Saturday, June 24, 2017

New Home Sales increase to 610,000 Annual Rate in May



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New Home Sales increase to 610,000 Annual Rate in May // Calculated Risk
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2017/06/new-home-sales-increase-to-610000.html

The Census Bureau reports New Home Sales in May were at a seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 610 thousand.

The previous three months combined were revised up.

"Sales of new single-family houses in May 2017 were at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 610,000, according to estimates released jointly today by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. This is 2.9 percent above the revised April rate of 593,000 and is 8.9 percent above the May 2016 estimate of 560,000."
emphasis added

Click on graph for larger image.

The first graph shows New Home Sales vs. recessions since 1963. The dashed line is the current sales rate.

Even with the increase in sales over the last several years, new home sales are still somewhat low historically.

The second graph shows New Home Months of Supply.

The months of supply was unchanged in May at 5.3 months.

The all time record was 12.1 months of supply in January 2009.

This is in the normal range (less than 6 months supply is normal).

"The seasonally-adjusted estimate of new houses for sale at the end of May was 268,000. This represents a supply of 5.3 months at the current sales rate."

On inventory, according to the Census Bureau:

"A house is considered for sale when a permit to build has been issued in permit-issuing places or work has begun on the footings or foundation in nonpermit areas and a sales contract has not been signed nor a deposit accepted."

Starting in 1973 the Census Bureau broke this down into three categories: Not Started, Under Construction, and Completed.

The third graph shows the three categories of inventory starting in 1973.

The inventory of completed homes for sale is still low, and the combined total of completed and under construction is also low.

The last graph shows sales NSA (monthly sales, not seasonally adjusted annual rate).

In May 2017 (red column), 58 thousand new homes were sold (NSA). Last year, 53 thousand homes were sold in May.

The all time high for May was 120 thousand in 2005, and the all time low for May was 26 thousand in 2010.

This was above expectations of 590,000 sales SAAR, and the previous months were revised up.   A solid report.  I'll have more later today.
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U.S. Demographics: The Millennials Take Over



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U.S. Demographics: The Millennials Take Over // Calculated Risk
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2017/06/us-demographics-millennials-take-over.html

From the Census Bureau The Nation's Older Population Is Still Growing, Census Bureau Reports

New detailed estimates show the nation's median age — the age where half of the population is younger and the other half older — rose from 35.3 years on April 1, 2000, to 37.9 years on July 1, 2016.

"The baby-boom generation is largely responsible for this trend," said Peter Borsella, a demographer in the Population Division. "Baby boomers began turning 65 in 2011 and will continue to do so for many years to come."

Residents age 65 and over grew from 35.0 million in 2000, to 49.2 million in 2016, accounting for 12.4 percent and 15.2 percent of the total population, respectively.

Click on graph for larger image.

This graph uses the data in the July 1, 2016 estimate released today.

Using the Census data, here is a table showing the ten most common ages in 2010 and 2016.

Note the younger baby boom generation dominated in 2010.  By 2016 the millennials have taken over.  The six largest groups, by age, are in their 20s - and eight of the top ten are in their 20s. 

My view is this is positive for both housing and the economy.

Population: Most Common Ages by Year  20102016150252492632024419235472764622748558512891821105255
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NYTimes.com: Pure Class Warfare, With Extra Contempt

I love it when K goes Lenin, and turns his genius in the correct class direction

From The New York Times:

Pure Class Warfare, With Extra Contempt

Republicans bet that tribal voters will support politicians who ruin their lives.

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/pure-class-warfare-with-extra-contempt/?mwrsm=Email

Friday, June 23, 2017

Commentary: Once Passed, Medicaid Cuts Won’t Be Easily Reversed [feedly]

Commentary: Once Passed, Medicaid Cuts Won't Be Easily Reversed
http://www.cbpp.org/health/commentary-once-passed-medicaid-cuts-wont-be-easily-reversed

Despite promises that the emerging Senate health bill will moderate the health coverage cuts in the House-passed American Health Care Act (AHCA), the Senate not only is retaining the House bill's fundamental restructuring of the Medicaid program — a "per capita cap" on federal funding — but is deepening the cuts under the per capita cap beginning around 2025.[1] Because the per capita cap wouldn't take effect until 2020 and the Senate's further cuts wouldn't kick in until five years after that, some suggest that policymakers might later undo the per capita cap itself or indefinitely delay the deeper cuts under pressure from state leaders, the public, providers, and others. This confidence is unwarranted; it ignores both recent history and the legislative constraints that would make it difficult or impossible to undo the deep Medicaid cuts.

THOSE STRUCTURAL CHANGES WOULD CREATE A POLITICAL DYNAMIC THAT COULD LEAD TO EVEN LARGER CUTS IN THE FUTURE. Once Congress both changes Medicaid's basic structure and enacts large annual savings, those cuts are highly unlikely to be reversed. In fact, those structural changes would create a political dynamic that could lead to even larger cuts in the future:

  • History suggests that structural changes to Medicaid would be very difficult to reverse. The basic concept behind the per capita cap is to impose a cap on federal funding per beneficiary, replacing the existing commitment of the federal government to pay a fixed share of state Medicaid costs. Experience with other programs suggests that such radical structural changes won't be reversed. The conversion of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) entitlement program to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant in 1996 is instructive: TANF's block grant structure has not only persisted but also led to a continuing erosion of the program's funding and effectiveness.[2]

    Indeed, the history of block grants (the closest analogy to a per capita cap) is that this structure enables deep cuts over time.  Since 2000, funding for the 13 major housing, health, and social services block grants has fallen by 27 percent, after adjusting for inflation (and 37 percent after adjusting for inflation and population growth).[3]   

  • Experience shows that spending cuts are also difficult to undo – due to both legislative and political constraints. Commentators have analogized the future increase in the Medicaid cuts to expiring tax provisions or cuts to Medicare payments to physicians under the "sustainable growth rate" (SGR) formula — measures that threatened sudden and painful cuts or tax increases, which Congress repeatedly delayed and ultimately largely reversed due to their political unpopularity. But recent history suggests that planned spending cuts aren't easy to undo. Unlike expiring tax provisions, both congressional rules and Republican demands may require "pay-fors" to offset the cost of reversing planned spending cuts. To reverse the spending cuts without offsetting the cost would likely require support from congressional leadership in both houses, 60 votes in the Senate, and support from the President.

    Indeed, while canceling the planned SGR cuts was highly popular and supported by a vocal and powerful interest group, for nearly 20 years — almost without exception — Congress either offset the cuts with other cuts (frequently other health cuts) or let them take effect. The automatic "sequestration" cuts passed in 2011 to force further deficit reduction are another example: a significant share of the cuts have taken effect, and sequestration relief has required substantial offsets.

    Reversing Medicaid cuts would require both a political consensus that they shouldn't have been enacted and sufficient congressional support to either waive budget rules or find painful offsets to achieve them. To be sure, Medicaid has broad-based support and affects a wide range of seniors, people with disabilities, and families with children.  But reversing these cuts would require mobilizing support not just for a low-income program but also for the revenue increases to pay for it.

  • The cuts under a per capita cap would grow substantially over time — making them harder to undo. That's true for both the destructive House cap and the even more destructive version under consideration by the Senate. Estimates suggest that the long-run cuts to Medicaid from a per capita cap indexed to general inflation, as under the Senate bill, could be several times larger or more than those under the House cap. That difference likely amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars of additional federal cuts in the subsequent decade.[4]  As a result, if offsets are needed to undo the Medicaid cuts, they would need to be far larger than those required to undo the past SGR cuts — and would grow substantially after the current ten-year budget window. Indeed, reversing all of the AHCA's tax breaks wouldn't pay for undoing the Medicaid cuts.
  • States would have to plan for cuts in advance — meaning they'd have no choice but to act pre-emptively, even if Congress eventually mitigated the damage. The magnitude of the cuts under a per capita cap, plus the difficulty of undoing them, would leave states with no choice but to act in advance. Even while lobbying Congress to reverse the cuts, they would pre-emptively limit Medicaid eligibility and services and cut provider payment rates to avoid the possibility that they'd have to drop coverage suddenly if the cuts took effect.[5]

Finally, it's worth noting that the Senate's changes illustrate another serious problem with a per capita cap: it gives policymakers an easy way to make deeper cuts to Medicaid whenever they need budget savings. Just as the Senate dialed down the growth rate of future Medicaid spending in order to meet the AHCA's overall deficit targets, future Congresses would have a strong incentive to make seemingly technical tweaks to the cap that generate large savings by further lowering the growth rate. Indeed, Congress may find it especially appealing to enact cuts that take effect several years down the line in order to offset more immediate costs, as the Senate is effectively doing with its changes.

Thus, while pundits may be right that the bill's Medicaid cuts will unfold differently over time than anticipated today, the cuts would likely end up bigger, not smaller, than those enacted now.

End Notes

[1] Edwin Park, "Senate Bill's Medicaid Cuts Would Be Even Deeper than House Cuts," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, June 20, 2017, http://www.cbpp.org/blog/senate-bills-medicaid-cuts-would-be-even-deeper-than-house-cuts.

[2] Liz Schott, "Lessons from TANF: Block-Granting a Safety-Net Program Has Significantly Reduced Its Effectiveness," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, February 22, 2017, http://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/lessons-from-tanf-block-granting-a-safety-net-program-has.

[3] David Reich et al., "Block-Granting Low-Income Programs Leads to Large Funding Declines Over Time, History Shows," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, February 22, 2017, http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/block-granting-low-income-programs-leads-to-large-funding-declines-over-time.

[4] Park.

[5] Edwin Park, "Medicaid Per Capita Cap Would Shift Costs and Risks to States and Harm Millions of Beneficiaries," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised February 27, 2017, http://www.cbpp.org/research/health/medicaid-per-capita-cap-would-shift-costs-and-risks-to-states-and-harm-millions-of.


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East Asia’s Real Lessons [feedly]

East Asia's Real Lessons
http://triplecrisis.com/east-asias-real-lessons/

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

International recognition of East Asia's rapid economic growth, structural change and industrialization grew from the 1980s. In Western media and academia, this was seen as a regional phenomenon, associated with some commonality, real or imagined, such as a supposed "yen bloc."

Others had a more mythic element, such as "flying geese," or ostensible bushido and Confucian ethics. Every purported miracle claims a mythic element, invariably fit for purpose. After all, miracles are typically attributed to supernatural forces, and hence, cannot be emulated by mere mortals. Hence, to better learn from ostensible miracles, it is necessary to demystify them.

The World Bank's 1993 East Asian Miracle (EAM) volume is the most influential document on the subject. It identified eight high-performing Asian economies: Japan, Hong Kong, three first-generation newly industrialized economies, namely South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, and three second-generation South East Asian newly industrializing countries, viz, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. Despite a title implying geo-spatial commonality, the study denied the significance of geography and culture, and specifically excluded China, the elephant in the region.

Strategic interventions?

The book identified six state interventions as important, approving of four "functional" interventions, but skeptical of two "strategic" interventions. Functional interventions supposedly compensated for market failures, while strategic interventions were deemed more market-distortive.

These two "strategic" interventions are in the areas of finance, specifically what it calls directed (targeted) and subsidized credit, and international trade, particularly what is often referred to as "industrial policy," or more rarely as "investment and technology policy."

Careful consideration of the accelerated East Asian growth and transformation experiences underscore that such interventions were mainly responsible for the superior performance of the Northeast Asian HPAEs compared to their Southeast Asian counterparts.

Industrial investments

Debates over Northeast Asian industrialization continue, but the pioneering work of American political economists Chalmers Johnson and Alice Amsden was undoubtedly seminal. Both showed that Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese government measures were quite different from typical World Bank development policy advice.

Successful finance ministry and central bank efforts to keep interest rates positive, but low, were crucial for accelerating industrial investments. From the mid-1970s, more orthodox Western economists began to characterize this as constituting "financial repression," for depressing interest rates, the incentive to save and funds available for investment.

Only later did other Western economists explain this Korean anomaly in terms of "financial restraint" to overcome financial market failures. But few have noted that savings rates actually follow, rather than determine investment rates. Meanwhile, cultural explanations have also been invoked to explain East Asia's high savings and investment rates.

Ownership matters

Subsidized and directed (or targeted) credit also promoted desired investments. Fiscal and other policies also encouraged reinvestment of profits, rather than maximizing "shareholder value," while other incentives encouraged desired investments. Where private investments were not forthcoming, the governments themselves made needed investments despite active discouragement by international development banks.

Strict controls on capital outflows, especially when foreign exchange resources were still scarce, also served to discourage capital flight. Northeast Asian economies were also careful to distinguish between long-term foreign direct investment (FDI) and short-term portfolio investment, or "hot money."

Perhaps owing to Bank preference for FDI, ostensibly to close both the "savings-investment" and "foreign exchange" gaps, the EAM also favoured FDI and did not consider ownership important. However, during the early decades of high growth before the 1990s, Northeast Asian governments encouraged national ownership of industrial enterprises.

This policy served to promote vertically and horizontally integrated industrial conglomerates in the case of Korean chaebol and Japanese keiretsu. (Zaibatsu were suppressed after the Second World War as they were held responsible for the pre-war Japanese military industrial complex.) Instead of FDI, South Korea encouraged licensing and, if necessary, joint-ventures to promote technology transfer.

Singapore and Malaysia in Southeast Asia have especially sought to attract FDI, initially for political reasons. Singapore desired strong Western support after establishing a new state in 1965. Since then, FDI has been attracted as part of a pro-active technology policy complemented by government policies, including investments. Attracting FDI to accelerate technology development is quite different from capital account liberalization enabling short-term financial inflows.

Trade policies

The Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese governments pursued import substituting industrialization policies from the 1950s, but later encouraged export orientation as well. Infant industries were provided with effective protection conditional on export promotion, effectively requiring firms to quickly become internationally competitive.

By protecting firms temporarily, depending on the product to be promoted, and by requiring certain output shares be exported within pre-specified periods, discipline was imposed on firms in return for the support provided. Such policies forced firms to achieve greater economies of scale and accelerate learning to reduce production costs quickly.

Requiring exports has also meant producers have had to achieve international consumer quality standards quickly, which accelerated progress in product and process technology. This "carrot and stick" approach induced many firms to rapidly become internationally competitive.

Thus, the very industrial, trade and financial policies rejected by the Bank were in fact necessary for East Asia's achievements. Some policies were inappropriately and prematurely undermined or terminated, e.g., with Japan's financial "big bang," with disastrous consequences.

Originally published by Inter Press Service.

Triple Crisis welcomes your comments. Please share your thoughts below.


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Links: Recession risks; the really, really bad Senate GOP health plan; see ya later… [feedly]

Links: Recession risks; the really, really bad Senate GOP health plan; see ya later…
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/links-recessions-risks-the-really-really-bad-senate-gop-health-plan-see-ya-later/

A few links to check out, both over at WaPo.

First, no one knows when the next recession will hit though it's closer now than when I started writing this sentence. But I've got two recessionary concerns: one, fiscal policy, both discretionary and automatic will be thoroughly insufficient due to the toxic mix of Congressional dysfunction and austerity; two, financial deregulation will raise the likelihood of another bubble.

Second, the Senate health care plan is worse than the House plan. Specifically, it's pretty much the House plan but with much deeper Medicaid cuts over the long term.

Finally, I'm outta here, headed for the far-east for a few weeks, and I'm gonna do my best not to cast my gaze westward. You know what that means, right? It means that you, OTE'ers, have to keep the forces of economic darkness from gaining any ground in my absence. Be assured, I'll hold you personally responsible if the sh__ goes south while I go east.

Best,
JB


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Links for 06-23-17 [feedly]