor centerpiece of any policy package responding to the coming slowdown.

Employer-side payroll tax cuts are even much worse. They are a pure windfall to business and would do nothing for workers in the short run. These employer-side cuts should be flatly opposed.

There is, however, a potential role for employer tax credits as a way to stand-up emergency paid sick leave or work sharing or unemployment insurance. The optimal way for these programs to work is to have them be an ongoing part of our social safety net that take effect automatically during downturns. In the case of work sharing and unemployment insurance, these should be social insurance programs financed in the long run by payroll taxes. Paid sick leave should be a mandated labor standard. But since we do not have strong systems in place to provide these benefits to workers affected by the economic fallout of COVID-19 in the short run, and because placing new costs on employers just as revenue potentially craters might not be optimal, we could use employer tax credits to finance the emergency provision of key benefits like paid sick leave and expanded unemployment insurance.

Economists Jared Bernstein and Jesse Rothstein, for example, have a proposal to use employer tax credits to finance quicker-acting unemployment insurance that allows workers to stay on payroll and be paid even while not working during a COVID-19 downturn. Dean Baker made a similar proposal as the Great Recession loomed.

Policy discussions about buffering the economy from the COVID-19 shock are moving very quickly and lines are being drawn. It remains the case that large direct payments to households and having the federal government pick up states' Medicaid spending for a year are likely the most valuable macroeconomic support that could be provided because they're well-targeted to counteract the particular damage inflicted by a COVID-19 recession.

It also remains the case that unconditional employer tax cuts should be rejected flatly as a solution. But there does remain a potential role for employer tax credits in helping deliver benefits to workers. As long as these tax credits are used solely for this purpose, they should be considered.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Wednesday, March 11, 2020

Stiglitz: Plagued by Trumpism [feedly]

Stiglitz: Plagued by Trumpism
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-coronavirus-failure-of-small-government-by-joseph-e-stiglitz-2020-03

Mar 9, 2020 

For 40 years, Republicans have been insisting that "government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem." But now that COVID-19, climate change, and other collective threats are bearing down on the US and the rest of the world, the bankruptcy of this nostrum has been laid bare.

NEW YORK – As an educator, I'm always looking for "teachable moments" – current events that illustrate and reinforce the principles on which I've been lecturing. And there is nothing like a pandemic to focus attention on what really matters.


The COVID-19 crisis is rich in lessons, especially for the United States. One takeaway is that viruses do not carry passports; in fact, they don't observe national borders – or nationalist rhetoric – at all. In our closely integrated world, a contagious disease originating in one country can and will go global.

The spread of diseases is one negative side effect of globalization. Whenever such cross-border crises emerge, they demand a global, cooperative response, as in the case of climate change. Like viruses, greenhouse-gas emissions are wreaking havoc and imposing massive costs on countries around the world through the damage caused by global warming and the associated extreme weather events.

No US presidential administration has done more to undermine global cooperation and the role of government than that of Donald Trump. And yet, when we face a crisis like an epidemic or a hurricane, we turn to government, because we know that such events demand collective action. We cannot go it alone, nor can we rely on the private sector. All too often, profit-maximizing firms will see crises as opportunities for price gouging, as is already evident in the rising prices of face masks.

Unfortunately, since US President Ronald Reagan's administration, the mantra in the US has been that "government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem." Taking that nostrum seriously is a dead-end road, but Trump has traveled further down it than any other US political leader in memory.

At the center of the US response to the COVID-19 crisis is one of the country's most venerable scientific institutions, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which has traditionally been staffed with committed, knowledgeable, highly trained professionals. To Trump, the ultimate know-nothing politician, such experts pose a serious problem, because they will contradict him whenever he tries to make up facts to serve his own interests.


Faith may help us cope with the deaths caused by an epidemic, but it is no substitute for medical and scientific knowledge. Willpower and prayers were useless in containing the Black Death in the Middle Ages. Fortunately, humanity has made remarkable scientific advances since then. When the COVID-19 strain appeared, scientists were quickly able to analyze it, test for it, trace its mutations, and begin work on a vaccine. While there is still much more to learn about the new coronavirus and its effects on humans, without science, we would be completely at its mercy, and panic would have already ensued.

Scientific research requires resources. But most of the biggest scientific advances in recent years have cost peanuts compared to the largesse bestowed on our richest corporations by Trump and congressional Republicans' 2017 tax cuts. Indeed, our investments in science also pale in comparison to the latest epidemic's likely costs to the economy, not to mention lost stock-market value.

Nonetheless, as Linda Bilmes of the Harvard Kennedy School points out, the Trump administration has proposed cuts to the CDC's funding year after year (10% in 2018, 19% in 2019). At the start of this year, Trump, demonstrating the worst timing imaginable, called for a 20% cut in spending on programs to fight emerging infectious and zoonotic diseases (that is, pathogens like coronaviruses, which originate in animals and jump to humans). And in 2018, he eliminated the National Security Council's global health security and biodefense directorate.

Not surprisingly, the administration has proved ill-equipped to deal with the outbreak. Though COVID-19 reached epidemic proportions weeks ago, the US has suffered from insufficient testing capacity (even compared to a much poorer country like South Korea) and inadequate procedures and protocols for handling potentially exposed travelers returning from abroad.

This subpar response should serve as yet another reminder that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. But Trump's all-purpose panacea for any economic threat is simply to demand more monetary-policy easing and tax cuts (typically for the rich), as if cutting interest rates is all that is needed to generate another stock-market boom.

This quack treatment is even less likely to work now than it did in 2017, when the tax cuts created a short-term economic sugar high that had already faded as we entered 2020. With many US firms facing supply-chain disruptions, it is hard to imagine that they would suddenly decide to undertake major investments just because interest rates were cut by 50 basis points (assuming commercial banks even pass on the cuts in the first place).

Worse, the epidemic's full costs to the US may be yet to come, particularly if the virus isn't contained. In the absence of paid sick leave, many infected workers already struggling to make ends meet will show up to work anyway. And in the absence of adequate health insurance, they will be reluctant to seek tests and treatment, lest they be hit with massive medical bills. The number of vulnerable Americans should not be underestimated. Under Trump, morbidity and mortality rates are rising, and some 37 million people regularly confront hunger.

All these risks will grow if panic ensues. Preventing that requires trust, particularly in those tasked with informing the public and responding to the crisis. But Trump and the Republican Party have been sowing distrust toward government, science, and the media for years, while giving free rein to profit-hungry social-media giants like Facebook, which knowingly allows its platform to be used to spread disinformation. The perverse irony is that the Trump administration's ham-handed response will undermine trust in government even further.

The US should have started preparing for the risks of pandemics and climate change years ago. Only governance based on sound science can protect us from such crises. Now that both threats are bearing down on us, one hopes that there are still enough dedicated bureaucrats and scientists left in the government to protect us from Trump and his incompetent cronies.


Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in economics, is University Professor at Columbia University and Chief Economist at the Roosevelt Institute. His most recent book is People, Power, and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent.



 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Piketty: Sanders to the aid of democracy in the United States [feedly]

Sanders to the aid of democracy in the United States

Thomas Piketty


Let it be said at once: the treatment received by Bernie Sanders in the leading media in the United States and in Europe is unjust and dangerous. Everywhere on the main networks and the large daily papers we read that Sanders is an 'extremist' and that only a 'centrist' candidate like Biden could triumph over Trump. This biased and somewhat unscrupulous treatment is particularly regrettable when a closer examination of the facts actually suggests that only a full-scale reorientation of the type proposed by Sanders would eventually rid American democracy of the inegalitarian practices which undermine it and deal with the electoral disaffection of the working classes.

Let's begin with the programme.  To say emphatically, as Sanders does, that a public, universal health insurance would enable the American population to be cared for more efficiently and more cheaply than the present private and extremely unequal system is not an 'extremist' statement. It is on the contrary a declaration, perfectly well documented by many research studies and international comparisons. In these difficult times when everyone deplores the rise of "fake news", it is right and proper for some candidates to rely on established facts and not resort to obscure language and complex tactics.

Similarly, Sanders is right when he proposes large-scale public investment in favour of education and public universities. Historically the prosperity of the United States has relied in the 20th century on the educational advance of the country over Europe and on a degree of equality in this field, and definitely not on the sacralisation of inequality and the unlimited accumulation of fortunes which Reagan wished to impose as an alternative model in the 1980s. The failure of this Reagan-style rupture is patent today with the growth of national income per capita being halved and an unprecedented rise in inequality. Sanders simply proposed a return to the sources of the country's model for development: a very wide diffusion of education.

Sanders also proposes a considerable rise in the level of the minimum wage (a policy in which the United States were for a long time the world leaders) and to learn from the experiences in co-management and voting rights for employees on the Boards of Directors of firms implemented successfully in Germany and in Sweden for decades. Generally speaking, Sanders' proposals show him to be a pragmatic social-democrat endeavouring to make the most of the experiences available and in no way a 'radical'.  And when he chooses to go further than European social democracy, for example with his proposal for a federal wealth tax rising to 8% per annum on multi-billionaires, this corresponds to the reality of the excessive concentration of wealth in the United States and the fiscal and administrative capacities of the American federal state, which has already been demonstrated historically.

Now, let's deal with the question of opinion polls. The problem of the repeated assertions that Biden would be better placed to beat Trump is that they have no objective factual basis. If we examine the existing data such as those compiled by RealClearPolitics.com, it is clear in all the national opinion polls that Sanders would beat Trump with the same differential as Biden. These polls are of course premature, but they are just as much for Biden as for Sanders. In several key States, we find that Sanders would come out ahead of Trump, for example in Pennsylvania and in Wisconsin.

If we analyse the surveys on the primaries which have just taken place, it appears clearly that Sanders mobilises the working-class electorate more than Biden. It is true that the latter attracts a considerable share of the Black vote, an inheritance of the Obama-Biden ticket. But Sanders mobilises the vast majority of the Latino vote and crushes Biden amongst the 18-29 years age group, as he does in the 30-44 years group. Above all, all the polls indicate that Sanders has the best scores amongst the underprivileged (annual incomes below 50,000$, no higher education qualification), whereas Biden, on the contrary, has the best scores amongst the most privileged (annual incomes above 100,000$, higher education diploma), whether it be White voters or those from minority backgrounds, independent of age.

Now it so happens that the highest potential for mobilisation is amongst the most underprivileged social categories. Generally speaking, voter turnout has always been relatively low in the United States: just barely above 50%, whereas it has long been between 70%-80% in France and in the United Kingdom, before falling recently. If we examine things in greater detail, we also find that on the other side of the Atlantic, there is a structurally lower participation amongst the poorest half of the voters, with a difference in the region of 15%-20% with the richest half (a difference which has also begun to be visible in Europe since the 1990s, even if it remains less marked).

To put it clearly: this electoral alienation of the American working classes is so long-standing that it will certainly not be reversed in one day. But what else can we do to deal with it than to undertake a far-reaching re-orientation of the election programme of the Democratic Party and to discuss these ideas openly in national campaigns?  The cynical, and unfortunately very commonplace vision amongst the Democratic elites, that nothing can be done to mobilise further the working-class vote, is extremely dangerous. In the last resort, this cynicism weakens the legitimacy of the democratic electoral system itself.


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American Mobility: From "Westward Ho" to "Home Attachment" [feedly]

An intriguing analysis of the decline in US (physical) mobility -- is it contributing to sharper regional 'blocs' in politics, too? Does it have implications for "the more perfect union", and many other questions?

American Mobility: From "Westward Ho" to "Home Attachment"
http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2020/03/american-mobility-from-westward-ho-to.html

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