Tuesday, April 4, 2017

Globalization and the End of the Labor Aristocracy, Part 1 [feedly]

Taking dogma to new heights....please spare us Part 2

Globalization and the End of the Labor Aristocracy, Part 1
http://triplecrisis.com/globalization-and-the-end-of-the-labor-aristocracy-part-1/

This is part one of a four-part article, first published in the March/April 2017 special "Costs of Empire" issue of Dollars & Sense magazine. Subsequent parts will appear on Triple Crisis over the next three weeks.

Economist and Triple Crisis contributor Jayati Ghosh argues that imperialism has not disappeared, but changed shape. The direct military conquest and control of economic territory by the great powers has given way (at least some of the time) to control through multilateral agreements and international institutions. Economic territory may still mean the seizure of land, mines, or oil fields—but it also may mean privatization of public assets and services, or the extension of intellectual property rights to new realms. Where the "labor aristocracy" of the imperialist countries once shared in the bounty of empire, the new incarnation of empire as "globalization" has helped grind away the incomes and status they once enjoyed.

Jayati Ghosh

Twenty-first century imperialism has changed its form. In the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, it was explicitly related to colonial control; in the second half of the 20th century it relied on a combination of geopolitical and economic control deriving also from the clear dominance of the United States as the global hegemon and leader of the capitalist world dealing with the potential threat from the Communist world. It now relies more and more on an international legal and regulatory architecture—fortified by various multilateral and bilateral agreements—to establish the power of capital over labor. This has involved a "grand bargain," no less potent for being implicit, between different segments of capital. Capitalist firms in the developing world gained some market access (typically intermediated by multinational capital) and, in return, large capital in highly developed countries got much greater protection and monopoly power, through tighter enforcement of intellectual property rights and greater investment protections.

These measures dramatically increased the bargaining power of capital relative to labor, globally and in every country. In the high-income countries, this eliminated the "labor aristocracy" first theorized by the German Marxist theorist Karl Kautsky in the early 20thcentury. The concept of the labor aristocracy derived from the idea that the developed capitalist countries, or the "core" of global capitalism, could extract superprofits from impoverished workers in the less developed "periphery." These surpluses could be used to reward workers in the core, relative to those in the periphery, and thereby achieve greater social and political stability in the core countries. This enabled northern capitalism to look like a win-win economic system for capital and labor (in the United States, labor relations between the late 1940s and the 1970s, for example, were widely termed a "capital-labor accord"). Today, the increased bargaining power of capital and the elimination of the labor aristocracy has delegitimated the capitalist system in the rich countries of the global North.

Increasing inequality, the decline in workers' incomes, the decline or absence of social protections, the rise of material insecurity, and a growing alienation from government have come to characterise societies in both developed and developing worlds. These sources of grievance have found political expression in a series of unexpected electoral outcomes (including the "Brexit" vote in the UK and the election of Trump in the United States). The decline of the labor aristocracy—really, its near collapse—has massive implications, as it undermines the social contract that made global capitalism so successful in the previous era. It was the very foundation of political stability and social cohesion within advanced capitalist countries, which is now breaking down, and will continue to break down without a drastic restructuring of the social and economic order. The political response to this decline has been expressed primarily in the rise of right-wing, xenophobic, sectarian, and reactionary political tendencies.

21st Century Imperialism

The early 21st century has been a weird time for imperialism. On the one hand, the phase of "hyper-imperialism"—with the United States as the sole capitalist superpower, free to use almost the entire world as its happy hunting ground—is over. Instead, the United States looks significantly weaker both economically and politically, and there is less willingness on the part of other countries (including former and current allies, as well as those that may eventually become rival powers) to accept its writ unconditionally. On the other hand, the imperial overreach that was so evident in the Gulf Wars and sundry other interventions, in the Middle East and around the world, continues despite the decreasing returns from such interventions. This continued through the Obama presidency, and it is still an open question whether the Trump presidency will lead to a dramatic reduction of this overreach ("isolationism") or merely a change in its direction.

The latter point is important, because there is little domestic political appetite in the United States for such imperial adventures, due to the high costs in terms of both government spending and the loss of lives of U.S. soldiers. The slogans that recently resonated with the U.S. electorate, such as that of "making America great again" were in that sense somewhat self-contradictory—looking towards an imagined past in which the American Dream could be fulfilled relatively easily (at least for some), without recognizing that this was predicated upon the country's global hegemony and far-flung empire.

The global context of imperialism is a complex one, in which the contours shift constantly. Recent political changes in various countries of the North have meant that global strategic alliances are also much more fluid than at any time over the past half century. The most talked-about current examples are the changing attitude of the Trump administration towards the United States' traditional enemy, Russia; and the complicated international politics emerging in Europe, with the Brexit vote and the emergence of right-wing political forces in a number of other European countries. But it is also evident in other parts of the world, notably in China, where traditional friends and foes are no longer so easily demarcated. Yet there is another sense in which the fundamentals of the imperialist process have not changed, even as the forms in which they are expressed are altered.

Defining imperialism broadly, as Lenin did—as the complex intermingling of economic and political interests, related to the efforts of large capital to control economic territory—it's clear that imperialism has not really declined at all. Rather, it has changed in form over the past half century, especially when we embrace a more expansive notion of what constitutes "economic territory." Economic territory includes the more obvious forms such as land and natural resources, as well as labor. These are all still hugely contested: The wars for oil in the Middle East, the continuing attempts at land grabs in Africa, and the struggle over the fruits of extraction of natural resources in parts of Latin America and Asia all testify to this.

But the struggle over economic territory also encompasses the search for and effort to control new markets—defined by both physical location and type of economic process. Understanding territory in this way helps us understand how imperialism is still very much alive and kicking, even though some of the more classic features (such as direct colonial control and annexations) are less in evidence.

One of the key aspects of recent capitalist dynamism has been its ability to create new forms of economic territory, bring them within the realm of capitalist economic relations, and therefore also subject them to imperialist control. Two forms of economic territory that are increasingly subject to capitalist organization and imperialist penetration today are 1) basic amenities and social services (earlier seen as the sole preserve of public provision) and 2) the generation and distribution of knowledge.

A major feature of our times is the privatization of areas that, until recently, were generally accepted as public responsibilities. Basic amenities like electricity, water, and transportation infrastructure, and social services like health, sanitation, and education all fall into this category. Of course, the fact that these were seen as public duties does not mean that they were always fulfilled. Indeed, expanding public provision and access to high-quality public infrastructure and social services has only come about historically as the result of prolonged mass struggles. And issues of inequality in access have always existed. Nevertheless, the fact that provision is no longer necessarily in the public domain, and that private provision is increasingly seen as the norm, has opened up huge new markets for potentially profit-making activity. This has been a crucial way of maintaining demand, given the saturation of markets in many mature economies, and the inadequate growth of markets in poorer societies.

Opening up such markets has occurred through a combination of inadequate public provision and changes in economic policy to encourage private investment. The expansion of the global bottled water industry, for example, is partly a result of the failure of adequate public delivery of potable water. Meanwhile, global institutions—including formal organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as more informal bodies such as the World Economic Forum—have actively encouraged private investment in formerly public sectors. This is a more complicated expression of the imperialistic drive for control over economic territory than the direct annexation of geographic territory, but that does not make it any less consequential.

Another new form of economic territory, increasingly subject to imperialist penetration, relates to knowledge generation and dissemination. The privatization of knowledge and its concentration in fewer and fewer hands—especially through the creation and enforcement of new "intellectual property rights"—have become significant barriers to technology transfer and social recognition of traditional knowledge. This is evident in the case of access to medicines, even essential and life-saving drugs. Patents reward multinational companies, allowing them to monopolize production, set high prices, or demand high royalties. Similarly, control over seed patents, overwhelming held by multinational agribusinesses, have enabled monopoly control over crucial technologies for food cultivation across the world, even in the poorest societies. The cases of medicine and food are comparatively well known and highly controversial, but much the same is true for industrial technologies, as well as knowledge for mitigating and adapting to adverse environmental changes (themselves resulting from the production systems created by global capitalism).

It's not just that national and international institutional structures that should provide checks and balances to the privatization of knowledge are more fragile and less effective than they used to be. Rather, it's that they are actively working in the opposite direction. The numerous "trade agreements" that have been signed across the world in recent years have been much less about trade liberalization—already so extensive that there is little scope for further opening up in most sectors—and much more about protecting investment and strengthening monopolies generated by intellectual property rights.

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I see no other option for Senate D’s but to filibuster Gorsuch [feedly]

I see no other option for Senate D's but to filibuster Gorsuch
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/i-see-no-other-option-for-senate-ds-but-to-filibuster-gorsuch/

In the course of noodling over whether the Senate D's should filibuster the Gorsuch nomination, I just can't see why not.

I don't say that lightly. While I've been a critical observer of filibuster abuse for a while (so I can't say I'd miss it), I worry about a less deliberative Senate. But given how severely trust, compromise, and thoughtfulness have devolved, the deliberation train left the station long ago, with Judge Merrick Garland tied to the tracks. At this point, I see no clear logic that points D's toward cooperation.

A few facts/assumptions to frame the discussion. For what follows to make sense, these must be at least broadly correct.

1) D's believe Judge Gorsuch is too conservative and threatens to overturn established case law in areas about which they care deeply, like abortion and worker rights. I think they're right.

2) D's have the votes to filibuster and thus block the nomination.

3) Senate R's are telling the truth when say they that if D's filibuster Gorsuch's nomination, even though they'd rather not, they will "go nuclear" (change the rules so that only a majority vote is required). I believe them.

Based on those assumptions, let's see what paths lead D's to the logic of filibuster vs. cooperation.

The goal of the D's is to have the R's nominate a justice where #1 one does not hold, i.e., a justice who they might not consider too conservative. In that case, they have two options: filibuster or cooperate with conditions.

They can filibuster Gorsuch et al until R's put up no Morsuch candidates. But based on #3, that won't work. If they filibuster, R's go nuclear and Gorsuch is on the court.

So they should cooperate, right, and give the R's the votes they need to get to 60? No, because that too lands them with Gorsuch.

What if they decide a second-best option is to cooperate with conditions? Give the R's Gorsuch (don't filibuster) based on a deal that the next time there's a Supreme Court opening—which might not be too far away—the R's will put up a less conservative candidate. This is the tactic the WaPo editorial board suggests today: "…postponing the discussion over abolishing the filibuster until Mr. Trump's next nomination, if any, would put Democrats in a stronger position and at least might pressure the president to select a more reasonable nominee next time than he otherwise might."

This strikes me as a highly risky strategy. First, if the R's are still in the majority next time there's an opening, the D's would have to trust Trump and the R's to meet the conditions of this second-best deal. There's no good reason to do so. Once R's assert, as they have, that they'll go nuclear if they don't get their way, the D's would be reckless and irresponsible not to believe them, either this time or next time.

Second, what if the Senate majority flips by the time of next opening? Then D's have given away a too conservative seat to Gorsuch, but, as part of the deal, will—assuming they stick to the deal—have to put up a moderate-at-best nominee with whom R's are OK. That's a bad deal versus trying to neutralize Gorsuch with a liberal counterpart, passed with a simple D majority.

So the D's best strategy is not to cooperate, i.e., to filibuster.

The problem is, once R's invoke #3, there are no reliable benefits to the D's from cooperating. Even if they could trust the R's to put up a more moderate nominee next time, unless they're convinced they'll never be back in the majority, they end up with a too-conservative court relative to filibustering and invoking the nuclear option that they will then take advantage of if their time comes. It may sound counterintuitive, but once Senate leader McConnell brought out the nuke, a move that showed without doubt that R's will do whatever it takes to move the court to the right, I see no obvious benefit to D's of not forcing him to use it.


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High Wages encourage Innovation?

Note: pretty wonky blog by "mostly Canadian economists"...but, as the Wizard tells Willow regarding the Birds of math: Ignore the Bird, Follow the River....


Worthwhile Canadian Initiative

High Wages encourage Innovation?

High wages increase the benefits of an innovation that increases labour productivity. The higher the wage, the bigger the benefits of saving an hour of labour to produce the same quantity of goods. But if that innovation itself requires labour to think up the new idea, test it, and implement it, then high wages increase the costs of innovation too. If benefits and costs increase by the same percentage, high wages will have zero effect on the number of innovations that pass the expected benefits > expected costs hurdle, and so zero effect on the number of innovations that would be implemented.

Think of a simple economy where land and labour produce food. At the aggregate level, what matters is whether innovation itself is more or less labour-intensive than the economy as a whole (or those sectors of the economy to which innovation might be applied). Think of an experimental trying out a new variety of wheat using the same labour/land ratio as the economy uses for existing varieties of wheat. The cost of the experiment is the opportunity cost of the existing wheat that could have been grown on the experimental plot of land using the experimental labour. The expected benefit of the experiment is the increased yield if the new variety is a success. The relative scarcity of labour to land, and the relative wage/rent ratio, has zero effect on the expected net benefits of doing the experiment. What does matter is the real rate of interest (the nominal rate minus the expected inflation rate on wheat). Because the costs of the experiment come this year, but the expected benefits of the experiment come in many future years. It is low interest rates, and not high wages, that should encourage innovation. Innovation is an investment.

Sure, innovators are looking at the expected benefits of innovation, and don't know the actual benefits. So it is always possible that labour-saving innovations will have a higher success rate than the innovators expected, and land-saving innovations will have a lower success rate than the innovators expected. If so, higher wages (and lower land rents) may cause innovators to start looking for gold in the exact place where the gold happens to be hiding. Just by luck. But it could easily have been the other way around.

Suppose that innovation, by its very nature, is a very labour-intensive activity. That sounds plausible to me. It takes a lot of labour, and very little land, to do the thinking, and measuring, and recording, and whatever, to find a new variety of wheat that works better than existing varieties. In that case, high wages would increase the costs of innovation by a greater percentage than they would increase the benefits of innovation. So for the marginal innovation, where the Expected Net Present Value was just barely positive, would become negative if wages increased. So fewer innovations would pass the E[NPV] > 0 hurdle if wages rose. If innovation itself is very labour-intensive, high wages discourage innovation.

You want to talk about skilled labour vs unskilled labour? Sure. If innovation requires skilled labour and saves unskilled labour, then a fall in the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages (a rise in the ratio of unskilled to skilled wages) will encourage innovation. But talk about that ratio; don't talk about just "wages".

And don't get me started on "capital"-saving innovation, because "capital" is the time-structure of production. Whenever you start a production process that has present costs and future benefits, you have capital. And the innovation itself is a capital project. And the benefits of innovation will probably outlast any production process it modifies. So a fall in the rate of interest will promote all innovation, including innovation that is purely "capital-saving". And if the real interest rate is negative, so it is profitable to store wheat even if some wheat does get lost in storage, then innovation that lengthens the production process (is the reverse of "capital-saving") is a good innovation. It means you can store wheat for longer before it rots.

I know little about economic history, and even less about innovation. But something about this "high wages encourage innovation" meme doesn't sound right to me.

[Update: Take the simplest case: an innovation costs C units of labour to implement, and benefits by saving B units of labour per year forever. No other costs or benefits. The wage is W, and interest rate is r. The Net Present Value of implementing is

NPV = WB/r - WC = W(B/r - C)

You don't need to know W to tell whether NPV > 0. All that matters is whether B/r > C.

Line up all the possible innovations, from the highest to the lowest NPV (NPV on the Y axis). The NPV curve slopes down, and crosses the X axis, because some projects have negative NPV. We implement if NPV > 0.

An increase in W does not shift the NPV curve up. It causes the NPV curve to swivel clockwise, around the point where it crosses the X axis. It has no effect on the percentage of projects that are profitable. A fall in r is what shifts the NPV curve up.]

--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV

The Winners and Losers Radio Show
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ProMarket: “Our New Economy Enables the Winners to Capture Much More of the Welfare”

ProMarket: 


"Our New Economy Enables the Winners to Capture Much More of the Welfare"

In this installment of ProMarket's new interview series on concentration in America, Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke discuss bigness, market power, and the digital economy. "[The] lack of online competition between the leading platforms affects offline welfare and democracy."


Does America have a concentration problem? On March 27-29, the Stigler Center hosted a first-of-its-kind, three-day conference in Chicago that focused on this very question.

 

The conference brought together dozens of top academics from law, economics, history, and political science, policymakers, journalists, and public intellectuals. Ahead of this conference, we presented influential scholars and thinkers with some questions on concentration, market power, and bigness—and their potential effects on the U.S. economy.

 

You can read all previous installments here


 

Ariel Ezrachi
Ariel Ezrachi

Ariel Ezrachi is the Slaughter and May Professor of Competition Law and a Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford. He also serves as the Director of the University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy. His most recent work deals with the digital economy and the limits of competition law. ​

 

Maurice Stucke is a co-founder of the law firm The Konkurrenz Group and a law professor at the University of Tennessee. He has over 20 years of experience in antitrust and competition policy issues, both in private practice and as a former prosecutor at the U.S. Department of Justice. He advises governments, law firms, consumer groups, and multinational firms on competition and privacy issues. Stucke also serves as one of the United States' non-governmental advisors to the International Competition Network, as a Senior Fellow at the American Antitrust Institute, and on the boards of the Academic Society for Competition Law and the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies.

 

Maurice Stucke
Maurice Stucke

In a series of papers published in the last two years, Ezrachi and Stucke explored the world of big data and artificial intelligence and argued that network effects can raise barriers to entry, enabling big platforms to engage in behaviors such as collusion, tacit collusion, and price discrimination, to the detriment of consumers. Their recent book Virtual Competition (Harvard University Press, 2016) explores the changing nature of competition in the age of big data and algorithms.

 

In a brief joint interview with ProMarket, Ezrachi and Stucke shared some thoughts on market power and the digital economy.

 

Q: The discourse on concentration, market power, and bigness in many U.S. industries has increased dramatically in the last year. Do you believe that we have enough empirical evidence to show that concentration is on the rise and having adverse effects on the economy?

 

Our focus in recent years has been on the digital economy. In our book Virtual Competition we explore, in detail, the increased concentration and economic power of very few companies and the way it affects our welfare and society. When one focuses on online markets it is easy to identify the shift in power to a few super-platforms. We are in the midst of a process of migration to online interfaces, smartphones, and tablets and increased reliance on a handful of super-platforms, which in controlling our interfaces, can affect our access to information, goods, services. As we explored elsewhere, the power they possess enables them to engage in these strategies in stealth mode—while creating a mirage of choice and competition. 

 

Q: Which industries should we be concerned with when we look at questions of concentration? Do we have evidence of excessive market power, reduction in quality or investment, or growing political influence?

 

Our research focuses on competition and the digital economy. In this area, we certainly identify increased concentration. The existence of several leading online gatekeepers enables them to affect the dynamics of competition and possible entry. The power, which is supported by network effects, big data, and big analytics, may enable a handful of companies to manipulate the market for goods, services, and ideas. With respect to the latter, it is interesting to note our growing reliance on online outlets for news. As we explored recently, lack of online competition between the leading platforms affects offline welfare and democracy.

 

Q: The five largest internet and tech companies—Apple, Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft—have outstanding market share in their markets. Are current antitrust policies and theories able to deal with the potential problems that arise from the dominant positions of these companies and the vast data they collect on users?

 

Yes and no. Big Data and Competition Policy explores several challenges. One challenge is the "nowcasting radar." Before the Big Data era, dominant tech firms were less aware of what their customers and rivals were doing (or planning to do). As Big Data and Competition Policy discusses, some platforms have a relative advantage in accessing and analyzing data to discern consumer trends well before others. Companies can nowcast, i.e., "predict the present" by using search inquiries, social network postings, tweets, etc. 

 

Nowcasting can yield a competitive advantage (and, at times, increase overall welfare). In monitoring search queries, Google can predict flu outbreaks well before the government health agencies can. Twitter's data can help companies identify emerging trends. Google and Apple, in controlling the mobile phone app stores, immediately know when users download rivals' apps.

 

Nowcasting also represents a potent data-based weapon, not previously available for monopolies, to monitor new business models in real time. The nowcasting radar can help some dominant firm identify nascent competitive threats. The data-opoly can use its relative advantage in accessing and processing personal data (such as watching for trends in its proprietary data from posts on a social network, search queries, emails, etc) to quickly identify (and squelch) nascent competitive threats. The dominant firm can acquire entrants before they become significant competitive threats or blunt the entrant's growth (such as manipulating its search engine results to make it harder to find the company). For example, Facebook warns its investors that its platform partners may use information shared by its users through the Facebook Platform to develop products or features that compete with Facebook.

 

Thus, it is as if the monopoly invented a radar system to monitor in real time the competitive portals. It can track nascent competitive threats shortly after they take off, and intercept or shoot them down long before they become visible to regulators and others.

 

Q: Is there a connection between the growing inequality in the U.S. and concentration, dominant firms, and winner-take-all markets?

 

Peter Thiel, the successful venture capitalist, famously noted that 'Competition Is for Losers.' That useful phrase captures the essence of many technology markets. Markets in which the winner of the competitive process is able to cement its position and protect it. Using data-driven network effects, it can undermine new entry attempts. Using deep pockets and the nowcasting radar, the dominant firm can purchase disruptive innovators.

 

Our new economy enables the winners to capture much more of the welfare. They are able to affect downstream competition as well as upstream providers. Often, they can do so with limited resistance from governmental agencies, as power in the online economy is not always easily captured using traditional competition analysis. Digital personal assistants, as we explore, have the potential to strengthen the winner's gatekeeper power.

 

Q: President Trump has signaled before and after the election that he may block mergers and go after certain dominant companies. What kind of antitrust policies should we expect from him? Pro-business, pro-competition, or political antitrust?

 

That will depend on several factors, including the intellectual leadership brought to the DOJ and FTC, their willingness to reexamine the "antitrust light" policies of the past, and the courts' willingness to listen.


--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV

The Winners and Losers Radio Show
7-9 AM Weekdays, The EPIC Radio Player Stream, 
Sign UP HERE to get the Weekly Program Notes.

Monday, April 3, 2017

Bernstein/Spielberg: The Progressive Agenda Now: Jobs and Medicare for All

The Progressive Agenda Now: Jobs and Medicare for All


The coming years will require progressives to play extremely tough defense if we hope to preserve gains we've made. That means highlighting the disconnect between the promises that Donald Trump and Republican lawmakers have made and their actual proposals, and hammering home who their plans are designed to help: people who are already very wealthy. It also means mobilizing in our communities to exert pressure on politicians, as progressives did with considerable success during the recent health-care debate.

But it's obvious that defense isn't enough. To win over and mobilize the public, social justice advocates must articulate what we're for, not just what we're against. The American people deserve better than what's currently on offer from team Trump, but for many, the status quo also falls short. If progressives are to fulfill one of our core principles—the use of public policy to improve the lives of those left out or underserved by the market economy—we need a simple, plausible plan that excites people. Two key components of that plan are Medicare for All and a guaranteed jobs program.

A Medicare for All health-care system

Republican complaints about Obamacare never passed the laugh test. Some, like the claim that it was killing jobs, were completely unfounded. Others, like the GOP's frequent reminders that millions of Americans remain uninsured, were hypocritical to the extreme. Their own bill proposed knocking 24 million people off of coverage. And it's because of Republican opposition that 19 states and millions of Americans still don't benefit from the Medicaid expansion.

The public's rejection of the House GOP's draconian Obamacare replacement bill was notable. "Trumpcare's failure proved, in the most emphatic way possible, that you can't go further right than the Affordable Care Act without starting to drop people en masse from health insurance coverage," The New Republic's Sarah Jones pointed out. "[I]f you want to improve health care in this country, there is nowhere else to go but left."

We agree. The Affordable Care Act led to historic gains in coverage and slowed down the growth in health-care costs. But one can applaud and work to build on those gains while also noting that our system continues to leave millions of people uninsured and many more with high deductibles, co-pays, and premiums (even after accounting for government subsidies).

We can improve the current system by getting the Medicaid expansion into the 19 states that haven't yet adopted it (for which there now appears to be budding support), introducing a public option into the insurance exchanges (as former President Obama himself suggested last year), improving outreach and assistance efforts, and raising marketplace subsidies to lower out-of-pocket costs.

But we should also aim higher, building off the compelling fact that other countries already provide universal or near-universal coverage to their citizens while spending about half of what we do as a share of GDP. Their approaches vary, but a common thread unites them: an increased role for the public sector, either as regulator, price-setter, insurer, provider, or some combination thereof. In fact, there are sound economic reasons that health insurance belongs in the public sphere. For one thing, consumers lack sufficient information to make welfare-maximizing choices in private markets. For another, the unpredictable nature of health care needs and the lack of incentives to cover sick people make a large risk pool optimal. It should come as no surprise that our own government-run health programs, Medicare and Medicaid, are both far more popular and more cost-efficient than private insurance in this country.

How to get from where we are to Medicare for All is a huge challenge. Paul Starr recently suggested a smart, incremental step in the Prospect: "Midlife Medicare," which extends the system to 50- to 64-year-olds without employer coverage. Demos strategist Vijay Das recommends expanding Medicare first to kids. In a political climate where some conservatives want to cut social insurance, these ideas provide examples of turning from defense—"hands off Medicare!"—to offense: expand Medicare's eligibility.

A federal job guarantee

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One of the many bad ideas in the failed Republican health-care bill was a Medicaid work requirement. As we explained in a recent op-ed, most people who can work already do, and those who don't are often faced with a lack of available jobs, transportation options, child-care services, or other work supports.

Lawmakers serious about providing work opportunities for people, rather than unnecessary and unrealistic requirements, should instead back a federal job guarantee. This proposal, outlined recently by Mark Paul, Sandy Darity, and Darrick Hamilton in Jacobin and by Jeff Spross in Democracy, is straightforward: the federal government would provide a job, with salary and benefits, to anyone who wanted one and didn't have one. A job guarantee could simultaneously lower un- and underemployment while providing critically needed labor in fields ranging from infrastructure to education to child and elder care.

A federal job guarantee would also be a useful program during recessions; when private-sector employment took a hit, public-sector employment could grow to offset the lost demand. It would help stabilize the economy while significantly reducing poverty and replacing the opportunities swallowed up by recession.

Making The Case

The arguments against these ideas would tend to fall into two familiar categories: "They require too much government" and "They're too expensive."

On the first objection, the government is already present, if not always accounted for. The idea of health care as a right is embodied in the fact that hospitals must treat the ill, regardless of their ability to pay. Half of our spending on health is already in the public sector. We already recognize health care's non-market attributes.

That's less the case with jobs, but think of it this way: When credit markets fail to provide enough capital to keep commerce humming along, it is widely agreed that the Federal Reserve must step in as the lender of last resort. Having conceded government's responsibility for boosting commerce, why not for labor? When the job market fails to provide adequate employment opportunities, as is the case even today when the national unemployment rate is quite low, there is a role for government to make up the difference.

As to cost—the second objection—funding these policies would indeed require significant tax hikes. The sharp rise in inequality in both pre-tax income and wealth suggests that progressive tax increases—ones that ask the most from those with the greatest ability to pay—are the right place to start. We should not kid ourselves into thinking, however, that we can pay for Medicare for All and a jobs guarantee solely by taxing the rich.

Yet we must consider not just the tax side—there's the benefit side of the equation, too! Part of our job must be to help people understand the benefits they'd receive from Medicare For All and a job guarantee. Analyses of Medicare for All-type programs conducted over the years, for instance, typically predict that low- and moderate-income Americans would see net savings. And we should not underestimate the consumer benefits of simplifying our complex, hybrid health-care system by significantly limiting the role of private insurers.

Many Americans, especially those left behind by structural economic changes that have undermined their economic opportunity, might also be deeply relieved and thus willing to help pay for an employment system that essentially took job insecurity off the table.

We recognize that the devil is often in the details and that we're talking about these two policies at a fairly abstract level. There's a great deal of analytic work to be done before we can fully enumerate their costs and benefits. Moreover, given our current president and Congress, we're a long way away from getting even incremental improvements to our laws on the books, let alone big overhauls like Medicare for All or a job guarantee.

But our fight against the bad ideas Republican lawmakers propose will be decidedly stronger if we simultaneously lay the groundwork for the good ideas the American people deserve.


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John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV

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Bernstein: Barriers to opportunity in today’s America

Barriers to opportunity in today's America  

via the Washington Post

By Jared Bernstein


Jared Bernstein, a former chief economist to Vice President Biden, is a senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and author of the new book 'The Reconnection Agenda: Reuniting Growth and Prosperity.'



I need a Trumpcation, by which I definitely do not mean a weekend in Mar-a-Lago, but a break from the chaos wrought by the administration.

To be clear, I'm not getting out of the vigilant oversight business, especially regarding attempts to sabotagethe Affordable Care Act or pass big, wasteful, regressive tax cuts. But it's also important to play offense, or at least describe what that would look like.

There are different ways to play offense in political economy, two of which are the inside and outside game. Ben Spielberg and I have a piece in the American Prospect on the outside game, an ambitious program calling for Medicare for All and a guaranteed job. On the inside, I'm testifying this week before the Joint Economic Committee at a hearing on ideas to improve economic opportunity in America. I'll summarize my testimony here after the hearing, but for now, let me set the table with a discussion about what I think we're talking about when we talk about opportunity and present some indicators intended to underscore the nature of the problem. I'll follow this up with a robust set of policy ideas intended to take down these barriers. And, getting back to defense, I'll include ways in which conservatives' current agenda is far more likely to bolster than to remove opportunity barriers.

There is no fixed definition of economic opportunity, but to my mind it corresponds to the realization of personal potential. If a child faces an inadequate school system, or a toxic environment, it will be much harder for her to realize her intellectual and, later, economic potential. If a parent lives in a community with an insufficient quantity of jobs, or jobs that pay wages that are too low to support a family, or jobs for which she lacks the necessary skills, both she and her family arguably face opportunity shortfalls. Such barriers can meaningfully be extended beyond schooling and jobs to housing, nutrition, health care and even infrastructure.

For example, consider the fact that due to toxic infrastructure — lead leaching into water pipes — children in parts of our country will suffer brain impairments (though, importantly, such damage need not be permanent). This is a clear example of an opportunity barrier constructed by a public policy failure, one that should be unacceptable in an economy as wealthy as our own. This framing of the problem suggests that a clear role for policy in the opportunity space is to take down the barriers that get between people and the realization of their economic potential. But how steep and extensive are the barriers to opportunity in today's America? Here's a list of some of the indicators, along with the variables with which they're associated.

Labor market barriers associated income, race and education:

 Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen recently noted that unemployment rates "averaged 13 percent in low- and moderate income communities from 2011 through 2015, compared with 7.3 percent in higher-income communities." Yellen also noted that in majority-minority areas, the jobless rate was 14.3 percent, 2011-15. The share of 25- to 54-year-old workers in these areas was nearly 9 percentage points lower than in non-majority-minority communities. Racial disparities exist in unemployment rates even controlling for education. Among whites with terminal high school degrees, unemployment was about 5 percent in 2015. For blacks, it was twice that level. Blacks with at least bachelor's degrees have unemployment rates of 4.1 percent compared with 2.4 percent for whites with at least bachelor's degrees.

Labor market barriers associated with rural areas: My own work has documented periods of slack labor markets over much of the past few decades, and their negative impact on the earnings and income growth of low- and moderate-income working families. More recently, there has been analysis of different trends in employment in rural, or non-metro, labor market indicators, and those from metro areas.

The figure below shows employment growth in rural and metro areas, with both indexed to 100 in 2008 Q1. While employment levels fell about the same amount in percentage terms in both areas over the deep recession, 2007-09, metro employment has recovered much more quickly, as the gap at the end of the figure reveals. By the middle of 2016, rural employment was still well below its pre-recession peak. Labor force participation trends reveal a similar gap (while population growth has stagnated in rural areas, the labor force has declined).

Source: USDA
Mobility barriers associated with regional economic segregation. In recent decades, families with children have experienced increased income segregation across place, driven by rising income inequality and by wealthier parents segregating themselves into areas with higher-performing schools. Researcher Ann Owens connects this development to diminished future opportunities for children: "Rising income inequality provided high-income households more resources, and parents used these resources to purchase housing in particular neighborhoods, with residential decisions structured, in part, by school district boundaries. Overall, results indicate that children face greater and increasing stratification in neighborhood contexts than do all residents, and this has implications for growing inequalities in their future outcomes." 

Education barriers associated with income: Close to 100 percent of children of parents with higher incomes/education pursued higher education, and 60 percent earned a bachelor's degree. Among children of parents with lower incomes/education, 72 percent pursued higher education and only 14 percent completed a BA. The figure below shows that the likelihood of a child from a wealthy family will attend an Ivy League or similarly elite school is 50 times that of a child from a low-income family.


Source: Chetty et al.

Mobility barriers associated with income, inequality and inadequate investments in children. While higher educational attainment is clearly associated with higher earnings, it is also the case that children who grow up in affluent households but do not graduate from college are 2.5 times as likely to have high incomes in adulthood as children who grow up poor but do graduate from college (see next figure). Recent research by Raj Chetty and others finds correlations between higher inequality and lower mobility. Chetty finds that as inequality has increased over time, one metric of mobility — the likelihood that adult children outearn their parents — has fallen, and that rising inequality explains 70 percent of the increase. One reason this relationship might exist is because when less GDP growth flows to lower-income families, their abilities to overcome mobility barriers — to move to opportunity, to invest in their children's future, to avoid the negative externalities of difficult neighborhoods — is diminished.


In fact, growing inequality is associated with less investment in children. In the early 1970s, high-income families spent four times what low-income families spent on "enrichment goods" for their kids (tutoring, books, trips, art supplies); in the mid-2000s, they spent seven times as much. Other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries spend five times what we spend on young children, often through prekindergarten education, despite solid research showing the benefit-cost ratio of such spending to be more than 8 to 1.

Employment and opportunity barriers associated with the criminal justice system. The National Employment Law Project reports that 70 million people in the country have a conviction or arrest history that can show up on a routine background check for employment. NELP also points out that more employers are conducting background checks wherein these records are likely to show up. Research reported by myself and Ben Spielberg show extensive employment and earnings disadvantages for those with criminal records, with serious negative spillovers to the families of those who face incarceration. The opportunity/mobility costs of having a criminal record is high: Men with criminal records are twice as likely to remain in the bottom-fifth of the income scale relative to men without records. The fact that these problems disproportionately affect racial minorities is partially a function of institutionalized racism associated with the criminal justice system, so the barrier of discrimination is germane here, as well.

Those are at least some of the barriers blocking opportunity today. How to wield public policy to reduce them is the subject of my testimony and while I'm sure the anticipation is killing you, you'll just have to wait for my next installment.--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV

The Winners and Losers Radio Show
7-9 AM Weekdays, The EPIC Radio Player Stream, 
Sign UP HERE to get the Weekly Program Notes.