Friday, September 21, 2018
Making Tariffs Corrupt Again [feedly]
Making Tariffs Corrupt Again
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/opinion/tariffs-trump-corrupt.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/opinion/tariffs-trump-corrupt.html
Trump has perverted the process and undermined U.S. credibility.
By Paul Krugman
Opinion Columnist
Sept. 20, 2018
President Trump has imposed tariffs, seemingly on whim, on about $300 billion worth of imports.CreditCreditDoug Mills/The New York Times
In normal times, Donald Trump's announcement of tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, bringing us closer to an all-out trade war, would have dominated headlines for days. Things being as they are, it was a below-the-fold story, drowned out by all the other scandals underway.
Yet Trump's tariffs really are a big, bad deal. Their direct economic impact will be modest, although hardly trivial. But the numbers aren't the whole story. Trumpian trade policy has, almost casually, torn up rules America itself created more than 80 years ago — rules intended to ensure that tariffs reflected national priorities, not the power of special interests.
You could say that Trump is making tariffs corrupt again. And the damage will be lasting.
Until the 1930s, U.S. trade policy was both dirty and dysfunctional. It wasn't just that overall tariffs were high; who got how much tariff protection was determined through a free-for-all of horse-trading among special interests.
The costs of this free-for-all went beyond economics: They undermined U.S. influence and damaged the world as a whole. Most notably, in the years after World War I, America demanded that European nations repay their war debts, which meant that they had to earn dollars through exports — and at the same time America imposed high tariffs to block those necessary exports.
But the game changed in 1934, when F.D.R. introduced the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Henceforth, tariffs would be negotiated via deals with foreign governments, giving export industries a stake in open markets. And these deals would be subject to up-or-down votes, reducing the ability of interest groups to buy themselves special treatment.
This U.S. innovation became the template for a global trading system, culminating in the creation of the World Trade Organization. And tariff policy went from being famously dirty to remarkably clean.
Now, the creators of this trading system knew that it needed some flexibility to remain politically viable. So governments were given the right to impose tariffs under a limited set of circumstances: to give industries time to cope with import surges, to respond to unfair foreign practices, to protect national security. And in the U.S. the power to impose these special-case tariffs was vested in the executive branch, on the understanding that this power would be used sparingly and judiciously.
Then came Trump.
So far, Trump has imposed tariffs on about $300 billion worth of U.S. imports, with tariff rates set to rise as high as 25 percent. Although Trump and his officials keep claiming that this is a tax on foreigners, it's actually a tax hike on America. And since most of the tariffs are on raw materials and other inputs into business, the policy will probably have a chilling effect on investment and innovation.
But the pure economic impact is only part of the story. The other part is the perversion of the process. There are rules about when a president may impose tariffs; Trump has obeyed the letter of these rules, barely, but made a mockery of their spirit. Blocking imports from Canada in the name of national security? Really?
Even the big China announcement, supposedly a response to unfair Chinese trade practices, was basically a put-up job. China is often a bad actor in the international economy. But this kind of retaliatory tariff is supposed to be a response to specific policies, and offer the targeted government a clear way to satisfy U.S. demands. What Trump did was instead to lash out based mainly on a vague sense of grievance, with no end game in sight.
In other words, when it comes to tariffs, as with so many other things, Trump has basically abrogated the rule of law and replaced it with his personal whims. And this will have a couple of nasty consequences.
First, it opens the door for old-fashioned corruption. As I said, most of the tariffs are on inputs into business — and some businesses are getting special treatment. Thus, there are now substantial tariffs on imported steel, but some steel users — including the U.S. subsidiary of a sanctioned Russian company —were granted the right to import steel tariff-free. (The Russian subsidiary's exemption was reversed after it became public knowledge, with officials claiming that it was a "clerical error.")
So what are the criteria for these exemptions? Nobody knows, but there is every reason to believe that political favoritism is running wild.
Beyond that, America has thrown away its negotiating credibility. In the past, countries signing trade agreements with the United States believed that a deal was a deal. Now they know that whatever documents the U.S. may sign supposedly guaranteeing access to its market, the president will still feel free to block their exports, on specious grounds, whenever he feels like it.
In short, while the Trump tariffs may not be that big (yet), they have already turned us into an unreliable partner, a nation whose trade policy is driven by political cronyism, and which is all too likely to default on its promises whenever it's convenient. Somehow, I don't think that's making America great again.
-- via my feedly newsfeed
By Paul Krugman
Opinion Columnist
Sept. 20, 2018
President Trump has imposed tariffs, seemingly on whim, on about $300 billion worth of imports.CreditCreditDoug Mills/The New York Times
In normal times, Donald Trump's announcement of tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, bringing us closer to an all-out trade war, would have dominated headlines for days. Things being as they are, it was a below-the-fold story, drowned out by all the other scandals underway.
Yet Trump's tariffs really are a big, bad deal. Their direct economic impact will be modest, although hardly trivial. But the numbers aren't the whole story. Trumpian trade policy has, almost casually, torn up rules America itself created more than 80 years ago — rules intended to ensure that tariffs reflected national priorities, not the power of special interests.
You could say that Trump is making tariffs corrupt again. And the damage will be lasting.
Until the 1930s, U.S. trade policy was both dirty and dysfunctional. It wasn't just that overall tariffs were high; who got how much tariff protection was determined through a free-for-all of horse-trading among special interests.
The costs of this free-for-all went beyond economics: They undermined U.S. influence and damaged the world as a whole. Most notably, in the years after World War I, America demanded that European nations repay their war debts, which meant that they had to earn dollars through exports — and at the same time America imposed high tariffs to block those necessary exports.
But the game changed in 1934, when F.D.R. introduced the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Henceforth, tariffs would be negotiated via deals with foreign governments, giving export industries a stake in open markets. And these deals would be subject to up-or-down votes, reducing the ability of interest groups to buy themselves special treatment.
This U.S. innovation became the template for a global trading system, culminating in the creation of the World Trade Organization. And tariff policy went from being famously dirty to remarkably clean.
Now, the creators of this trading system knew that it needed some flexibility to remain politically viable. So governments were given the right to impose tariffs under a limited set of circumstances: to give industries time to cope with import surges, to respond to unfair foreign practices, to protect national security. And in the U.S. the power to impose these special-case tariffs was vested in the executive branch, on the understanding that this power would be used sparingly and judiciously.
Then came Trump.
So far, Trump has imposed tariffs on about $300 billion worth of U.S. imports, with tariff rates set to rise as high as 25 percent. Although Trump and his officials keep claiming that this is a tax on foreigners, it's actually a tax hike on America. And since most of the tariffs are on raw materials and other inputs into business, the policy will probably have a chilling effect on investment and innovation.
But the pure economic impact is only part of the story. The other part is the perversion of the process. There are rules about when a president may impose tariffs; Trump has obeyed the letter of these rules, barely, but made a mockery of their spirit. Blocking imports from Canada in the name of national security? Really?
Even the big China announcement, supposedly a response to unfair Chinese trade practices, was basically a put-up job. China is often a bad actor in the international economy. But this kind of retaliatory tariff is supposed to be a response to specific policies, and offer the targeted government a clear way to satisfy U.S. demands. What Trump did was instead to lash out based mainly on a vague sense of grievance, with no end game in sight.
In other words, when it comes to tariffs, as with so many other things, Trump has basically abrogated the rule of law and replaced it with his personal whims. And this will have a couple of nasty consequences.
First, it opens the door for old-fashioned corruption. As I said, most of the tariffs are on inputs into business — and some businesses are getting special treatment. Thus, there are now substantial tariffs on imported steel, but some steel users — including the U.S. subsidiary of a sanctioned Russian company —were granted the right to import steel tariff-free. (The Russian subsidiary's exemption was reversed after it became public knowledge, with officials claiming that it was a "clerical error.")
So what are the criteria for these exemptions? Nobody knows, but there is every reason to believe that political favoritism is running wild.
Beyond that, America has thrown away its negotiating credibility. In the past, countries signing trade agreements with the United States believed that a deal was a deal. Now they know that whatever documents the U.S. may sign supposedly guaranteeing access to its market, the president will still feel free to block their exports, on specious grounds, whenever he feels like it.
In short, while the Trump tariffs may not be that big (yet), they have already turned us into an unreliable partner, a nation whose trade policy is driven by political cronyism, and which is all too likely to default on its promises whenever it's convenient. Somehow, I don't think that's making America great again.
-- via my feedly newsfeed
Can Trade Agreements Be a Friend to Labor? [feedly]
This is an important discussion, and is an even broader arena than discussed here because there is an inescapable link between trade inequities with respect to labor and immigration. Dani hits one of the key points: Focus on the establishment of elementary labor rights, not "standards" that may be simply impossible to negotiate or obtain solidarity across borders and the uniqueness of each nations' history, laws and customs. The standards issues -- e.g.minimum wage, property qualifications work classifications, etc -- can work against unity, and also against nations with large public stakes in inputs to enterprises.
Also important: the Golden Rule of International Relations: Do not demand your partner make concessions you yourself would not accept in a similar situation.
**************************************
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trade-agreement-labor-provisions-small-practical-effect-by-dani-rodrik-2018-09
Sep 14, 2018 DANI RODRIK
To date, labor clauses in trade agreements have remained a fig leaf, neither raising labor standards abroad nor protecting them at home. Real change would require a significantly different approach, including how trade agreements uphold and enforce workers' rights.
CAMBRIDGE – Labor advocates have long complained that international trade agreements are driven by corporate agendas and pay little attention to the interests of working people. The preamble of the World Trade Organization Agreement mentions the objective of "full employment," but otherwise labor standards remain outside the scope of the multilateral trade regime. The only exception is a clause, left over from the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the precursor to the WTO), which permits governments to restrict imports that are produced with prison labor.
Regional trade agreements, by contrast, have long taken labor standards aboard. The linkage in these agreements between preferential market access and adherence to core labor rights has become increasingly explicit. In the original North American Free Trade Agreement, signed in 1992, labor standards were shunted to a side agreement. Since then, US trade agreements have typically included a labor chapter.1
According to its proponents, the Trans-Pacific Partnership would have required Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei to improve their labor practices significantly – and Vietnam to recognize independent trade unions. And US President Donald Trump's administration claims that its revamped agreement with Mexico contains the strongest labor provisions of any trade agreement.
Developing countries have generally resisted inclusion of labor standards in trade agreements for fear that advanced countries will abuse such provisions for protectionist purposes. This fear can be justified when the requirements go beyond core labor rights and make specific wage and other material demands. For example, the new US-Mexico agreement requires that 40-45% of a car be made by workers earning at least $16 per hour.
Auto companies can certainly afford to pay higher wages, and this provision on its own may not undermine employment prospects in Mexico. But it is not an altogether salutary precedent either, insofar as it sets an unrealistic wage floor – many multiples higher than the average for the Mexican manufacturing sector as a whole.
On the other hand, developing countries have little reason to reject labor standards that address bargaining asymmetries in the workplace and fundamental human rights. Core labor standards such as freedom of association, collective bargaining rights, and prohibition of compulsory labor are not costly to economic development; in fact, they are essential to it.
In practice, the problem with trade agreements' labor provisions is not that they are too restrictive for developing countries; it is that they may remain largely cosmetic, with little practical effect. A key concern is enforcement. For one thing, charges of labor-rights violations can be brought only by governments, not by trade unions or human rights organizations. By contrast, investment disputes can be launched by corporations themselves.
Critics rightly worry that governments that are not particularly friendly to labor causes will not be keen to follow through. To date, there has been only a single instance of labor rights being pursued under a trade agreement's dispute settlement procedures, and the outcome is hardly encouraging.
Following two years of complaints by US and Guatemalan trade unions, the US government formally launched a case against Guatemala in 2010. When a final decision was announced in 2017, nearly a decade after the initial grievances were aired, the arbitration panel decided against the US, but not because Guatemala lived up to its labor rights obligations under its own laws. The panel did find violations of Guatemalan labor laws. For example, court orders against employers who had dismissed workers for engaging in union activities were not enforced. But it ruled that such violations did not have an effect on Guatemala's competitive advantage and exports, and therefore were not covered by the trade agreement!
There are two reasons to care about labor standards. First, we may have a humanitarian desire to improve working conditions everywhere. In this case, we should have equal regard for workers in the domestic economy and those employed in export industries. Focusing on the latter may even backfire, by deepening dualistic labor-market structures.
In principle, we could expand enforceable labor clauses in trade agreements to cover working conditions in the entire economy. But it seems odd to have the linkage in the first place: why should labor rights be left to trade negotiators and the commercial interests sitting around the table, and remain hostage to negotiations couched in terms of market access?
If we are serious about improving working conditions everywhere, we should resort to experts on human rights, labor markets, and development, and raise the profile of the International Labor Organization instead. The objectives of both domestic labor unions and international human-rights advocates are served better through other means.
One argument for linkage with trade is that it gives countries a real incentive to reform labor-market practices. But foreign aid agencies have long experience with conditionality, and they know that it is effective only under special conditions. The desire for change must come from within the country and be demonstrated by prior actions. Achieving reform by threatening to suspend material benefits – aid or market access – is unlikely to work.
Alternatively, the concern about labor standards may be narrower: upholding working conditions at home and preventing a race to the bottom. In this case, we should seek domestic remedies, as with safeguards against import surges. What is required is a mechanism against "social dumping" that prevents poor labor practices in exporting countries from spilling over to the importing country.
Such a scheme, if poorly designed, might deliver excessive protectionism. Yet even the overtly protectionist anti-dumping measures allowed under existing trade rules have not been overly damaging to trade, while providing an escape valve for political pressure. A well-designed safeguard against social dumping should do no worse.
Labor rights are too important to leave to trade negotiators alone. To date, labor clauses in trade agreements have remained a fig leaf, neither raising labor standards abroad nor protecting them at home. Real change would require a significantly different approach. We can start by treating labor rights as being on a par with commercial interests, rather than being an adjunct to them.
-- via my feedly newsfeed
To date, labor clauses in trade agreements have remained a fig leaf, neither raising labor standards abroad nor protecting them at home. Real change would require a significantly different approach, including how trade agreements uphold and enforce workers' rights.
CAMBRIDGE – Labor advocates have long complained that international trade agreements are driven by corporate agendas and pay little attention to the interests of working people. The preamble of the World Trade Organization Agreement mentions the objective of "full employment," but otherwise labor standards remain outside the scope of the multilateral trade regime. The only exception is a clause, left over from the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the precursor to the WTO), which permits governments to restrict imports that are produced with prison labor.
Regional trade agreements, by contrast, have long taken labor standards aboard. The linkage in these agreements between preferential market access and adherence to core labor rights has become increasingly explicit. In the original North American Free Trade Agreement, signed in 1992, labor standards were shunted to a side agreement. Since then, US trade agreements have typically included a labor chapter.1
According to its proponents, the Trans-Pacific Partnership would have required Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei to improve their labor practices significantly – and Vietnam to recognize independent trade unions. And US President Donald Trump's administration claims that its revamped agreement with Mexico contains the strongest labor provisions of any trade agreement.
Developing countries have generally resisted inclusion of labor standards in trade agreements for fear that advanced countries will abuse such provisions for protectionist purposes. This fear can be justified when the requirements go beyond core labor rights and make specific wage and other material demands. For example, the new US-Mexico agreement requires that 40-45% of a car be made by workers earning at least $16 per hour.
Auto companies can certainly afford to pay higher wages, and this provision on its own may not undermine employment prospects in Mexico. But it is not an altogether salutary precedent either, insofar as it sets an unrealistic wage floor – many multiples higher than the average for the Mexican manufacturing sector as a whole.
On the other hand, developing countries have little reason to reject labor standards that address bargaining asymmetries in the workplace and fundamental human rights. Core labor standards such as freedom of association, collective bargaining rights, and prohibition of compulsory labor are not costly to economic development; in fact, they are essential to it.
In practice, the problem with trade agreements' labor provisions is not that they are too restrictive for developing countries; it is that they may remain largely cosmetic, with little practical effect. A key concern is enforcement. For one thing, charges of labor-rights violations can be brought only by governments, not by trade unions or human rights organizations. By contrast, investment disputes can be launched by corporations themselves.
Critics rightly worry that governments that are not particularly friendly to labor causes will not be keen to follow through. To date, there has been only a single instance of labor rights being pursued under a trade agreement's dispute settlement procedures, and the outcome is hardly encouraging.
Following two years of complaints by US and Guatemalan trade unions, the US government formally launched a case against Guatemala in 2010. When a final decision was announced in 2017, nearly a decade after the initial grievances were aired, the arbitration panel decided against the US, but not because Guatemala lived up to its labor rights obligations under its own laws. The panel did find violations of Guatemalan labor laws. For example, court orders against employers who had dismissed workers for engaging in union activities were not enforced. But it ruled that such violations did not have an effect on Guatemala's competitive advantage and exports, and therefore were not covered by the trade agreement!
There are two reasons to care about labor standards. First, we may have a humanitarian desire to improve working conditions everywhere. In this case, we should have equal regard for workers in the domestic economy and those employed in export industries. Focusing on the latter may even backfire, by deepening dualistic labor-market structures.
In principle, we could expand enforceable labor clauses in trade agreements to cover working conditions in the entire economy. But it seems odd to have the linkage in the first place: why should labor rights be left to trade negotiators and the commercial interests sitting around the table, and remain hostage to negotiations couched in terms of market access?
If we are serious about improving working conditions everywhere, we should resort to experts on human rights, labor markets, and development, and raise the profile of the International Labor Organization instead. The objectives of both domestic labor unions and international human-rights advocates are served better through other means.
One argument for linkage with trade is that it gives countries a real incentive to reform labor-market practices. But foreign aid agencies have long experience with conditionality, and they know that it is effective only under special conditions. The desire for change must come from within the country and be demonstrated by prior actions. Achieving reform by threatening to suspend material benefits – aid or market access – is unlikely to work.
Alternatively, the concern about labor standards may be narrower: upholding working conditions at home and preventing a race to the bottom. In this case, we should seek domestic remedies, as with safeguards against import surges. What is required is a mechanism against "social dumping" that prevents poor labor practices in exporting countries from spilling over to the importing country.
Such a scheme, if poorly designed, might deliver excessive protectionism. Yet even the overtly protectionist anti-dumping measures allowed under existing trade rules have not been overly damaging to trade, while providing an escape valve for political pressure. A well-designed safeguard against social dumping should do no worse.
Labor rights are too important to leave to trade negotiators alone. To date, labor clauses in trade agreements have remained a fig leaf, neither raising labor standards abroad nor protecting them at home. Real change would require a significantly different approach. We can start by treating labor rights as being on a par with commercial interests, rather than being an adjunct to them.
Links (9/17/18) [feedly]
Links (9/17/18)
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2018/09/links-91718.html
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http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2018/09/links-91718.html
- The Credit Crunch and the Great Recession (Wonkish) - Paul Krugman
- Comments on monetary policy at the effective lower bound - Janet Yellen
- Why central banks should not be inflation nutters - VoxEU
- Can Trade Agreements Be a Friend to Labor? - Dani Rodrik
- What Do We Actually Know About the Economy? (Wonkish) - Paul Krugman
- Central Banks Strike Back Against Political Interference - Bloomberg
- Economics Gets It Wrong Because Research Is Hard to Replicate - Bloomberg
- Ten Years Ago - Economic Principals
- Output Gaps and Robust Monetary Policy Rules - Roberto Billi
- Charting the Financial Crisis - Brookings
- Can codetermination help fix America's wage problem? - Lane Kenworthy
- The Most Addictive Theorem in Applied Mathematics - Scientific American
- The Economist as Public Intellectual - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
- Interview with Chad Syverson - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
- Ten Year House Price Volatility - Richard Green
- Another lesson of the GFC unlearnt - mainly macro
- We're Measuring the Economy All Wrong - The New York Times
- Crisis firefighters still uninterested in fire prevention - FT
- The Fed's Floor System: Sayonara? - Macro Musings
- Tax Cuts Are Costing the U.S. Treasury Money - Bloomberg
- Economic Security Programs Cut Poverty Nearly in Half Over Last 50 Years - CBPP
- What We Should Have Learned From the 2008 Financial Crisis - Reinhart and Reinhart
- Could A Coalition of the "Friends of Turkey" Ride to Turkey's Financial Rescue? - Brad Setser
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Hurricane Anniversary Highlights Puerto Rico’s Need for Adequate Medicaid Funding [feedly]
Hurricane Anniversary Highlights Puerto Rico's Need for Adequate Medicaid Funding
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/hurricane-anniversary-highlights-puerto-ricos-need-for-adequate-medicaid-funding
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/hurricane-anniversary-highlights-puerto-ricos-need-for-adequate-medicaid-funding
A year after Hurricane Maria took an extraordinary human and economic toll on Puerto Rico, the island faces immediate recovery tasks as well as longer-term challenges that predated the storm, including a decade-long recession and an overwhelming debt burden. Inadequate federal Medicaid funding — far less than what Puerto Rico would have received if it were a state — has contributed significantly to the island's financial problems.
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By the Numbers: Income and Poverty, 2017 [feedly]
By the Numbers: Income and Poverty, 2017
https://www.epi.org/blog/by-the-numbers-income-and-poverty-2017/
-- via my feedly newsfeed
https://www.epi.org/blog/by-the-numbers-income-and-poverty-2017/
Jump to statistics on:
This fact sheet provides key numbers from today's new Census reports, Income and Poverty in the United States: 2017 and The Supplemental Poverty Measure: 2017. Each section has headline statistics from the reports for 2017, as well as comparisons to the previous year, to 2007 (the final year of the economic expansion that preceded the Great Recession), and to 2000 (the historical high point for many of the statistics in these reports.) All dollar values are adjusted for inflation (2017 dollars).
Earnings
Median annual earnings for men working full time fell 1.1 percent, to $52,146, in 2017.Men's earnings are down 2.5 percent since 2007, and are still 1.9 percent lower than they were in 2000.
Median annual earnings for women working full time fell 1.1 percent, to $41,977, in 2017.Women's earnings are up 0.9 percent since 2007, and are 7.1 percent higher than they were in 2000.
Median annual earnings for men working full time in 2017: $52,146
Change over time:
- 2016–2017: -1.1%
- 2007–2017: -2.5%
- 2000–2017: -1.9%
Median annual earnings for women working full time in 2017: $41,977
Change over time:
- 2016–2017: -1.1%
- 2007–2017: 0.9%
- 2000–2017: 7.1%
Incomes
Median household income rose 1.8 percent, to $61,372, in 2017. Median household income is down 0.1 percent since 2007, and is 0.8 percent lower than it was in 2000.
Median non-elderly household income rose 2.5 percent, to $69,928, in 2017. Median non-elderly household income is up 0.8 percent since 2007, and is still 2.7 percent lower than it was in 2000.
Median household income in 2017: $61,372
Change over time:
- 2016–2017: 1.8%
- 2007–2017: -0.1%
- 2000–2017: -0.8%
Median non-elderly household income in 2017: $69,628
Change over time:
- 2016–2017: 2.5%
- 2007–2017: 0.8%
- 2000–2017: -2.7%
Median household income for white, non-Hispanic households rose 2.6 percent, to $68,145, in 2017. Median household income is up 1.5 percent since 2007, and is 1.4 percent higher than it was in 2000.
Median household income for African American households fell 0.2 percent, to $40,258, in 2017. Median household income is down 2.9 percent since 2007, and is still 7.9 percent lower than it was in 2000.
Median household income for Hispanic households rose 3.7 percent, to $50,486, in 2017.Median household income is up 6.7 percent since 2007, and is 3.4 percent higher than it was in 2000.
Median white, non-Hispanic household income in 2017: $68,145
Change over time:
- 2016–2017: 2.6%
- 2007–2017: 1.5%
- 2000–2017: 1.4%
Median African American household income in 2017: $40,258
Change over time:
- 2016–2017: -0.2%
- 2007–2017: -2.9%
- 2000–2017: -7.9%
Median Hispanic household income in 2017: $50,486
Change over time:
- 2016–2017: 3.7%
- 2007–2017: 6.7%
- 2000–2017: 3.4%
Poverty
The poverty rate fell 0.4 percentage points, to 12.3 percent, in 2017. The poverty rate is 0.2 percentage points lower than in 2007. The poverty rate is 1.0 percentage points higher than it was in 2000.
The child poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points, to 17.5 percent, in 2017. The child poverty rate was also 0.5 percentage points lower in 2017 than it was in 2007, although it is still 1.3 percentage points higher than it was in 2000.
Poverty rate in 2017: 12.3%
Change over time:
- 2016–2017: -0.4 percentage points
- 2007–2017: -0.2 percentage points
- 2000–2017: 1.0 percentage points
Poverty rate for children in 2017: 17.5%
Change over time:
- 2016–2017: -0.5 percentage points
- 2007–2017: -0.5 percentage points
- 2000–2017: 1.3 percentage points
The white, non-Hispanic poverty rate fell 0.1 percentage points, to 8.7 percent, in 2017.The white, non-Hispanic poverty rate is 0.5 percentage points higher than in 2007, and is 1.3 percentage points higher than it was in 2000.
The African American poverty rate fell 0.8 percentage points, to 21.2 percent, in 2017.The African American poverty rate is 3.3 percentage points lower than in 2007, and is now 1.3 percentage points lower than it was in 2000.
The Hispanic poverty rate fell 1.1 percentage points, to 18.3 percent, in 2017. The Hispanic poverty rate is 3.2 percentage points lower than in 2007, and is 3.2 percentage points lower than it was in 2000.
White, non-Hispanic poverty rate in 2017: 8.7%
Change over time:
- 2016–2017: -0.1 percentage points
- 2007–2017: 0.5 percentage points
- 2000–2017: 1.3 percentage points
African American poverty rate in 2017: 21.2%
Change over time:
- 2016–2017: -0.8 percentage points
- 2007–2017: -3.3 percentage points
- 2000–2017: -1.3 percentage points
Hispanic poverty rate in 2017: 18.3%
Change over time:
- 2016–2017: -1.1 percentage points
- 2007–2017: -3.2 percentage points
- 2000–2017: -3.2 percentage points
Policy matters
The Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) is an alternative poverty measure published by the Census Bureau since 2010 that is more sophisticated than the official poverty measure referenced earlier in this fact sheet. The SPM takes into account an array of typical expenses—such as housing, food, clothing, health care, and more—as well as people's income from both market sources and government programs. Using the Supplemental Poverty Measure, we can evaluate how government assistance lifts people out of poverty.
SPM poverty rate in 2017: 13.9%
Impact of government assistance on poverty as measured by the SPM:
- Social Security kept 27.0 million people out of poverty in 2017.
- Refundable tax credits (such as the Earned Income Tax Credit) kept 8.3 million people out of poverty in 2017.
- The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, also known as food stamps) kept 3.4 million people out of poverty in 2017.
- Unemployment insurance kept 542,000 people out of poverty in 2017.
SNAP stands for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.
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Monday, September 10, 2018
Revealing political tour in St Petersburg
A most revealing tour yesterday in St. Petersburg: 1) the "museum of political history"; and 2) a memorialized apartment of Sergei Kirov, a leader of the CPSU and the popular mayor of Leningrad until he was assassinated in 1934. First, tour guides in every subject domain must be examined and relicensed by the state annually. So, the guide scripts and "facts" are centrally approved.
Second, Lenin has very nearly been, and is being ERASED: example: "He was a German agent, bent upon ceding lands and treasure in WW1, a terrorist who staged a 'coup' to overthrow the "real' revolution led by Kerensky". The smugness and derision of our guide was as thick as a pound of butter on a saltine.
Third, there was no need for revolution at all, since Tsar Alexander II freed the serfs had he not been assassinated by "terrorists".
Fourth, the Romanovs -- perhaps the most extractive and putrid autocracy in human history -- are raised from their porcelin, marble and golden graves and memorialized with apologies reminiscent of "Gone With the Wind" fables that glossed over the stench of the US Confederacy.
Fifth, Stalin gets a halfway pass, despite his manifest crimes. I am speculating a bit, but the deep, deep pride of the Russian peoples immense sacrifices, and profound victory in WWII cannot be erased, yet, from common memory. Thus Stalin's crimes -- the RED TERROR (this phrase was repeated 30 times in a 3 hour tour, and blamed primarily on the "terrorist Lenin") are held to just be a feature of "communism", not Stalin's personal character.
Sixth, for those who think this script was an introduction to a rejection of authoritarianism -- sorry, the word "democracy" was not mentioned once.
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