Monday, April 23, 2018

Sam Bowles: Marx and modern microeconomics

Marx and modern microeconomics

Samuel Bowles 21 April 2018




Economists, looking back, have not found much to admire in Karl Marx, the economist, the bicentennial of whose birth we commemorate next month. John Maynard Keynes referred to Capital as "an obsolete economic textbook [that is] not only scientifically erroneous but without interest or application to the modern world" (Keynes 1925). Paul Samuelson's judgement – "From the viewpoint of pure economic theory, Karl Marx can be regarded as a minor post-Ricardian" – was equally harsh, especially as he thought Ricardo was "the most overrated of economists"(Samuelson 1962). 

These assessments are based largely on our current – and correct in my view – understanding of Marx's labour theory of value as a pioneering, but inconsistent and outdated, attempt at a general equilibrium model of pricing and distribution. But there is another aspect of his work that has been strongly vindicated by theoretical advances in recent decades: the idea that the exercise of power is an essential aspect of the working of the capitalist economy, even in its idealised, perfectly competitive, state. 

Domination in liberal society

Marx used the labour theory of value to demonstrate that the exploitation of workers is a necessary condition for profits (Yoshihara 2017). The normative term 'exploitation' is justified by the claim that profit arises from a system of domination in which the wealthy, as owners of capital goods, direct the activities and limit the choices of employees (Vrousalis 2013). Domination in this sense could be sustained by an autocratic state acting on behalf of a capitalist class, or through the exercise of market power made possible by limited competition in goods markets.

But Marx chose to study a more challenging question: how could the domination of labour by capital take place in a private, perfectly competitive, economy governed by a liberal state? His answer was based on what seems a strikingly modern principal-agent representation of the employer-employee relationship, arising from a conflict of interest over the amount of labour effort performed that could be resolved in an enforceable contract. 

Marx stressed that the employer purchases the worker's time on the labour market, not the worker's work. The employee's supply of effort to the production process is not secured by contract but was rather an "extraction" that "only by misuse could ... have been called any kind of exchange at all" (Marx 1939).

To stress the distinctive aspect of the labour market, Marx (1867) pointed out that: 

"[T]he rise in ... wages may ... be unaccompanied by any change in the price of labour [meaning effort], or may even be accompanied by a fall in the latter."

The important consequence for the worker, "be his payment high or low," was "domination and exploitation" and "a form of despotism more hateful for its meanness" (ibid).

The final step in Marx's explanation of domination in a liberal capitalist economy was the process of accumulation and technical change that supports a permanent "reserve army" (ibid) of the unemployed, and which provides the basis of the employer's labour discipline strategy. The private ownership of the means of production conveys the right to exclude others from use of the firm's assets, and therefore the owners of firms have a powerful threat to induce workers to supply the effort that could not be secured by contract: work hard, or join the "reserve army".

The politics of production

Marx did not explain why the labour contract was incomplete. He assumed this was an uncontroversial empirical observation and used it as the starting point for his economic theory. In this, he resembles Charles Darwin who advanced a powerful theory of natural selection without an understanding of the mechanism by which it occurred. Genetic inheritance would later be explained by Gregor Mendel.

Just as Mendel underpinned Darwin, a more complete understanding of the incomplete labour contract developed in the twentieth century, but did not overturn Marx's conclusions. Like Marx, Ronald Coase (1937) stressed the central role of authority in the firm's contractual relations: 

"[N]ote the character of the contract into which a factor enters that is employed within a firm ...[T]he factor ... for certain remuneration agrees to obey the directions of the entrepreneur."

Indeed, Coase defined the firm by its political structure: 

"If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in prices but because he is ordered to do so ... the distinguishing mark of the firm is the suppression of the price mechanism." (ibid)

Herbert Simon provided the first Coasean model of the firm (Simon 1951). He represented the employment contract as an exchange in which the employees transfer control rights over their work tasks to the employer, in return for a wage. Simon stressed the advantage to the employer of this arrangement, because there was unavoidable uncertainty about the tasks that would be required over the course of the contract. Therefore there was a high cost of agreeing to a complete contractual specification of the activities to be performed. Simon did not know that he was modelling exactly the incomplete contract for labour that was the fulcrum of Marx's economic theory.

Coase or Simon did not directly explain why control rights confer power. As an empirical matter, the firm appears to be a political institution in the sense that some members of the firm routinely give commands with the expectation that they will be obeyed, while others are constrained to follow these commands. If we say that the manager has the right to decide what the worker will do, this means only that the manager has the legitimate authority, not the power to secure compliance. Given that, in a liberal society, the manager is restricted in the kinds of punishment that can be inflicted, and given that the employee is free to leave, it is a puzzle that orders are typically obeyed.

Noticing this, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz challenged the Coasean idea that the firm is a mini "command economy", suggesting that the employment contract is no different in this respect from other contracts:

"The firm ... has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two people ... Wherein then is the relationship between a grocer and his employee different from that between a grocer and his customer?" (Alchian and Demsetz 1972)

Oliver Hart (1989) responded:

'[T]he reason that an employee is likely to be more responsive to what his employer wants than a grocer is that the employer ... can deprive the employee of the assets he works with and hire another employee to work with these assets, while the customer can only deprive the grocer of his customer and as long as the customer is small, it is presumably not very difficult for the grocer to find another customer."

The exercise of power

This explanation requires a demonstration that power – in some well-defined sense – can be exercised by employers over employees in the equilibrium of a competitive economy. It is nevertheless puzzling that power is exercised in a competitive economy, in which each actor engages voluntarily in exchanges, from which each is equally free to walk away.

The following sufficient condition for the exercise of power captures the central features of Marx's (1867) representation of the "despotism" of the workplace: 

For B to have power over A, it sufficient that, by imposing or threatening to impose sanctions on A, B is capable of affecting A's actions in ways that further B's interests, while A lacks this capacity with respect to B. (Bowles and Gintis 1992)

The definition clarifies the difference between the employer and the grocer in Hart's response to Alchian and Demsetz. The sanctions imposed on the employee by depriving that employee access to the capital good are severe (technically, first order), while those imposed on the grocer by the departing customer are negligible or zero (second order). The disgruntled consumer who walks out the door does not impose a sanction on the grocer because the grocer (in competitive equilibrium) was maximising profits by selecting a level of sales that equates marginal cost to the exogenously given price. A small variation in sales has only a second-order effect on profits. But this is not the case for the employer-employee relationship. This is because involuntary unemployment is a characteristic of the competitive equilibrium of a market in which labour effort is not covered in an enforceable contract(Bowles 1985, Gintis and Ishikawa 1987, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1985). The employer's threat to terminate the worker's position wouldthus impose a first-order cost on the worker. This is the basis of the exercise of power by employers.

The incomplete nature of the labour contract is therefore essential to showing both why the employer's power over the worker is essential to profit-making, and also how it can be sustained by equilibrium unemployment. Marx understood the first but not the second, providing instead a dynamic (and not entirely convincing) account of how the reserve army would be sustained in the long run.

Microeconomist or precursor to modern micro? 

Marx was a pioneer in the study of principal-agent relationships, though of course he did not use the term. Principal-agent models now form the microeconomic foundation for the study of relationships among classes (though economists do not use that term) in capitalist and other economies, for example the standard treatments of the exchanges between employer and employee, or between lender and borrower. These models are essential to current analysis of workaday economic problems such as the cyclical patterns in wage-setting and productivity, and the quantity constraints that borrowers face in credit markets. Both of these problems have substantial microeconomic importance, but are also important foundations of macroeconomics.

Marx was a visionary precursor of modern microeconomics, and modern microeconomics has repaid him the favour by clarifying the limits of some of his most important ideas. Among them the labour theory of value as a representation of a general system of exchange (Morishima 1973, 1974), and his "theory of the tendency of the profit rate to fall" (Bowles 1981, Okishio 1961). As Michio Morishima (1974) pointed out, Marx did not resolve the outstanding theoretical problems of his day, but rather anticipated problems that would later be addressed mathematically.

Modern public economics, mechanism design and public choice theory has also challenged the notion – common among many latter-day Marxists, though not originating with Marx himself – that economic governance without private property and markets could be a viable system of economic governance. 

Political and economic problems

In 1972 Abba Lerner astutely identified one of the limits of the neoclassical paradigm. A contract transforms "a political problem into an economic problem. An economic transaction is a solved political problem ... Economics has gained the title Queen of the Social Sciences by choosing solved political problems as its domain." (Lerner 1972)

Whether this is a feature or a bug depends on your point of view. The Queen's domain has not seemed too cramped because the same paradigm provided a reason to think that unsolved "political problems", such as the incomplete nature of the labour contract, or the exercise of power byemployers over workers, were illusions. Joseph Schumpeter made this point: "What distinguishes directing and directed labour appears at first sight to be very fundamental," he wrote. But, he argued, in reality the difference "constitutes no essential economic distinction ... the conduct of the former is subject to the same rules as that of the latter ... and to establish this regularity ... is a fundamental task of economic theory." (Schumpeter 1934)

Why, one wonders, would Schumpeter consider this point to be of such exceptional importance? The answer is that if Marx's despotism of the workplace is real, then the liberal argument against economic democracy – there's nothing there to democratise – is false.

Editors' note: This column is based on a larger work of the same title to be published in Japanese in a special issue of Keizai Seminar, edited by Naoki Yoshihara. 

References

Alchian, A A and H Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", American Economic Review 62(5): 777-95.

Bowles, S (1981), "Technical Change and the Profit Rate: A Simple Proof of the Okishio Theorem", Cambridge Journal of Economics 5(2): 183–186.

Bowles, S (1985), "The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo- Hobbesian, and Marxian Models", American Economic Review 75(1): 16-36.

Bowles, S and H Gintis (1992), "Power and Wealth in a Competitive Capitalist Economy", Philosophy and Public Affairs 21(4): 324-53.

Coase, R H (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica 4: 386-405.

Gintis, H and T Ishikawa (1987), "Wages, Work Discipline, and Unemployment", Journal of Japanese and International Economies 1: 195-228.

Hart, O (1989), "An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm", Columbia Law Review 89(7): 1757-74.

Keynes, J M (1925), "Soviet Russia." Nation and Athenaeum, 17, 19 and 24 October.

Lerner, A (1972), "The Economics and Politics of Consumer Sovereignty", American Economic Review 62(2): 258-66.

Mark, K (1867), Capital, Critique of Political Economy, Verlag von Otto Meisner.

Marx, K (1939), Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Marx-Engels Institute.

Morishima, M (1973), Marx's Economics: A Dual Theory of Value and Growth, Cambridge University Press.

Morishima, M (1974), "Marx in Light of Modern Economic Theory", Econometrica 4: 611-32.

Okishio, N (1961), "Technical Changes and the Rate of Profit", Kobe University Economic Review 7: 85-99.

Samuelson, P (1962), "Economists and the History of Ideas", American Economic Review 51(1): 1-18.

Schumpeter, J (1934), The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle, Oxford University Press.

Shapiro, C and J Stiglitz (1985), "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Disciplining Device: A Reply", American Economic Review 75(4): 892-93.

Simon, H (1951), "A Formal Theory of the Employment Relation", Econometrica 19(3): 293-305.

Vrousalis, N (2013), "Exploitation, Vulnerability, and Social Domination", Philosophy and Public Affairs 41: 131-57.

Yoshihara, N (2017), "A Progress Report on Marxian Economic Theory and on Controversies in Exploitation Theory since Okishio, 1963", Journal of Economic Surveys,forthcoming.



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Sunday, April 22, 2018

Enlighten Radio:California Country, Storytelling and Recovery

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Friday, April 20, 2018

What’s Driving Trade Tensions Between The US and China [feedly]

What's Driving Trade Tensions Between The US and China
https://economicfront.wordpress.com/2018/04/12/whats-driving-trade-tensions-between-the-us-and-china/

There is a lot of concern over the possibility of a trade war between China and the US.  In early April President Trump announced that his administration was considering levying $100 billion of additional tariffs on Chinese exports, after the Chinese government responded to a previously proposed US tariff hike on Chinese goods of $50 billion by announcing its own equivalent tariff hikes on US exports.  And the Chinese government has made clear it will again respond in kind if these new tariffs are actually imposed.

So, what's it all about?

To this point, it is worth emphasizing that no new tariffs have in fact been levied, by either the US or Chinese governments.  The first round of announced US tariffs on Chinese goods are still subject to a public comment period before becoming effective, and the content of the second round has yet to be formally decided upon.  Thus, both countries have time to back away from their threats.

Also significant is the fact that both countries are being careful about the products they are threatening to tax.  For example, the Trump administration has carefully avoided talking about placing tariffs on computers or cell phones, two of the biggest US imports from China.  The US has also refrained from putting tariffs on clothing, shoes, and furniture, also major imports from China.

It is not hard to guess the reason why: these goods are produced as part of multinational corporate controlled production and marketing networks that operate under the direction of leading US corporations like Dell, Apple, and Walmart.  Taxing these goods would threaten corporate profitability. As a former commissioner of the US International Trade Commission pointed out: "It seems that the U.S. trade representative was very much aware of the global value chains in keeping some of these items off the list."

The Chinese government, for its part, as been equally careful. For example, it put smaller plans on its proposed tariff list while exempting the larger planes made by Boeing.

Although the media largely echoes President Trump's claim that his tariff threats directed at China are all about trying to reduce the large US trade deficit with China in order to save high paying manufacturing jobs and revitalize US manufacturing, the president really has a far narrower aim—that is to protect the monopoly position and profits of dominant US corporations.  The short hand phrase for this is the protection of "intellectual property rights." As Trump tweeted in March: "The U.S. is acting swiftly on Intellectual Property theft. We cannot allow this to happen as it has for many years!"

Bloomberg News offers a more detailed explanation of the connection between the tariff threats and the goal of defending corporate intellectual property:

the White House is considering imposing tariffs on a broad range of consumer goods to punish China for its IP [intellectual property] practices. . . . the U.S. alleges . . . that China has been stealing U.S. trade secrets, forcing American companies to hand over proprietary technology as a condition of doing business on the mainland, and providing state support for Chinese firms to acquire critical technology abroad. A consensus is growing that these policies, designed to establish China as a dominant player in key technologies of the future, from semiconductors to electric cars, threaten to erode America's technological edge, both commercial and military.

In other words, US tariff threats are, in reality, a bargaining chip to get the Chinese government to accept stronger protections for the intellectual property rights and technology of leading US firms in industries such as pharmaceuticals, aerospace, telecommunications, and autos.  If Trump succeeds, US multinational corporations will become more profitable.  But there will be little gain for US workers.

The auto industry offers a good case in point.  President Trump has repeatedly said that forcing China to lower its tariffs on imported US cars will help the US auto industry.  As he correctly points out, there is a 2.5 percent tariff on cars shipped from China to the U.S. and a 25 percent tariff on cars shipped from the U.S. to China.  Trump claims that lowering the Chinese tariff would allow US automakers to export more cars to China and boost auto employment in the US.

However, GM, Ford and other automakers have already established joint ventures with Chinese firms and the great majority of the cars they sell in China are made in China.  This allows them to avoid the tariff.  China is GM's biggest market and has been for six years straight.  The company has 10 joint ventures and two wholly owned foreign enterprises as well as more than 58,000 employees in China. It sells approximately 4 million cars a year in China, almost all made in China.

The two largest automobile exporters from the US to China are actually German.  BMW shipped 106,971 vehicles from the U.S. to China in 2017; Mercedes sent 71,198.  Ford was the leading US owned auto exporter and in third place with total yearly exports of 45,145 vehicles.  Fiat Chrysler was fourth with 16,545.

In short, lowering tariffs on auto imports from the US will do little to boost auto production or employment in the US, or even corporate profits.  The leading US automakers have already globalized their production networks.  But, changes to the joint venture law, or a toughening of intellectual property rights in China could mean a substantial boost to US automaker profits.

For its part, the Chinese government is trying to use its large state-owned enterprises, control over finance, investment restrictions on foreign investment, licensing powers, government procurement policies, and trade restrictions to build its own strong companies.  These are reasonable development policies, ones very similar to those used by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.  It is short-sided for progressives in the US to criticize the use of such policies.  In fact, we should be advocating the development of similar state capacities in the US in order to rebuild and revitalize the US economy.

That doesn't mean we should uncritically embrace the Chinese position.  The reason is that the Chinese government is using these policies to promote highly exploitative Chinese companies that are themselves increasingly export oriented and globalizing.  In other words, the Chinese state seeks only a rebalancing of power and wealth for the benefit of its own elites, not a progressive restructuring of its own or the global economy.

In sum, these threats and counter-threats over trade have little to do with defending worker interests in the US or in China.  Unfortunately, this fact has been lost in the media frenzy over how to interpret Trump's grandstanding and ever-changing policies.  Moreover, the willingness of progressive analysts to join with the Trump administration in criticizing China for its use of state industrial policies ends up blurring the important distinction between the capacities and the way those capacities are being used.  And that will only make it harder to build the kind of movement we need to reshape the US economy.



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Is the Lewis Model of Economic Development Still Relevant to Developing Countries? [feedly]

Is the Lewis Model of Economic Development Still Relevant to Developing Countries?
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/20/04/2018/lewis-model-economic-development-still-relevant-developing-countries

ESRC GPID Director and Global Policy's Deputy Executive Editor, Andy Sumner, takes a look at a model of economic development from the 1950s that he argues is highly relevant to developing countries today.

In the mid-1950s, W. Arthur Lewis outlined a model of economic development. At the heart of the model were the dynamics of labour reallocation in a 'dual economy' composed of a traditional or subsistence sector and a modern or industrial or capitalist sector. The Lewis model has since become one of the most influential models in development economics and its creator was awarded the Nobel Prize in appreciation of it.

Lewis argued that the driver of capital accumulation was a sectoral movement of the factor of production abundant in developing countries, labour, from the 'traditional' or 'non-capitalist' sector (of low productivity, low wage, priced to average product not marginal product, and thus with widespread disguised unemployment) to the 'modern' or 'capitalist' sector (of higher productivity and where wages are set by productivity in the 'subsistence sector'). Crucial is the existence of surplus labour in the traditional or non-capitalist sector. Because of this, wages are set just above subsistence across the whole economy, leading to the transfer of labour over time from traditional or non-capitalist to modern or capitalist sectors and the capture of labour productivity gains to capitalists as profits as these are the source of growth via reinvestment. The floor for wages is institutionally set at subsistence. When the surplus labour disappears an integrated labour market and economy emerge and wages will then start to rise.

The Lewis model was intended as a critique of the neoclassical approach in that labour is available to the modern or capitalist sector of an economy not in a perfectly elastic supply but upward sloping rather than flat, and with a distinction between surplus-producing labour and subsistence labour (the latter of which was a negligible source of net profits for reinvestment, which Lewis saw as the driver for growth). Lewis also rejected the assumptions of neoclassical economists of perfect competition, market clearing and full employment and Lewis made the distinction, noted above, between productive labour, which produced a surplus, and unproductive labour, which did not.

Despite its age, the model remains relevant as an 'ideal type' or heuristic device for the study of economic development through which contemporary patterns of structural transformation and their implications for inclusive growth, wages, profits, employment and productivity can be examined.

In the Lewis model the transfer of labour from a low- to a high-productivity sector can change the functional distribution of income in favour of capital owners. IMF research has argued that this is associated with rising income inequality between individuals too. To manage such inequality, Lewis saw a key role for government to intervene via taxes and subsidies amongst many other policies.

Lewis later discussed the relationship between economic development and distribution as one based on within and between sector inequality somewhat resonating with Simon Kuznets analysis of inequality between and within sectors. Lewis though took a different line and argued that the growth of the modern or capitalist sector, or the 'enclave sector' as he called it in that paper, has good and bad impacts on the traditional sector. Notably, the enclave may enrich the traditional sector by buying commodities and services from it; providing employment to those in the traditional sector; sending remittances; selling goods and services cheaper; and by developing infrastructure, public goods and, through an example of new ideas and institutions, the enclave sector can modernize the traditional sector. Whether development leads to widening inequality depends, he argued on whether the enclave is able to respond to the new economic opportunities (e.g. price changes or the demand for labour). In short, inegalitarian development is not the failure of 'trickle down' vertically from rich to poor but the failure to trickle along or spread horizontally the benefits from enclave to traditional sectors.

The role of the state is highlighted by Lewis who posited that distribution in the enclave depends on the pattern of growth and a set of factors, many of which are 'susceptible to public control' notably the distribution of property, economic structure (in terms of firm size and the capital intensity of production and dependence on foreign resources) and the speed of growth which has the potential to alter 'the relative quantities of the factors of production, and the derived demands, and therefore the distribution of income'. Further, the traditional sector may see income stagnate because the enclave may be predatory (e.g. driving people off their land); products may compete with traditional trades; the wage rate in the enclave may be too high and raise the price of labour above its marginal productivity; because of geographical polarization (the enclave attracts best brains and capital); because population growth accelerates due to improved public health reducing the death rate; and/or excessive migration from the countryside.

What did Lewis conclude? He concluded that whether the enclave enriches or not the traditional sector 'probably depends most on whether the government coerces or helps the traditional sector, and on the nature of the enclaves' (meaning the modern or capitalist sector).

Of course, Lewis and his model have received a number of historical critiques. Though many of these are about what Lewis has been interpreted to mean rather than precisely what he said. For instance, the erroneous claim that Lewis neglected the existence of an urban informal sector absorbing rural surplus labour or the supposed lack of consideration of an open economy. These are misperceptions of the Lewis model. That said, contemporary development poses a set of new questions such as circular or 'commuter' labour migration between sectors rather than permanent migration and relatedly, the role of non-farm income in rural areas which is often estimated to be a substantial part of rural incomes suggesting again workers are not only active in the 'traditional economy' at one point in time. Further, the role of remittances from urban to rural areas (and international remittances).

More importantly, the transfer or labour can take a variety of forms beyond the one anticipated by Lewis. It is by no means guaranteed that the transfer will be from low to high productivity activities. In fact the opposite seems to be the case in many countries. A transfer from low productivity agriculture to low productivity services has been the experience of many developing countries in some cases and other cases a reversing of the Lewis transition in 'premature deindustrialisation'.

In sum, the basic Lewis model is best viewed as an 'ideal type' or an heuristic device to compare to experience. In reality, there are multiple and likely co-existing and co-evolving modalities of structural transformation. What the Lewis model does provide is what Kirkpatrick and Barrientos, aptly referred to as 'an illuminating framework within which to discuss the reality of the process of development, not taking the homogeneity of its sectors literally, but looking behind this to uncover their internal workings and heterogeneity'. For these reasons and many more the Lewis model of economic development remains relevant to developing countries today for understanding the process of structural transformation or long run economic development.

 

 

 

Andy Sumner is a Reader in International Development in the Department of International Development, King's College London. He is Director of the ESRC Global Poverty & Inequality Dynamics (GPID) Research Network. 



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Thursday, April 19, 2018

Links [feedly] Lots of good ones today from Mark Thoma

Links
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2018/04/links.html

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