Saturday, March 10, 2018

Dean Baker and Jared Bernstein: We Know What Bad Trade Policy Looks Like. But What About Good Trade Policy? [feedly]

We Know What Bad Trade Policy Looks Like. But What About Good Trade Policy?

Dean Baker and Jared Bernstein

http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/we-know-what-bad-trade-policy-looks-like-but-what-about-good-trade-policy

Tariffs of 25 percent and 10 percent on all steel and aluminum imports, respectively, are, as has been widely reported, likely to do more harm than good. They may help protect the minority of workers in the targeted industries, but at some cost to the majority in others.

The costs of the tariffs themselves may hardly be noticeable to consumers. Journalist Neil Irwin is correct when he reports that Sen. Mike Lee's claim that the tariffs constitute a "huge job-killing tax hike on American consumers" is true "in terms of direction" but misleading "in terms of magnitude."

The bigger dangers to our economy are twofold. One, that our trading partners will retaliate by taxing our exports to them, thus hurting a broad swath of our exporting industries, and two, by leading an emboldened, reckless Trump administration to enact more bad trade policy.

It is here that the outcry against these tariffs, while sensible in the ways just noted, is woefully incomplete. Nobody seems to have any ideas about what better trade policy would look like. There's a huge status quo bias implicit in virtually every critical take we've seen, as if the genie that President Trump let out of the bottle — globalization creates losers as well as winners, and those losers can be a potent political force — has evaporated into the ether. Such denial helped elevate Trump in the first place.

It is thus clearly insufficient to yell "higher prices!" or even "trade war!" and call it a day. Critics of the tariffs need to tell us what they think better, more inclusive trade policy looks like. Here are some of our ideas.

Use the benefits of trade to help those hurt by it. Trade boosts growth and thus raises gross domestic product and tax revenue. Yet, our politics and tax policies have blocked fiscal policies that could help those whose jobs, earnings and communities have been hit by foreign competition. Such policies include sectoral employment training (training workers for existing or future jobs in their communities), apprenticeships (earn while you learn) and, perhaps most important, direct job creation. Regarding the latter, even as we close in on full employment, we know there are parts of the country that have too few gainful opportunities. To address this labor market failure, a movement is building for job creation policies that include subsidizing employers to hire those left behind as well as directly creating decent quality jobs.

Stop protecting professionals and patents. Over the past four decades, we have designed a trade policy that removes virtually all barriers to trade in goods. Although this has the benefit of allowing us to get imported goods at lower prices (while also putting downward pressure on the wages of U.S. workers who produce these goods), we have not made the same effort to remove protectionist barriers in other areas.

For example, doctors in the United States are highly protected from foreign competition, including highly accomplished doctors in other wealthy countries. As a result, our doctors earn about twice as much on average as doctors in other wealthy countries. If we paid our doctors the same as doctors in countries such as Canada, France and Germany, the savings would be about $90 billion a year, more than six times the estimates of the cost to consumers from the steel tariffs.

Another important area where the country would gain enormously from trade liberalization is reducing the importance of government-granted patent and copyright monopolies. Yet, trade policy over the past four decades has made these monopolies longer and stronger, and sought to apply them worldwide.

The amount at stake is enormous. Many drugs that sell for tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of dollars at their protected price would cost just a few hundred dollars at their free-market price. In the case of prescription drugs, we will spend more than $450 billion this year on drugs that would almost certainly cost less than $80 billion in a free market. The difference of $370 billion is more than 30 times the amount that is at stake with the steel tariffs.

The potential gains from removing barriers to trade in professional services and patents are thus both economically large, and, unlike much past trade liberalization, inequality reducing. How rich would Bill Gates be if there were no copyrights or patents on Microsoft software so that everyone could copy them at no cost? The usual counterargument is that these protections are needed to boost innovation, but there are alternative approaches that are much more efficient and far less inequitable.

Currency management and capital flows: It is widely recognized that some countries game the trading system, not by dumping metals below cost onto global markets, but by suppressing the value of their currencies, making our exports to them more expensive and their imports to us, cheaper. These nations run large trade surpluses that they use to finance large purchases of U.S. currencies and assets, generating capital flows that pump up both the dollar and our trade deficit. Tariffs will not help in this regard (Paul Krugman of the New York Times worries that given current conditions, they could strengthen the dollar). One pushback idea is Joseph E. Gagnon and C. Fred Bergsten's "countervailing currency intervention" plan, wherein the United States makes it clear that we will "offset the effects of currency manipulation through equal purchases of the intervening country's currency."

There's a lot more to bring to this table (e.g., see these "new rules of the road" for much more inclusive trade deals). We recognize that no one in the Trump administration is sitting at that table right now, and in this regard, "do less harm" is a perfectly legitimate rationale for opposing their reckless trade policies. But for economic and political reasons, our energies must not be devoted to solely opposing bad trade policies. We must start building the case for much better ones.


Jared Bernstein, a former chief economist to Vice President Joe Biden, is a senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and author of 'The Reconnection Agenda: Reuniting Growth and Prosperity'.

Dean Baker is senior economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research.



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Dean Baker; The Continuing Attack on Workers’ Rights: The Janus Case [feedly]

The Continuing Attack on Workers' Rights: The Janus Case
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/the-continuing-attack-on-workers-rights-the-janus-case

Later this year, the United States Supreme Court will decide a lawsuit filed by Mark Janus, a public employee in the State of Illinois. Janus is arguing that he cannot be forced to pay a representation fee to a public sector union as a condition of employment by the state. If the court rules in favor of Janus, as is widely expected, it will be yet another blow against unions, further weakening workers' power.

Under current law, the federal government gives states the option of allowing "agency shop" provisions in contracts under which everyone who is covered by a union contract. Twenty-four states, including California and New York, allow such contracts.

These contracts make it easier for unions to organize and to be a strong presence in the workplace since they prevent workers from being able to freeload. Without an agency shop provision, workers would be able to get the pay and benefits negotiated by the union, and even the right to have union representation in disputes with management, without having to pay a penny for those union supports.

While most workers support their union and will pay representation fees without being required by a contract, recent experience indicates that between 20 to 30 percent of workers will take the freeloading option. This hugely weakens the union if they lose 20 to 30 percent of their revenue. It is likely to make them a less effective agent for members and will almost certainly result in fewer unions in the public sector.

This is clearly the goal of the groups supporting Janus. He is having his suit funded by right-wing groups that have been attacking unions for decades. The ostensible basis for the suit is that Janus somehow has his right to work compromised if he has to pay representation fees as a condition for holding a public sector job. The argument is that the government can't force him to support an organization (the union) that he may not like. (It is important to note that he is not forced to join the union, only pay for his representation.)

The idea that there is some workers' right at issue is ridiculous on its face. Workers can be required to wear uniforms that they may not like. The government may buy health insurance for workers from a company that some workers consider corrupt. Or, it may invest their retirement money with financial companies that engage in what workers view as bad practices.

No one questions the right for the government to make these decisions for workers and what is done with a portion of their compensation. If workers are sufficiently bothered, their option is to look for another job. The plaintiff in Janus is effectively arguing that allowing workers to impose a condition on their coworkers somehow violates their rights in ways that the government, contracting on their behalf, does not.

There is no logic in this position. It is purely an effort to weaken the power of workers. In recent years the right has turned their focus on public sector workers, primarily because they have already been so successful in weakening unions in the private sector.

In the 1970s, unionization rates in the private sector were over 20 percent. They are now under 7.0 percent. Meanwhile the unionization rate in the public sector has changed little, remaining close to 37.0 percent for most of this period, until the recent attack started pushing it down in the last five or six years.

It is understandable why the right would be targeting unions. Not only are they an important source of funding and a source of campaign workers for Democratic candidates, but they have also been behind efforts to push progressive measures at the state and local level.

With the right effectively blocking most progressive movement at the federal level since the early days of the Obama administration, many state and local governments have moved forward with measures like higher minimum wages, paid family leave and sick days, and even state-managed retirement systems for private sector workers.

In every case where such measures have advanced, unions have played a central role. In some cases, this has meant lobbying legislators to support these measures. In others, proponents were able to pass these measures into law with ballot initiatives in which funding and campaign work by unions were essential.

The right recognizes the importance of unions to progressive change and for this reason wants to do everything it can to weaken them. Unfortunately, many people who consider themselves progressives have not been as understanding of the role that unions have played in promoting change. As a result, they have not always been supportive of measures to facilitate unionization and sometimes push policies, like charter schools, which are a direct attack on public sector unions.

It may be too late to prevent an anti-union ruling in the Janus case, but finding ways to rebuild the labor movement is not just a problem for labor unions. It is a problem for anyone interested in progressive change in the United States. It will be necessary to be as innovative in finding ways to support unions as the right has been in its efforts to destroy them.



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The many flaws in the Senate’s rollback of Dodd-Frank: Attention must be paid. [feedly]

The many flaws in the Senate's rollback of Dodd-Frank: Attention must be paid.
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/the-many-flaws-in-the-senates-rollback-of-dodd-frank-attention-must-be-paid/

A couple of days ago, I participated in the "On Point" radio show about this (sort of) bispartisan effort to significantly rollback the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill that passed back in 2010. I was a member of team Obama back then and thought this was an important and very necessary advance. Imperfect, sure, but an essential set of regulations and consumer protections to diminish the seemingly endless repetition of the economic shampoo cycle: bubble, bust, repeat.

You can listen to my take on the show. I think this so-called fix to the bill goes way too far and exempts or partially exempts too many potentially risky institutions from the necessary oversight in Dodd-Frank. This mistake represents a) precisely the amnesia about reckless finance that repeatedly shows up years after the last crisis, b) an underestimate by the Senate Democrats signing on to the measure of the risk brought back into the system , and c) an almost completely unnecessary bit of work.

By that last point, I mean this: what's the motivation here? The financial sector, large and small, is doing great in terms of profitability (and that's before all their goodies in the tax cuts), credit is freely flowing, and while there's always speculation afoot in financial markets, there are no large and potentially destabilizing credit bubbles. So, of all the problems we face, why should Congress waste valuable time fixing something that's clearly not broken?

No question, as I stressed on the show, compliance with Dodd-Frank is far from costless, as any banking executive will readily tell you. And while the compliance burden is smaller for smaller banks, it's still a pain for some institutions, like community banks and credit unions. So, I grant that there's a rationale for reducing that burden. But, as you'd expect, given the linkages between Congress and the deep-pocketed banking lobby (and, trust me, I'm not just talking about the R's), the Senate legislation goes much further than that.

Moreover, once the bill gets out of the Senate, it may well have to be reconciled with a far more deregulatory House bill. Most notably, the Senate bill leaves the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created by Dodd-Frank intact, whereas House conservatives have long been trying to crush the CFPB.

But there were two points that came up in the show that I wanted to further amplify, including an important fact check.

A couple of times in the show, advocates of the rollback argued that Dodd-Frank was responsible for putting a bunch of smaller banks out of business. I pointed out that while it's true that there are fewer smaller banks, this is a long-term trend that did not accelerate post Dodd-Frank. The figure below shows this to be the case, which correct the strong, wrong assertion to the contrary made by Cong. Jeb Henserling towards the end of the show.

My second point is one I alluded to but wanted to further underscore: just because a bank is not "systemically connected," i.e., its failure does not threaten the larger financial system, doesn't mean it should be able to engage in excessively risky finance.

The rollback allows smaller banks to make some of the same kind of risky mortgages that inflated the bubble that ultimately gave us the Great Recession. For two reasons, however, proponents of the bill argue this won't be a problem. First, because the banks can't securitize and offload the mortgages, so keeping them on their books gives them the incentive to not underprice risk. Second, they simply don't lend enough in this space to threaten the system.

I don't buy the first claim for a moment. The reason the shampoo cycle exists is because time-and-again, institutions increasingly get their risk on as the memory of the last meltdown fades. We had plenty of credit bubbles and busts before securitization come on this scene.

I asked the Roosevelt Institute's Mike Konczal (read his excellent, deep-dive oped on the rollback bill) about this second point: whether we should downplay concerns about smaller banks because they're not "systemically connected." Like me, he views such concerns as highly germane to this misguided legislation: "When banks fail, they usually fail in a correlated way, because they are chasing the same strategies and ideas. So, you can have several mid-sized or smaller banks collapse at the same time and added together they become a real threat. At that point you'll wish they were better capitalized and had better failure planning, which is exactly what this bill rolls back."

This is far from over, and I can tell you from my own visits up to the Hill in recent days that many Democrats, and not just from the Sanders/Warren wing, recognize what's going on here, oppose the bill, and fear their Senate colleagues got rolled. So, assuming you'd rather not end up where we were ten years ago, stay tuned into this and join me in pushing back on it.



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Jobs report: There’s still room to run in this job market! [feedly]

Jobs report: There's still room to run in this job market!
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/jobs-report-theres-still-room-to-run-in-this-job-market/

Payrolls rose 313,000 last month, well above expectations, and the unemployment rate held at 4.1 percent, as wage growth moderated a bit  from last month's pace (up 2.6 percent, yr/yr). Though these monthly data are notoriously jumpy, the out-sized job gains were accompanied by a nice pop in labor force participation rate–up 0.3 percent to 63 percent–suggesting that the hot labor market may be pulling new workers in from the sidelines. If so–if this turns out to be more of a trend than a blip–this has important, positive implications for the increased "supply-side" of the economy, implying more room-to-run than many economists believe to be the case.

This was the first over 300K month since July 2016, and the jump in labor force participation comes after the rate was stuck at 62.7 percent since last September. However, both of these values jump around and so our monthly smoother provides a look at the underlying trend in job growth by taking 3, 6, and 12 month averages of the monthly changes.

This month, the smoother tells a surprising story. Typically, as economies close in on full employment, we expect the rate of job gains to slow, as the labor market nears its capacity. But the smoother shows the opposite pattern, that of a (slightly) accelerating trend. For example, over the past three months, the average monthly job gains come to 242,000, but over the last 12 months, they amount to a lower 190,000. We should be careful not to over-interpret even these smoothed numbers, but the punchline is that it's hard to make a case that employment growth is DEcelerating, as would be the case if the economy's water glass, if you will, were full to the brim.

This question of how much room-to-run exists out there is leading, as it should, to close scrutiny of wage growth for signs that job market pressures are pushing up paychecks. The figures below show yearly hourly wage growth (along with a smoother trend) of both all private sector workers and the lower paid 80 percent who are blue-collar or non-managers. The wage pop that spooked markets last month (Jan17/Jan18) was revised down slightly, from allegedly scary 2.9 percent to 2.8 percent. As noted, this month's wage pace slowed a bit to 2.6 percent.

Again, the smooth trend (6-mos average, in this case) in wage growth deserves a close look, and it shows remarkably little acceleration given the persistent tightness of the job market. I'll discuss why that may be occurring in a moment, but in fact, there's a bit more there than meets the eye. Taking annualized growth rates of quarterly averages reveals more wage acceleration: 2.9 percent over the past three months compared to 2.5 percent last spring. This suggests perhaps a bit more pressure than the annual growth numbers reveal, which is, of course, what we'd expect at this point.

That said, there's just no story right now, at least in the actual data (as opposed to expectations), of an overly tight job market leading to inflationary wage gains. The figure below shows some of the key indicators from the Fed's dashboard, including unemployment, the Fed's guess at the "natural rate" (the lowest unemployment rate consistent with stable inflation), actual inflation (PCE core, the Fed's preferred gauge), and the Fed's inflation target of 2 percent.

As you see, unemployment has been below the Fed's "natural rate" for about a year (!) and both inflation and wage growth remain subdued. In other words, the links in the chain that go from a tight labor market, to faster wage growth, to faster inflation, remain uniquely weak.

There are surely many reasons for this, not all of which are understood. Productivity growth is lower, which tamps down potential wage growth. But also, worker bargaining power looks weaker than it should be at low unemployment. That's partly because the unemployment rate isn't telling the full story. Consider the prime-age (25-54) employment rate. Its peak in 2007 was 80.3 percent and its trough was 74.8 percent. Last month, it popped up three-tenths to 79.3 percent, thus it has recovered 4.5 out of 5.5 lost points. Given the population of these workers, each point amounts to 1.3 million potential workers added to the labor force. In other words, while there's no question that there's less slack in the job market, it's very likely a mistake to conclude there's no slack left.

A few more details:

–Warmer February weather compared to a harsh January may have played a role in the big jobs pop. The strong construction number (61,000 jobs added) may be evidence of that effect.

–Retailers (brick and mortar stores) got an off-trend-to-the-upside bump of 50,000. I suspect that trails off in coming months.

–Manufacturing, perhaps helped by the weaker dollar, continues to post decent gains, and is up 224,000 over the past year.

–Black unemployment, which spiked last month, fell back down to 6.9 percent, close to its historical low, suggesting the tight labor market is helping to employ minority workers. Still, the black rate remains close to twice the white rate.

This morning I read a pretty typical market take of the current job market. Economists at Barclays Bank wrote: "Looking ahead, we will view solid growth in employment less favorably."

While I'm sorry in this analytic context for getting my class warrior on, why must Wall St. begrudge Main St. right now? The answer is high pressure job markets threaten wage gains which threaten both profit margins and inflation. Well, we've had too few wage gains relative to profits, and not enough inflation. So I, for one, will be looking at more reports like this one "more favorably."



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Welfare Versus GDP: What Makes People Better Off [feedly]

Welfare Versus GDP: What Makes People Better Off
https://blogs.imf.org/2018/03/07/welfare-versus-gdp-what-makes-people-better-off/

Oslo, Norway. In rich countries like Norway, that have greater life expectancy, more leisure, and lower inequality, measured well-being is higher than income (photo: iStock by Getty Images).

For years, economists have worked to develop a way of measuring general well-being and comparing it across countries. The main metric has been differences in income or gross domestic product per person. But economists have long known that GDP is an imperfect measure of well-being, counting just the value of goods and services bought and sold in markets. The challenge is to account for non-market factors such as the value of leisure, health, and home production, such as cleaning, cooking and childcare, as well as the negative byproducts of economic activity, such as pollution and inequality.

Charles Jones and Peter Klenow proposed a new index two years ago (American Economic Review, 2016) that combines data on consumption with three non-market factors—leisure, excessive inequality, and mortality—in an economically consistent way to calculate expected lifetime economic benefits across countries. In our recent working paper, Welfare vs. Income Convergence and Environmental Externalities, we updated and extended this work, attempting to include measures of environmental effects and sustainability. In this blog we look at our results from updating the new index.

Our findings clearly suggest that per capita income or GDP does capture the main component of well-being. And health—a key component of well being—is critical to raising welfare and income.

The well-being index

What emerges from Jones and Klenow's work is a consumption-equivalent index that measures welfare derived from consumption, then adds the value of leisure (or home production) and subtracts costs related to inequality. This calculation is made for each country over one year and then multiplied by the life expectancy in each country. This gives us a measure of average expected lifetime welfare based on consumption, leisure, inequality, and life expectancy. (Click here for a further discussion of the well-being index.)

There is a close relationship between our calculation of per capita welfare for 151 countries in 2014 and per capita income or GDP. The chart above shows that most countries line up fairly well along the 45-degree line (where relative welfare and income per capita are the same) indicating correlation, but there are significant differences, too. Poorer countries on the left are largely below the line, showing that welfare is lower than income. Richer countries at the top right are above the line, reflecting welfare that is higher than income. 

Grouping countries by income quintile gives us some insight into why this is the case (see chart above). We can present the welfare index for each quintile calculated from the components of life expectancy, consumption, leisure, and inequality, with US levels as a benchmark. As a group, the top fifth of countries based on income has a combined welfare index almost 7 percent below the US benchmark. The bottom fifth's index is about 95 percent lower than that of the US.

As the main component of the index, consumption explains most of the difference in welfare between countries at different income levels. Richer countries in the top two-fifths benefit from higher life expectancy and lower inequality. Poorer countries in the bottom three-fifths have lower life expectancy and higher inequality, contributing to lower welfare.

How has welfare changed over time? Welfare grew more quickly than income during the recent global financial crisis (chart below). This is particularly true for countries that were hardest hit in Western Europe and North America. The only exception is Asia, which had an impressively high level of growth in both income and welfare.


 What can we learn from the calculation of this index?

First, don't throw out GDP. As imperfect as it is, per capita income or GDP does capture the main component of well-being. Policies that improve the efficiency of production and contribute to income will continue to be important in promoting welfare. These include the bread and butter of IMF policy advice: promoting macroeconomic and financial stability, and structural reforms to improve the efficiency of markets.

Second, improvements in health are vital. Poor health leads to lower life expectancy and imposes a significant welfare cost on poorer countries. Policies that improve health are powerful tools in raising welfare: improving access to healthcare, nutrition, and clean water; improving the quality of care; and taxing unhealthy behaviors such as smoking.

Bad health also contributes to disruptions in employment, lowers productivity, and reduces economic growth. So, improvements in health will not only elevate welfare directly but are also likely to result in higher incomes and future welfare improvements in a virtuous cycle.

See Geoffrey Bannister explain his findings on Welfare versus GDP below:




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Beware of Strike-it-Rich Euphoria: the Curse of Potential Oil Wealth [feedly]

Beware of Strike-it-Rich Euphoria: the Curse of Potential Oil Wealth



https://blogs.imf.org/2018/03/09/beware-of-strike-it-rich-euphoria-the-curse-of-potential-oil-wealth/

The resource curse, or paradox of plenty, is when countries with an abundance of natural resources suffer stagnant economic growth or even contraction.

In this podcast, World Bank economist James Cust, says the problem of eradicating extreme poverty is going to be about how resource-rich countries manage their resource wealth.

"The share of the world's poor living in resource-rich countries in the year 2000 was less than 25 percent, but by 2030 it will be almost 75 percent," says Cust. 

While the resource curse is notorious, Cust has his sights set on the lesser known presource curse. He says the latter is not an effect from oil exports, as is the case for the better-known resource curse, but rather an effect from the discovery of oil or other natural resources.

"We find that some countries have experienced problems in growth, even before production begins—before a single barrel of oil is taken out of the ground," he says.

Expectations form the basis of the curse, he adds, and countries, governments and citizens alike suffer from a strike-it-rich euphoria. This emboldens governments to increase spending and borrowing, and in some cases, it leads to economic crises when oil prices collapse, he says.

In theory, major resource discoveries should propel growth. But in practice, Cust says the opposite is often true. Keeping that in mind, Cust has a simple recommendation for countries to avoid the presourse curse.

"Don't count your chickens before they've hatched."

Take Ghana and Tanzania, which both had major discoveries of oil during the commodities boom. Ghana got off to a good start. The government put in place a strong petroleum revenue management program that specified how to use the oil revenues, and included a savings fund for future generations. It saved about $500 million from oil revenues. Unfortunately, the country borrowed about $4.5 billion. Although it didn't break the rules of their petroleum revenue management act, it defied the spirit of it, Cust says. And when the oil price crashed in 2014, oil revenues dried up, growth slumped.  

Tanzania took a different path. The government didn't increase borrowing to the same extent as Ghana, and didn't increase spending to unsustainable levels. So, when oil prices crashed in 2014, they weren't as vulnerable as Ghana was. 

Fortunately, Cust says lessons from Ghana and Tanzania's experience can help the current roster of nations grappling with these same challenges learn, and in turn, smartly manage their own major discoveries. 

VISIT WEBSITE

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Mark Thoma Links for 03-09-18 [feedly]

Links for 03-09-18
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2018/03/links-for-03-09-18.html

I kind of got behind...



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