Friday, October 5, 2018

State Cuts to Higher Ed


A decade since the Great Recession hit, state spending on public colleges and universities remains well below historical levels. Overall state funding for public two- and four-year colleges in the school year ending in 2018 was more than $7 billion below its 2008 level, after adjusting for inflation. (See Figure 1.) In the most difficult years after the recession, colleges responded to significant funding cuts by increasing tuition, reducing faculty, limiting course offerings, and in some cases closing campuses.
Funding has rebounded slightly since then, but costs remain high and services in some places have not returned.

The promise to past generations of students in America has been that if you work hard and strive, public colleges and universities will serve as an avenue to greater economic opportunity and upward mobility. For today's students — a cohort more racially and economically diverse than any before it — that promise is fading.

Rising tuition threatens affordability and access leaving students and their families –– including those whose annual wages have stagnated or fallen over recent decades — either saddled with onerous debt or unable to afford college altogether. This is especially true for students of color (who have historically faced large barriers to attending college), low-income students, and students from non-traditional backgrounds. Higher costs jeopardize not only the prospects of those individual students but also the outlook for whole communities and states, which are increasingly reliant on highly educated workforces to grow and thrive.

To build a prosperous economy — one in which the benefits of higher education are broadly shared and felt by every community regardless of race or class — lawmakers will need to invest in high-quality, affordable, and accessible public higher education by increasing funding for public two- and four-year colleges and by pursuing policies that allow more students to pursue affordable postsecondary education. By doing so, they can help build a stronger middle class and develop the entrepreneurs and skilled workers a strong state economy needs.

Of the 49 states (all except Illinois)[1] analyzed over the full 2008-2018 period, after adjusting for inflation:[2]

45 spent less per student in the 2018 school year than in 2008. The only states spending more than in 2008 were California, Hawaii, North Dakota, and Wyoming.
States cut funding deeply after the recession hit. The average state spent $1,502, or 16 percent, less per student in 2018 than in 2008.
Per-student funding in nine states — Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina — fell by more than 30 percent over this period.
In 31 states, per-student funding fell between the 2017 and 2018 school years. In 15 of these states, funding also fell the previous year.
In 18 states, per-student funding rose between the 2017 and 2018 school years.
Overall, per-student funding essentially remained flat between 2017 and 2018.[3]

Deep state funding cuts have had major consequences for public colleges and universities. States (and, to a lesser extent, localities) provide just over half of the costs of teaching and instruction at these schools.[4] Over the last decade, higher education institutions have:

Raised tuition. Annual published tuition at four-year public colleges has risen by $2,651, or 36 percent, since the 2008 school year.[5] In Louisiana, published tuition at four-year schools has doubled, while in six other states — Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, and Hawaii — published tuition is up more than 60 percent. These sharp tuition increases have accelerated longer-term trends of college becoming less affordable and costs shifting from states to students. Over the last 20 years, the price of attending a four-year public college or university has grown significantly faster than the median income. Although federal student aid has risen, on average it has fallen short of covering the increases in tuition and other college expenses.
Reduced academic opportunities and student services. Tuition increases have compensated for only part of the revenue loss resulting from state funding cuts. Over the past several years, public colleges and universities have cut faculty positions, eliminated course offerings, closed campuses, and reduced student services, among other cuts.

A large and growing share of future jobs will require college-educated workers.[6]Sufficient public investment in higher education to keep quality high and tuition affordable, and to provide financial aid to students who need it most, would help states develop the skilled and diverse workforce they will need to compete for these jobs.

Sufficient public investment can only occur, however, if policymakers make sound tax and budget decisions. To make college more affordable and increase access to higher education, many states need to consider new revenue to fully make up for years of cuts.

States Have Only Partially Reversed Funding Cuts

State and local tax revenue is a major source of support for public colleges and universities. Unlike private institutions, which rely more heavily on charitable donations and large endowments to help fund instruction, public two- and four-year colleges typically rely heavily on state and local appropriations. In 2017, state and local dollars constituted 54 percent of the funds these institutions used directly for teaching and instruction.[7]

While states have been reinvesting in higher education for the past few years, resources remain well below 2008 levels — 16 percent lower per student — even as state revenues have returned to pre-recession levels. (See Figures 1 and 2.) Between the 2008 school year (when the recession took hold) and the 2018 school year, adjusted for inflation:

State spending on higher education at two- and four-year public colleges nationwide fell $1,409 per student, or 16 percent, after adjusting for inflation.
Per-student funding rose in only four states: California, Hawaii, North Dakota, and Wyoming.
Twenty states cut funding per student by more than 20 percent, and in nine of those states the cut exceeded 30 percent.
Arizona cut per-student funding by more than half.[8]
FIGURE 1
State Funding for Higher Education Remains Far Below Pre-Recession Levels in Most States

 

FIGURE 2
State Funding for Higher Education Remains Far Below Pre-Recession Levels in Most States

 

Nationally, between the 2017 and 2018 school years, per-student funding remained virtually unchanged in the 49 states where reliable data were available. However, in 18 states per-student funding increased, by 3.4 percent or almost $270 per student, on average.

  • The funding increases varied from $5 per student in Michigan to $970 in Hawaii.
  • Four states raised per-student funding by more than 5 percent.

In 31 states, per-student funding fell between 2017 and 2018, by 2.6 percent or roughly $200 per student, on average. And among the 18 states where funding rose, eight states' funding increases between 2017 and 2018 were lower than their average increase over the previous three years.

  • The funding cuts varied from $16 per student in New York to $1,939 in North Dakota.
  • Four states — Alaska, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Wyoming — cut funding by more than $500 per student.
  • Fifteen states cut per-student funding in both 2017 and 2018.

State Cuts Have Helped Drive Up Tuition

Tuition remains much higher than before the recession in most states. Since the 2008 school year, average annual published tuition has risen by $2,651 nationally, or 36 percent.[9] (See Figures 3 and 4.) Steep increases have been widespread; average tuition at public four-year institutions has increased by:

  • more than 60 percent in seven states;
  • more than 40 percent in 20 states; and
  • more than 20 percent in 40 states.

In Louisiana, the state with the largest percentage increase since the recession hit, tuition has doubled, rising $4,773 per student since 2008. Average tuition at a four-year Louisiana public university is now $9,302 a year.[10]

In Arizona, the state with the largest dollar increase since the recession hit, tuition has risen $5,355 per student, or 91.3 percent. Average tuition at a four-year Arizona public university is now $11,218 a year.[11]

In recent years, as states have modestly increased investment in two- and four-year colleges from their recession lows, tuition hikes have been much smaller than in the worst years after the recession.[12] Published tuition — the "sticker price" — at public four-year institutions rose by less than 1 percent nationally between the 2017 and 2018 school years:

  • Average tuition nationally increased $94, or almost 1 percent, adjusted for inflation.[13]
  • Montana increased average tuition across its four-year institutions more than any other state, by more than 5 percent, or roughly $339. Mississippi, Oregon, and Rhode Island raised average tuition by more than 4 percent.
  • Rhode Island increased average tuition across its four-year institutions on a dollar basis more than any other state, by $559, or roughly 4.8 percent. Connecticut, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana, and Oregon raised average tuition by more than $300.
  • Hawaii cut tuition more than any other state, by 2 percent, or $220.[14]
FIGURE 3
Tuition Has Increased Sharply at Public Colleges and Universities

 

FIGURE 4
Tuition Has Increased Sharply at Public Colleges and Universities

 

Reduced Investment Comes as Public Colleges Enrolling More Students of Color

Many states closed revenue shortfalls after the recession and its subsequent sluggish recovery through sizeable budget cuts, as opposed to pursuing a more balanced mix of responsible and targeted cuts and revenue increases. In fact, between fiscal years 2008 and 2012, for every $1 state lawmakers raised in new revenue they cut $3 from existing spending. This led to exceedingly deep cuts to higher education — which contributed to higher-than-typical tuition increases, described above — that might have been avoided if lawmakers had pursued a more balanced approach.

For high school graduates who chose college over dim employment prospects and older workers who returned to retool and gain new skills, these cuts and tuition increases came at an especially bad time.[15] Enrollment peaked in the 2011 school year with nearly 11.7 million full-time-equivalent students even as states slashed higher education budgets.

The state funding cuts and rising tuition that followed the last recession fit into a longer-term trend in place since the 1980s. Over time, students and their families have assumed much greater responsibility for paying for public higher education. That's because during and immediately following recessions, state and local funding for higher education tends to fall, while tuition tends to grow more quickly. During periods of economic growth, funding tends to recover somewhat, while tuition stabilizes at a higher share of total higher educational funding.[16] (See Figure 5.)

In 1988, students — through tuition — provided about a quarter of public colleges and universities' revenue, while state and local governments provided the remaining three-quarters. Today, that split is almost 50-50.

FIGURE 5
Students Funding Larger Share of Education Funds After Recessions

 

Nearly every state has shifted costs to students over the last 25 years, with the most drastic shift occurring since the onset of the Great Recession. In 1988, average tuition exceeded per-student state expenditures in only two states: New Hampshire and Vermont. By 2008, that number had grown to ten states. In 2017 (the latest year for which there are data), tuition revenue exceeded state and local funding for higher education in 28 states. And in 15 states, tuition revenue constituted at least 60 percent of higher education revenue used for instructional purposes.[17]

At the same time, this growing burden on students and families coincided with a multi-decade increase in the number of students from communities of color attending college. In 1980, students of color — that is black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, and American Indian students — made up roughly 17 percent of students at public colleges. By 2010, that number had more than doubled to over 36 percent, and today over 40 percent of students attending public two- and four- year colleges are students of color.[18]

This long-term decline in state funding and growing expectation that students and families shoulder a greater load for college education has created a more costly and fraught path to completing college — a path that a more diverse group of students is now navigating.

Families Have Been Hard-Pressed to Absorb Rising Tuition Costs

The cost shift from states to students has happened over a period when many families have had trouble absorbing additional expenses due to stagnant or declining incomes. In the 1970s and early to mid-1980s, tuition and incomes both grew modestly faster than inflation; by the late 1980s, tuition began to rise much faster than incomes. The sharp tuition increases since the recession have exacerbated the longer-term trend. Tuition jumped 36 percent between the 2008 and 2018 school years, while real median income grew just over 2.1 percent.

In 2008, when the recession took hold, average in-state tuition and fees at a public four-year institution accounted for 14 percent of a family's median household income. By 2017 they accounted for 16.5 percent, and in eight states, average annual tuition and fees at a public four-year university accounted for over 20 percent of a household's median pay. The burden of college costs is particularly heavy for households of color, whose members often face additional barriers to employment and difficulty accessing better-paying jobs. The average cost of in-state tuition and fees comprised 20 percent or more of the median household income in 2017 for Hispanic and black households in 22 states and 33 states, respectively.

Map
 
Table
TABLE 1
Average Tuition and Fees at a Public Four-Year University as a Share of Median Household Income, by Race, 2017
State
Overall
White, Non-Hispanic
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Alabama
21.0%
18.0%
32.2%*
26.8%*
14.1%*
Alaska
9.7%
8.7%
11.1%*
10.4%*
Arizona
19.3%
17.5%
24.4%*
23.3%*
14.4%*
Arkansas
18.0%
16.5%
27.0%*
20.1%*
California
13.0%
11.1%
19.2%*
16.6%*
10.2%*
Colorado
14.9%
13.7%
20.0%*
20.0%*
12.9%
Connecticut
15.9%
13.8%
25.3%*
25.4%*
13.6%
Delaware
19.0%
17.2%
26.5%*
12.1%*
Florida
12.1%
10.9%
15.8%*
13.4%*
9.1%*
Georgia
15.0%
12.9%
19.7%*
18.2%*
10.9%*
Hawaii
13.7%
13.7%
14.6%
12.8%*
Idaho
13.4%
13.1%
15.5%*
Illinois
21.3%
19.0%
36.6%*
25.3%*
15.9%*
Indiana
17.1%
16.1%
27.7%*
19.8%*
13.7%*
Iowa
14.1%
13.7%
26.8%*
17.8%*
12.4%*
Kansas
15.8%
14.8%
24.7%*
19.6%*
12.7%*
Kentucky
20.6%
19.9%
27.7%*
23.7%*
16.9%*
Louisiana
19.4%
15.6%
31.7%*
22.6%*
14.1%
Maine
17.2%
17.0%
Maryland
11.6%
10.3%
14.6%*
13.1%*
9.4%*
Massachusetts
15.9%
14.5%
26.2%*
29.3%*
13.5%*
Michigan
22.7%
21.0%
35.9%*
27.0%*
15.4%*
Minnesota
16.1%
15.3%
28.9%*
21.7%*
14.7%
Mississippi
17.2%
13.6%
25.6%*
17.5%*
Missouri
16.1%
15.1%
24.8%*
17.8%*
13.5%
Montana
12.0%
11.8%
13.0%
Nebraska
13.2%
12.5%
22.1%*
16.9%*
Nevada
11.9%
11.0%
17.3%*
13.3%*
10.8%
New Hampshire
21.4%
21.1%
25.7%*
New Jersey
16.9%
14.8%
26.9%*
24.9%*
11.4%*
New Mexico
14.2%
12.0%
19.6%*
16.5%*
New York
11.9%
10.2%
17.2%*
16.5%*
10.9%*
North Carolina
13.6%
11.9%
18.8%*
17.8%*
9.0%*
North Dakota
12.8%
12.2%
14.1%*
Ohio
19.1%
17.5%
32.0%*
25.2%*
14.4%*
Oklahoma
16.0%
15.1%
24.0%*
18.4%*
13.6%
Oregon
16.2%
15.8%
26.3%*
19.4%*
12.6%*
Pennsylvania
23.6%
22.2%
37.1%*
34.9%*
18.8%*
Rhode Island
17.9%
16.0%
27.8%*
16.3%
South Carolina
24.1%
20.6%
37.9%*
30.0%*
19.9%
South Dakota
14.4%
13.6%
19.7%*
Tennessee
18.6%
17.4%
25.0%*
23.0%*
13.7%*
Texas
16.1%
13.2%
21.1%*
20.4%*
11.3%*
Utah
9.6%
9.1%
13.8%*
9.4%
Vermont
27.1%
26.8%
Virginia
17.3%
15.9%
24.9%*
18.9%*
12.2%*
Washington
13.1%
12.6%
18.8%*
17.8%*
10.4%*
West Virginia
17.2%
16.8%
24.9%*
Wisconsin
15.1%
14.3%
30.4%*
20.8%*
12.9%*
Wyoming
8.4%
8.2%
9.8%*

Sources: 1-year American Community Survey data, Table B19013*, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/searchresults.xhtml?refresh=t, "College Board, "Trends in Higher Education Finance," Table 5, Public Four-Year In-State Tuition & Fees, current dollars, https://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/figures-tables/list.

Notes: Results are not included where the standard error associated with the median income is more than 10% of the estimated median income and are presented with an asterisk where the median income for that group is statistically different from that of non-Hispanic whites. Note that suppression and statistical significance tests are tied to median income, not tuition (which is a published sticker figure) as a share of (estimated) median income. Some people in the "Black" category may also identify as "Hispanic," so these categories are not necessarily exclusive. College Board estimates public four-year in-state tuition and fees by determining the price charged by each institution in a state and weighting the price by the number of full-time undergraduate students enrolled.

 

Expanding Immigrant Students' Access and Affordability

States can expand access and affordability for more students by improving immigrants' access to higher education. Even as federal immigration policy is in turmoil, states can take an inclusive approach to in-state tuition and financial aid that will benefit all residents regardless of immigration status.

In Maryland and New Jersey, where eligible students who are undocumented could already pay in-state tuition rates at state colleges and universities, lawmakers in 2018 voted to let them apply for need-based state financial aid as well. Connecticut opened access to institutional financial aid to all students who are eligible to pay in-state tuition, including those who are undocumented, and lawmakers in Oregon and Washington strengthened existing laws enabling students to receive state financial aid or scholarships regardless of status. Meanwhile, Colorado this spring allowed refugees as well as Afghans and Iraqis who received special immigrant visas to qualify for in-state tuition rates immediately.

States Can Use Inclusive Policies to Improve Immigrants' Access to Higher Education

 

All told, undocumented students are now eligible for in-state tuition rates in 21 states plus the District of Columbia and have access to state financial aid in 11 states. (These counts include Hawaii and Michigan, where access to in-state rates and aid — extended by Boards of Regents rather than state lawmakers — is limited to major state universities.)

Undocumented families have lower average incomes than other families, and a college education — even at in-state tuition rates — is out of reach for many without financial assistance. Students who are undocumented don't have access to Pell Grants and other federal aid — by far the largest pool of need-based financial aid available to other students.

States already guarantee all children, no matter their immigration status, a place in K-12 schools to help them reach their potential and develop the educated workers of tomorrow. Giving a state's high school graduates access to higher education at in-state tuition rates, with access to financial aid, builds on this investment.

Cost Shift Harms Students and Families, Especially Those With Low Incomes

Higher tuition combined with weakly rising or stagnant incomes has damaging consequences for families, students, and communities.

  • Tuition costs deter some students from enrolling in college. While the recession encouraged many students to enroll in higher education, the large tuition increases of the past few years may have prevented further enrollment gains. College price increases result in declining enrollment, research consistently finds.[19] While many universities and the federal government provide financial aid to students, research suggests that a high sticker price can dissuade students from enrolling even if the net price, including aid, doesn't rise.
  • Rising tuition may harm students of color and reduce campus diversity. While more students of color are enrolling in college, rising tuition and fees is a headwind to this trend as students of color are less likely to enroll as the cost of tuition goes up. In a recently published study, researchers found that tuition increases reduced campus diversity, particularly at non-selective institutions. For full-time freshmen enrolled at non-selective schools, a $1,000 increase in tuition costs was associated with a 4.5 percent drop in class diversity.[20] Another study that examined tuition policy changes in Texas in the early 2000s concluded that rising tuition limited enrollment gains for Hispanic students in the state.[21]
  • Tuition increases likely deter low-income students, in particular, from enrolling. College cost increases have the biggest impact on students from low-income families, research shows. For example, a 1995 study by Harvard University researcher Thomas Kane concluded that states with the largest tuition increases during the 1980s and early 1990s "saw the greatest widening of the gaps in enrollment between high- and low-income youth."[22] Low-income families' relative lack of knowledge about the admissions and financial aid processes may exacerbate the problem. Students from families that struggle to get by — including those who live in communities with lower shares of college-educated adults and attend high schools that have higher student-to-counselor ratios — tend to overestimate the true cost of higher education more than students from wealthier households, in part because they are less aware of the financial aid for which they are eligible.[23] 

    These effects are particularly concerning because gaps in college enrollment between higher- and lower-income youth are alreadypronounced. In 2015, 63 percent of recent high school graduates from families with income in the lowest 20 percent enrolled in some form of postsecondary education, compared to over 83 percent of students from the top 20 percent.[24] Significant enrollment gaps based on income exist even among prospective students with similar academic records and test scores.[25] Rising costs at public colleges and universities may widen these gaps further.

  • Tuition increases may push lower-income students toward less-selective public institutions, reducing their future earnings. Perhaps just as important as a student's decision to enroll in higher education is the choice of which college to attend. A large share of high-achieving students from struggling families fail to apply to any selective colleges or universities, a 2013 Brookings Institution study found.[26] Even here, research indicates that financial constraints and concerns about costs push lower-income students to narrow their list of potential schools and ultimately enroll in less-selective institutions.[27] Another 2013 study found evidence that some high-achieving, low-income students are more likely to "undermatch" in their college choice, in part due to financial constraints.[28] 

    Where a student decides to go to college has broad economic implications, especially for economically disadvantaged students and students of color. Students with less-educated parents, as well as black and Hispanic students, benefit especially from attending more elite colleges by experiencing higher postgraduate earnings, a 2011 study by Stanford University and Mathematica Policy Research found.[29]

Low-Income Students Still Struggle With Debt

As tuition continues to increase, incomes remain stagnant or rise slowly, and federal and state financial aid fails to make up the difference — even for low-income students eligible for federal and state aid — debt burdens for students and their families continue to grow. Among students graduating with a bachelor's degree in 2012, 79 percent of those from families with incomes in the bottom quarter had student loans, compared with 55 percent of those from families in the top income quarter.[30] In the same year, more than 80 percent of graduating black students borrowed at public institutions, compared with 64 percent of graduating students overall.[31]

The share of students graduating with debt has risen since the start of the recession. Between the 2008 and 2015 school years, the share of students graduating with debt from a public four-year institution rose from 55 percent to 59 percent. The average amount of debt incurred by a bachelor's degree recipient with loans at a public four-year institution grew as well, to $27,000 from $21,226 (in 2016 dollars), an increase of 26 percent. By contrast, the average level of debt incurred rose only about 1 percent in the six years prior to the recession.[32]

In short, at public four-year institutions, more students are taking on larger amounts of debt. By the second quarter of 2018, student debt totaled $1.4 trillion — more than the United States population's credit card or auto loan debt.[33]

Yet, while college loan burdens have increased significantly for students at public four-year institutions, the sizeable run-up in debt levels was driven in large part by a growing share of students attending private for-profit institutions — such as Corinthian and the University of Phoenix — and two-year community colleges. In 2000, borrowers entering repayment on student loans from for-profit and two-year institutions made up roughly 30 percent of all borrowers overall, a study from the U.S. Treasury Department and Stanford University researchers found. By 2011, that share had risen to nearly half. For-profit institutions were such a driving force that in 2014, eight of the top ten and 13 of the top 25 institutions whose students owed (collectively) the most in federal student loan debt were for-profit institutions. In 2000, only one for-profit made the top 25.[34]

Onerous debt burdens make it more difficult for students to reach economic stability, costing resources that could instead go towards paying rent, saving for emergencies, or investing in the future. High debt burdens have been especially damaging for black and Latino communities. One study, which followed first-time college entrants starting in 2004, found that over 37 percent of all black first-time college students across public, private non-profit, and for-profit institutions had defaulted on their student loans within 12 years. For Hispanic students, the default rate over the same period was 20 percent. For their white counterparts, the rate was just 12 percent. The same study projected default rates into the future and predicted that as many as 70 percent of black borrowers in the 2004 cohort would default on their loans by 2024.[35]

There can be significant consequences for defaulting on student loans. Defaults impact an individual's credit rating — lowering credit scores and making it more difficult to get future loans, housing, and even jobs. Wages can be garnished to repay the defaulted loan and older borrowers may lose a portion of their Social Security payments.[36]

States Must Address Workforce Discrimination Against Graduates of Color

The economic benefits of receiving a postsecondary credential have been well-documented.aHowever, these benefits are not shared equally across people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. Black and Hispanic college graduates still earn substantially less than their white peers, studies show.b

When studies have attempted to determine what contributes to these gaps beyond measured variables, racial discrimination is one significant factor that emerges — that is, consciously or otherwise, employers are devaluing the potential of qualified workers of color due to their race or ethnicity. A body of research has emerged to understand the impact discrimination plays in hiring and wages.

In one 2014 study, researchers created resumes of hypothetical applicants from elite, highly selective colleges and less-prestigious state schools. After submitting the resumes to over 1,000 job listings, researchers found that black job applicants who had graduated from highly prestigious private institutions received responses from employers at a rate nearly a third lower than their comparable white counterparts. In fact, white students who had attended significantly less prestigious state schools had about the same response rates from potential employers as did black students applying from elite institutions. Even more striking, the same study found that not only did black applicants receive lower response rates, but they also received job offers with lower starting salaries than those they offered to the applicants' white peers.c

A 2010 study of salary negotiations found that employers expected applicants of color to negotiate less than their white peers and effectively penalized them when they attempted to negotiate, viewing applicants of color as being more "pushy" and, in turn, offering them lower initial salaries.d

Research also indicates that discrimination may not be declining over time. In a meta-analysis conducted in 2017, researchers analyzed 30 years of studies on hiring discrimination and concluded that — even after controlling for variables such as education, occupational type, and gender — "African Americans remain substantially disadvantaged relative to equally qualified whites, and we see little indication of progress over time." While the studies analyzed did seem to indicate some decline in discrimination in hiring facing Latinx individuals, the improvement was modest at best, the report noted.e

For people of color who do attain college credentials to access the full benefit of these degrees, states will need to take steps to address workforce discrimination in hiring, wage-setting, and retention, including: (1) increasing the amount of information available to businesses, job seekers, and the public on the under- or overrepresentation of people of color in companies relative to the given sector at large and the state's general working population;f (2) providing resources and tools for employers to help them analyze personnel policies, train hiring managers, and adjust organizational practices with an eye toward reducing discrimination; and (3) tightening state employment discrimination laws to protect workers from illegal practices and ensure that laws make it possible for workers to reasonably seek recourse.g

aJennifer Ma, Matea Pender, and Meredith Welch, "Education Pays 2016," College Board, 2016, https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/education-pays-2016-full-report.pdf.

b Valerie Wilson and William M. Rodgers, "Black-white wage gaps expand with rising wage inequality," Economic Policy Institute, September 20, 2016, https://www.epi.org/publication/black-white-wage-gaps-expand-with-rising-wage-inequality/#epi-toc-7; Tomaz Cajner et al., "Racial Gaps in Labor Market Outcomes in the Last Four Decades and Over the Business Cycle," Federal Reserve Board, June 12, 2017, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017071pap.pdf.

c S. Michael Gaddis, "Discrimination in the Credential Society: An Audit Study of Race and College Selectivity in the Labor Market," Social Forces, Vol. 93, Issue 4, June 1, 2015, pp. 1451–1479, https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sou111.

d Morela Hernandez and Derek R. Avery, "Getting the Short End of the Stick: Racial Bias in Salary Negotiations," MIT Sloan Management Review, June 15, 2016, https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/getting-the-short-end-of-the-stick-racial-bias-in-salary-negotiations/ .

e Lincoln Quillian et al., "Meta-analysis of field experiments shows no change in racism discrimination in hiring over time," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, August 8, 2017, http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/early/2017/09/11/1706255114.full.pdf.

Philip Cohen, "A Simple, Legal Way to Help Stop Employment Discrimination," The Atlantic, April 1, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/04/a-simple-legal-way-to-help-stop-employment-discrimination/274519/.

Lisa Nagele-Piazza, "Not All State Employment Discrimination Laws Are Created Equal," Society for Human Resource Management, September 15, 2017, https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/pages/state-employment-discrimination-laws.aspx.

 

States Can Do More to Ensure College Affordability and Accessibility

Long-term cuts to per-student higher education funding threaten affordability, access, and quality at public two- and four-year colleges across the states. Not only should states direct additional resources into supporting public colleges and universities and reverse the long-term trend of disinvestment, but they can also implement smarter state financial aid policies and ensure that dollars go to the schools that need it most.

Craft State Financial Aid to Target Students in Need

In the 2015-2016 academic school year, state colleges and universities awarded students almost $10.7 billion in financial aid.[37] They awarded about 76 percent of those dollars at least partly based on need to students with low incomes who might otherwise struggle to afford the costs of attending college. They awarded the remaining 24 percent based on merit to high-achieving students (typically measured by high school GPA or college entry exam scores), regardless of household income.[38]

The primary purpose of need-based aid is to expand access to higher education. For low-income students, financial aid can make a significant difference in not only affording the cost of college but in being able to graduate. A $1,000 increase in a student's financial aid corresponds to a 9.2-percentage-point decrease in the likelihood that a student will drop out of college, research indicates.[39] Other studies have found similar effects, noting that aid targeted at low-income students can boost college retention rates and increase the share of low-income college graduates.[40]

In contrast, merit-based aid is often framed as a reward for students who have demonstrated exceptional academic achievement or leadership ability. Lawmakers hope that by rewarding academic achievement, they can lure talented students to remain in state for college and in their working years afterwards. While studies do show that offering merit-based aid can encourage certain students who would have attended college elsewhere to remain in state, some of the aid goes to students who would have stayed in state anyway.[41]

Merit aid also raises concerns that, when poorly designed, these programs can direct resources to college students from advantaged backgrounds — typically white students and students from high-income and wealthy communities who have had the benefit of well-resourced K-12 school systems and access to costly college test prep courses. One study from the early 2000s analyzed the Georgia HOPE scholarship program, one of the largest and oldest state merit-based programs in the country. Researchers found that while the HOPE program — which had no income limit on eligibility and required high schoolers to have graduated with at least a 3.0 GPA (at the time of study) — did encourage more students across racial/ethnic backgrounds to attend a four-year institution, its benefits disproportionally went to white students in the state, actually increasing the state's racial gap in college attendance.[42]

States would be better off bolstering need-based aid programs, simplifying and consolidating programs to reduce confusion and encourage greater enrollment, and building design aspects into these programs that not only encourage enrollment but also encourage timely completion to reduce costs to both the state and students.[43]

Ensure Resources Go to Schools in Greatest Need

While most state funds for higher education are distributed on a per-pupil basis, over the past few decades states have experimented with funding models that aim to encourage better outcomes by rewarding schools that excel across specific benchmarks — and withholding funds from those that don't. Lawmakers in states across the country have implemented funding formulas, commonly referred to as performance funding, that evaluate two- and four-year colleges on their ability to meet goals in areas such as degree completion, student retention, and job placement rates. In recent years, states have implemented performance funding schemes while continuing to cut overall state funding, hoping to encourage colleges to produce better outcomes with fewer resources.

Currently, 32 states operate with performance-based funding policies for their public two- and four-year colleges.[44] The proportion of state funds appropriated to two- and four-year colleges through performance funding formulas varies widely, a State Higher Education Executive Officers survey found. Of the 23 states that reported using performance funding formulas to allocate resources to four-year colleges, 13 reported allocating more than 10 percent of their funding via performance metrics. Six states reported using performance funding formulas to allocate more than half of their state's resources.[45]

Research to date has found little to no positive impact of these schemes. "Across this body of research, the weight of evidence suggests states using performance-based funding do not out-perform other states — results are more often than not not statistically significant," a 2016 study examining research on performance funding concluded.[46]

Performance funding is less effective than policymakers might hope for several reasons. One is that after years of cuts to baseline funding, public colleges — especially two-year colleges and regional institutions with smaller endowments and more modest enrollment numbers — lack the basic resources needed meet the goals laid out by performance-based metrics.

Given the inputs required to improve performance metrics, even small penalties or withholding of funds can harm less-resourced institutions without giving them the tools they would need to improve. One study noted that "the policy [in Tennessee] did not build the capacity necessary to accomplish…higher order goals."[47] Another noted that a lack of capacity building support is an "important impediment" to being able to meet the demands of lawmakers to meet performance goals.[48] This capacity gap is particularly acute for public historically black colleges and universities, other minority serving institutions, and smaller regional schools that — due to financial constraints — have limited ability to collect, manage, and make institutional changes based on data.

States implementing performance funding also often use measures that are poorly tailored to identify institutions that produce better outcomes for their students — especially institutions with larger shares of low-income students, students from non-traditional backgrounds, and students of color. One study noted that performance funding arrangements typically fail to account for the unique challenges that smaller regional institutions face, putting them at a significant disadvantage when measured against larger flagship institutions with more selective admission policies. "If an institution has an open-admissions policy that encourages the acceptance of academically under-prepared students, then applicable output indicators should focus on how effective the institution is in educating that particular population of students."[49]

Rather than creating funding models that benefit the most well-resourced schools at the expense of smaller regional institutions — which often teach the students most in need of additional resources and supports — lawmakers should focus additional state funds on building the capacity of colleges with fewer resources.

End Notes

[1] Complete appropriations data for Illinois is only available through 2017.

[2] This paper uses CPI-U-RS inflation adjustments to measure real changes in costs. Over the past year, the CPI-U-RS increased by 2.4 percent. We use the CPI-U-RS for the calendar year that begins the fiscal/academic year. Unless noted, all figures in this paper are adjusted for inflation.

[3] CBPP calculation using the "Grapevine" higher education appropriations data from Illinois State University, enrollment data from the State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, and the Consumer Price Index, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since enrollment data are available only through the 2017 school year, enrollment for the 2018 school year is estimated using data from past years.

[4] Education Executive Officers Association, "State Higher Education Finance: FY2017," March 2018, p. 18, http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/project-files/SHEEO_SHEF_FY2017_FINAL.pdf.

[5] Calculated from College Board, "Trends in College Pricing 2017: Average Tuition and Fee and Room and Board Charges, 1971-72 to 2017-18 (Enrollment-Weighted)," Table 2, https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2017-trends-in-college-pricing_0.pdf.

[6] Anthony P. Carnevale, Nicole Smith, and Jeff Strohl, "Recovery: Job Growth and Education Requirements through 2020," Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, June 2013, https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/tll0zkxt0puz45hu21g6.

[7] State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, April 2017.

[8] CBPP calculation using the "Grapevine" higher education appropriations data from Illinois State University, enrollment and combined state and local funding data from the State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, and the Consumer Price Index, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since enrollment data are only available through the 2017 school year, we have estimated enrollment for the 2018 school year using data from past years.

[9] CBPP analysis using College Board, "Trends in College Pricing 2016," https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2016-trends-college-pricing-web_1.pdf. In non-inflation-adjusted terms, average tuition is up $3,459 over this period.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid.

[12] Costs reported above include both published tuition and fees. Average tuition and fee prices are weighted by full-time enrollment.

[13] As noted earlier, this and other figures in this report have been adjusted for inflation. Of states with increased tuition, the average tuition increased $242, or 2.6 percent.

[14] CBPP analysis using College Board, "Trends in College Pricing 2016," https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2016-trends-college-pricing-web_1.pdf. See appendix for fiscal years 2016-17 change in average tuition at public four-year colleges.

[15] See, for example, "National Postsecondary Enrollment Trends: Before, During and After the Great Recession," National Student Clearinghouse Research Center, July 2011, p. 6, http://pas.indiana.edu/pdf/National%20Postsecondary%20Enrollment%20Trends.pdf. A survey by the American Association of Community Colleges (AACC) indicated that increases in Fall 2009 enrollment at community colleges were, in part, due to workforce training opportunities; see Christopher M. Mullin, "Community College Enrollment Surge: An Analysis of Estimated Fall 2009 Headcount Enrollments at Community Colleges," AACC, December 2009, http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED511056.pdf.

[16] State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, "State Higher Education Finance: FY2017," 2018, p. 25, Figure 5, http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/project-files/SHEEO_SHEF_FY2017_FINAL.pdf.

[17] State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, April 2018; government funding includes both state and local funding sources.

[18] U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS), "Fall Enrollment in Colleges and Universities" surveys, 1976 and 1980; Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), "Fall Enrollment Survey" (IPEDS-EF:90-99); IPEDS Spring 2001 through Spring 2016, Fall Enrollment component; and Enrollment in Degree-Granting Institutions by Race/Ethnicity Projection Model, 1980 through 2026. (This table was prepared March 2017.) https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_306.30.asp.

[19] See, for example, Steven W. Hemelt and Dave E. Marcotte, "The Impact of Tuition Increases on Enrollment at Public Colleges and Universities," Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, September 2011; Donald E. Heller, "Student Price Response in Higher Education: An Update to Leslie and Brinkman," Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 68, No. 6 (November-December 1997), pp. 624-659.

[20] Drew Allen and Gregory Wolniak, "Exploring the Effects of Tuition Increases on Racial/Ethnic Diversity at Public Colleges and Universities," Research in Higher Education, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11162-018-9502-6.

[21] Stella Flores and Justin Shepard, "Pricing Out the Disadvantaged? The Effect of Tuition Deregulation in Texas Public Four-Year Institutions," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 655, 2014, pp. 99-122.

[22] Thomas J. Kane, "Rising Public College Tuition and College Entry: How Well Do Public Subsidies Promote Access to College?" National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995, http://www.nber.org/papers/w5164.pdf?new_window=1.

[23] Eric P. Bettinger et al., "The Role of Simplification and Information in College Decisions: Results from the H&R Block FAFSA Experiment," National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009, http://www.nber.org/papers/w15361.pdf. For details on the disparity in access to counseling for low-income students, see "Course, Counselor, and Teacher Gaps: Addressing the College Readiness Challenge in High-Poverty High Schools," Center for Law and Social Policy, June 2015, http://www.clasp.org/resources-and-publications/publication-1/CollegeReadinessPaperFINALJune.pdf.

[24] U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS), 1975 through 2015. https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_302.30.asp.

[25] In a 2008 piece, Georgetown University scholar Anthony Carnevale pointed out that "among the most highly qualified students (the top testing 25 percent), the kids from the top socioeconomic group go to four-year colleges at almost twice the rate of equally qualified kids from the bottom socioeconomic quartile." Anthony P. Carnevale, "A Real Analysis of Real Education," Liberal Education, Fall 2008, p. 57.

[26] Christopher Avery and Caroline M. Hoxby, "The Missing 'One Offs': The Hidden Supply of High-Achieving, Low-Income Students," National Bureau for Economic Research, Working Paper 18586, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects/bpea/spring-2013/2013a_hoxby.pdf.

[27] Patrick T. Terenzini, Alberto F. Cabrera, and Elena M. Bernal, "Swimming Against the Tide," College Board, 2001, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED562879.pdf

[28] Eleanor W. Dillon and Jeffrey A. Smith, "The Determinants of Mismatch Between Students and Colleges," National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2013, http://www.nber.org/papers/w19286. Additionally, other studies have found that undermatching is more likely to occur for students of color. In 2009 William G. Bowen, Matthew M. Chingos, and Michael S. McPherson found that undermatching was more prevalent for black students — especially black women — than for comparable white students.

[29] Stacey Dale and Alan Krueger, "Estimating the Return to College Selectivity Over the Career Using Administrative Earning Data." Mathematica Policy Research and Princeton University, February 2011, https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-findings/publications/estimating-the-return-to-college-selectivity-over-the-career-using-administrative-earning-data.

[30] College Board, "Figure 2014_14B. Cumulative Debt of 2011-12 Bachelor's Degree Recipients by Dependency Status and Family Income," Prepared October 2014, https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2017-trends-student-aid-source-data_1.xlsx. Low-income dependent students are defined as students from families earning less than $30,000 annually, while high-income students come from families earning more than $106,000.

[31] Mark Huelsman, "The Debt Divide: The Racial and Class Bias Behind the 'New Normal' of Student Borrowing," May 2015, http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Mark-Debt%20divide%20Final%20(SF).pdf. Hispanic or Latino students generally borrow at levels equal to the national average. African American students are also more likely to take on student debt to finance education at two-year colleges.

[32] College Board, "Trends in Student Aid 2016," Figure 12, October 2017, https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2017-trends-student-aid_0.pdf.

[33] Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit," August 2018, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2018Q2.pdf.

[34]Adam Looney and Constantine Yannelis, "A Crisis in Student Loans? How Changes in the Characteristics of Borrowers and in the Institutions They Attended Contributed to Rising Loan Defaults," Brookings Institution, BPEA Conference Draft, September 10, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects/bpea/fall-2015_embargoed/conferencedraft_looneyyannelis_studentloandefaults.pdf.

[35] Scott-Clayton, Judith, "The Looming Student Loan Default Crisis is Worse than We Thought," Brookings Institution, January 10, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/scott-clayton-report.pdf.

[36] Ben Miller, "Who Are Student Loan Defaulters?" Center for American Progress, December 14, 2017, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/reports/2017/12/14/444011/student-loan-defaulters/.

[37] National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs, "47th Annual Survey Report on State-Sponsored Student Financial Aid," 2018, https://www.nassgapsurvey.com/survey_reports/2015-2016-47th.pdf.

[38]Ibid.

[39] Eric Bettinger, "How Financial Aid Affects Persistence." National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2004, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10242.

[40] Sara Goldrick-Rab et al., "Need-Based Financial Aid and College Persistence: Experimental Evidence from Wisconsin," Wisconsin Scholars Longitudinal Study, October 10, 2012, http://finaidstudy.org/documents/Goldrick-Rab%20Harris%20Kelchen%20Benson%202012%20FULL.pdf. See also Sigal Alon, "Who Benefits Most From Financial Aid? The Heterogeneous Effect of Need-Based Grants on Students' College Persistence," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 92, No. 3, September 2011, http://people.socsci.tau.ac.il/mu/salon/files/2011/11/ssq_sep2011_final.pdf.

[41] Liang Zhang and Erik C. Ness, "Does State Merit-Based Aid Stem Brain Drain?" Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, June 1, 2010, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.3102/0162373709359683. See also David L. Sjoquist and John V. Winters, "Merit aid and post-college retention in the state," Journal of Urban Economics, March 2014, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119013000818.

[42] Sue Dynarski, "The Consequences of Merit Aid," National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2002, http://www.nber.org/papers/w9400.pdf. The same study did find, however, that merit-based programs in other states that employed less stringent requirements did not have this same effect on widening enrollment gaps — further indicating that how merit-aid program are structured matters significantly.

[43] Sandy Baum et al., "Beyond Need and Merit: Strengthening State Grant Programs," Brookings Institution, May 8, 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/research/beyond-need-and-merit-strengthening-state-grant-programs/.

[44] Nicholas Hillman, "Why Performance-Based College Funding Doesn't Work," The Century Foundation, May 25, 2016, https://tcf.org/content/report/why-performance-based-college-funding-doesnt-work/.

[45] State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, April 2018, http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/project-files/SHEEO_SHEF_FY2017_FINAL.pdf.

[46] Nicholas Hillman, "Why Performance-Based College Funding Doesn't Work," The Century Foundation, May 25, 2016, https://tcf.org/content/report/why-performance-based-college-funding-doesnt-work/.

[47] Nicholas Hillman et al., "Evaluating the Impacts of 'New' Performance Funding in Higher Education," Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 2014, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3fc4/5ae172a258afef40532278fd0a621fb9b6e2.pdf.

[48] K. J. Dougherty et al., "Performance funding for higher education: forms, origins, impacts, and futures," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 655(1), (2014). 163-184. p. 169.

[49] Tiffany Jones, "Performance Funding at MSIs: Considerations and Possible Measures for Public Minority-Serving Institutions," Southern Education Foundation, June 2014, http://www.southerneducation.org/getattachment/38aA decade since the Great Recession hit, state spending on public colleges and universities remains well below historical levels. Overall state funding for public two- and four-year colleges in the school year ending in 2018 was more than $7 billion below its 2008 level, after adjusting for inflation. (See Figure 1.) In the most difficult years after the recession, colleges responded to significant funding cuts by increasing tuition, reducing faculty, limiting course offerings, and in some cases closing campuses. 

OVERALL STATE FUNDING FOR PUBLIC TWO- AND FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES IN THE SCHOOL YEAR ENDING IN 2018 WAS MORE THAN $7 BILLION BELOW ITS 2008 LEVEL.Funding has rebounded slightly since then, but costs remain high and services in some places have not returned.

The promise to past generations of students in America has been that if you work hard and strive, public colleges and universities will serve as an avenue to greater economic opportunity and upward mobility. For today's students — a cohort more racially and economically diverse than any before it — that promise is fading.

Rising tuition threatens affordability and access leaving students and their families –– including those whose annual wages have stagnated or fallen over recent decades — either saddled with onerous debt or unable to afford college altogether. This is especially true for students of color (who have historically faced large barriers to attending college), low-income students, and students from non-traditional backgrounds. Higher costs jeopardize not only the prospects of those individual students but also the outlook for whole communities and states, which are increasingly reliant on highly educated workforces to grow and thrive.

To build a prosperous economy — one in which the benefits of higher education are broadly shared and felt by every community regardless of race or class — lawmakers will need to invest in high-quality, affordable, and accessible public higher education by increasing funding for public two- and four-year colleges and by pursuing policies that allow more students to pursue affordable postsecondary education. By doing so, they can help build a stronger middle class and develop the entrepreneurs and skilled workers a strong state economy needs.

Of the 49 states (all except Illinois)[1] analyzed over the full 2008-2018 period, after adjusting for inflation:[2]

  • 45 spent less per student in the 2018 school year than in 2008. The only states spending more than in 2008 were California, Hawaii, North Dakota, and Wyoming.
  • States cut funding deeply after the recession hit. The average state spent $1,502, or 16 percent, less per student in 2018 than in 2008.
  • Per-student funding in nine states — Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina — fell by more than 30 percent over this period.
  • In 31 states, per-student funding fell between the 2017 and 2018 school years. In 15 of these states, funding also fell the previous year.
  • In 18 states, per-student funding rose between the 2017 and 2018 school years.
  • Overall, per-student funding essentially remained flat between 2017 and 2018.[3]

Deep state funding cuts have had major consequences for public colleges and universities. States (and, to a lesser extent, localities) provide just over half of the costs of teaching and instruction at these schools.[4] Over the last decade, higher education institutions have:

  • Raised tuition. Annual published tuition at four-year public colleges has risen by $2,651, or 36 percent, since the 2008 school year.[5] In Louisiana, published tuition at four-year schools has doubled, while in six other states — Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, and Hawaii — published tuition is up more than 60 percent.

     

    These sharp tuition increases have accelerated longer-term trends of college becoming less affordable and costs shifting from states to students. Over the last 20 years, the price of attending a four-year public college or university has grown significantly faster than the median income. Although federal student aid has risen, on average it has fallen short of covering the increases in tuition and other college expenses.

  • Reduced academic opportunities and student services. Tuition increases have compensated for only part of the revenue loss resulting from state funding cuts. Over the past several years, public colleges and universities have cut faculty positions, eliminated course offerings, closed campuses, and reduced student services, among other cuts.

A large and growing share of future jobs will require college-educated workers.[6]Sufficient public investment in higher education to keep quality high and tuition affordable, and to provide financial aid to students who need it most, would help states develop the skilled and diverse workforce they will need to compete for these jobs.

Sufficient public investment can only occur, however, if policymakers make sound tax and budget decisions. To make college more affordable and increase access to higher education, many states need to consider new revenue to fully make up for years of cuts.

States Have Only Partially Reversed Funding Cuts

State and local tax revenue is a major source of support for public colleges and universities. Unlike private institutions, which rely more heavily on charitable donations and large endowments to help fund instruction, public two- and four-year colleges typically rely heavily on state and local appropriations. In 2017, state and local dollars constituted 54 percent of the funds these institutions used directly for teaching and instruction.[7]

While states have been reinvesting in higher education for the past few years, resources remain well below 2008 levels — 16 percent lower per student — even as state revenues have returned to pre-recession levels. (See Figures 1 and 2.) Between the 2008 school year (when the recession took hold) and the 2018 school year, adjusted for inflation:

  • State spending on higher education at two- and four-year public colleges nationwide fell $1,409 per student, or 16 percent, after adjusting for inflation.
  • Per-student funding rose in only four states: California, Hawaii, North Dakota, and Wyoming.
  • Twenty states cut funding per student by more than 20 percent, and in nine of those states the cut exceeded 30 percent.
  • Arizona cut per-student funding by more than half.[8]
FIGURE 1
State Funding for Higher Education Remains Far Below Pre-Recession Levels in Most States

 

FIGURE 2
State Funding for Higher Education Remains Far Below Pre-Recession Levels in Most States

 

Nationally, between the 2017 and 2018 school years, per-student funding remained virtually unchanged in the 49 states where reliable data were available. However, in 18 states per-student funding increased, by 3.4 percent or almost $270 per student, on average.

  • The funding increases varied from $5 per student in Michigan to $970 in Hawaii.
  • Four states raised per-student funding by more than 5 percent.

In 31 states, per-student funding fell between 2017 and 2018, by 2.6 percent or roughly $200 per student, on average. And among the 18 states where funding rose, eight states' funding increases between 2017 and 2018 were lower than their average increase over the previous three years.

  • The funding cuts varied from $16 per student in New York to $1,939 in North Dakota.
  • Four states — Alaska, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Wyoming — cut funding by more than $500 per student.
  • Fifteen states cut per-student funding in both 2017 and 2018.

State Cuts Have Helped Drive Up Tuition

Tuition remains much higher than before the recession in most states. Since the 2008 school year, average annual published tuition has risen by $2,651 nationally, or 36 percent.[9] (See Figures 3 and 4.) Steep increases have been widespread; average tuition at public four-year institutions has increased by:

  • more than 60 percent in seven states;
  • more than 40 percent in 20 states; and
  • more than 20 percent in 40 states.

In Louisiana, the state with the largest percentage increase since the recession hit, tuition has doubled, rising $4,773 per student since 2008. Average tuition at a four-year Louisiana public university is now $9,302 a year.[10]

In Arizona, the state with the largest dollar increase since the recession hit, tuition has risen $5,355 per student, or 91.3 percent. Average tuition at a four-year Arizona public university is now $11,218 a year.[11]

In recent years, as states have modestly increased investment in two- and four-year colleges from their recession lows, tuition hikes have been much smaller than in the worst years after the recession.[12] Published tuition — the "sticker price" — at public four-year institutions rose by less than 1 percent nationally between the 2017 and 2018 school years:

  • Average tuition nationally increased $94, or almost 1 percent, adjusted for inflation.[13]
  • Montana increased average tuition across its four-year institutions more than any other state, by more than 5 percent, or roughly $339. Mississippi, Oregon, and Rhode Island raised average tuition by more than 4 percent.
  • Rhode Island increased average tuition across its four-year institutions on a dollar basis more than any other state, by $559, or roughly 4.8 percent. Connecticut, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana, and Oregon raised average tuition by more than $300.
  • Hawaii cut tuition more than any other state, by 2 percent, or $220.[14]
FIGURE 3
Tuition Has Increased Sharply at Public Colleges and Universities

 

FIGURE 4
Tuition Has Increased Sharply at Public Colleges and Universities

 

Reduced Investment Comes as Public Colleges Enrolling More Students of Color

Many states closed revenue shortfalls after the recession and its subsequent sluggish recovery through sizeable budget cuts, as opposed to pursuing a more balanced mix of responsible and targeted cuts and revenue increases. In fact, between fiscal years 2008 and 2012, for every $1 state lawmakers raised in new revenue they cut $3 from existing spending. This led to exceedingly deep cuts to higher education — which contributed to higher-than-typical tuition increases, described above — that might have been avoided if lawmakers had pursued a more balanced approach.

For high school graduates who chose college over dim employment prospects and older workers who returned to retool and gain new skills, these cuts and tuition increases came at an especially bad time.[15] Enrollment peaked in the 2011 school year with nearly 11.7 million full-time-equivalent students even as states slashed higher education budgets.

The state funding cuts and rising tuition that followed the last recession fit into a longer-term trend in place since the 1980s. Over time, students and their families have assumed much greater responsibility for paying for public higher education. That's because during and immediately following recessions, state and local funding for higher education tends to fall, while tuition tends to grow more quickly. During periods of economic growth, funding tends to recover somewhat, while tuition stabilizes at a higher share of total higher educational funding.[16] (See Figure 5.)

In 1988, students — through tuition — provided about a quarter of public colleges and universities' revenue, while state and local governments provided the remaining three-quarters. Today, that split is almost 50-50.

FIGURE 5
Students Funding Larger Share of Education Funds After Recessions

 

Nearly every state has shifted costs to students over the last 25 years, with the most drastic shift occurring since the onset of the Great Recession. In 1988, average tuition exceeded per-student state expenditures in only two states: New Hampshire and Vermont. By 2008, that number had grown to ten states. In 2017 (the latest year for which there are data), tuition revenue exceeded state and local funding for higher education in 28 states. And in 15 states, tuition revenue constituted at least 60 percent of higher education revenue used for instructional purposes.[17]

At the same time, this growing burden on students and families coincided with a multi-decade increase in the number of students from communities of color attending college. In 1980, students of color — that is black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, and American Indian students — made up roughly 17 percent of students at public colleges. By 2010, that number had more than doubled to over 36 percent, and today over 40 percent of students attending public two- and four- year colleges are students of color.[18]

This long-term decline in state funding and growing expectation that students and families shoulder a greater load for college education has created a more costly and fraught path to completing college — a path that a more diverse group of students is now navigating.

Families Have Been Hard-Pressed to Absorb Rising Tuition Costs

The cost shift from states to students has happened over a period when many families have had trouble absorbing additional expenses due to stagnant or declining incomes. In the 1970s and early to mid-1980s, tuition and incomes both grew modestly faster than inflation; by the late 1980s, tuition began to rise much faster than incomes. The sharp tuition increases since the recession have exacerbated the longer-term trend. Tuition jumped 36 percent between the 2008 and 2018 school years, while real median income grew just over 2.1 percent.

In 2008, when the recession took hold, average in-state tuition and fees at a public four-year institution accounted for 14 percent of a family's median household income. By 2017 they accounted for 16.5 percent, and in eight states, average annual tuition and fees at a public four-year university accounted for over 20 percent of a household's median pay. The burden of college costs is particularly heavy for households of color, whose members often face additional barriers to employment and difficulty accessing better-paying jobs. The average cost of in-state tuition and fees comprised 20 percent or more of the median household income in 2017 for Hispanic and black households in 22 states and 33 states, respectively.

Map
 
Table
TABLE 1
Average Tuition and Fees at a Public Four-Year University as a Share of Median Household Income, by Race, 2017
State
Overall
White, Non-Hispanic
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Alabama
21.0%
18.0%
32.2%*
26.8%*
14.1%*
Alaska
9.7%
8.7%
11.1%*
10.4%*
Arizona
19.3%
17.5%
24.4%*
23.3%*
14.4%*
Arkansas
18.0%
16.5%
27.0%*
20.1%*
California
13.0%
11.1%
19.2%*
16.6%*
10.2%*
Colorado
14.9%
13.7%
20.0%*
20.0%*
12.9%
Connecticut
15.9%
13.8%
25.3%*
25.4%*
13.6%
Delaware
19.0%
17.2%
26.5%*
12.1%*
Florida
12.1%
10.9%
15.8%*
13.4%*
9.1%*
Georgia
15.0%
12.9%
19.7%*
18.2%*
10.9%*
Hawaii
13.7%
13.7%
14.6%
12.8%*
Idaho
13.4%
13.1%
15.5%*
Illinois
21.3%
19.0%
36.6%*
25.3%*
15.9%*
Indiana
17.1%
16.1%
27.7%*
19.8%*
13.7%*
Iowa
14.1%
13.7%
26.8%*
17.8%*
12.4%*
Kansas
15.8%
14.8%
24.7%*
19.6%*
12.7%*
Kentucky
20.6%
19.9%
27.7%*
23.7%*
16.9%*
Louisiana
19.4%
15.6%
31.7%*
22.6%*
14.1%
Maine
17.2%
17.0%
Maryland
11.6%
10.3%
14.6%*
13.1%*
9.4%*
Massachusetts
15.9%
14.5%
26.2%*
29.3%*
13.5%*
Michigan
22.7%
21.0%
35.9%*
27.0%*
15.4%*
Minnesota
16.1%
15.3%
28.9%*
21.7%*
14.7%
Mississippi
17.2%
13.6%
25.6%*
17.5%*
Missouri
16.1%
15.1%
24.8%*
17.8%*
13.5%
Montana
12.0%
11.8%
13.0%
Nebraska
13.2%
12.5%
22.1%*
16.9%*
Nevada
11.9%
11.0%
17.3%*
13.3%*
10.8%
New Hampshire
21.4%
21.1%
25.7%*
New Jersey
16.9%
14.8%
26.9%*
24.9%*
11.4%*
New Mexico
14.2%
12.0%
19.6%*
16.5%*
New York
11.9%
10.2%
17.2%*
16.5%*
10.9%*
North Carolina
13.6%
11.9%
18.8%*
17.8%*
9.0%*
North Dakota
12.8%
12.2%
14.1%*
Ohio
19.1%
17.5%
32.0%*
25.2%*
14.4%*
Oklahoma
16.0%
15.1%
24.0%*
18.4%*
13.6%
Oregon
16.2%
15.8%
26.3%*
19.4%*
12.6%*
Pennsylvania
23.6%
22.2%
37.1%*
34.9%*
18.8%*
Rhode Island
17.9%
16.0%
27.8%*
16.3%
South Carolina
24.1%
20.6%
37.9%*
30.0%*
19.9%
South Dakota
14.4%
13.6%
19.7%*
Tennessee
18.6%
17.4%
25.0%*
23.0%*
13.7%*
Texas
16.1%
13.2%
21.1%*
20.4%*
11.3%*
Utah
9.6%
9.1%
13.8%*
9.4%
Vermont
27.1%
26.8%
Virginia
17.3%
15.9%
24.9%*
18.9%*
12.2%*
Washington
13.1%
12.6%
18.8%*
17.8%*
10.4%*
West Virginia
17.2%
16.8%
24.9%*
Wisconsin
15.1%
14.3%
30.4%*
20.8%*
12.9%*
Wyoming
8.4%
8.2%
9.8%*

Sources: 1-year American Community Survey data, Table B19013*, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/searchresults.xhtml?refresh=t, "College Board, "Trends in Higher Education Finance," Table 5, Public Four-Year In-State Tuition & Fees, current dollars, https://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/figures-tables/list.

Notes: Results are not included where the standard error associated with the median income is more than 10% of the estimated median income and are presented with an asterisk where the median income for that group is statistically different from that of non-Hispanic whites. Note that suppression and statistical significance tests are tied to median income, not tuition (which is a published sticker figure) as a share of (estimated) median income. Some people in the "Black" category may also identify as "Hispanic," so these categories are not necessarily exclusive. College Board estimates public four-year in-state tuition and fees by determining the price charged by each institution in a state and weighting the price by the number of full-time undergraduate students enrolled.

 

Expanding Immigrant Students' Access and Affordability

States can expand access and affordability for more students by improving immigrants' access to higher education. Even as federal immigration policy is in turmoil, states can take an inclusive approach to in-state tuition and financial aid that will benefit all residents regardless of immigration status.

In Maryland and New Jersey, where eligible students who are undocumented could already pay in-state tuition rates at state colleges and universities, lawmakers in 2018 voted to let them apply for need-based state financial aid as well. Connecticut opened access to institutional financial aid to all students who are eligible to pay in-state tuition, including those who are undocumented, and lawmakers in Oregon and Washington strengthened existing laws enabling students to receive state financial aid or scholarships regardless of status. Meanwhile, Colorado this spring allowed refugees as well as Afghans and Iraqis who received special immigrant visas to qualify for in-state tuition rates immediately.

States Can Use Inclusive Policies to Improve Immigrants' Access to Higher Education

 

All told, undocumented students are now eligible for in-state tuition rates in 21 states plus the District of Columbia and have access to state financial aid in 11 states. (These counts include Hawaii and Michigan, where access to in-state rates and aid — extended by Boards of Regents rather than state lawmakers — is limited to major state universities.)

Undocumented families have lower average incomes than other families, and a college education — even at in-state tuition rates — is out of reach for many without financial assistance. Students who are undocumented don't have access to Pell Grants and other federal aid — by far the largest pool of need-based financial aid available to other students.

States already guarantee all children, no matter their immigration status, a place in K-12 schools to help them reach their potential and develop the educated workers of tomorrow. Giving a state's high school graduates access to higher education at in-state tuition rates, with access to financial aid, builds on this investment.

Cost Shift Harms Students and Families, Especially Those With Low Incomes

Higher tuition combined with weakly rising or stagnant incomes has damaging consequences for families, students, and communities.

  • Tuition costs deter some students from enrolling in college. While the recession encouraged many students to enroll in higher education, the large tuition increases of the past few years may have prevented further enrollment gains. College price increases result in declining enrollment, research consistently finds.[19] While many universities and the federal government provide financial aid to students, research suggests that a high sticker price can dissuade students from enrolling even if the net price, including aid, doesn't rise.
  • Rising tuition may harm students of color and reduce campus diversity. While more students of color are enrolling in college, rising tuition and fees is a headwind to this trend as students of color are less likely to enroll as the cost of tuition goes up. In a recently published study, researchers found that tuition increases reduced campus diversity, particularly at non-selective institutions. For full-time freshmen enrolled at non-selective schools, a $1,000 increase in tuition costs was associated with a 4.5 percent drop in class diversity.[20] Another study that examined tuition policy changes in Texas in the early 2000s concluded that rising tuition limited enrollment gains for Hispanic students in the state.[21]
  • Tuition increases likely deter low-income students, in particular, from enrolling. College cost increases have the biggest impact on students from low-income families, research shows. For example, a 1995 study by Harvard University researcher Thomas Kane concluded that states with the largest tuition increases during the 1980s and early 1990s "saw the greatest widening of the gaps in enrollment between high- and low-income youth."[22] Low-income families' relative lack of knowledge about the admissions and financial aid processes may exacerbate the problem. Students from families that struggle to get by — including those who live in communities with lower shares of college-educated adults and attend high schools that have higher student-to-counselor ratios — tend to overestimate the true cost of higher education more than students from wealthier households, in part because they are less aware of the financial aid for which they are eligible.[23] 

    These effects are particularly concerning because gaps in college enrollment between higher- and lower-income youth are alreadypronounced. In 2015, 63 percent of recent high school graduates from families with income in the lowest 20 percent enrolled in some form of postsecondary education, compared to over 83 percent of students from the top 20 percent.[24] Significant enrollment gaps based on income exist even among prospective students with similar academic records and test scores.[25] Rising costs at public colleges and universities may widen these gaps further.

  • Tuition increases may push lower-income students toward less-selective public institutions, reducing their future earnings. Perhaps just as important as a student's decision to enroll in higher education is the choice of which college to attend. A large share of high-achieving students from struggling families fail to apply to any selective colleges or universities, a 2013 Brookings Institution study found.[26] Even here, research indicates that financial constraints and concerns about costs push lower-income students to narrow their list of potential schools and ultimately enroll in less-selective institutions.[27] Another 2013 study found evidence that some high-achieving, low-income students are more likely to "undermatch" in their college choice, in part due to financial constraints.[28] 

    Where a student decides to go to college has broad economic implications, especially for economically disadvantaged students and students of color. Students with less-educated parents, as well as black and Hispanic students, benefit especially from attending more elite colleges by experiencing higher postgraduate earnings, a 2011 study by Stanford University and Mathematica Policy Research found.[29]

Low-Income Students Still Struggle With Debt

As tuition continues to increase, incomes remain stagnant or rise slowly, and federal and state financial aid fails to make up the difference — even for low-income students eligible for federal and state aid — debt burdens for students and their families continue to grow. Among students graduating with a bachelor's degree in 2012, 79 percent of those from families with incomes in the bottom quarter had student loans, compared with 55 percent of those from families in the top income quarter.[30] In the same year, more than 80 percent of graduating black students borrowed at public institutions, compared with 64 percent of graduating students overall.[31]

The share of students graduating with debt has risen since the start of the recession. Between the 2008 and 2015 school years, the share of students graduating with debt from a public four-year institution rose from 55 percent to 59 percent. The average amount of debt incurred by a bachelor's degree recipient with loans at a public four-year institution grew as well, to $27,000 from $21,226 (in 2016 dollars), an increase of 26 percent. By contrast, the average level of debt incurred rose only about 1 percent in the six years prior to the recession.[32]

In short, at public four-year institutions, more students are taking on larger amounts of debt. By the second quarter of 2018, student debt totaled $1.4 trillion — more than the United States population's credit card or auto loan debt.[33]

Yet, while college loan burdens have increased significantly for students at public four-year institutions, the sizeable run-up in debt levels was driven in large part by a growing share of students attending private for-profit institutions — such as Corinthian and the University of Phoenix — and two-year community colleges. In 2000, borrowers entering repayment on student loans from for-profit and two-year institutions made up roughly 30 percent of all borrowers overall, a study from the U.S. Treasury Department and Stanford University researchers found. By 2011, that share had risen to nearly half. For-profit institutions were such a driving force that in 2014, eight of the top ten and 13 of the top 25 institutions whose students owed (collectively) the most in federal student loan debt were for-profit institutions. In 2000, only one for-profit made the top 25.[34]

Onerous debt burdens make it more difficult for students to reach economic stability, costing resources that could instead go towards paying rent, saving for emergencies, or investing in the future. High debt burdens have been especially damaging for black and Latino communities. One study, which followed first-time college entrants starting in 2004, found that over 37 percent of all black first-time college students across public, private non-profit, and for-profit institutions had defaulted on their student loans within 12 years. For Hispanic students, the default rate over the same period was 20 percent. For their white counterparts, the rate was just 12 percent. The same study projected default rates into the future and predicted that as many as 70 percent of black borrowers in the 2004 cohort would default on their loans by 2024.[35]

There can be significant consequences for defaulting on student loans. Defaults impact an individual's credit rating — lowering credit scores and making it more difficult to get future loans, housing, and even jobs. Wages can be garnished to repay the defaulted loan and older borrowers may lose a portion of their Social Security payments.[36]

States Must Address Workforce Discrimination Against Graduates of Color

The economic benefits of receiving a postsecondary credential have been well-documented.aHowever, these benefits are not shared equally across people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. Black and Hispanic college graduates still earn substantially less than their white peers, studies show.b

When studies have attempted to determine what contributes to these gaps beyond measured variables, racial discrimination is one significant factor that emerges — that is, consciously or otherwise, employers are devaluing the potential of qualified workers of color due to their race or ethnicity. A body of research has emerged to understand the impact discrimination plays in hiring and wages.

In one 2014 study, researchers created resumes of hypothetical applicants from elite, highly selective colleges and less-prestigious state schools. After submitting the resumes to over 1,000 job listings, researchers found that black job applicants who had graduated from highly prestigious private institutions received responses from employers at a rate nearly a third lower than their comparable white counterparts. In fact, white students who had attended significantly less prestigious state schools had about the same response rates from potential employers as did black students applying from elite institutions. Even more striking, the same study found that not only did black applicants receive lower response rates, but they also received job offers with lower starting salaries than those they offered to the applicants' white peers.c

A 2010 study of salary negotiations found that employers expected applicants of color to negotiate less than their white peers and effectively penalized them when they attempted to negotiate, viewing applicants of color as being more "pushy" and, in turn, offering them lower initial salaries.d

Research also indicates that discrimination may not be declining over time. In a meta-analysis conducted in 2017, researchers analyzed 30 years of studies on hiring discrimination and concluded that — even after controlling for variables such as education, occupational type, and gender — "African Americans remain substantially disadvantaged relative to equally qualified whites, and we see little indication of progress over time." While the studies analyzed did seem to indicate some decline in discrimination in hiring facing Latinx individuals, the improvement was modest at best, the report noted.e

For people of color who do attain college credentials to access the full benefit of these degrees, states will need to take steps to address workforce discrimination in hiring, wage-setting, and retention, including: (1) increasing the amount of information available to businesses, job seekers, and the public on the under- or overrepresentation of people of color in companies relative to the given sector at large and the state's general working population;f (2) providing resources and tools for employers to help them analyze personnel policies, train hiring managers, and adjust organizational practices with an eye toward reducing discrimination; and (3) tightening state employment discrimination laws to protect workers from illegal practices and ensure that laws make it possible for workers to reasonably seek recourse.g

aJennifer Ma, Matea Pender, and Meredith Welch, "Education Pays 2016," College Board, 2016, https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/education-pays-2016-full-report.pdf.

b Valerie Wilson and William M. Rodgers, "Black-white wage gaps expand with rising wage inequality," Economic Policy Institute, September 20, 2016, https://www.epi.org/publication/black-white-wage-gaps-expand-with-rising-wage-inequality/#epi-toc-7; Tomaz Cajner et al., "Racial Gaps in Labor Market Outcomes in the Last Four Decades and Over the Business Cycle," Federal Reserve Board, June 12, 2017, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017071pap.pdf.

c S. Michael Gaddis, "Discrimination in the Credential Society: An Audit Study of Race and College Selectivity in the Labor Market," Social Forces, Vol. 93, Issue 4, June 1, 2015, pp. 1451–1479, https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sou111.

d Morela Hernandez and Derek R. Avery, "Getting the Short End of the Stick: Racial Bias in Salary Negotiations," MIT Sloan Management Review, June 15, 2016, https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/getting-the-short-end-of-the-stick-racial-bias-in-salary-negotiations/ .

e Lincoln Quillian et al., "Meta-analysis of field experiments shows no change in racism discrimination in hiring over time," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, August 8, 2017, http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/early/2017/09/11/1706255114.full.pdf.

Philip Cohen, "A Simple, Legal Way to Help Stop Employment Discrimination," The Atlantic, April 1, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/04/a-simple-legal-way-to-help-stop-employment-discrimination/274519/.

Lisa Nagele-Piazza, "Not All State Employment Discrimination Laws Are Created Equal," Society for Human Resource Management, September 15, 2017, https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/pages/state-employment-discrimination-laws.aspx.

 

States Can Do More to Ensure College Affordability and Accessibility

Long-term cuts to per-student higher education funding threaten affordability, access, and quality at public two- and four-year colleges across the states. Not only should states direct additional resources into supporting public colleges and universities and reverse the long-term trend of disinvestment, but they can also implement smarter state financial aid policies and ensure that dollars go to the schools that need it most.

Craft State Financial Aid to Target Students in Need

In the 2015-2016 academic school year, state colleges and universities awarded students almost $10.7 billion in financial aid.[37] They awarded about 76 percent of those dollars at least partly based on need to students with low incomes who might otherwise struggle to afford the costs of attending college. They awarded the remaining 24 percent based on merit to high-achieving students (typically measured by high school GPA or college entry exam scores), regardless of household income.[38]

The primary purpose of need-based aid is to expand access to higher education. For low-income students, financial aid can make a significant difference in not only affording the cost of college but in being able to graduate. A $1,000 increase in a student's financial aid corresponds to a 9.2-percentage-point decrease in the likelihood that a student will drop out of college, research indicates.[39] Other studies have found similar effects, noting that aid targeted at low-income students can boost college retention rates and increase the share of low-income college graduates.[40]

In contrast, merit-based aid is often framed as a reward for students who have demonstrated exceptional academic achievement or leadership ability. Lawmakers hope that by rewarding academic achievement, they can lure talented students to remain in state for college and in their working years afterwards. While studies do show that offering merit-based aid can encourage certain students who would have attended college elsewhere to remain in state, some of the aid goes to students who would have stayed in state anyway.[41]

Merit aid also raises concerns that, when poorly designed, these programs can direct resources to college students from advantaged backgrounds — typically white students and students from high-income and wealthy communities who have had the benefit of well-resourced K-12 school systems and access to costly college test prep courses. One study from the early 2000s analyzed the Georgia HOPE scholarship program, one of the largest and oldest state merit-based programs in the country. Researchers found that while the HOPE program — which had no income limit on eligibility and required high schoolers to have graduated with at least a 3.0 GPA (at the time of study) — did encourage more students across racial/ethnic backgrounds to attend a four-year institution, its benefits disproportionally went to white students in the state, actually increasing the state's racial gap in college attendance.[42]

States would be better off bolstering need-based aid programs, simplifying and consolidating programs to reduce confusion and encourage greater enrollment, and building design aspects into these programs that not only encourage enrollment but also encourage timely completion to reduce costs to both the state and students.[43]

Ensure Resources Go to Schools in Greatest Need

While most state funds for higher education are distributed on a per-pupil basis, over the past few decades states have experimented with funding models that aim to encourage better outcomes by rewarding schools that excel across specific benchmarks — and withholding funds from those that don't. Lawmakers in states across the country have implemented funding formulas, commonly referred to as performance funding, that evaluate two- and four-year colleges on their ability to meet goals in areas such as degree completion, student retention, and job placement rates. In recent years, states have implemented performance funding schemes while continuing to cut overall state funding, hoping to encourage colleges to produce better outcomes with fewer resources.

Currently, 32 states operate with performance-based funding policies for their public two- and four-year colleges.[44] The proportion of state funds appropriated to two- and four-year colleges through performance funding formulas varies widely, a State Higher Education Executive Officers survey found. Of the 23 states that reported using performance funding formulas to allocate resources to four-year colleges, 13 reported allocating more than 10 percent of their funding via performance metrics. Six states reported using performance funding formulas to allocate more than half of their state's resources.[45]

Research to date has found little to no positive impact of these schemes. "Across this body of research, the weight of evidence suggests states using performance-based funding do not out-perform other states — results are more often than not not statistically significant," a 2016 study examining research on performance funding concluded.[46]

Performance funding is less effective than policymakers might hope for several reasons. One is that after years of cuts to baseline funding, public colleges — especially two-year colleges and regional institutions with smaller endowments and more modest enrollment numbers — lack the basic resources needed meet the goals laid out by performance-based metrics.

Given the inputs required to improve performance metrics, even small penalties or withholding of funds can harm less-resourced institutions without giving them the tools they would need to improve. One study noted that "the policy [in Tennessee] did not build the capacity necessary to accomplish…higher order goals."[47] Another noted that a lack of capacity building support is an "important impediment" to being able to meet the demands of lawmakers to meet performance goals.[48] This capacity gap is particularly acute for public historically black colleges and universities, other minority serving institutions, and smaller regional schools that — due to financial constraints — have limited ability to collect, manage, and make institutional changes based on data.

States implementing performance funding also often use measures that are poorly tailored to identify institutions that produce better outcomes for their students — especially institutions with larger shares of low-income students, students from non-traditional backgrounds, and students of color. One study noted that performance funding arrangements typically fail to account for the unique challenges that smaller regional institutions face, putting them at a significant disadvantage when measured against larger flagship institutions with more selective admission policies. "If an institution has an open-admissions policy that encourages the acceptance of academically under-prepared students, then applicable output indicators should focus on how effective the institution is in educating that particular population of students."[49]

Rather than creating funding models that benefit the most well-resourced schools at the expense of smaller regional institutions — which often teach the students most in need of additional resources and supports — lawmakers should focus additional state funds on building the capacity of colleges with fewer resources.

End Notes

[1] Complete appropriations data for Illinois is only available through 2017.

[2] This paper uses CPI-U-RS inflation adjustments to measure real changes in costs. Over the past year, the CPI-U-RS increased by 2.4 percent. We use the CPI-U-RS for the calendar year that begins the fiscal/academic year. Unless noted, all figures in this paper are adjusted for inflation.

[3] CBPP calculation using the "Grapevine" higher education appropriations data from Illinois State University, enrollment data from the State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, and the Consumer Price Index, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since enrollment data are available only through the 2017 school year, enrollment for the 2018 school year is estimated using data from past years.

[4] Education Executive Officers Association, "State Higher Education Finance: FY2017," March 2018, p. 18, http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/project-files/SHEEO_SHEF_FY2017_FINAL.pdf.

[5] Calculated from College Board, "Trends in College Pricing 2017: Average Tuition and Fee and Room and Board Charges, 1971-72 to 2017-18 (Enrollment-Weighted)," Table 2, https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2017-trends-in-college-pricing_0.pdf.

[6] Anthony P. Carnevale, Nicole Smith, and Jeff Strohl, "Recovery: Job Growth and Education Requirements through 2020," Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, June 2013, https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/tll0zkxt0puz45hu21g6.

[7] State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, April 2017.

[8] CBPP calculation using the "Grapevine" higher education appropriations data from Illinois State University, enrollment and combined state and local funding data from the State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, and the Consumer Price Index, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since enrollment data are only available through the 2017 school year, we have estimated enrollment for the 2018 school year using data from past years.

[9] CBPP analysis using College Board, "Trends in College Pricing 2016," https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2016-trends-college-pricing-web_1.pdf. In non-inflation-adjusted terms, average tuition is up $3,459 over this period.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid.

[12] Costs reported above include both published tuition and fees. Average tuition and fee prices are weighted by full-time enrollment.

[13] As noted earlier, this and other figures in this report have been adjusted for inflation. Of states with increased tuition, the average tuition increased $242, or 2.6 percent.

[14] CBPP analysis using College Board, "Trends in College Pricing 2016," https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2016-trends-college-pricing-web_1.pdf. See appendix for fiscal years 2016-17 change in average tuition at public four-year colleges.

[15] See, for example, "National Postsecondary Enrollment Trends: Before, During and After the Great Recession," National Student Clearinghouse Research Center, July 2011, p. 6, http://pas.indiana.edu/pdf/National%20Postsecondary%20Enrollment%20Trends.pdf. A survey by the American Association of Community Colleges (AACC) indicated that increases in Fall 2009 enrollment at community colleges were, in part, due to workforce training opportunities; see Christopher M. Mullin, "Community College Enrollment Surge: An Analysis of Estimated Fall 2009 Headcount Enrollments at Community Colleges," AACC, December 2009, http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED511056.pdf.

[16] State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, "State Higher Education Finance: FY2017," 2018, p. 25, Figure 5, http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/project-files/SHEEO_SHEF_FY2017_FINAL.pdf.

[17] State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, April 2018; government funding includes both state and local funding sources.

[18] U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS), "Fall Enrollment in Colleges and Universities" surveys, 1976 and 1980; Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), "Fall Enrollment Survey" (IPEDS-EF:90-99); IPEDS Spring 2001 through Spring 2016, Fall Enrollment component; and Enrollment in Degree-Granting Institutions by Race/Ethnicity Projection Model, 1980 through 2026. (This table was prepared March 2017.) https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_306.30.asp.

[19] See, for example, Steven W. Hemelt and Dave E. Marcotte, "The Impact of Tuition Increases on Enrollment at Public Colleges and Universities," Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, September 2011; Donald E. Heller, "Student Price Response in Higher Education: An Update to Leslie and Brinkman," Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 68, No. 6 (November-December 1997), pp. 624-659.

[20] Drew Allen and Gregory Wolniak, "Exploring the Effects of Tuition Increases on Racial/Ethnic Diversity at Public Colleges and Universities," Research in Higher Education, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11162-018-9502-6.

[21] Stella Flores and Justin Shepard, "Pricing Out the Disadvantaged? The Effect of Tuition Deregulation in Texas Public Four-Year Institutions," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 655, 2014, pp. 99-122.

[22] Thomas J. Kane, "Rising Public College Tuition and College Entry: How Well Do Public Subsidies Promote Access to College?" National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995, http://www.nber.org/papers/w5164.pdf?new_window=1.

[23] Eric P. Bettinger et al., "The Role of Simplification and Information in College Decisions: Results from the H&R Block FAFSA Experiment," National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009, http://www.nber.org/papers/w15361.pdf. For details on the disparity in access to counseling for low-income students, see "Course, Counselor, and Teacher Gaps: Addressing the College Readiness Challenge in High-Poverty High Schools," Center for Law and Social Policy, June 2015, http://www.clasp.org/resources-and-publications/publication-1/CollegeReadinessPaperFINALJune.pdf.

[24] U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS), 1975 through 2015. https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_302.30.asp.

[25] In a 2008 piece, Georgetown University scholar Anthony Carnevale pointed out that "among the most highly qualified students (the top testing 25 percent), the kids from the top socioeconomic group go to four-year colleges at almost twice the rate of equally qualified kids from the bottom socioeconomic quartile." Anthony P. Carnevale, "A Real Analysis of Real Education," Liberal Education, Fall 2008, p. 57.

[26] Christopher Avery and Caroline M. Hoxby, "The Missing 'One Offs': The Hidden Supply of High-Achieving, Low-Income Students," National Bureau for Economic Research, Working Paper 18586, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects/bpea/spring-2013/2013a_hoxby.pdf.

[27] Patrick T. Terenzini, Alberto F. Cabrera, and Elena M. Bernal, "Swimming Against the Tide," College Board, 2001, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED562879.pdf

[28] Eleanor W. Dillon and Jeffrey A. Smith, "The Determinants of Mismatch Between Students and Colleges," National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2013, http://www.nber.org/papers/w19286. Additionally, other studies have found that undermatching is more likely to occur for students of color. In 2009 William G. Bowen, Matthew M. Chingos, and Michael S. McPherson found that undermatching was more prevalent for black students — especially black women — than for comparable white students.

[29] Stacey Dale and Alan Krueger, "Estimating the Return to College Selectivity Over the Career Using Administrative Earning Data." Mathematica Policy Research and Princeton University, February 2011, https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-findings/publications/estimating-the-return-to-college-selectivity-over-the-career-using-administrative-earning-data.

[30] College Board, "Figure 2014_14B. Cumulative Debt of 2011-12 Bachelor's Degree Recipients by Dependency Status and Family Income," Prepared October 2014, https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2017-trends-student-aid-source-data_1.xlsx. Low-income dependent students are defined as students from families earning less than $30,000 annually, while high-income students come from families earning more than $106,000.

[31] Mark Huelsman, "The Debt Divide: The Racial and Class Bias Behind the 'New Normal' of Student Borrowing," May 2015, http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Mark-Debt%20divide%20Final%20(SF).pdf. Hispanic or Latino students generally borrow at levels equal to the national average. African American students are also more likely to take on student debt to finance education at two-year colleges.

[32] College Board, "Trends in Student Aid 2016," Figure 12, October 2017, https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2017-trends-student-aid_0.pdf.

[33] Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit," August 2018, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2018Q2.pdf.

[34]Adam Looney and Constantine Yannelis, "A Crisis in Student Loans? How Changes in the Characteristics of Borrowers and in the Institutions They Attended Contributed to Rising Loan Defaults," Brookings Institution, BPEA Conference Draft, September 10, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects/bpea/fall-2015_embargoed/conferencedraft_looneyyannelis_studentloandefaults.pdf.

[35] Scott-Clayton, Judith, "The Looming Student Loan Default Crisis is Worse than We Thought," Brookings Institution, January 10, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/scott-clayton-report.pdf.

[36] Ben Miller, "Who Are Student Loan Defaulters?" Center for American Progress, December 14, 2017, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/reports/2017/12/14/444011/student-loan-defaulters/.

[37] National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs, "47th Annual Survey Report on State-Sponsored Student Financial Aid," 2018, https://www.nassgapsurvey.com/survey_reports/2015-2016-47th.pdf.

[38]Ibid.

[39] Eric Bettinger, "How Financial Aid Affects Persistence." National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2004, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10242.

[40] Sara Goldrick-Rab et al., "Need-Based Financial Aid and College Persistence: Experimental Evidence from Wisconsin," Wisconsin Scholars Longitudinal Study, October 10, 2012, http://finaidstudy.org/documents/Goldrick-Rab%20Harris%20Kelchen%20Benson%202012%20FULL.pdf. See also Sigal Alon, "Who Benefits Most From Financial Aid? The Heterogeneous Effect of Need-Based Grants on Students' College Persistence," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 92, No. 3, September 2011, http://people.socsci.tau.ac.il/mu/salon/files/2011/11/ssq_sep2011_final.pdf.

[41] Liang Zhang and Erik C. Ness, "Does State Merit-Based Aid Stem Brain Drain?" Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, June 1, 2010, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.3102/0162373709359683. See also David L. Sjoquist and John V. Winters, "Merit aid and post-college retention in the state," Journal of Urban Economics, March 2014, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119013000818.

[42] Sue Dynarski, "The Consequences of Merit Aid," National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2002, http://www.nber.org/papers/w9400.pdf. The same study did find, however, that merit-based programs in other states that employed less stringent requirements did not have this same effect on widening enrollment gaps — further indicating that how merit-aid program are structured matters significantly.

[43] Sandy Baum et al., "Beyond Need and Merit: Strengthening State Grant Programs," Brookings Institution, May 8, 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/research/beyond-need-and-merit-strengthening-state-grant-programs/.

[44] Nicholas Hillman, "Why Performance-Based College Funding Doesn't Work," The Century Foundation, May 25, 2016, https://tcf.org/content/report/why-performance-based-college-funding-doesnt-work/.

[45] State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, April 2018, http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/project-files/SHEEO_SHEF_FY2017_FINAL.pdf.

[46] Nicholas Hillman, "Why Performance-Based College Funding Doesn't Work," The Century Foundation, May 25, 2016, https://tcf.org/content/report/why-performance-based-college-funding-doesnt-work/.

[47] Nicholas Hillman et al., "Evaluating the Impacts of 'New' Performance Funding in Higher Education," Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 2014, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3fc4/5ae172a258afef40532278fd0a621fb9b6e2.pdf.

[48] K. J. Dougherty et al., "Performance funding for higher education: forms, origins, impacts, and futures," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 655(1), (2014). 163-184. p. 169.

[49] Tiffany Jones, "Performance Funding at MSIs: Considerations and Possible Measures for Public Minority-Serving Institutions," Southern Education Foundation, June 2014, http://www.southerneducation.org/getattachment/38a

--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV
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How Trump Got Rich [feedly]

How Trump Got Rich
https://ritholtz.com/2018/10/how-trump-got-rich/

President Trump has long sold himself as a self-made billionaire. But after spending a year studying tens of thousands of pages of confidential records, our New York Times colleagues uncovered new details about the president's financial history. Here's what they found.   How Trump Really Got Rich NYT: We don't have President Trump's tax returns.…

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The post How Trump Got Rich appeared first on The Big Picture.


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A Critical Look at China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative [feedly]

A Critical Look at China's One Belt, One Road Initiative
https://economicfront.wordpress.com/2018/10/02/a-critical-look-at-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative/

China's growth rate remains impressive, even if on the decline. The country's continuing economic gains owe much to the Chinese state's (1) still considerable ability to direct the activity of critical economic enterprises and sectors such as finance, (2) commitment to policies of economic expansion, and (3) flexibility in economic strategy.  It appears that China's leaders view their recently adopted One Belt, One Road Initiative as key to the country's future economic vitality.  However, there are reasons to believe that this strategy is seriously flawed, with working people, including in China, destined to pay a high price for its shortcomings.

Chinese growth trends downward

China grew rapidly over the decades of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s with production and investment increasingly powered by the country's growing integration into regional cross-border production networks.  By 2002 China had become the world's biggest recipient of foreign direct investment and by 2009 it had overtaken Germany to become the world's biggest exporter.  Not surprisingly, the Great Recession and the decline in world trade that followed represented a major challenge to the county's export-oriented growth strategy.

The government's response was to counter the effects of declining external demand with a major investment program financed by massive money creation and low interest rates. Investment as a share of GDP rose to an all-time high of 48 percent in December 2011 and remains at over 44 percent of GDP.

But, despite the government's efforts, growth steadily declined, from 10.6% in 2010 to 6.7% in 2016, before registering an increase of 6.9% in 2017.  See the chart below. Current predictions are for a further decline in 2018.

Beginning in 2012, the Chinese government began promoting the idea of a "new normal"— centered around a target rate of growth of 6.5%. The government claimed that the benefits of this new normal growth rate would include greater stability and a more domestically-oriented growth process that would benefit Chinese workers.

However, in contrast to its rhetoric, the state continued to pursue a high grow rate by promoting a massive state-supported construction boom tied to a policy of expanded urbanization.  New roads, railways, airports, shopping centers, and apartment complexes were built.

As might be expected, such a big construction push has left the country with excess facilities and infrastructure, highlighted by a growing number of ghost towns.  As the South China Morning Post describes:

Six skyscrapers overlooking a huge, man-made lake once seemed like a dazzling illustration of a city's ambition, the transformation of desert on the edge of Ordos in Inner Mongolia into a gleaming residential and commercial complex to help secure its future prosperity.

At noon on a cold winter's day the reality seemed rather different.

Only a handful of people could be seen entering or exiting the buildings, with hardly a trace of activity in the 42-storey skyscrapers.

The complex opened five years ago, but just three of its buildings have been sold to the city government and another is occupied by its developer, a bank and an energy company. The remaining two are empty – gates blocked and dust piled on the ground.

Ordos, however, was just one project in China's rush to urbanize. The nation used more cement in the three years from 2011 to 2013 than the United States used in the entire 20th century. . . .

Other mostly empty ghost towns can be found across China, including the Yujiapu financial district in Tianjin, the Chenggong district in Kunming in Yunnan and Yingkou in Liaoning province.

This building boom was financed by a rapid increase in debt, creating repayment concerns. Corporate debt in particular soared, as shown below, but local government and household debt also grew substantially.

The boom also caused several industries to dramatically increase their scale of production, creating serious overcapacity problems.   As the researcher Xin Zhang points out:

Over the past decade, scholars and government officials have held a stable consensus that "nine traditional industries" in China are most severely exposed to the excess capacity problem: steel, cement, plate glass, electrolytic aluminium, coal, ship-building, solar energy, wind energy and petrochemical. All of these nine sectors are related to energy, infrastructural construction and real estate development, reflecting the nature of a heavily investment-driven economy for China.

Not surprisingly, this situation has also led to a significant decline in economy-wide rates of return.  According to Xin Zhang:

despite strong overall growth performance, the capital return rate of the Chinese economy has started to be on a sharp decline recently. Although the results vary by different estimation methods, research in and outside China points out a recent downward trend. For example, two economists show that all through the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, the capital return rate of the Chinese economy had been relatively stable at about 0.22, much higher than the US counterpart. However, since the mid-1990s, the capital return rate experienced more ups and downs, until the dramatic drop to about 0.14 in 2013.  Since then, the return to capital within Chinese economy has decreased even further, creating the phenomenon of a "capital glut".

In other words, it was becoming increasingly unlikely that the Chinese state could stabilize growth pursuing its existing strategy.   In fact, it appears that many wealthy Chinese have decided that their best play is to move their money out of the country.  A China Economic Review article highlights this development:

Since 2015, the specter of capital flight has been haunting the Chinese economy. In that year, faced with the threat of a currency devaluation and an aggressive anti-corruption campaign, investors and savers began moving their wealth out of China. The outflow was so large that the central bank was forced to spend more than $1 trillion of its foreign exchange reserves to defend the exchange rate.

The Chinese government was eventually able to dam up the flow of capital out of its borders by imposing strict capital controls, and China's balance of payments, exchange rate and foreign currency reserves have all stabilized. But even the largest dam cannot stop the rain; it can only keep water from flowing further downstream. There are now several signs that the conditions that originally led to the first massive wave of capital flight have returned. The strength of China's capital controls might soon be put to the test.

Chinese leaders were not blind to the mounting economic difficulties. Limits to domestic construction were apparent, as was the danger that unused buildings and factories coupled with excess capacity in key industries could easily trigger widespread defaults on the part of borrowers and threaten the stability of the financial sector. Growing labor activism on the part of workers struggling with low salaries and dangerous working conditions added to their concern.

However, despite earlier voiced support for the notion of a "new normal" growth tied to slower but more worker-friendly and domestically-oriented economic activity, the party leadership appears to have chosen a new strategy, one that seeks to maintain the existing growth process by expanding it beyond China's national borders: its One Belt and One Road Initiative.

The One Belt, One Road Initiative

Xi Jinping was elected President by the National People's Congress in 2013.  And soon after his election, he announced his support for perhaps the world's largest economic project, the One Belt, One Road Initiative (BRI).  However, it was not until 2015, after consultations between various commissions and Ministries, that an action plan was published and the state aggressively moved forward with the initiative.

The initial aim of the BRI was to link China with 70 other countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Oceania.  There are two parts to the initial BRI vision: The "Belt", which seeks to recreate the old Silk Road land trade route, and the "Road," which is not actually a road, but a series of ports creating a sea-based trade route spanning several oceans. The initiative was to be given form through a number of separate but linked investments in large-scale gas and oil pipelines, roads, railroads, and ports as well as connecting "economic corridors." Although there is no official BRI map, the following provides an illustration of its proposed territorial reach.

One reason that there is yet no official BRI map is that the initiative has continued to evolve.  In addition to infrastructure it now includes efforts at "financial integration," "cooperation in science and technology,", "cultural and academic exchanges," and the establishment of trade "cooperation mechanisms."

Moreover, its geographic focus has also expanded.  For example, in September 2018, Venezuela announced that the country "will now join China's ambitious New Silk Road commercial plan which is allegedly worth U.S. $900 billion."  Venezuela follows Uruguay, which was the first South American country to receive BRI funds.

Xi's initiative did not come out of the blue.  As noted above, Chinese economic growth had become ever more reliant on foreign investment and exports.  And, in support of the process, the Chinese government had used its own foreign investment and loans to secure markets and the raw materials needed to support its export activity.  In fact, Chinese official aid to developing countries in 2010 and 2011 surpassed the value of all World Bank loans to these countries.  China's leading role in the creation of the BRICs New Development Bank, Asia Infrastructural Investment Bank and the proposed Shanghai Cooperation Organization Bank demonstrates the importance Chinese leaders place on having a more active role in shaping regional and international economic activity.

But, the BRI, if one is to take Chinese state pronouncements at their word, appears to have the highest priority of all these efforts and in fact serves as the "umbrella project" for all of China's growing external initiatives.  In brief, the BRI appears to represent nothing less than an attempt to solve China's problems of overcapacity and surplus capital, declining trade opportunities, growing debt, and falling rates of profit through a geographic expansion of China's economic activity and processes.

Sadly this effort to sustain the basic core of the existing Chinese growth model is far from worker friendly. The same year that the BRI action plan was published, the Chinese government began a massive crackdown on labor activism.  For example, in 2015 the government launched an unprecedented crackdown on several worker-centers operating in the southern part of the country, placing a number of its worker-activists in detention centers. This move coincided with renewed repression of the work of worker-friendly journalists and activist lawyers.  The Financial Times noted that these actions may well represent "the harshest crackdown against organized labor by the Chinese authorities in two decades."

And attacks against workers and those who support them continue.  A case in point: in August of this year, police in riot gear broke into a house in Huizhou occupied by recent graduates from some of China's top universities who had come to the city to support worker organizing efforts. Some 50 people were detained; 14 remain in custody or under house arrest.

A flawed strategy                                            

To achieve its aims, the BRI has largely involved the promotion of projects that mandate the use of Chinese enterprises and workers, are financed by loans that host countries must repay, and either by necessity or design lead to direct Chinese ownership of strategic infrastructure.  For example, the Center for Strategic Studies recently calculated that approximately 90% of Belt and Road projects are being built by Chinese companies.

While BRI investments might temporarily help sustain key Chinese industries suffering from overcapacity, absorb surplus capital, and boost enterprise profit margins, they are unlikely to serve as a permanent fix for China's growing economic challenges; they will only push off the day of reckoning.

One reason for this negative view is that in the rush to generate projects, many are not financially viable.  Andreea Brinza, writing in Foreign Policy, illustrates this problem with an examination of European railway projects:

If one image has come to define the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China's ambitious, amorphous project of overseas investment, it's the railway. Every few months or so, the media praises a new line that will supposedly connect a Chinese city with a European capital. Today it's Budapest. Yesterday it was London. They are the newest additions to China's iron network of transcontinental railway routes spanning Eurasia. But the vast majority of these routes are economically pointless, unlikely to operate at a profit, and driven far more by political need than market demand. . . .

Chongqing-Duisburg, Yiwu-London, Yiwu-Madrid, Zhengzhou-Hamburg, Suzhou-Warsaw, and Xi'an-Budapest are among the more than 40 routes that now connect China with Europe. Yet out of all these, only Chongqing-Duisburg, connecting China with Germany, was created out of a genuine market need. The other routes are political creations by Beijing to nourish its relations with European states like Poland, Hungary, and Britain.

The Chongqing-Duisburg route has been described as a benchmark for the "Belt," the part of the project that crosses Eurasia by land. (The "Road" is a series of nominally linked ports with little coherence.) But paradoxically enough, the Chongqing-Duisburg route was created before Chinese President Xi Jinping announced what has become his flagship project, then "One Belt, One Road" and now the BRI. It was an existing route reused and redeveloped by Hewlett-Packard and launched in 2011 to halve the time it took for the computing firm's laptops to reach Europe from China by sea. . . .

Unlike the HP route, in which trains arrived in Europe full of laptops and other gadgets, the containers on the new routes come to Europe full of low-tech Chinese products — but they leave empty, as there's little worth transporting by rail that Chinese consumers want. With only half the route effectively being used, the whole trip often loses money. For Chinese companies that export toys, home products, or decorations, the maritime route is far more profitable, because it comes at half the price tag even though it's slower.

The Europe-China railroads are unproductive not only because of the transportation price, as each container needs to be insulated to withstand huge temperature differences, but also because Russia has imposed a ban on both the import and the transport of European food through its territory. Food is one of the product categories that can actually turn a profit on a Europe-China land run — without it, filling China-bound containers isn't an easy job. For example, it took more than three months to refill and resend to China a train that came to London from Yiwu, although the route was heavily promoted by both a British government desperate for post-Brexit trade and a Chinese one determined to talk up the BRI.

Today, most of the BRI's rail routes function only thanks to Chinese government subsidies. The average subsidy per trip for a 20-foot container is between $3,500 and $4,000, depending on the local government. For example, Chinese cities like Wuhan and Zhengzhou offer almost $30 million in subsidies every year to cargo companies. Thanks to this financial assistance, Chinese and Western companies can pay a more affordable price per container. Without subsidies, it would cost around $9,000 to send a 20-foot container by railway, compared with $5,000 after subsidies. Although the Chinese government is losing money on each trip, it plans to increase the yearly number of trips from around 1,900 in 2016 to 5,000 cargo trains in 2020.

Another reason to doubt the viability of the BRI is that a growing number of countries are becoming reluctant to participate because it means that they will have to borrow funds for projects that may or may not benefit the country and/or generate the foreign exchange necessary to repay the loans.  As a result, the actual value of projects is far less than reported in the media.  Thomas S. Eder and Jacob Mardell make this point in their discussion of BRI activities with 16 Central and Eastern European countries (the 16+1):

Numbers on Chinese investment connected to the Belt and Road Initiative tend to be inflated and misleading. Only a fraction of the reported sums is connected to actual infrastructure projects on the ground. And most of the projects that are underway are financed by Chinese loans, exposing debt-ridden governments to additional risks. . . .

Depending on the source, BRI is called either a 900 billion USD or an up to 8 trillion USD global initiative. Yet only a fraction of the lower number is backed up by actual projects on the ground. BRI investments in 16+1 countries are similarly plagued by confusion over figures and a tendency towards inflation.

Media reports often arrive at their figures for the sum of "deals announced" by collating planned projects based on vague Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) and expressions of interest by Chinese companies. Many parties share an interest to push Belt and Road-related figures upwards: local officials in BRI target countries like to impress constituencies, journalists like to capture readers, and Chinese officials are keen to cultivate the hype surrounding BRI.

The Banja Luka – Mlinište Highway in Bosnia Herzegovina, for example, is strongly associated with 16+1 investment. Sinohydro signed a preliminary agreement on implementing the project in 2014, for 1.4 billion USD, and this figure was then widely reported in English-language media. Four years later, though, final approval for an Export-Import Bank loan financing the highway section was still pending. This highway is actually one of the projects emerging in the region that we have fairly good information on, but the preliminary nature of the agreement is not reflected in media reports on the project.

Also in 2014, China Huadian signed an agreement on the construction of a 500MW power station in Romania, reportedly for 1 billion USD. Talks faltered, appeared to resume in 2017, and there has been no progress reported since. It is unclear whether and when this project will materialize, but it is the sort of "deal" counted by those totting up the value of Chinese investment in 16+1 countries. An even larger figure – 1.3 billion – was reported in connection with Kolubara B, though it was later claimed that a cooperation agreement with Italian company Edison had already been signed, three years prior to the expression of interest by Sinomach.

Another important point is that Chinese "investment" in the region – and this very clearly emerges from the MERICS database – often refers to concessional loans from Chinese policy banks. This is financing that needs to be paid back, with interest, whether the project delivers commensurate economic benefits or not.

As with Belt and Road projects elsewhere in the world, loans made by Beijing to CEE countries create potential for financial instability. Smaller countries, which might lack the institutional capacity to assess agreements (such as risks associated with currency fluctuation), are particularly vulnerable.

The Bar-Boljare motorway in Montenegro illustrates this point. It is being built by the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) with an 809 million EUR loan from Exim Bank. The IMF claims that, without construction of the highway, Montenegro's debt would have declined to 59% of GDP, rather than rising to 78% of GDP in 2019. It warns that continued construction of the highway "would again endanger debt sustainability."

The motorway is typical of many BRI projects in that it is being built by a Chinese state-owned company, using mostly Chinese workers and materials, and with a loan that the Montenegrin government must pay back, but which a Chinese policy bank will earn interest on. On top of this, Chinese contractors working on the highway are exempt from paying VAT or customs duties on imported materials.

Because of these investment requirements, many countries are either canceling or scaling back their BRI projects.  The South China Morning Post recently reported that the Malaysian government decided to:

cancel two China-financed mega projects in the country, the US$20 billion East Coast Rail Link and two gas pipeline projects worth US$2.3 billion. Malaysian Prime Minister said his country could not afford those projects and they were not needed at the moment. . . .

Indeed, Mahathir's decision is just the latest setback for the plan, as politicians and economists in an increasing number of countries that once courted Chinese investments have now publicly expressed fears that some of the projects are too costly and would saddle them with too much debt.

Myanmar is, as Reuters reports, one of those countries:

Myanmar has scaled back plans for a Chinese-backed port on its western coast, sharply reducing the cost of the project after concerns it could leave the Southeast Asian nation heavily indebted, a top government official and an advisor told Reuters.

The initial $7.3 billion price tag on the Kyauk Pyu deepwater port, on the western tip of Myanmar's conflict-torn Rakhine state, set off alarm bells due to reports of troubled Chinese-backed projects in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, the official and the advisor said.

Deputy Finance Minister Set Aung, who was appointed to lead project negotiations in May, told Reuters the "project size has been tremendously scaled down".

The revised cost would be "around $1.3 billion, something that's much more plausible for Myanmar's use", said Sean Turnell, economic advisor to Myanmar's civilian leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.

A third reason for doubting the viability of the BRI to solve Chinese economic problems is the building political blowback from China's growing ownership position of key infrastructure that is either the result of, or built into, the terms of its BRI investment activity.  An example of the former outcome: the Sri Lankan government was forced to hand over the strategic port of Hambantota to China on a 99-year lease after it could not repay its more than $8 billion in loans from Chinese firms.

Unfortunately, Africa offers many examples of both outcomes, as described in a policy brief survey of China-Africa BRI activities:

In BRI projects, Chinese SOEs overseas are moving away from 'turnkey' engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) projects, towards longer term Chinese participation as managers and stakeholders in running projects. China Merchants Holding, which constructed the new multipurpose port and industrial zone complex in Djibouti, is also a stakeholder and will be jointly managing the zone, in a consortium with Djiboutian port authorities, for ten years. Likewise, SOE contractors for new standard gauge railway projects in Ethiopia and Kenya will also be tasked with railway maintenance and operations for five to ten years after construction is completed. . . .

Beyond transportation, the BRI is spurring expansion of digital infrastructure through an "information silk road". This is an extension of the 'going out' of China's telecommunications companies, including private mobile giants Huawei and ZTE, who have constructed a number of telecommunications infrastructure projects in Africa, but also the expansion of large SOEs such as China Telecoms. China Telecoms has established a new data center in Djibouti that will connect it to the company's other regional hubs in Asia, Europe, and to China, and potentially facilitate the development of submarine fibre cable networks in East Africa. . . .

Countries linked to the BRI, including Morocco, Egypt, and Ethiopia, have also been singled out [as] 'industrial cooperation demonstration and pioneering countries' and 'priority partners for production capacity cooperation countries'; these countries have seen a rapid expansion of Chinese-built industrial zones, presaging not only greater trade but also industrial investment from China. . . .

However, the rapid expansion in infrastructure credit that the BRI offers also brings significant risks. Many of these large infrastructure projects are supported through debt -based finance, raising questions over African economies' rising debt levels and its sustainability. For resource-rich economies, low commodity values have strained government revenues and precipitated exchange rate crises—both of which constrain a government's ability to repay external borrowing.

In Tanzania, the BRI-associated Bagamoyo Deepwater Port was suspended by the government in 2016 due to lack of funds. The port was originally a joint investment between Tanzanian and Chinese partners China Merchants Holding, which would construct the port and road infrastructure, along with a special economic zone. While project construction has continued, funding constraints have meant that the government has had to forego its equity stake. This represents a case where African governments may risk losing ownership of projects, as well as the long-term revenues they bring.

Adding to political tensions is the fact that many BRI projects "displace or disrupt existing communities or sensitive ecological areas."   It is no wonder that China has seen a rapid growth in the number of private security companies that serve Chinese companies participating in BRI projects.  In the words of the Asia Times, these firms are:

described as China's 'Private Army.' Fueled by growing demand from domestic companies involved in the multi-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative, independent security groups are expanding in the country.

In 2013, there were 4,000-registered firms, employing more than 4.3 million personnel. By 2017, the figure had jumped to 5,000 with staff numbers hovering around the five-million mark.

What lies ahead?

The reasons highlighted above make it highly unlikely that the BRI will significantly improve Chinese long-term economic prospects.  Thus, it seems likely that Chinese growth will continue to decline, leading to new internal tensions as the government's response to the BRI's limitations will likely include new efforts to constrain labor activism and repress wages.  Hopefully, the strength of Chinese resistance to this repression will create the space for meaningful public discussion of new options that truly are responsive to majority needs.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Dean Baker on Trump’s Reality-TV Trade Deal [feedly]




Trump's Reality-TV Trade Deal
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/trump-s-reality-tv-trade-deal

Dean Baker
The Nation, October 3, 2018

See article on original site

Not surprisingly, Donald Trump is boasting loudly about his big new trade deal with Canada and Mexico. He touted the package, now called the United States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement, or USMCA, as "the biggest trade deal in the United States' history" and promised that it would "transform North America back into a manufacturing powerhouse."

In reality, there is not much in this package that was not also in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), from which Trump removed the United States shortly after taking office. And progressives should oppose Trump's "historic" new trade deal for the same reasons they opposed the TPP.

Before getting into specifics, though, some basics on trade would be useful. Trump routinely refers to trade deals as pacts in which some countries are winners and others (the United States, in his story) are losers. The scorecard is the bilateral trade deficit. By this measure, Trump could denounce negotiators in the Obama, Clinton, and two Bush administrations as "stupid," since the United States ended up with deals that left this country with enormous trade deficits. But this fundamentally misrepresents our trade negotiators' agenda.

To take the case of NAFTA, US negotiators were quite explicitly negotiating a pact that would make it as easy as possible for US corporations to set up factories in Mexico in order to take advantage of its relatively low-cost labor. Much of the deal was about establishing rules on investment that ensured US corporations their factories could not be expropriated and that Mexico would not be able to prevent them from repatriating profits back to the United States. We even set up a special extra-judicial process, the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which gave corporations an extra safeguard to protect their investments.

Since a major purpose of NAFTA was facilitating the outsourcing of factory jobs to Mexico, we should recognize that the US trade deficit with Mexico is evidence of the deal's success, not its failure. The same applies to other pacts, most importantly the agreement that allowed China to enter the World Trade Organization.

While the millions of manufacturing workers who lost their jobs in places like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Michigan were very big losers from China's entry into the WTO, companies like GE and General Motors, which were doing the outsourcing, were very happy with the outcome. The same applies to retailers like Walmart, which used low-cost supply chains in China to undermine their domestic competitors.

With this background in mind, we can ask who will win and who will lose from USMCA. Here we can pretty much go back to the story with the TPP.

Like the TPP, the USMCA includes a variety of measures that strengthen and lengthen patent and copyright monopolies as well as related protections. This is good news for the industries that benefit from these protections, especially the prescription-drug industry, but it's bad news for pretty much everyone else.

During his campaign, Trump frequently denounced the outrageous prices the pharmaceutical companies charge for drugs. He has a strange way of clamping down on the industry, though; apparently, it's to make people in Canada and other countries pay more for their drugs.

People who own stock in pharmaceutical companies should expect to see higher profits and therefore higher stock prices, but pretty much everyone else is harmed rather than helped in this deal. Locking in stronger protections (yes, this is protectionism, the opposite of free trade) makes it more difficult for people in the United States to seek out lower-cost drugs elsewhere.

Also, as a matter of basic economics, a larger US surplus on licensing fees for patents means a larger trade deficit in everything else, other things being equal. That's because, contrary to what is often reported in the media, what is being protected is not "our" intellectual property; it is the intellectual property of a relatively small number of large corporations. The more money they get from our trading partners, the less money our trading partners have to spend on US manufactured goods and other items made here.

The USMCA also includes rules on the digital economy that are likely to benefit behemoths like Amazon, Google, and Facebook, to the detriment of other countries. One of the key issues in negotiations was whether such companies would be required to have a physical presence in countries where they do business. If they were, it would facilitate legal action against those that do things like assist in tax evasion or in manipulating elections. The final USMCA deal prohibits countries from requiring such a physical presence. This is a dangerous precedent, since the rules in the USMCA are likely to be carried over to other trade deals.

The final USMCA language also ended up retaining the ISDS, although it does limit the mechanism's scope to a more narrow range of issues, such as when an industry dumps goods below cost. This is definitely a plus, since the ISDS had been used to challenge a wide range of laws and regulations affecting the environment, consumer safety, and workers' rights.

There are also provisions on currency management. While neither Mexico nor Canada had deliberately reduced the value of their currencies against the dollar in order to make their goods more competitive, the section on currency values can be a useful precedent for future trade pacts.

Trump has talked a lot about bringing back manufacturing jobs. This trade pact, however, is unlikely to make that happen. While it does include some changes that may make a small difference at the margin, such as raising the North American content threshold that allows cars to qualify for tariff-free access (from 62.5 percent to 75 percent), it is likely to have only a minimal effect on trade patterns. Many cars already meet this threshold. In cases where they are far from the threshold, companies can still opt to import a car into the United States and pay a 2.5 percent tariff. That is a modest penalty that is dwarfed by the size of currency fluctuations.

Some people may wrongly take consolation in the USMCA requirement that 40–45 percent of the value added in vehicles must come from workers who make at least $16 an hour. This is essentially saying that this portion of the value-added must come from the United States or Canada, since $16 an hour is well above the pay of Mexican autoworkers.

If the purpose was to raise the pay of Mexican autoworkers, a target in the range of $10 to $12 an hour would have been much more realistic. As it is, the deal does include some stronger wording on labor rights, but the enforcement mechanism is nothing like the ISDS available to investors. The best hope for Mexican workers in this respect is their newly elected president, the left-populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador, not the USMCA.

It is important to recognize that the manufacturing jobs lost to imports over the past two decades are like toothpaste out of the tube; they are not coming back. While reducing the US trade deficit would increase the number of relatively high-paying manufacturing jobs available here to workers without college degrees, most of these jobs will not be in the rust-belt states that were big job losers. And a much smaller percentage of the new jobs will be unionized.

OK, so the new NAFTA may not be a big boon to manufacturing, but at least we will sell more milk to Canada, right? Milk exports to our northern neighbor seem to loom large in Donald Trump's head, but not in the real world. Canada's market for dairy products is a bit more than $3 billion. We already have a surplus of $600 million in dairy trade with Canada. This means that if we captured half of the Canadian market—a huge achievement—we would increase our dairy sales to Canada by about $1.1 billion. This is equal to roughly 2.5 percent of our industry's current production and 0.006 percent of US GDP.

In Trump's reality-TV world, the USMCA may amount to a historic accomplishment. In the real world, it won't change very much at all. Perhaps, if he keeps blustering about the Great Milk Conquest (GMC), it will help Trump carry Vermont in 2020.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

50 years of radical political economy [feedly]

50 years of radical political economy
https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2018/10/02/50-years-of-radical-political-economy/

I don't usually post Michael Roberts, even though he is a competent economist, because he  peddles a lot of dogmatic baggage, and reduces all basic arguments to "that's capitalism"! critiques. Again, its like proclaiming that water runs downhill. 

Keep that in mind when you read his summary of the 50th Anniversary of URPE, Union of Radical Political Economists in Amherst, Mass. The list of ideas is threadbare enough to recommend passing over entirely. But the links may be worth chasing down.

Things are usually not nearly as bad ad Roberts makes them out. :)

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

50 years of radical political economy [feedly]


I don't usually post Michael Roberts, even though he is a competent economist, because he  peddles a lot of dogmatic baggage, and reduces all basic arguments to "that's capitalism"! critiques. Again, its like proclaiming that water runs downhill. 

Keep that in mind when you read his summary of the 50th Anniversary of URPE, Union of Radical Political Economists in Amherst, Mass. The list of ideas is threadbare enough to recommend passing over entirely. But the links may be worth chasing down.

Things are usually not nearly as bad ad Roberts makes them out. :)


50 years of radical political economy
https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2018/10/02/50-years-of-radical-political-economy/

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Dean Baker: Trump’s Reality-TV Trade Deal [feedly]

Cheap labor was not the ONLY reason for the export of capital from the US, but Baker is correct that it is a KEY incentive. However, exposing the fact that capital seeks lower labor costs is like exclaiming tht water runs downhill.



Trump's Reality-TV Trade Deal
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/trump-s-reality-tv-trade-deal


Dean Baker
The Nation, October 3, 2018

See article on original site

Not surprisingly, Donald Trump is boasting loudly about his big new trade deal with Canada and Mexico. He touted the package, now called the United States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement, or USMCA, as "the biggest trade deal in the United States' history" and promised that it would "transform North America back into a manufacturing powerhouse."

In reality, there is not much in this package that was not also in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), from which Trump removed the United States shortly after taking office. And progressives should oppose Trump's "historic" new trade deal for the same reasons they opposed the TPP.

Before getting into specifics, though, some basics on trade would be useful. Trump routinely refers to trade deals as pacts in which some countries are winners and others (the United States, in his story) are losers. The scorecard is the bilateral trade deficit. By this measure, Trump could denounce negotiators in the Obama, Clinton, and two Bush administrations as "stupid," since the United States ended up with deals that left this country with enormous trade deficits. But this fundamentally misrepresents our trade negotiators' agenda.

To take the case of NAFTA, US negotiators were quite explicitly negotiating a pact that would make it as easy as possible for US corporations to set up factories in Mexico in order to take advantage of its relatively low-cost labor. Much of the deal was about establishing rules on investment that ensured US corporations their factories could not be expropriated and that Mexico would not be able to prevent them from repatriating profits back to the United States. We even set up a special extra-judicial process, the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which gave corporations an extra safeguard to protect their investments.

Since a major purpose of NAFTA was facilitating the outsourcing of factory jobs to Mexico, we should recognize that the US trade deficit with Mexico is evidence of the deal's success, not its failure. The same applies to other pacts, most importantly the agreement that allowed China to enter the World Trade Organization.

While the millions of manufacturing workers who lost their jobs in places like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Michigan were very big losers from China's entry into the WTO, companies like GE and General Motors, which were doing the outsourcing, were very happy with the outcome. The same applies to retailers like Walmart, which used low-cost supply chains in China to undermine their domestic competitors.

With this background in mind, we can ask who will win and who will lose from USMCA. Here we can pretty much go back to the story with the TPP.

Like the TPP, the USMCA includes a variety of measures that strengthen and lengthen patent and copyright monopolies as well as related protections. This is good news for the industries that benefit from these protections, especially the prescription-drug industry, but it's bad news for pretty much everyone else.

During his campaign, Trump frequently denounced the outrageous prices the pharmaceutical companies charge for drugs. He has a strange way of clamping down on the industry, though; apparently, it's to make people in Canada and other countries pay more for their drugs.

People who own stock in pharmaceutical companies should expect to see higher profits and therefore higher stock prices, but pretty much everyone else is harmed rather than helped in this deal. Locking in stronger protections (yes, this is protectionism, the opposite of free trade) makes it more difficult for people in the United States to seek out lower-cost drugs elsewhere.

Also, as a matter of basic economics, a larger US surplus on licensing fees for patents means a larger trade deficit in everything else, other things being equal. That's because, contrary to what is often reported in the media, what is being protected is not "our" intellectual property; it is the intellectual property of a relatively small number of large corporations. The more money they get from our trading partners, the less money our trading partners have to spend on US manufactured goods and other items made here.

The USMCA also includes rules on the digital economy that are likely to benefit behemoths like Amazon, Google, and Facebook, to the detriment of other countries. One of the key issues in negotiations was whether such companies would be required to have a physical presence in countries where they do business. If they were, it would facilitate legal action against those that do things like assist in tax evasion or in manipulating elections. The final USMCA deal prohibits countries from requiring such a physical presence. This is a dangerous precedent, since the rules in the USMCA are likely to be carried over to other trade deals.

The final USMCA language also ended up retaining the ISDS, although it does limit the mechanism's scope to a more narrow range of issues, such as when an industry dumps goods below cost. This is definitely a plus, since the ISDS had been used to challenge a wide range of laws and regulations affecting the environment, consumer safety, and workers' rights.

There are also provisions on currency management. While neither Mexico nor Canada had deliberately reduced the value of their currencies against the dollar in order to make their goods more competitive, the section on currency values can be a useful precedent for future trade pacts.

Trump has talked a lot about bringing back manufacturing jobs. This trade pact, however, is unlikely to make that happen. While it does include some changes that may make a small difference at the margin, such as raising the North American content threshold that allows cars to qualify for tariff-free access (from 62.5 percent to 75 percent), it is likely to have only a minimal effect on trade patterns. Many cars already meet this threshold. In cases where they are far from the threshold, companies can still opt to import a car into the United States and pay a 2.5 percent tariff. That is a modest penalty that is dwarfed by the size of currency fluctuations.

Some people may wrongly take consolation in the USMCA requirement that 40–45 percent of the value added in vehicles must come from workers who make at least $16 an hour. This is essentially saying that this portion of the value-added must come from the United States or Canada, since $16 an hour is well above the pay of Mexican autoworkers.

If the purpose was to raise the pay of Mexican autoworkers, a target in the range of $10 to $12 an hour would have been much more realistic. As it is, the deal does include some stronger wording on labor rights, but the enforcement mechanism is nothing like the ISDS available to investors. The best hope for Mexican workers in this respect is their newly elected president, the left-populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador, not the USMCA.

It is important to recognize that the manufacturing jobs lost to imports over the past two decades are like toothpaste out of the tube; they are not coming back. While reducing the US trade deficit would increase the number of relatively high-paying manufacturing jobs available here to workers without college degrees, most of these jobs will not be in the rust-belt states that were big job losers. And a much smaller percentage of the new jobs will be unionized.

OK, so the new NAFTA may not be a big boon to manufacturing, but at least we will sell more milk to Canada, right? Milk exports to our northern neighbor seem to loom large in Donald Trump's head, but not in the real world. Canada's market for dairy products is a bit more than $3 billion. We already have a surplus of $600 million in dairy trade with Canada. This means that if we captured half of the Canadian market—a huge achievement—we would increase our dairy sales to Canada by about $1.1 billion. This is equal to roughly 2.5 percent of our industry's current production and 0.006 percent of US GDP.

In Trump's reality-TV world, the USMCA may amount to a historic accomplishment. In the real world, it won't change very much at all. Perhaps, if he keeps blustering about the Great Milk Conquest (GMC), it will help Trump carry Vermont in 2020.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed