Friday, October 5, 2018

Dean Baker: Trump’s Reality-TV Trade Deal [feedly]

Cheap labor was not the ONLY reason for the export of capital from the US, but Baker is correct that it is a KEY incentive. However, exposing the fact that capital seeks lower labor costs is like exclaiming tht water runs downhill.



Trump's Reality-TV Trade Deal
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/trump-s-reality-tv-trade-deal


Dean Baker
The Nation, October 3, 2018

See article on original site

Not surprisingly, Donald Trump is boasting loudly about his big new trade deal with Canada and Mexico. He touted the package, now called the United States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement, or USMCA, as "the biggest trade deal in the United States' history" and promised that it would "transform North America back into a manufacturing powerhouse."

In reality, there is not much in this package that was not also in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), from which Trump removed the United States shortly after taking office. And progressives should oppose Trump's "historic" new trade deal for the same reasons they opposed the TPP.

Before getting into specifics, though, some basics on trade would be useful. Trump routinely refers to trade deals as pacts in which some countries are winners and others (the United States, in his story) are losers. The scorecard is the bilateral trade deficit. By this measure, Trump could denounce negotiators in the Obama, Clinton, and two Bush administrations as "stupid," since the United States ended up with deals that left this country with enormous trade deficits. But this fundamentally misrepresents our trade negotiators' agenda.

To take the case of NAFTA, US negotiators were quite explicitly negotiating a pact that would make it as easy as possible for US corporations to set up factories in Mexico in order to take advantage of its relatively low-cost labor. Much of the deal was about establishing rules on investment that ensured US corporations their factories could not be expropriated and that Mexico would not be able to prevent them from repatriating profits back to the United States. We even set up a special extra-judicial process, the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which gave corporations an extra safeguard to protect their investments.

Since a major purpose of NAFTA was facilitating the outsourcing of factory jobs to Mexico, we should recognize that the US trade deficit with Mexico is evidence of the deal's success, not its failure. The same applies to other pacts, most importantly the agreement that allowed China to enter the World Trade Organization.

While the millions of manufacturing workers who lost their jobs in places like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Michigan were very big losers from China's entry into the WTO, companies like GE and General Motors, which were doing the outsourcing, were very happy with the outcome. The same applies to retailers like Walmart, which used low-cost supply chains in China to undermine their domestic competitors.

With this background in mind, we can ask who will win and who will lose from USMCA. Here we can pretty much go back to the story with the TPP.

Like the TPP, the USMCA includes a variety of measures that strengthen and lengthen patent and copyright monopolies as well as related protections. This is good news for the industries that benefit from these protections, especially the prescription-drug industry, but it's bad news for pretty much everyone else.

During his campaign, Trump frequently denounced the outrageous prices the pharmaceutical companies charge for drugs. He has a strange way of clamping down on the industry, though; apparently, it's to make people in Canada and other countries pay more for their drugs.

People who own stock in pharmaceutical companies should expect to see higher profits and therefore higher stock prices, but pretty much everyone else is harmed rather than helped in this deal. Locking in stronger protections (yes, this is protectionism, the opposite of free trade) makes it more difficult for people in the United States to seek out lower-cost drugs elsewhere.

Also, as a matter of basic economics, a larger US surplus on licensing fees for patents means a larger trade deficit in everything else, other things being equal. That's because, contrary to what is often reported in the media, what is being protected is not "our" intellectual property; it is the intellectual property of a relatively small number of large corporations. The more money they get from our trading partners, the less money our trading partners have to spend on US manufactured goods and other items made here.

The USMCA also includes rules on the digital economy that are likely to benefit behemoths like Amazon, Google, and Facebook, to the detriment of other countries. One of the key issues in negotiations was whether such companies would be required to have a physical presence in countries where they do business. If they were, it would facilitate legal action against those that do things like assist in tax evasion or in manipulating elections. The final USMCA deal prohibits countries from requiring such a physical presence. This is a dangerous precedent, since the rules in the USMCA are likely to be carried over to other trade deals.

The final USMCA language also ended up retaining the ISDS, although it does limit the mechanism's scope to a more narrow range of issues, such as when an industry dumps goods below cost. This is definitely a plus, since the ISDS had been used to challenge a wide range of laws and regulations affecting the environment, consumer safety, and workers' rights.

There are also provisions on currency management. While neither Mexico nor Canada had deliberately reduced the value of their currencies against the dollar in order to make their goods more competitive, the section on currency values can be a useful precedent for future trade pacts.

Trump has talked a lot about bringing back manufacturing jobs. This trade pact, however, is unlikely to make that happen. While it does include some changes that may make a small difference at the margin, such as raising the North American content threshold that allows cars to qualify for tariff-free access (from 62.5 percent to 75 percent), it is likely to have only a minimal effect on trade patterns. Many cars already meet this threshold. In cases where they are far from the threshold, companies can still opt to import a car into the United States and pay a 2.5 percent tariff. That is a modest penalty that is dwarfed by the size of currency fluctuations.

Some people may wrongly take consolation in the USMCA requirement that 40–45 percent of the value added in vehicles must come from workers who make at least $16 an hour. This is essentially saying that this portion of the value-added must come from the United States or Canada, since $16 an hour is well above the pay of Mexican autoworkers.

If the purpose was to raise the pay of Mexican autoworkers, a target in the range of $10 to $12 an hour would have been much more realistic. As it is, the deal does include some stronger wording on labor rights, but the enforcement mechanism is nothing like the ISDS available to investors. The best hope for Mexican workers in this respect is their newly elected president, the left-populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador, not the USMCA.

It is important to recognize that the manufacturing jobs lost to imports over the past two decades are like toothpaste out of the tube; they are not coming back. While reducing the US trade deficit would increase the number of relatively high-paying manufacturing jobs available here to workers without college degrees, most of these jobs will not be in the rust-belt states that were big job losers. And a much smaller percentage of the new jobs will be unionized.

OK, so the new NAFTA may not be a big boon to manufacturing, but at least we will sell more milk to Canada, right? Milk exports to our northern neighbor seem to loom large in Donald Trump's head, but not in the real world. Canada's market for dairy products is a bit more than $3 billion. We already have a surplus of $600 million in dairy trade with Canada. This means that if we captured half of the Canadian market—a huge achievement—we would increase our dairy sales to Canada by about $1.1 billion. This is equal to roughly 2.5 percent of our industry's current production and 0.006 percent of US GDP.

In Trump's reality-TV world, the USMCA may amount to a historic accomplishment. In the real world, it won't change very much at all. Perhaps, if he keeps blustering about the Great Milk Conquest (GMC), it will help Trump carry Vermont in 2020.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Unemployment hits a 49 year low as jobs/wages stay on solid, hot-but-not-too-hot, trend. [feedly]

Unemployment hits a 49 year low as jobs/wages stay on solid, hot-but-not-too-hot, trend.
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/unemployment-hits-a-49-year-low-as-jobs-wages-stay-on-solid-hot-but-not-too-hot-trend/

The nation's payrolls grew by 134,000 jobs last month and the unemployment rate fell to a 49-year low of 3.7 percent. While the jobs number came in well below expectations, that should not be considered bad news. First, Hurricane Florence may have slightly dampened monthly payrolls (see below discussion of the impact of hurricanes on the jobs data). But more importantly, upward revisions for the prior two months' data reveal a trend over the past three months of 190,000 jobs per month, a solid pace of job gains for this stage of the labor market recovery. Hourly pay was up 2.8 percent, just slightly off last month's cyclical high of 2.9 percent.

The decline in unemployment is "real," meaning it occurred through fewer unemployed persons as opposed to people leaving the labor market. The black unemployment rate, at 6 percent, is only slightly higher than its all-time low of 5.9 percent earlier this year. At its peak in the depths of the last recession, black joblessness was almost 17 percent, meaning it is now down about 11 percentage points, close to twice the decline of the overall rate (about 6 points) and a critical reminder of the disproportionate benefits of full employment to less-advantaged workers.

To get a cleaner take on the underlying pace of job gains, our monthly smoother takes averages of the number of jobs added over 3, 6, and 12-month periods. In all three cases, the bars are hovering around 200,000, a very solid pace of job gains for year nine of the economic expansion.

In September, as noted, hourly wages for all private-sector workers grew 2.8 percent on a year-over-year basis, and 2.7 percent for lower-paid workers (the 80 percent of the workforce that's in blue-collar or non-managerial jobs). The figures below show that the trends for both groups have slowed gained some speed as unemployment has come down. Such acceleration, which, it must be underscored, is occurring at a smooth at not at all unusually quick pace (compare it to the speed of wage growth decline in the downturn), has been long-awaited and should be welcomed, not feared as inflationary. As a figure below shows, there is no evidence that wage growth is bleeding into higher (core) inflation.

Turning to the sectoral jobs data, there's perhaps some Florence effects in the 17,000 loss of leisure/hospitality jobs (which include hotels, waitpersons, food prep) and the 20,000 jobs lost in retail trade ("brick and mortar" stores). But this a relatively small losses in noisy, monthly data, and the BLS series on those who missed work due to weather last month showed a relatively small jump, especially relative to much larger storms in the past.

One data point in the report that is less positive is the flat, recent trend in the employment rate for prime age workers (25-54), a measure of labor demand and a source of "room-to-run" claims made about the current labor market. That is, as the figure shows, the prime-age employment rate, while still not quite back to its prior peak before the recession, has been steadily climbing back, signal that the strong labor market was pulling more workers in from the sidelines, and suggesting greater labor market capacity than most economists presumed. However, if the recent flattening (hard to see in the figure, but the rate has wiggled around 79.3 percent for about seven months) persists, it will suggest this source of labor supply could be tapped out. Moreover, as I have written previously, and as you can kind of see in the figure if you squint at it for awhile, this indicator tends to flatten before a recessions. However, whether this is a pause in its upward trajectory or a stopping point is yet to be seen.

The last figure is in here to underscore the point made above about how core inflation remains "well-behaved," even as the unemployment rate is close to a full point below the Fed's "natural rate" (its estimate of the lowest jobless rate consistent with stable inflation). Even as wage growth slowly trends up (the yellow line in the figure), core inflation is merely at the Fed's 2 percent target. Importantly, since the target is an average, not a ceiling, and given how long inflation has missed the target to the downside, this figure suggests the Fed chair Powell's view of a strong but not overheating labor market/economy is correct.

Hurricanes and the jobs data.

The jobs data information comes from two surveys. Payroll and wage data are drawn from the Establishment Survey, while unemployment and much other utilization information comes from the Household Survey. In both cases, the surveys' "reference period" is the week of the month that includes the 12th, meaning Florence occurred during the survey week.

This can affect the data in various ways. First, regarding payrolls, even if someone can't get to work, if they are paid for work, they are considered to be on the payroll and counted (of course, if a hurricane prevents the submission of data from firms to the Bureau, this could interrupt this process). However, if, due to the storm, someone misses work and is unpaid, they are not counted that week, and this dynamic often suppresses employment, especially in severe cases.

Since low-wage workers are more likely to fall out of the survey in this manner, hurricanes can artificially boost average pay, by temporarily taking lower-paid workers out of the sample. In fact, this is believed to have occurred last September during Hurricane Irma, a storm that disrupted a much larger area than Florence.

The household survey is a phone survey to individuals, so it too could be disrupted by evacuations. Moreover, its employment concept is different from the Establishment Survey as it counts those temporary absent from their jobs due to weather as employed, even if they are not paid. In fact, the Bureau tracks this number, which, as can be seen here, always spikes during big storms.

As noted, a few sectoral job losses suggested a Florence impact, but the BLS reported that survey response rates did not seem much diminished by the storm, so its impacts in today's report are probably small. Also, such impacts are temporary and storm-induced losses in the labor market tend to be quickly reversed. In addition, repairing the damage from the storms can often show up as a plus for employment, e.g., construction, in later years.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Progress on Income and Poverty Continued Into 2017 But Abruptly Halted on Health Coverage, Census Data Show [feedly]

Progress on Income and Poverty Continued Into 2017 But Abruptly Halted on Health Coverage, Census Data Show
https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/progress-on-income-and-poverty-continued-into-2017-but-abruptly

ncome rose and poverty declined for the third straight year in 2017 but progress on health coverage halted and apparently began to reverse, according to Census data released September 12. One Census survey found no significant change in the share of Americans without health insurance in 2017, but a larger Census survey that is more sensitive to small changes showed the uninsured rate edged up slightly.  

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Thursday, October 4, 2018

The USMCA is not a free trade deal. That’s because there are no free trade deals. [feedly]

The USMCA is not a free trade deal. That's because there are no free trade deals.
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/the-usmca-is-not-a-free-trade-deal-thats-because-there-are-no-free-trade-deals/

INSIGHTS

Add note

I'm doing my best to work through the text of the new NAFTA, now called YMCA, I mean CAMUS, no…wait…USMCA!

Trade agreements make for a dense read…here's a snippet from the Ag chapter, one of the 34 chapters, followed by "annexes" and "side letters":

"Parties recognize that under Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994, a Party may temporarily apply an export prohibition or restriction that is otherwise prohibited under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 on foodstuffs to prevent or relieve a critical shortage of foodstuffs, subject to meeting the conditions set out…"

It's just saying that in a food emergency, a party to the agreement can restrict food exports and remain in compliance, but I print that little example to make a larger point: There is no such thing as "free trade" and there are no "free trade agreements." FTAs are mythical creatures.

In the real world, agreements exist between trading partners that comprise hundreds of pages of rules by which they will engage in trade. These rules can be straightforward, like the one above, or seemingly obscure (have a look at the side letter on cheese names; as far as I know, I've never had Emmentaler cheese, but if this deal becomes law, I can enjoy it free of tariffs!).

Trade rules can favor workers, like the new language in support of independent Mexican unions, or investors, like the dispute settlement procedures that are somewhat weakened in the new agreement. It's all about who got a seat at the table when the deal was drawn up.

Before getting into some weeds on the new deal, I underscore this point so you don't confuse trade deals with trade, and especially with the trade balance (I'm talking to you, Trump). The CBO, which certainly doesn't have a protectionist thumb on the scale, recently pointed out that estimates of the impact of "trade agreements on the U.S. trade balance are very small and highly uncertain." The flows of goods, services, money, and financial assets will continue apace whether or not this deal is approved.

That doesn't mean trade deals don't matter. Instead, it means they have a lot more to do with who wins and loses from trade than whether cargo ships continue to sail the seas and trucks go back and forth across the borders of North America.

Many journalists have done nice work unpacking what's in the deal, so I'll just highlight some parts of interest.

Is this really that different a deal than the NAFTA? There are, as noted, differences, but they are not big enough for Trump to credibly claim that NAFTA was a horrible disaster while the USMCA is incredible. As noted, I don't see the deal, should it become law, changing the flows of goods, services, money, or people in ways that would change economic outcomes. New rules for Mexican auto production, including requirements for a) more production in the trade zone and b) a subset of Mexican auto workers to get paid $16 per hour (2-3 times their current wage), have led some to predict higher car prices.

It's possible, but nothing is that simple in international trade. Auto exporters trying to sell cars here in the US can forgo the duty-free benefits of the trade deal and pay the existing (WTO) auto tariff amounting to a mere 2.5 percent. And exchange rate movements can eventually swamp such price differences, especially as the $16 is not indexed to inflation.

It also must be underscored that Mexico has a lousy record of implementing and enforcing labor rights, so these changes—ones I view as clear improvements in the deal—will require close monitoring. I don't trust this administration to follow through on that.

What's good, what's bad in the deal? Some of the auto requirements just noted are intended to reduce the trade-induced wage arbitrage opportunities that have long hurt production workers exposed to export competition.

The new rules on Mexican unions are also a positive change. It's not just that these rules potentially make it easier for Mexican workers to form unions. It's that the unions could finally gain some true independence, as too often, Mexican unions have been Potemkin unions, fronts for management to impose harsh labor conditions with impunity. Again, this is where enforcement is especially crucial.

Though Canada got to keep one part of the dispute system they wanted—the one they use to fight over dumping and countervailing fees—the ISDS process (investor state dispute settlements) will be phased out for Canada and limited in Mexico. Trade expert Lori Wallach and I have discussed the serious problems with ISDS, as it provides a mechanism by which corporate rights could preempt sovereign rights at the expense of taxpayers. But before we get too excited about this change, we need to learn more about the carve-outs from the new rules. If it's too easy for favored industries to prosecute investment cases using the old NAFTA and TPP tribunals, then this change won't be meaningful.

What's bad in the new deal is the same stuff that was bad in the old one (same with TPP): protectionist measures that further belie the idea of "free trade." I'm talking here about patent and IP extensions that American lobbies like Big Pharma insist on as the price of their support (Dean Baker has some details here). Surely those complaining about higher car prices based on labor protections should be lodging the same complaints here.

Will Congress Approve the Deal?

Which Congress are you referring to? If the D's take the majority in the House, look for a whole lot of activism around improving enforcement and blocking ways for countries to get around any labor-friendly rules in the proposed deal. For one concrete example, they're want to raise that 2.5 percent tariff on auto imports to block companies from skirting the new, higher origin requirements in the USMCA.

But aside from those details—and who knows, I could see Trump and his trade rep, Bob Lighthizer, getting behind the House D's on preserving those protections—and based on what we know now, I suspect a majority in both chambers will want this deal to go through.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Summers on Trumpenomics

Trump hasn't prepared us for the inevitable economic slowdown  

Lawrence H. Summers is a professor at and past president of Harvard University. He was treasury secretary from 1999 to 2001 and an economic adviser to President Barack Obama from 2009 through 2010.

President Trump regularly and proudly takes credit for the U.S. economy's strong performance. And with rapid growth during the second quarter, the stock market strong, the unemployment rate back below 4 percent and the midterm elections looming, Trump's rhetoric and that of his supporters will probably escalate in coming months.

In fact, however, the president receives more of a boost from the strong economy than the other way around. This conclusion will only be reinforced if Trump's current steps toward a trade war retard U.S. economic performance, as is increasingly feared. A variety of observations are pertinent:

First, history suggests that presidential popularity rises with declining unemployment. It is reasonable to suppose that, if unemployment was at its historical average of 5.8 percent, instead of the current 3.9 percent, Trump's approval rating would fall lower than its already anemic level. As it is, he is less popular than any first-term president with an unemployment rate less than 5 percent.

Second, the acceleration of growth as we have observed is well within the normal range of growth forecast errors. Before the 2016 election, when a Trump presidency was not anticipated, consensus forecasts for the U.S. economy were 2.2 percent growth for 2017 and 2.1 percent for 2018. The actual outcome in 2017 of 2.2 percent and the current consensus forecast of 2.8 percent for 2018 do not represent a statistically significant fluctuation from the mean.

Third, it appears that growth has accelerated and exceeded expectations to a greater extent outside the United States, suggesting that whatever is driving America's growth is global, rather than something for which U.S. policy can be credited. While the United States met its expectations for 2017, other parts of the world — including China, Europe and Japan — exceeded expectations. And, looking at 2018 estimates, the U.S. growth rate improvement looks likely to lag behind the world once again.

Fourth, market evidence calls into question the idea that the United States has become a highly attractive place to invest because of Trump's policies. Net foreign direct investment in the United States was down nearly two-thirds in the first quarter of 2018 over the first quarter of 2016.

Goldman Sachs analysts have demonstrated that U.S. companies that do more business abroad have outperformed those that are more domestically focused. And there is the basic observation that, even before trade war fears took hold, the dollar had declined during the Trump presidency. 

Fifth, the underlying reason the U.S. economy is strong right now is that it has been possible to run a taut economy with unemployment below 4 percent and not face significant inflationary pressures. No one is quite sure why this is the case. It is probable that some combination of globalization, technology and the reduction of employee power as unions have weakened have changed the inflation process. It is difficult to see why Trump deserves credit for these structural changes, which have been happening for a long time.

Sixth, there is what Ben Bernanke, the former Federal Reserve chairman, has labeled the "Wile E. Coyote" issue, for the cartoon character with a penchant for heedlessly sprinting off the edge of cliffs. It may well be that an element of current success that can be attributed to Trump administration policy is borrowing prosperity from the future. This is most obvious in the case of the soybean exports that were accelerated to avoid tariffs, but it is fairly ubiquitous. 

Fiscal stimulus is like a drug with tolerance effects; to keep growth constant, deficits have to keep getting larger. Some combination of gathering foreign storm clouds, the end of growing fiscal stimulus and the delayed effect of tightening monetary policies may converge to slow or end the expansion. 

The choices this administration is making invite foreign retaliation against U.S. exporters and use up fiscal capacity — even as the economy is growing rapidly. Because of this, and because there is limited room for monetary policy, the country will not be in a position to respond strongly if a downturn comes. All the more reason, therefore, to avoid pulling demand forward. 

This is all quite dangerous. The president has taken credit for far more economic success than he deserves. He will disproportionately be blamed when the downturn comes. What follows will be a test of our democracy.

--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV
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