https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/25/11/2019/revolution-number-9-why-world-uproar-right-now
-- via my feedly newsfeed
The 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) encourages firms to adopt wellness programs by letting them offer participation incentives up to 30% of the total cost of health insurance coverage, and 18 states currently include some form of wellness incentives as a part of their Medicaid program. Workplace wellness industry revenue has more than tripled in size to $8 billion since 2010, and wellness programs now cover over 50 million U.S. workers.This study was carried out among employees at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign campus. Here's a capsule description of the process:
We developed a comprehensive workplace wellness program, iThrive, which ran for two years and included three main components: an annual on-site biometric health screening, an annual online health risk assessment (HRA), and weekly wellness activities. We invited 12,459 benefits-eligible university employees to participate in our study and successfully recruited 4,834 participants, 3,300 of whom were assigned to the treatment group and were invited to take paid time off to participate in the wellness program.3 The remaining 1,534 subjects were assigned to a control group, which was not permitted to participate. Those in the treatment group who successfully completed the entire two-year program earned rewards ranging from $50 to $650, with the amounts randomly assigned and communicated at the start of each program year.The researchers had access to lots of background information as well, because they could look at past employment records and health care spending for those who wanted to participate They write:
From our analysis, we find evidence of significant advantageous selection into our program based on medical spending and health behaviors. At baseline, average annual medical spending among participants was $1,384 less than among nonparticipants. This estimate is statistically (p = .027) and economically significant: all else equal, it implies that increasing the share of participating (low-spending) workers employed at the university by 4.3 percentage points or more would offset the entire costs of our intervention. Participants were also more likely to have visited campus recreational facilities and to have participated in running events prior to our study. We find evidence of adverse selection when examining productivity: at baseline, participants were more likely to have taken sick leave and were less likely to have worked more than 50 hours a week than were nonparticipants.The results? Disappointing.
Despite strong program participation, we do not find significant effects of our intervention on 40 out of the 42 outcomes we examine in the first year following random assignment. These 40 outcomes include all our measures of medical spending, productivity, health behaviors, and self-reported health. We fail to find significant treatment effects on average medical spending, on different quantiles of the spending distribution, or on any major subcategory of medical utilization (pharmaceutical drugs, office, or hospital). We find no effects on productivity, whether measured using administrative variables (sick leave, salary, promotion), survey variables (hours worked, job satisfaction, job search), or an index that combines all available measures. We also do not find effects on visits to campus gym facilities or on participation in a popular annual community running event, two health behaviors a motivated employee might change within one year. These null effects persist when we estimate longer-run effects of the two-year intervention using outcomes measured up to 30 months after the initial randomization. ...
Our intervention had two positive treatment effects in the first year, based on responses to follow-up surveys. First, employees in the treatment group were more likely than those in the control group to report ever receiving a health screening. This result indicates that the health screening component of our program did not merely crowd out health screenings that would have otherwise occurred without our intervention. Second, treatment group employees were more likely to report that management prioritizes worker health and safety, although this effect disappears after the first year.
After 18 months, the rates for 2 self-reported outcomes were higher in the intervention group than in the control group: for engaging in regular exercise (69.8% vs 61.9% ...) and for actively managing weight (69.2% vs 54.7% ...). The program had no significant effects on other prespecified outcomes: 27 self-reported health outcomes and behaviors (including self-reported health, sleep quality, and food choices), 10 clinical markers of health (including cholesterol, blood pressure, and body mass index), 38 medical and pharmaceutical spending and utilization measures, and 3 employment outcomes (absenteeism, job tenure, and job performance). ... [T]here were no significant differences in clinical measures of health, health care spending and utilization, and employment outcomes after 18 months. Although limited by incomplete data on some outcomes, these findings may temper expectations about the financial return on investment that wellness programs can deliver in the short term.
As often happens when an elite-driven coup leads to US-endorsed regime change, there are powerful attempts to disguise its real character. A recurrent method is to blame the coup on its victim. Of this, the November 10, 2019 coup in Bolivia is a textbook example. The narrative went as follows. Bolivian president Evo Morales, eager to perpetuate himself in power, orchestrated a fraudulent election. His people saw this as deceitful and authoritarian. A popular uprising ensued, eventually leading to Morales's resignation and exile.
How such a storyline could have prospered, despite the absence of any solid evidence regarding election rigging, raises questions about the media and its role. It also sounds the alarm as to the part played by the institution that generated this narrative in the first place: The Organization of American States (OAS).
On October 21, the day after Bolivia's presidential elections, the OAS Mission of Electoral Observers in Bolivia issued a press release expressing "its deep concern and surprise at the drastic and hard-to-explain change in the trend of the preliminary results revealed after the closing of the polls". Two days later, the mission's preliminary report reiterated this claim and expressed its concern that the quick count "had been interrupted." The OAS report called for a second round of voting, in contrast to the official results that put Morales on 47.07 percent and afforded him the 10 point lead he needed over his closest contender Carlos Mesa, on 36.51 percent, to avoid a runoff.
The OAS recommendation was startling. The electoral results were in line with what many polls had predicted. And they coincided with the parliamentary elections, held on the same day, in which the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), Morales's political party, had secured a majority in both houses of the assembly.
The OAS's attack on the validity of the results relied almost exclusively on its focus on the "interruption" on election night of the quick count: the nonofficial count carried out by a private firm to give the media and the general public some preliminary information on the electoral results.
Incidentally, Bolivia's electoral authorities had previously announced that the quick count would only include 80 percent of tally sheets. Given that it was halted at 83.85 percent, there were in fact no legal grounds on which to question this decision. But more importantly, the binding, official count was never stopped. Yet, all around the world, newsrooms claimed, falsely, that the "vote count" had been interrupted.
As for the OAS's argument on the "change of trend," this too was a serious mistake. A paper I have coauthored on the Bolivian elections clearly demonstrates that "the overall trends in the results (…) are easily explainable and consistent with the fact that later-reporting rural areas heavily favor the MAS." There was, contrary to the OAS's assertion, no "change of trend," merely a steady, continuous increase in Morales's lead throughout the vote-counting process; an easily projectable result for any statistician, which relied on the simple fact that later-reporting areas were more pro-Morales than earlier-reporting ones.
If the OAS's argument seemed absurd, it nevertheless served the interests of a broad anti-Morales offensive. On October 24, the US ambassador to the OAS led the charge: "Before the TREP [quick count] was suspended the results indicated the need for a second round of elections. After the TREP was reactivated, almost 24 hours later, lo and behold no second round is needed and Evo Morales is firmly ahead in the vote count!" he exclaimed. And thus, with the active support of the US, the flawed narrative was given more impetus.
Despite the weakness of the OAS's position, these suspicions of electoral wrongdoing had a decisive effect on the escalation and radicalization of the protests against Morales in Bolivia. Seeking to appease, Morales called for an international audit of the elections. So the OAS returned to Bolivia with a new team of experts and, on November 10, issued a preliminary audit report.
The audit was a foregone conclusion. Much of it focused again on the quick count and repeated some of the statistical blunders of the mission's preliminary report. A second part shifted the line of fire to new terrain. The audit spoke of "irregularities," even if it remained vague as to their exact nature and provided no evidence, or the tally sheets with problems.
The audit report essentially became a long list of denunciations, its sole purpose being to justify the mission's earlier report with as many irregularities as possible, regardless of scale and impact. The fraud narrative had become so prevalent that it was too late for the OAS to contradict its earlier conclusions. This, in turn, would have drawn some scrutiny on its practices and possibly awoken ghosts from the past ― the OAS's problematic role in the 2011 Haitian elections comes to mind.
US pressures were also on. Washington had waited for the right moment to settle its accounts with Morales for his expulsion of the US ambassador in 2008, among many other grievances during 13 years of frosty relations. And OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro, who has not always enjoyed unwavering support from the State Department, desperately needs US backing for his 2020 reelection bid. From his point of view, there was no turning back on the OAS's position.
How a global narrative of fraud should have emerged from the OAS's bizarre attack on a quick vote count that is not legally binding and on late-reporting votes naturally favoring a candidate over another, is quite incredible. Yet that is exactly what happened. In this world of post-truth politics, a false media narrative based on the OAS's flawed statistics was instrumental in overthrowing a democratically elected government. Now Bolivia faces the consequences.
Guillaume Long is a senior policy analyst at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (www.cepr.net) and previously held several cabinet positions in the government of Ecuador, including Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Culture, and Minister of Knowledge and Human Talent.
In this part, we investigate whether firms produce strategic patents, which help the firm build thickets around its core business to ensure that technologies are not easily copied and challenged by others. ... If a firm's aim is mostly protecting its core technology, the new internal patent will cite many patents from the firm's existing portfolio. In contrast, if a firm's aim is expanding into new fields, more citations will be made in that case to patents that are not in the firm's portfolio. In this regard, the fraction of self-citations is informative about how internal a patent is and how likely it is that a patent serves to build a thicket. ... The striking observation is that while until 2000 patents were becoming more explorative in nature based on our earlier interpretation, this trend reverses completely around 2000, and patents become more exploitative and internal since then.
With knowledge diffusion slowing down, the direct effect is that market leaders are protected from being imitated. As a result, the technology gaps start widening, presenting market leaders a stronger market power. Market concentration and markups rise on average. Profit share of GDP increases, and labor share decreases. Larger gaps also discourage the followers, causing the productivity gap between them and the leaders to open up. The strengthening of leaders also discourages forward-looking entrants; hence, firm entry and the employment share of young firms go down. Discouraged followers and entrants exert smaller competitive pressure on market leaders; as a result, market leaders relax, and they experiment less. Hence, overall dynamism and experimentation decrease in the economy. To sum up, our quantitative investigation in this section underscores the importance of potential distortions in knowledge diffusion in explaining the declining U.S. business dynamism.Of course, the fact that you can build a model which produces these results doesn't prove the model is the best or only explanation. And while the patent evidence is suggestive, it doesn't prove that a resurgence of patent thickets are the best or only explanation of a reduction in the diffusion of knowledge across the economy, either. But
Chinese President Xi Jinping said his nation wants to work toward a phase one trade agreement with the U.S. on the "basis of mutual respect and equality," his first comments on a partial deal that he could potentially sign with President Donald Trump.
"We didn't initiate this trade war and this isn't something we want," Xi reiterated in a Friday meeting with prominent international visitors to Beijing including former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. "When necessary, we will fight back, but we have been working actively to try not to have a trade war."
Just a few days ago, U.S. President Donald Trump said China wasn't "stepping up to the level that I want" in the negotiations amid doubts about whether the two sides can hammer out a written agreement. On Wednesday, China's chief trade negotiator, Liu He, indicated he was "cautiously optimistic" about reaching the first phase of a deal.
Liu made the comments in a speech in Beijing on Wednesday ahead of the Bloomberg New Economy Forum, which is being organized by Bloomberg Media Group, a division of Bloomberg LP, the parent company of Bloomberg News. Some of the foreigners who met with Xi on Friday were also in Beijing to attend the forum.
The Chinese leader spoke to more than a dozen people including former U.S. government officials such as Hank Paulson and Gary Cohn. Bloomberg LP Chairman Peter Grauer also attended the meeting.
Since Trump announced the phase one deal a month ago, markets have been whipsawed by comments from both sides, first indicating progress, and then the opposite.
The latest potential hurdle came after Liu made his dinner-time comments, when the U.S. House voted 417-1 for legislation supporting Hong Kong protesters that has already been unanimously approved by the Senate. It could go to Trump as soon as Thursday and he plans to sign the bill, a person familiar with the matter said.
Xi on Friday also shed some more light on China's plans to open up its financial markets. He said the reforms set in motion will not stop, but that the nation needs to be careful and will also ensure its "financial sovereignty."
"We are working to realize the Chinese dream of renewal of our nation," he said. "It's not a dream about hegemony, it's not about replacing others. We are just trying to restore our place and role in the world rather than reliving the humiliating days of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal era."
China has this year sped up the opening of its $40 trillion financial market, and will next year give the go-ahead for foreign securities firms to take full ownership of joint ventures they have in the country. Officials in Beijing are seeking to attract foreign investments to support economic growth, which in part has been hurt by a crackdown on lending at their local banks after years of rapid growth.
Top executives from banking firms such as Goldman Sachs Group Inc. were also in Beijing attending the forum, flagging they were preparing major investments and expansions in the country to capture an estimated $9 billion in annual profits.
Brock Silvers, managing director at Adamas Asset Management in Hong Kong, said Xi's emphasis on financial sovereignty signals Beijing's unwillingness to cede too much control.
"Where reform conflicts with state economic authority, the Xi Administration will continue to support the statist position," he said. "This policy, which could effectively restrict larger systemic reform, also seems to be a major factor in the ongoing repatriation of China's offshore listed giants like Alibaba."