Thursday, May 11, 2017

Understanding Brexit [feedly]

Understanding Brexit
http://triplecrisis.com/understanding-brexit/

On April 24, John Weeks, retired from SOAS University of London, gave testimony on the economic cost of Brexit to the Committee on the Affairs of the European Union of the Deutsche Bundestag. He was invited as an expert witness by the Left Party (Die Linke) based on a study he had co-authored on reform of the European Union. His main points were that while the economic costs have been exaggerated, the social consequences, especially loss of EU protection of the environment, consumer rights, employment rights and civil rights, will be extremely detrimental to British citizens, with the possible independence of Scotland a massive shock to the political system.

Summary of testimony (in German, use right-click to translate)

A primer on the split that has now been set into motion.

John Weeks

In the United Kingdom on June 23, 2016, 52% of those casting ballots voted in favor of ending the UK's membership in the European Union—generally referred to as "Brexit" (Britain + exit). Voters in England (population 53 million) and Wales (3.1 million) supported "Leave" (in both about 53% voted to leave), while Northern Ireland (1.8 million) and Scotland (5.3 million) gave majorities for "Remain" (53% and a landslide 62%, respectively).

These results came on a high voter turnout of 72% (compared to 66% in the 2015 national election). Whether the outcome was "close" is a question of opinion. Those of us in the losing camp think so, while the winners consider the outcome "decisive." It is with some reluctance that I concede that many may have voted to stay with little enthusiasm, balanced perhaps by "Leave" voters who did so to protest government policies while believing Brexit would lose.

Various hypotheses have come forth to explain why a majority of those voting chose "Leave": national sovereignty (however defined), dislike of the European Union, revenge of globalization "losers," and anti-immigration sentiment. While anger over the inequalities generated by globalization and fears of immigrants may have prompted many in the working and middle classes to vote for Brexit, this and other anti-EU motivations must be placed in the longer context of British relations with the continent.

At the end of World War II, British politicians and the public viewed the United Kingdom as among the winners of the war, and the continental countries (with the obvious exception of Russia) as the losers, either defeated and occupied by Nazi Germany or being themselves allies of the Nazis. When the governments of Germany, France, Italy, and the "Benelux" countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg) formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, the UK's Labour government, by far the most progressive in the country's history, declined to join, choosing instead to maintain a "special relationship" with the United States.

Twenty years later, the Conservative government of Edward Heath sought to join the ECSC's successor, the European Economic Community (EEC). Led by the trade unions, the vast majority of progressives opposed entry, rhetorically labeling the EEC as a "capitalist club." However, in 1975 two-thirds of those voting supported joining the EEC (notwithstanding the infamous 1967 veto, by French President Charles DeGaulle, of Britain's first attempt to join in 1967).

Over the next forty years all British governments, Conservative or Labour, would vacillate in their approach to the European Union (created from the EEC by the 1993 Maastricht Treaty), from lukewarm to overtly hostile. The xenophobic and chauvinistic right-wing of the Conservative (Tory) Party opposed the EU on principle. The Tory mainstream favored membership, but opposed the protection of worker rights and civil rights enshrined in the EU treaties (then in the so-called Social Chapter). The Labour government of Tony Blair in 1997 signed onto the Social Chapter, but only half-heartedly, committed as the Blair government was to a neoliberal "flexible" market.

The EU treaties and legislation by the European Parliament facilitated and even accelerated many progressive reforms in the United Kingdom, most obviously for gay and lesbian rights and guarantees of employment rights such as paid vacations. However, for the last twenty years both the Conservative Party leadership and that of the Labour Party emphasized the advantages of the single European market with only rare mention of worker and civil rights. When the referendum campaign began, the mainstream of both major parties focused narrowly on the alleged economic advantage of EU membership, with only a minority of the electorate aware of EU protection of citizens' rights.

The anti-EU right wing campaigned by harping on the myth of a European super-state that would bring tyranny to Britain and, its trump card, the putative dangers of immigration. Of the two, the free movement of labor within the European Union stands out as the strongest motivation, basically as a result of consciously created confusion. Pro-Brexit propaganda misrepresented intra-EU migration as equivalent to all immigration, shamelessly exploiting fears of Islamic refugees. In contrast to the free movement of citizens guaranteed within the European Union, migration from outside the Union is severely restricted.

In the months leading up to the referendum, debate over refugees from war-torn Syria—most going to neighboring countries, some to continental Europe, and very few to the UK—dominated politics in the European Union. The issue became all the more explosive in the wake of the November 2015 terrorist attack in Paris. Had the UK vote occurred a year earlier, the anti-EU campaign would have found it much more difficult to whip up anti-immigrant hysteria, though a majority of voters might still have supported Brexit for the reasons explained above.

Understanding "what Brexit means" in practice begins by accepting the irreversibility of the referendum result under present political conditions. The House of Commons of the UK includes three political parties with more than ten seats—Conservatives (330), Labour (229), and the Scottish National Party (SNP, 56)—while all other parties have a total of 35 seats. In none of the big three is there a majority in favor of a second referendum, even less to treat the June 23 vote as non-binding ("advisory"). Reversing the referendum outcome is politically impossible at this time.
While the SNP favors remaining within the European Union, it would achieve that goal by creating an independent Scotland via a referendum planned for 2018. The Northern Ireland situation is far more complex. Some form of federation with Eire (the official name of the Republic of Ireland) would maintain open borders between North and South, which many on the island want. However, it is hard to imagine the large Protestant majority in Northern Ireland surrendering any political decisions to the government of the Catholic South.

While leaving the EU may prove complex in procedure, its meaning and consequences are no mystery. The frequency of the question "What does Brexit mean?" results not from lack of clarity about the answer but from the unwillingness of parts of the British media to accept the irreversibility of the referendum. This is especially the case for the Guardian, the least reactionary daily newspaper in Britain, whose approach to Brexit seems designed to convince readers that the process will be unmanageably complex and prone to a disastrous outcome.

The major issues are 1) trading and investment flows after formally exiting the EU, 2) the status of citizens of EU countries who work in Britain, and 3) replacing the EU legal framework within domestic legislation. Despite receiving more publicity, the first two are likely to be considerably less problematic than the third. With regard to the first, both Britain and the EU have open capital markets that allow free flow of funds.

On trade, both the United Kingdom and the European Union are subject to the rule prohibiting discrimination among trading partners. That implies that, after Brexit is complete, British exporters and importers would face the same trade rules as those in the United States or any other WTO member. Anxieties about post-Brexit tariffs would seem exaggerated given that the trade-weighted EU levy on imports is just 2.3%. The EU share of UK total trade in goods has been falling for over a decade, and is now less than 50%. The non-EU trade deficit is considerably smaller than that with EU countries both for goods and for services. Net foreign investment of all types into the UK has fallen consistently since the mid-2000s, more so from EU countries than the rest of the world.

Before joining the then-EEC there were no visas required among Western European countries, an arrangement likely to continue after Brexit. While the current uncertainty forced upon EU citizens working in Britain by the Tory government is appalling, it would be astounding if relatively free movement of labor is not maintained, given the importance of those employees to the private and public sectors and the large number of UK citizens working on the continent.

The core strategy of mainstream pro-EU groups is to represent leaving the EU as a disaster in the making. This strategy extends the counter-productive approach taken during the referendum campaign, that fear of the unknown would prove the most effective defense of EU membership. Stressing purely economic effects allows the pro-EU neoliberals to avoid discussion of the most serious danger of Brexit: the loss of protections of civil rights and employment rights.

Further obfuscation of the consequences of leaving the EU has come in the form of the adjectives "hard" and "soft." Determining the cognitive meaning of these modifiers presents a daunting task, but the message comes across clearly—"hard Brexit" is "bad," verging on disastrous, while "soft Brexit" is "good" and the route of reason, with no Brexit being considered best of all.

These clichés are easily translated into simple English. "Hard Brexit" refers to a complete break with EU institutions, placing Britain into the category with the countries of the world that are neither EU members nor associates. (The EU currently has 28 members and four other associates, either through the European Economic Area or by bilateral treaty.)

The right-wingers inside and outside the Conservative Party favor this option, complete withdrawal. A group of far-right ideologues, Economists for Free Trade (formerly Economists for Brexit), provide the putative intellectual justification for a complete break. Their goal in a complete withdrawal is to end legal constraints and regulations on UK business set by EU environmental law, the employment rights protected in EU treaties, and civil and human rights enforced by the European Court of Justice. To be politically appealing, right-wing politicians package "Hard Brexit" as the anti-immigration option. It should be more accurately named "Hard-right Brexit."

A "soft Brexit" strategy seeks to maintain association with as many aspects of EU institutions as possible consistent with the referendum outcome. Were it possible, the softest of soft Brexits would have Britain become an associate rather than a member, and retain all the putative advantages of membership. Political conditions in both Britain and among EU governments make the softest option impossible.

By EU treaty, access to the common market (the so-called "single market") requires accepting free movement of labor from member countries and associates. Opposition to immigration played a dominant role in the referendum campaign. So effective were far-right efforts to equate intra- and extra-EU migration that no British government could accept a continuation of free movement of EU labor and survive electorally.

Even if a British government were to accept free movement, the governments of several EU countries, especially the German government, would reject the full-privileges associate membership option. The great fear among EU politicians is that other countries might follow Britain, with a possible Italian exit from the euro the greatest anxiety. German banks hold substantial public and private debt from other euro countries, which goes far to explain opposition by Chancellor Angela Merkel and her finance minister to any form of debt restructuring.
A joke circulating in the corridors of EU office blocks in Brussels is that the greatest uncertainty facing the British government is whether it can exit the European Union while there is still a Union to leave. The joke correctly suggests that Brexit is not the most serious problem confronting EU leaders in the foreseeable future.

The refugee crisis, elections in France and Germany, and the resurgence of fascism (trivialized as "populism") do not merely complicate negotiations over Brexit, but render it secondary to European domestic debate. In this uncertain context, the priority for the EU side in Brexit negotiations will be to prevent further defections; to make sure that if some version of Brexit is going to happen, it will have to be "hard Brexit" to send a message to others considering defection.

On the British side, the government appears strong because of an ineffective opposition, but has a weak negotiating position due to divisions within the Conservative Party. The First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, has made it clear that an unfavorable outcome of Brexit negotiations would provide a strong argument for independence to Scotland's strongly pro-EU population. With the Conservative Party deeply split, staggering into "hard Brexit" and blaming the German government for it may be the least-worst outcome from the point of view of the May government.

To non-Europeans, the British exit from the European Union may seem incomprehensible. After all, with its opt-out from joining the eurozone (otherwise mandated by EU treaty), a position it shares with Denmark, the British government and people need never fear Brussels-imposed austerity policies like those that so devastated Greece. The opt-out from the eurozone was reinforced by the UK in 2014, under the Conservative government, being the only EU member that refused to sign the dysfunctional Treaty on Coordination, Stability, and Governance, which contains the enforcement mechanisms for EU fiscal rules.

Brexit should become comprehensible when one realizes that no British government has given strong support to membership other than as a trading arrangement. Complementary to this narrow approach to EU membership, Conservative governments have consistently attacked the broader aspects of EU membership, while the Labour Party leadership has largely ignored them, treating them as a political embarrassment.

The impact of decades of attacks on the "bureaucrats in Brussels," repeated and successful demands from all UK governments for special treatment ("opt-outs"), and the 2003 condescending rejection of membership in the eurozone left public support for the European Union shallow and volatile. A recent opinion poll indicated that barely 50% of those aged 18-30 in Britain identified themselves as "European," a share far below that in continental countries.

As for so many issues in the neoliberal age, the impact of Brexit differs by class. For the Conservative government, leaving the EU offers UK business an unexpected opportunity to remove employment rights and workers' rights in general. This is a long-term project, dating back to Margaret Thatcher's war on the trade union movement in the 1980s.

In the British legislative system, Parliament can by simple majority enact any law (there is no hierarchy of laws such as in the United States—no need for laws to pass muster of a written constitution, and no supermajorities required to amend such a constitution). Facing a divided and near-dormant opposition Labour Party, a Conservative victory looms likely in the coming parliamentary elections. The incompetent but entrenched Tory government faces no legal barrier to revisiting the Trade Union Act of 2016 and adding the draconian limits on strikes that the House of Lords judged to be in conflict with EU law.

In all the large EU countries, reactionary neoliberalism is as strong as or stronger than in the United Kingdom. There is a major difference—on the continent the power of capital is restrained by the European Convention of Human Rights and the employment guarantees in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (for example, Article 157 prohibits pay discrimination).With the Labour Party weakened by ideological conflict, an effective strategy has yet to emerge to prevent a Brexit disaster for workers' rights and human rights. Progressives are fortunate that, due to its incompetence and internal divisions, the Conservative government has failed to establish negotiating priorities or clarify exit goals. There is clarity on one thing—for the foreseeable future the progressive fight is to prevent the worst outcome, a post-Brexit neoliberal Britain with business interests hegemonic.

Sources: Andrew Walker, "The Tony Blair Years," BBC News, Aug. 28, 2003 (bbc.co.uk); Article 157, The Lisbon Treaty (lisbon-treaty.org); European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, "LGBTI" (fra.europa.eu); Hannah Finselbach, "Trade in goods MRETS (all BOP: EU 2013): time series dataset," Office for National Statistics, April 7, 2017 (ons.gov.uk); Ian Traynor, Nicholas Watt, David Gow, and Patrick Wintour, "David Cameron blocks EU treaty with veto, casting Britain adrift from Europe," The Guardian, Dec. 9, 2011 (theguardian.com); Department for Business, Innovation & Skills and Nick Boles MP, "Trade Union Act Becomes Law," May 4, 2016 (gov.uk); John Weeks, "EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Read it before you vote on 23 June," Open Democracy UK, June 19, 2016 (opendemocracy.net); John Weeks, "The Six-Pack: EU Mandate for Bad Economic Policy," Social Europe, April 6, 2016 (socialeurope.eu); Lisa O'Carroll and Caelainn Barr, "Half of young adults in the UK do not feel European, poll reveals," The Guardian, April 11, 2017 (theguardian.com); Matt Wrack and John Weeks, "The Weeks Update: Matt Rack, Head of Fire Brigades Union & John Weeks discuss the controversial Trade Union bill," 2016 (audioboom.com); "Parlemeter 2016," European Parliament (europarl.europa.eu); Sami Hamroush, "Foreign direct investment involving UK companies: Inward tables," Office for National Statistics, Dec. 2, 2016 (ons.gov.uk); Stuart Wier, "A 'Fresh Start' for Britain in Europe?" Open Democracy UK, Jan. 18, 2013 (opendemocracy.net); Tejvan Pettinger, "Gordon Brown's 5 Economic Test for Joining Euro," Economics Help, March 13, 2007 (economicshelp.org); "The European Convention on Human Rights," Human Rights News, Views & Info, (rightsinfo.org); "What does leaving the EU mean for trade?" Full Fact, June 28, 2016 (fullfact.org); World Trade Organization, "Principles of the Trading System," World Trade Organization (wto.org).

John Weeks is a London-based member of the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE), one of the founders of the UK-based Economists for Rational Economic Policies, and part of the European Research Network on Social and Economic Policy.

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Flat Phills, all around [feedly]

Flat Phills, all around
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/flat-phills-all-around/

I've got a piece in today's WaPo on the diminished correlation between the tightening labor market and wage and price growth. This is evidence of the well-known flattening of the "Phillips Curve," the statistical relationship between nominal wages, prices, and tightness in the job market.

The figure below shows annualized growth rates of a) core PCE inflation and b) nominal wages of blue-collar factory workers and non-managers in services over numerous periods of falling unemployment. Since the 1980s, those growth rates have been falling. In the current episode of falling unemployment, price growth has been particularly slow. Those familiar with this phenomenon will recognize this observation as the flipside of the question we were asking when unemployment was 10 percent: "why isn't the rate of inflation falling."

Source: BLS, BEA

My WaPo piece gets into the why's and why-this-matters. Here, I just wanted to post some complementary evidence.

A simple model does a decent job of predicting yearly changes in the ECI wage index. The model includes two lags of the dependent variable and a measure of full employment: u-u*, or unemployment minus the CBOs estimate of the full employment rate.

The figure shows that the model tracks wage growth through the tight-labor market of the 1990s, but over-predicts in the 2000s. Toward the end of the series, there's a hint that ECI wage growth may start to underperform the forecast.

The growth in the blue-collar, non-managerial hourly wage has also flattened in recent months, even as the job market has tightened further (the smooth line is a 6-mos moving average).

Finally, Kalman filtering is a useful statistical technique to test whether and how much an economic relationship–in this case, the correlation between ECI wage growth and u-u*, or labor market tightness–is changing over time. The last figure shows that in a model with yearly ECI changes as the dependent variable, the coefficient on u-u* has drifted up and is about zero now. Moreover, the upward drift accelerated a lot in the last few years.

I say what I think this means–and cite many explanations from others whom I bugged about it–in Monday's paper. But the facts of the case look pretty solid to me, at least for now.


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Chart of the Week: Conflict’s Legacy for Growth [feedly]

Chart of the Week: Conflict's Legacy for Growth
https://blogs.imf.org/2017/05/08/chart-of-the-week-conflicts-legacy-for-growth/



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A New Twist in the Link Between Inequality and Economic Development [feedly]

A New Twist in the Link Between Inequality and Economic Development
https://blogs.imf.org/2017/05/11/a-new-twist-in-the-link-between-inequality-and-economic-development/

By Francesco Grigoli

May 11, 2017

Version in Español (Spanish)

Much has been written about the relationship between inequality and economic development, but theory remains inconclusive. When income is more concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, this can lead to less demand by the general population and lower investment in education and health, impairing long-term growth. At the same time, a certain level of inequality endows the rich with the means to start businesses, and creates incentives to increase productivity and investment, promoting economic activity. But the initial inequality levels also matter to explain why an increase in inequality varies in its impact on economic development across countries.

Empirical research assumes that the relationship between inequality and economic development stays the same no matter where a country is on the inequality scale, as measured by the Gini coefficient (which ranges from zero, when everyone has the same income, to 100, when a single individual receives all the income).

In two recent papers—Inequality Overhang and Inequality and Growth: A Heterogeneous Approach—we dig deeper into the direction of this relationship, using a sample of 77 countries at different stages of development and representing all geographical regions, with at least 20 years of data, and employing techniques that address some shortcomings in the literature. Owing to data limitations, we focus on income inequality only and refrain from analyzing the equally relevant concept of wealth inequality.

What we find is that the effect of income inequality on economic growth can be either positive or negative, and that at a particular level of inequality—at a Gini of about 27 percent to be exact—the direction of the relationship changes—that is, where inequality begins to hurt economic development.

We also assess if some of the commonly proposed tools to combat the harmful effects of rising inequality—such as boosting financial inclusion and promoting female labor participation—effectively mitigate the impact on economic development.

Not all countries are alike

Our results show that a change in income inequality growth does not have the same effect across countries. While the median impact of inequality growth on per capita GDP growth is negative and significant, lasting about 2 years, this is not true for all countries. In Ecuador, Jordan, Nigeria, and Panama, for example, the effect is large and negative.

For other countries, like Finland, for instance, the impact is positive, as the results for the 25th percentile show. This large dispersion highlights the limited relevance of the average effect typically estimated.

Inequality overhang

Different effects across countries can be linked to different initial inequality levels. If income is not highly concentrated, an increase in inequality can provide incentives for countries to be more productive. If highly concentrated, that same increase can lead to rent-seeking behaviors—the top appropriating a larger and larger share of the nation's pie for themselves. Also, when inequality is low, it is unlikely that any increase would lead to social unrest; conversely, when inequality is already high, any further increase would likely reduce social consensus, and the ability to implement pro-growth reforms.

The chart below highlights the existence of a hump-shaped relationship between inequality and economic development, revealing the existence of what we call an "inequality overhang."

In other words, the impact of income inequality on economic development is positive for values of a net Gini below 27 percent (where net refers to its measurement after taxes and transfers), but the impact becomes negative for values above 27 percent. Also, as countries become more unequal, the negative impact on economic development becomes larger.

Trade-offs and win-win policies

Improving access of households and business to banking services, as well as promoting participation of women in the labor force can help combat the negative impact of increasing inequality on economic growth. However, they could also make things worse by over-leveraging poorer households or generating an oversupply of labor.

We find that, while financial access is generally desirable, it can lead to a greater negative impact of income inequality on economic development, as banks may curtail credit to customers at the lower end of the income distribution because of their inability to repay. To prevent this trade-off, mechanisms should be considered to ensure that those who lose access to credit when income becomes more concentrated can continue consuming even when their income falls. On the other hand, greater female labor participation is a win-win in that it enlarges the pool of talent that is available to work and reduces (or even reverse) the negative impact of inequality on growth. 


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SNAP Helps Low-Wage Workers [feedly]

SNAP Helps Low-Wage Workers
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2017/05/snap-helps-low-wage-workers.html

Brynne Keith-Jennings at the CBPP:

SNAP Helps Low-Wage Workers: For millions of Americans, work doesn't provide enough income for them to feed their families. Our major new report explains that SNAP (formerly food stamps) provides workers with low pay and often fluctuating incomes with crucial additional monthly income to help put food on the table. It also helps workers get by while they're between jobs.
Up to 30 percent of Americans earn pay that would barely lift a family above the poverty line for full-time, year-round work. And, in many cases, workers who want a full-time job can only get part-time work or have irregular schedules that can change from week to week, with little advance notice or worker input.
Also, low-wage jobs tend to lack crucial supports such as paid sick leave, which can cost workers their jobs when they get sick or must care for an ill family member. In addition, low-wage workers are less likely than other workers to qualify for unemployment insurance.
SNAP benefits support work. The benefit formula phases out benefits slowly as earnings rise and includes a 20 percent deduction for earned income to reflect work-related expenses. As a result, SNAP benefits fall by only 24 to 36 cents for each additional $1 of earnings for most households. SNAP benefits can help smooth out volatile income and provide much-needed food assistance when workers' hours are cut or they lose their jobs.
SNAP participants work in a wide range of jobs but, compared to all workers, a greater share of them are in service occupations (see graph) and industries such as retail and hospitality — jobs likelier to have low wages and other disadvantages. In some occupations, such as dishwashers, food preparation workers, and nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides, at least one-quarter of workers participate in SNAP. For them and millions of others whose jobs don't provide enough or steady income to provide for their families, SNAP provides essential support.

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The Economics of Trust [feedly]

The Economics of Trust
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2017/05/the-economics-of-trust.html

From the IMFBlog:

The Economics of Trust: Trust in other people – the glue that holds society together – is increasingly in short supply in the United States and Europe, and inequality may be the culprit.
In surveys over the past 40 years, the share of Americans who say that most people can be trusted has fallen to 33 percent from about 50 percent. The erosion of trust coincides with widening disparities in incomes.
But does inequality reduce trust? There is evidence that it does, according to researchby Eric D. Gould, a professor of economics at Hebrew University, and Alexander Hijzen, a senior economist at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. They analyzed data from the American National Election Survey from 1980 to 2010. The results show that wider income inequality explains 44 percent of the drop in trust. The authors, who reported their findings in an IMF working paper, found similar results in Europe...

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Dan Little (Understanding Society): Gererativism

Generativism 

Dan Little

http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2017/05/generativism.html


There is a seductive appeal to the idea of a "generative social science". Joshua Epstein is one of the main proponents of the idea, most especially in his book, Generative Social Science: Studies in Agent-Based Computational Modeling. The central tool of generative social science is the construction of an agent-based model (link). The ABM is said to demonstrate the way in which an observable social outcome of pattern is generated by the properties and activities of the component parts that make it up -- the actors. The appeal comes from the notion that it is possible to show how complicated or complex outcomes are generated by the properties of the components that make them up. Fix the properties of the components, and you can derive the properties of the composites. Here is Epstein's capsule summary of the approach:
The agent-based computational model -- or artificial society -- is a new scientific instrument. It can powerfully advance a distinctive approach to social science, one for which the term "generative" seems appropriate. I will discuss this term more fully below, but in a strong form, the central idea is this: To the generativist, explaining the emergence of macroscopic societal regularities, such as norms or price equilibria, requires that one answer the following question: 
The Generativist's Question 
*How could the decentralized local interactions of heterogeneous autonomous agents generate the given regularity?  
The agent-based computational model is well-suited to the study of this question, since the following features are characteristic: [heterogeneity, autonomy, explicit space, local interactions, bounded rationality] (5-6)
And a few pages later:
Agent-based models provide computational demonstrations that a given microspecification is in fact sufficient to generate a macrostructure of interest. . . . To the generativist -- concerned with formation dynamics -- it does not suffice to establish that, if deposited in some macroconfiguration, the system will stay there. Rather, the generativist wants an account of the configuration's attainment by a decentralized system of heterogeneous autonomous agents. Thus, the motto of generative social science, if you will, is: If you didn't grow it, you didn't explain its emergence. (8)
Here is how Epstein describes the logic of one of the most extensive examples of generative social science, the attempt to understand the disappearance of Anasazi population in the American Southwest nearly 800 years ago.
The logic of the exercise has been, first, to digitize the true history -- we can now watch it unfold on a digitized map of Longhouse Valley. This data set (what really happened) is the target -- the explanandum. The aim is to develop, in collaboration with anthropologists, microspecifications -- ethnographically plausible rules of agent behavior -- that will generate the true history. The computational challenge, in other words, is to place artificial Anasazi where the true ones were in 80-0 AD and see if -- under the postulated rules -- the simulated evolution matches the true one. Is the microspecification empirically adequate, to use van Fraassen's phrase? (13)
Here is a short video summarizing the ABM developed under these assumptions:



The artificial Anasazi experiment is an interesting one, and one to which the constraints of an agent-based model are particularly well suited. The model follows residence location decision-making based on ground-map environmental information.

But this does not imply that the generativist interpretation is equally applicable as a general approach to explaining important social phenomena.

Note first how restrictive the assumption is of "decentralized local interactions" as a foundation to the model. A large proportion of social activity is neither decentralized nor purely local: the search for muons in an accelerator lab, the advance of an armored division into contested territory, the audit of a large corporation, preparations for a strike by the UAW, the coordination of voices in a large choir, and so on, indefinitely. In all these examples and many more, a crucial part of the collective behavior of the actors is the coordination that occurs through some centralized process -- a command structure, a division of labor, a supervisory system. And by its design, ABMs appear to be incapable of representing these kinds of non-local coordination.

Second, all these simulation models proceed from highly stylized and abstract modeling assumptions. And the outcomes they describe capture at best some suggestive patterns that might be said to be partially descriptive of the outcomes we are interested in. Abstraction is inevitable in any scientific work, of course; but once recognizing that fact, we must abandon the idea that the model demonstrates the "generation" of the empirical phenomenon. Neither premises nor conclusions are fully descriptive of concrete reality; both are approximations and abstractions. And it would be fundamentally implausible to maintain that the modeling assumptions capture all the factors that are causally relevant to the situation. Instead, they represent a particular stylized hypothesis about a few of the causes of the situation in question.  Further, we have good reason to believe that introducing more details at the ground level will sometimes lead to significant alteration of the system-level properties that are generated.

So the idea that an agent-based model of civil unrest could demonstrate that (or how) civil unrest is generated by the states of discontent and fear experienced by various actors is fundamentally ill-conceived. If the unrest is generated by anything, it is generated by the full set of causal and dynamic properties of the set of actors -- not the abstract stylized list of properties. And other posts have made the point that civil unrest or rebellion is rarely purely local in its origin; rather, there are important coordinating non-local structures (organizations) that influence mobilization and spread of rebellious collective action. Further, the fact that the ABM "generates" some macro characteristics that may seem empirically similar to the observed phenomenon is suggestive, but far from a demonstration that the model characteristics suffice to determine some aspect of the macro phenomenon. Finally, the assumption of decentralized and local decision-making is unfounded for civil unrest, given the important role that collective actors and organizations play in the success or failure of social mobilizations around grievances (link).

The point here is not that the generativist approach is invalid as a way of exploring one particular set of social dynamics (the logic of decentralized local decision-makers with assigned behavioral rules). On the contrary, this approach does indeed provide valuable insights into some social processes. The error is one of over-generalization -- imagining that this approach will suffice to serve as a basis for analysis of all social phenomena. In a way the critique here is exactly parallel to that which I posed to analytical sociology in an earlier post. In both cases the problem is one of asserting priority for one specific approach to social explanation over a number of other equally important but non-equivalent approaches.

Patrick Grim et al provide an interesting approach to the epistemics of models and simulations in "How simulations fail" (link). Grim and his colleagues emphasize the heuristic and exploratory role that simulations generally play in probing the dynamics of various kinds of social phenomena.
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John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV

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