Saturday, March 18, 2017

And now … West Virginia’s latest ‘mine safety’ bill [feedly]

And now … West Virginia's latest 'mine safety' bill
http://blogs.wvgazettemail.com/coaltattoo/2017/03/14/and-now-west-virginias-latest-mine-safety-bill/


A sign for the Upper Big Branch miners is seen in front of a church in Eunice off of Route 3, W.Va. on Thursday, March 8, 2010. .(AP Photo/The Register-Herald, Rick Barbero)

West Virginia led the nation in coal-mining deaths last year and we've seen two coal miners— including one working at one of the governor's operations — die on the job so far in 2017.

So obviously, it's a good time for lawmakers at the Capitol to start focusing on coal-mine safety. And what better time to introduce what is certainly the most sweeping mine safety bill in many years than on a Saturday session of the state Senate, right?

After an initial glance at Senate Bill 582, here's what United Mine Workers President Cecil Roberts had to say over the weekend:

We are reviewing the legislation to make sure we fully understand the impact it will have on working miners. This is the first opportunity we have had to see any of this language. The fact that this bill was introduced on a Saturday when it would get the least amount of media coverage tells you all you need to know about how proud its authors are of it. When legislators are afraid of the people finding out what they are doing, something is wrong.

The bill, sponsored by Sen. Randy Smith, R-Tucker and a Mettiki Coal official, is 106 pages long and is  — to borrow the word used by longtime mine safety advocate Davitt McAteer — "breathtaking" in the extent to which is essentially eliminates any meaningful role for the state Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training in enforcement of  safety and health protections for West Virginia's miners.

For example, instead of conducting "inspections" at the state's mines, the office would only perform "compliance visits and education." Actual enforcement actions could only be taken against mine operators if a state employee discovers conditions that present imminent danger to workers — unless, of course, the infraction was committed by an individual miner. The state's "Individual Penalty Assessments," which target mostly mid-level foremen and not companies or corporate agents, would remain part of state law, under the bill.

Oddly, in a state where coal industry officials and their politicians have spent so much time bucking any role for the federal government in regulating mining, the bill also eliminates a long list of West Virginia safety and health standards and says that instead of those standards, mine operators must simply follow U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration rules.

There's a lot of other stuff in this bill, including some confusing provisions about the Department of Environmental Protection's Special Reclamation Fund, a program that is of growing importance as the state faces the decline of the coal industry and the legacy liabilities that often poorly regulated mining has left behind.

The bill is on the agenda today for a 1 p.m. meeting of the Senate Energy, Industry and Mining Committee, which is chaired by Sen. Smith. Two of the bill's other three sponsors are also on the committee, if that gives you any idea whether this legislation is set to get moving.

This would be the third year in a row that West Virginia lawmakers have moved to weaken coal mine safety and health protections (see here and here). And before you blame the Republicans, recall that a Democratic-controlled Legislature and a Democratic governordidn't exactly pass meaningful mine safety reforms in the wake of the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster.

Stay tuned …


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

AFL-CIO Analysis of President Donald Trump’s FY 2018 Budget [feedly]

AFL-CIO Analysis of President Donald Trump's FY 2018 Budget
http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Political-Action-Legislation/AFL-CIO-Analysis-of-President-Donald-Trump-s-FY-2018-Budget

FL-CIO President Richard Trumka made the following statement regarding President Donald Trump's proposed budget:

 "Working people in states like Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin didn't vote for a budget that slashes workforce training and fails to invest in our nation's infrastructure. President Trump's proposed budget attempts to balance the budget on the backs of working families. The $54 billion cut to programs that benefit working families is dangerous and destructive. Huge cuts to the departments of Labor, Education and Transportation will make workplaces less safe, put more children at risk and make improving our failing infrastructure much more difficult. The administration can and should do better."

VISIT WEBSITE
 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Fractions within the Working Class [feedly]

Fractions within the Working Class
https://workingclassstudies.wordpress.com/2017/03/13/fractions-within-the-working-class/

This has been a rough year.  After the election, I reposted a few articles on my Facebook wall, as did so many of my friends, about the "working-class vote."  Did the white working-class just elect Trump?  I didn't think so, but I also understood that the world can look very different to a working-class person than it does to a middle-class one.  I knew this because I grew up poor, and it is a constant struggle speaking to both sides of my life, my past and my present, my mother and my colleagues.  My mother, let me point out, did not vote for Trump.  She thinks he's a jackass.  Two of her sisters did, however.  I don't know anyone else in my extended family who voted for him.  There were lots of Bernie supporters, not many Clinton supporters, and a whole bunch of abstainers.

A friend of mine from college, someone raised on the less wealthy spectrum of the educated middle class, took issue with even the idea of the "working class." What was this really?  He knew a lot of blue-collar workers, plumbers, builders, who made a lot more money than he or his mother ever did.  I gave him the quick sociological explanations — it's about power, not money, but his question remained with me.  Based on power at work, two-thirds of Americans can be classified as "working class" (see Michael Zweig's excellent The Working-Class Majority).  That is a hell of a lot of people.  They don't all think alike.  It struck me that sociologists, myself included, have spent untold ink arguing over the distinctions within the middle class (lower-middle, upper-middle, professional-managerial, those with economic capital vs. those with cultural capital, etc.) and where the line is between wherever this middle is and the top, and yet we have spent hardly any time  looking within the largest class of them all.

So, I pulled out the General Social Survey (GSS), which has been asking thousands of Americans every year or so all about their lives, political identifications, and voting patterns. I decided to see if there were differences within the working class based on type of working-class job, and not on education, race or  income level.  Working-class jobs are those with little autonomy and often involving the use of one's body – to wield a hammer, carry a baby, deliver a package from Amazon, stand all day greeting customers.  These jobs are held by a very diverse group of people; there are more people of color in the working class than in the middle or upper class.  When I refer to "the working class," I mean this whole diverse group, not only white male workers.

Let me give you a snapshot of five fractions of the working class: the Builders, the Makers, the Movers, the Clerks, and those who Serve (I call this category "CookCleanCare" to remind myself of the range of work within this fraction).  Builders most fit the stereotype of "the working class" (three-quarters are men, most are white, and many of them do wear hard hats at work), but it is only one fraction.  A more diverse lot are Makers, including assembly-line workers, tool-and-die makers, sewers, and cabinetmakers.  This is the fraction that has seen the largest influx of women in the past few decades, although still mostly male.  Movers include a wide array of transport jobs, from UPS drivers to ambulance drivers to long-haul truckers, also mostly men.  Most of those in the other two fractions are female. The CookCleanCare group includes those who prepare our food, clean our messes, and care for our children.  The Clerks are our growing retail worker category.  Back in the day being a clerk was seen as a move up, but today's clerks are generally poorly paid and even less likely to hold a college degree than CookCleanCare workers (the most educated fraction).

Here are some other interesting differences between the fractions.  Builders are the most likely to be living in the same place where they grew up, Makers the least likely.  Movers are the most likely to identify themselves as "working class."  Twice as many Builders as Makers think of themselves as "middle class."  Makers, in contrast, are more likely than the others to think of themselves as "lower class."  In terms of income, Builders make the most money, Movers the least.   If we looked only at white men in each of the fractions, we would find the most instances of sexism, nativism, and racism among the Makers, perhaps reflecting the fact that this group has seen the biggest changes over the past few decades.  But it is important to note that a greater proportion of rich white men and white male managers express racist views than any working-class fraction does.

During the past decade or two, ever since Reagan really, we have been hearing a lot about how "the working class" has turned its back on the Democratic Party.   But this is only true if we limit "the working class" to white men without college degrees.  If we include the whole of the working class, this claim is simply wrong.  According to my analysis of GSS data, there has never been a presidential election in which the majority of the working class voted for the Republican candidate.

If we look at the working class based on broad occupational categories rather than race or education, we get a very different picture from "the working class" that political pundits have been talking about.  We don't yet have GSS data for the 2016 election, but figures from 2012 suggest the value of analyzing working-class voters based on their jobs rather than income or education.

This graph of voting patterns in the 2012 Presidential Election, arrayed by largest supporters of Obama from left to right, shows that while all occupational groups gave Obama a majority, two working-class fractions were at the polar ends of the spectrum. The Professional-Managerial Class fell near the middle. 

Organizing the data by job categories also helps us understand that white working-class men don't vote as a unified bloc. If we look only at white men, Obama's lead lessens, with Romney winning slight majorities with Makers, Movers, and Clerks (not to mention lots of PMC support).  Why were white male Movers, Makers, and Clerks swayed by Romney while white male Builders and CookCleanCare were not?  For one thing, the Democratic Party may have forgotten Movers and Makers.  Women and people of color in these fractions may find other aspects of the Democratic party compelling, but white males less so.  All five fractions took an economic hit during the Recession and, unlike the PMC, none of them have recovered, as you can see from the chart below.  Makers even saw their wages decline before the recession hit.

This points to the second problem with the "working class voting against their class interests" narrative.  Neoliberalism has clearly not been working for many working-class people.  The outrageous vote for Trump may be less an appreciation of his qualities or a heeled response to his dog-whistles and more a giant "Fuck You!" to the establishment.  If we don't figure out a way to provide security and prosperity for all, we might just get neither for any of us.

Class is a complicated construct.  Each fraction includes millions of workers, living in different parts of America, with different pasts, different futures, different understandings of how the world works. One way to gain deeper insight into the working class is to consider how major fractions within the working class respond to political appeals.  A call for massive infrastructure building, for example, is more likely to resonate with Builders, while a threat to cut the Department of Education may worry CookCleanCare members most.  It is also true that the nature of work changes, sometimes rapidly, as has been the case for many Makers and Clerks.  We owe the working class the respect of paying attention to which fractions are being mowed down on the front lines of neoliberalism.  It doesn't seem like either major party has been doing a good job of this lately.

Allison L. Hurst

Allison L. Hurst is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Oregon State University and the author of two books on the experiences and identity reformations of working-class college students, The Burden of Academic Success: Loyalists, Renegades, and Double Agents (2010) and College and the Working Class (2012).  She was one of the founders of the Association of Working-Class Academics, an organization composed of college faculty and staff who were the first in their families to graduate from college, for which she also served as president from 2008 to 2014. She is Chairperson of the Working-Class Academics Section of the Working-Class Studies Association.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Will Human Rights Law actually Protect us from Fascism? [feedly]

Will Human Rights Law actually Protect us from Fascism?
http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/16/03/2017/will-human-rights-law-actually-protect-us-fascism

Human rights regimes such as the European Convention on Human Rights are unlikely to shield citizens against the wave of authoritarianism threatening liberal democracies.

Shortly after the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the USA, multiple authors on openGlobalRights were already debating what role, if any, international human rights could play in the struggle against the spread, normalisation and institutionalisation of the misogyny, racism and latent fascism of the Trump campaign. In the European context, memories of fascism and the Nazi Holocaust were important factors in the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950. The drafters may have been driven by a broader agenda to contain democracy and socialist ideas, but the hope that a supra-national legal system of human rights protection would stabilise and safeguard liberal democratic institutions runs quite deep in the foundations of the ECHR.

Now that liberal democracies have delivered far-right regimes in Europe (and beyond) and contributed to the legitimation of xenophobic discourse and practices, there is indeed cause to ask whether international human rights law will actually deliver on its "promise". The legal perspective from the European regime, however, suggests that human rights law alone is unlikely to protect liberal democratic institutions from a fascist take-over and that we are far from immune from the atrocities of the early twentieth century.

First, there is little in the ECHR that could be used to challenge the election of a party with fascist views through the ordinary democratic process, as opposed to challenging the laws or actions of such a regime. Article 17 of the ECHR states that nothing in the Convention implies that any state, group or person has the right to engage in an activity or act aimed at destructing the rights and freedoms in the Convention. But the focus and effects of this provision are limited. It only refers to actions that annihilate human rights; it does not speak to the ideology or political formation of the state. And it can only be used to exclude reliance on the ECHR (e.g., by individuals seeking to rely on Article 10 on the right to freedom of expression to disseminate racist views); it is not a self-standing provision on the basis of which an action can be brought directly before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The result is that although fascist ideology goes against any notion of universal human equality, that fundamental incompatibility carries little concrete juridical effects. After all, Golden Dawn, an openly neo-Nazi party, sits with a comfortable 7% in the Greek Parliament.

Second, the ECHR would not necessarily prevent a regime with fascist aspirations from derogating from its human rights obligations. The creation of a supra-national machinery was designed to place human rights beyond the reach of the nation state. In particular, the ECHR purported to avoid a remake of the Weimar Constitution—which was suspended during the Third Reich—by placing limits on the ability of states to derogate from their human rights obligations. Pursuant to Article 15 ECHR, the ECtHR must verify that there is a "war or other public emergency" that justified departure from the ECHR and that the measures taken do not go beyond what is "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation".

But there are reasons to doubt the resilience of this framework. Although states must notify the Council of Europe of their intention to derogate from the ECHR, the mechanism of Article 15 is largely reactive. This becomes particularly problematic under conditions of internal repression and of pan-European convergence towards the far right, where the prospects of a successful challenge diminish. Judicial control has been weak thus far on the ground that national authorities are best placed to determine the existence of, and the measures required to respond to, an emergency. Moreover, the interpretation of Article 15 ECHR has evolved to reflect the changing political and social conjuncture.  

For example, since 9/11, states are no longer required to demonstrate the existence of an imminent and concrete threat—intelligence over a possible terrorist attack on UK soil was sufficient to meet the Article 15 requirements—contributing to the collapse between normalcy and exception that underpins criticisms that the "war or terror" has led to a permanent state of emergency. And emergency measures passed to combat terrorism have often been used for purposes other than the aversion of the "security threat". Many of the measures introduced in France after the Paris attacks of November 2015 have since been used to suppress political activism, including opposition to the infamous "Loi El-Komhri", which dismantled many labour law guarantees for workers. The state of emergency also made space for more institutionalised forms of racism and Islamophobia, as the controversial "Burkini Bans" adopted on grounds of "peace and public order" demonstrate (the French Conseil d'Etat set aside some of the bans, but various regional bodies still refuse to comply). Thus, Article 15 ECHR has been no panacea to authoritarianism, even by liberal democratic regimes.

In theory, Article 17 ECHR—prohibiting the destruction of rights and freedoms—could prevent a fascist government from invoking Article 15. But the professed neutrality of the human rights framework raises questions about the willingness of the ECtHR to express a clear judgment on, and openly condemn, the fascist nature of a regime. In the "Greek case", several states objected to the invocation of Article 15 by the Greek military junta. But the Commission largely avoided the question, ruling that the junta had failed to establish that there was a communist conspiracy threatening the life of the Greek nation without making any mention of the dictatorial nature of the regime. Even if the ECtHR could be expected, in the abstract, to take a more robust position, this underestimates the concrete effects of far-right resurgence and the more covert forms fascism takes in the contemporary moment. It is difficult to imagine the ECtHR would bar Marine Le Pen, were she to be elected, from extending the state of emergency and further consolidating her power, even though the Front National remains rooted in the fascist project.

Legally, the situation is quite different from the 1930s. At the time, there was no international human rights regime in place that could be brought to bear on the internal activities of the state. It would, however, be naïve—and dangerous—to think that the human rights framework will deliver on its promise to curb the impulses of fascism. On Trump's election, Barack Obama attempted to present a façade of business-as-usual and ensure an orderly transition of power. A week into Trump's presidency, there were already signs that blind faith in liberal constitutional institutions is fading. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets in protest of the "Muslim Ban" and recent research has already warned that the legal and institutional framework of the US Constitution provides little safeguards against an authoritarian turn. Commentators have asked whether international human rights law will come to the rescue. The European legal framework suggests that attempts to "lock-in" liberal democratic institutions through human rights instruments are unlikely to prevent or survive the rise of fascism. And there is therefore an urgent need to build alternative strategies of resistance, both in Europe and beyond.

 

 

Eva Nanopoulos is a Lecturer in Law at Queen Mary, University of London. This post first appeared on OpenDemocracy.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Can Economic Growth really be Decoupled from Increased Carbon Emissions in Least Developed Countries? Ethiopia’s Story [feedly]

Can Economic Growth really be Decoupled from Increased Carbon Emissions in Least Developed Countries? Ethiopia's Story

Steve Baines - 16th March 2017

http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/16/03/2017/can-economic-growth-really-be-decoupled-increased-carbon-emissions-least-developed-c


These are definitely not the research findings I expected to be presenting. The data in front of me has challenged some of my long-held assumptions.

Climate negotiations through the years show us one thing very clearly – that Least Developed Countries demand the right to develop their own economies and build their own prosperity for their people. They are not prepared to accept underdevelopment under the guise of 'carbon responsibility'.

So the question becomes whether Least Developed Countries can deliver these improved living standards for their citizens without causing the environmental damage historically inflicted through growth in the West…or to put it another way …Can LDCs "leapfrog" dirty technology and move straight to green solutions? Does prosperity always automatically come with a carbon price tag? Evidence of any form of "absolute" decoupling (where growth goes up and emissions go down) is very thin on the ground. "History provides little support for the plausibility of decoupling" says Tim Jackson in Prosperity Without Growth.

Well Tim, we now have early, tentative evidence that such "decoupling" is indeed possible in practice. This is Ethiopia's story.

Ethiopia's Commitment

We all think we know about Ethiopia – the familiar headlines – famine, drought, refugees. Right now that old stereotype is back in the news: Ethiopia is in the midst of a severe drought crisis, and according to the latest figures, 5.6 million people need food and still more need water, Ironically this suffering is likely to be more severe because of climate change.

Ironic because Ethiopia is a big and complicated place, and other, remarkable, progress is being made, including on climate change:  In 2010 Prime Minister Meles Zenawi committed Ethiopia to two amazing joint goals: To become a Middle Income nation by 2025 and to do this by 2030 without a single additional gram of Greenhouse Gas emissions (GHGs) from 2010 levels.

These commitments were set out in Ethiopia's Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) Strategy 2010. The context is not promising. One third of Ethiopia's people currently live on less than $1.25 a day, so the strategy commits Ethiopia to raising real incomes per person 3.3 times over 15 years (measured by Gross National Income per capita). Also by the end of this target period there will be over half as many people again in the country. All without increasing emissions.

Surely this is madness – I thought as I flew into Addis Ababa in July 2016. For my research, I used World Bank statistics of Population, Gross National Income (GNI) and GHG emission, alongside CRGE commitments to calculate how much more carbon-efficient Ethiopia's Technology would need to become to meet its targets.

Using World Bank figures on Population growth and Ethiopian commitments to Middle Income status and carbon neutrality it is possible to calculate that "Technology" in Ethiopia needs to become more carbon-efficient by a factor of over 4.5 times (2010- 2030) if CRGE goals are to be met.

I also compared this level of Technological (leapfrogging) carbon efficiency gains to that achieved by other nations at times of strong economic growth. Using the same methodology, between 1999 and 2012 none of the 6 other countries surveyed (2 OECD countries, 2 BRICS countries and 2 other developing countries) were able to rise to the challenge of decoupling on this scale.

So has Ethiopia got a track record of achievement to back up its ambitious commitments? Using the World Bank datasets I looked back at Ethiopia's recent performance and also talked to key players in Government and civil society.

Here are the killer figures – Between 1999 and 2012:

  • Population increased 43%,
  • National affluence (GNI) increased 242%
  • But GHG emissions actually decreased by around 15% (see graph). After taking population growth into account, per capita emissions went down over 40%.

These results blew me away. They demonstrate that Ethiopia has the track record to meet their twin targets if they can just stay on the same trajectory.

Ethiopia GHG

How has Ethiopia achieved this? …by making its institutions ready for change. The study looked in depth at the capacity of Ethiopia to benefit from climate finance and then focused in on some landmark case studies in investment into "green growth" initiatives – the rollout of a national programme of "Eco Industrial Parks", securing international private investment in construction of a major geothermal plant and ongoing efforts to enhance the take-up of "New Improved Cook Stoves" across the country.

Conclusion

So where has all of this got us? Ethiopia's achievements may constitute a small, tentative, fragile message of hope. If we believe World Bank figures, at very early stage development Ethiopia has decoupled absolute GHG emissions from economic growth.

Critical questions remain: fruitful areas for new research. In particular – How have the benefits of this green economic growth been distributed among the people? If growth can indeed be green and the results of growth be equitably shared to relieve poverty, then we really have a development model which is worth replicating. "Win-win" solutions for the planet and the people.

Perhaps it will prove harder to sustain once low hanging fruit and easy wins have been banked….or just possibly Ethiopia has forged a new route for Sustainable Development – a model for other LDCs to follow.

The study was undertaken in partnership with Oxfam GB, the Environment & Climate Research Centre in Addis Ababa, UNDP's Ethiopia office and the University of Birmingham.

 

 

This post first appeared on Duncan Green's from Poverty to Power blog.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

CBPP: Peggy Bailey: African Americans Have Much to Lose Under House GOP Health Plan [feedly]

African Americans Have Much to Lose Under House GOP Health Plan
http://www.cbpp.org/blog/african-americans-have-much-to-lose-under-house-gop-health-plan

Running for President, President Trump asked African Americans, "What do you have to lose by trying something new like Trump?"  As it turns out, one answer is health insurance.

With the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimating that the House Republican health plan would cause 24 million people to lose health insurance, African Americans have particular reason for concern due to existing health disparities and related financial burdens. 

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) boosted the African American insured rate by 5 percentage points, to 88 percent, slightly below the 91 percent national figure.  The House Republican plan, by contrast, would cause large numbers of African Americans to lose coverage.  About 15 million of the nearly 40 million African Americans get coverage through Medicaid, which the House plan would cut by $880 billion over ten years; about 1.5 million of them are covered through the ACA's Medicaid expansion, which the House plan would effectively eliminate.  Many other African Americans have private insurance through the ACA's marketplaces, where coverage would become less affordable for many consumers under the House plan (due partly to its much weaker premium tax credits to help them buy coverage). 

In 2015, African Americans under 65 were likelier than whites, Asian Americans, and Hispanics to report difficulty paying medical bills in the past year, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports.  Losing health insurance would further erode African Americans' financial stability.  It also would likely widen the already significant health disparities between African Americans and other races.  African Americans' death rates due to diabetes, heart disease, and cancer significantly exceed whites' and generally exceed all other races. 

Even more striking is the disparity in HIV rates: 60 per 100,000 African Americans have been diagnosed with HIV, compared to 7 per 100,000 whites, the CDC reports; the African American diagnosis rate is almost triple that of the next highest group (Hispanics). There's also a wide disparity in death rates among people diagnosed with HIV:  24 per 100,000 for African Americans, compared to 7 or fewer per 100,000 for all other races. 

Health insurance is key to reducing these disparities by making care affordable. The ACA's Medicaid expansion has improved enrollees' access to a doctor or clinic and led to improved self-reported health status among enrollees.  For example, in Ohio — where African Americans make up almost one-quarter of the Medicaid expansion population — expansion enrollees with chronic conditions reported that Medicaid coverage improved their access to care and management of their conditions.  And 48 percent of Ohio's Medicaid expansion enrollees reported feeling better since gaining health insurance.  

Policymakers considering the House Republican plan need to understand that health insurance for African Americans is, in fact, a lot to lose.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Bernstein: ICYMI: 8 problems with Trump’s ‘budget’ (with a side of thoughts about defense spending) [feedly]

ICYMI: 8 problems with Trump's 'budget' (with a side of thoughts about defense spending)
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/icymi-8-problems-with-trumps-budget-with-a-side-of-thoughts-about-defense-spending/

I've but a few points to add to the reams of analysis I've read on the Trump administration's first budget (if I may put in a plug for the home team, the most comprehensive coverage I've seen is right here at WaPo).

1) A new administration's first budget is typically "skinny" as it is still getting staffed up. But, as Richard Kogan of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities shows, this one is downright emaciated (that's why, in the title, I call this a "budget" rather than a budget). It covers only the 30 percent of the federal spending that's discretionary (funds that must be appropriated each year vs. the mandatory programs, such as Social Security), leaves out any tax plans (so no information on revenue), and thus provides no grand totals on either spending, revenue and their difference: the deficit. That's one reason I stand strongly by point No. 8 below (while it's still very important to grok its implications, this budget ain't going anywhere as is).

2) The most widely reported point about the overall thrust of the budget is its ploughshares-to-swords theme: President Trump proposes to raise defense spending by $54 billion and, to maintain revenue neutrality, cut non-defense discretionary (NDD) spending to make up the difference.

3) Since much NDD spending helps less-advantaged families and communities, that makes this budget a close cousin of the Republicans' Obamacare replacement. While that benighted plan proposes to transfer almost a trillion dollars out of Medicaid and tax subsidies (that make insurance more affordable for low-income, moderate-income and older people) to the wealthiest households in tax cuts, this one pays for its defense plus-up by cutting job training, worker protections, student aid and college assistance, housing assistance for low-income renters, heating-bill assistance for low-income elders, Meals on Wheels and more.

4) Sticking with this theme of reverse-Robin-Hoodism, under the auspices of "recogniz[ing] a greater role for State and local governments and the private sector to address community and economic development needs," the administration would also eliminate a number of programs designed to help disadvantaged places, including the Community Development Block Grant, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program, the Economic Development Administration, Choice Neighborhoods, the Self-help Homeownership Opportunity Program and the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund. The claim is that these programs do not have successful track records. That is, of course, a relevant budgeting criterion, and improving the effectiveness of federal funds targeted at high-need communities is a worthy goal. But just pulling federal support from those communities — which this budget proposes — is not an attempt to accomplish that goal. Instead, language about "devolv[ing] … activities to the State and local level" is code for Trump's intent to abandon the very places he once promised to revitalize.

5) While I hate to remind you of a nasty, unfortunate word, it's important to recall that because of "sequestration," wherein Congress agreed to cap discretionary spending at fixed amounts, NDD spending is already at a historic low (see figure).

6) "But wait," you ask (if you're still with me). How can Trump plus-up defense given sequestration rules? I'll get to that in point No. 8, but it's one reason I don't think this budget is going anywhere. To be fair, that alone does not distinguish it from far more thoughtful, detailed budgets. This process has been thoroughly broken for many years.

7) While analysis of this budget proposal has been extensive, there is one point on which I've seen too little analysis: Does the Defense Department really require an extra $54 billion to meet its mission? Lawrence Korb, who has street cred in this space, emphatically says no here. "Just as the sequester is a non-strategic and unwise way to limit a budget, increased funding that is not connected to a sound defensive strategy for the demands we face today will be non-strategic, wasteful, and do more harm than good."

8) I'm confident this budget isn't going anywhere legislatively. Depending on some arcane Senate rules, raising the defense cap is likely to invoke a filibuster, meaning the Republicans would need at least eight Democrats to sign on. Of course, it's possible that some Senate Democrats would be uncomfortable filibustering defense appropriations, but that's a heavy lift. Moreover, once you start dinging this many programs, you're bound to hit stuff to which even constituents of hard-right tea party lawmakers object. A small but pointed example: I've already heard Republican blowback to cuts of subsidized air travel to rural areas. Sen. John Thune (R-S.D.) has raised concerns regarding further domestic spending cuts, as has Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) regarding the historically large 29 percent cut to the State Department's budget. From 30,000 feet up, aggregated spending cuts often look a lot more attractive than on the ground level.

Like I said, this won't be the first budget by a long shot to meet with congressional resistance, but remember, this is a Republican Congress, so you'd expect it to be much more welcoming. From where I sit, part of what's going on here is that as good as it is at PR and riling up the base, team Trump is extremely challenged when it comes to governing (see Ron Klain's excellent analysis of this point). The president can sign his name, so some — thanks to the courts, not all — of his executive orders are in play. But beyond that, it hasn't passed one piece of legislation, including the main things Trump ran on, such as health-care reform, tax cuts, the wall or trade negotiations.

Sure, it's still early days. But the Trump administration is learning that governing is hard. At least, that's what I hope it is learning.


********

One thought about point #7:

7) While analysis of this budget proposal has been extensive, there is one point on which I've seen too little analysis: Does the Defense Department really require an extra $54 billion to meet its mission? Lawrence Korb, who has street cred in this space, emphatically says no here. "Just as the sequester is a non-strategic and unwise way to limit a budget, increased funding that is not connected to a sound defensive strategy for the demands we face today will be non-strategic, wasteful, and do more harm than good."

For someone who's deeply interested in fiscal policy, I don't research/write enough about defense spending. That's a problem, and not just because it's about 15% of the budget, but because it gets so little scrutiny. To be clear, this is not a knee-jerk claim that we must slash spending in the sector. While we spend many multiples more than other countries (eg, Russia spends $50 billion/yr, less than Trump's requested plus-up), knowledgeable analysts like Michael O'Hanlon think the current budget is in the right ballpark.

But my issue is that too many progressives, myself included (and this critique applies to many liberal think tanks in the fiscal biz too), fail to learn as much as we should about defense spending and thus have little to say at moments like this, when the president proposes turning ploughshares into swords on the backs of the poor and the environment.

A few other links that are worth checking out (the WaPo's been doing great work on the many shortcomings of this budget):

–When it comes to the Meals on Wheels program, all the sudden team Trump cares about evidence. But they get it wrong, big league.

–Underscoring my point #8 re the president's own party resisting his budget. Nice point by General Mattis in there, btw: if you cut diplomacy, you're going to need to spend more on bullets.

–On the basic philosophy of this budget: paying for defense by cutting poor people's programs.

–CBPP's president, Bob Greenstein, on the budget.

 -- via my feedly newsfeed