Thursday, January 12, 2017

Re: [socialist-econ] There Will Be No Obamacare Replacement [feedly]

The fascists created their own Monster. They campaigned on Obamacare is a disaster and created the need amongst their base to destroy it--even tho very large elements of their base desperately need Obamacare. 



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On Jan 12, 2017, at 1:47 PM, John Case <jcase4218@gmail.com> wrote:


....really, Prof Krugman, only Comey and Putin?

There Will Be No Obamacare Replacement
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2017/01/there-will-be-no-obamacare-replacement.html

Paul Krugman:

There Will Be No Obamacare Replacement: You may be surprised at the evident panic now seizing Republicans, who finally — thanks to James Comey and Vladimir Putin — are in a position to do what they always wanted, and kill Obamacare. How can it be that they're not ready with a replacement plan?
That is, you may be surprised if you spent the entire Obama era paying no attention to the substantive policy issues — which is a pretty good description of the Republicans, now that you think about it.
From the beginning, those of us who did think it through realized that anything like universal coverage could only be achieved in one of two ways: single payer, which was not going to be politically possible, or a three-legged stool of regulation, mandates, and subsidies. Here's how I put it exactly 7 years ago...
It's actually amazing how thoroughly the right turned a blind eye to this logic, and some — maybe even a majority — are still in denial. But this is as ironclad a policy argument as I've ever seen; and it means that you can't tamper with the basic structure without throwing tens of millions of people out of coverage. You can't even scale back the spending very much — Obamacare is somewhat underfunded as is.
Will they decide to go ahead anyway, and risk opening the eyes of working-class voters to the way they've been scammed? I have no idea. But if Republicans do end up paying a big political price for their willful policy ignorance, it couldn't happen to more deserving people.

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

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Rodrik: Trump’s Defective Industrial Policy

Trump's Defective Industrial Policy



CAMBRIDGE – US President-elect Donald Trump has yet to take office, but his brand of flawed industrial policy has been on full display since his surprise win in November.

Within weeks of the election, Trump had already claimed a victory. Through a mix of inducements and intimidation, he prevailed on the heating and cooling firm Carrier to keep some of its operations in Indiana, "saving" around 1,000 American jobs. Touring the Carrier plant subsequently, he warned other US firms that he would impose stiff tariffs on them if they moved plants overseas and shipped products back home.

The Year Ahead 2017 Cover Image

His Twitter account has produced a stream of commentary in the same vein. He has taken credit for Ford's decision keep a Lincoln plant in Kentucky, rather than move it to Mexico. He has threatened General Motors with import tariffs if it continues to import Chevrolet Cruzes from Mexico instead of making them in the United States.

Trump has also hounded defense contractors for cost overruns, berating the aerospace giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin on separate occasions for producing planes that are too expensive.

Trump's policy style represents a sharp break from that of his predecessors. It is highly personalized and temperamental. It relies on threats and bullying. It is prone to boasting, exaggeration, and lies about actual successes. It is a type of public spectacle, staged on Twitter. And it is deeply corrosive of democratic norms.

Economists tend to advocate an arm's-length relationship between government and business. Public officials are supposed to insulate themselves from private firms, lest they be corrupted and engage in favoritism. This is a prized principle in the US – but one that is more often breached than observed. An obvious example is the undeniable influence over US government policy exercised by finance moguls during the last three decades.

Yet close business-government interactions also lie behind many of America's successes. The history of US economic development is one of pragmatic partnerships and collaboration between the public and private sector, rather than arm's-length relationships and rigid rules. As historically minded economists and policy analysts such as Michael LindStephen Cohen, and Brad DeLong have reminded us, the US is heir to a Hamiltonian tradition in which the federal government provides the investment, infrastructure, finance, and other support that private enterprise needs.

US technological innovation owes as much to specific government programs, such as loan assistance or government purchases as it does to American entrepreneurs' and inventors' ingenuity. As Harvard Business School professor Josh Lerner notes, some of the most dynamic technology companies in the US, including Apple and Intel, received financial support from the government before going public. The electric carmaker Tesla was a beneficiary of the same public loan guarantee program as Solyndra, the solar cell company that went bust in 2011 in a spectacular public collapse.

As the Solyndra example illustrates, many public initiatives fail. But the ultimate test is whether the social return on the portfolio as a whole is positive, taking successes together with the flops. Such broad evaluations tend to be rare. But one analysis found that US programs to boost energy efficiency had produced positive net benefits. Interestingly, the bulk of the benefits were attributable to three relatively modest projects.

Sociologists Fred Block and Matthew Keller have provided perhaps the best analysis of the US "developmental state" – a reality that they say the reigning market-fundamentalist ideology has obscured. Block and Keller describe how a "decentralized network of publicly funded laboratories" and an "alphabet soup" of financing initiatives, such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, work with private firms and help them commercialize their products. They and their colleagues have documented the extensive role of both federal and state governments in supporting the collaborative networks on which innovation rests – whether in biotech, green technologies, or nanotech.

Such industrial policies, based on close collaboration and coordination between the public and private sectors, have of course been the hallmark of East Asian economic policymaking. It is difficult to imagine China's transformation into a manufacturing powerhouse – and the attendant success of its export-oriented model – without the Chinese government's helping and guiding hand. It is ironic that the same people who extol Chinese gains from globalization are often alarmed that a US administration may copy the Chinese approach and explicitly endorse industrial policies.

Unlike China, of course, the US purports to be a democracy. And industrial policy in a democracy requires transparency, accountability, and institutionalization. The relationship between the government and private firms has to be calibrated carefully. Government agencies need to be close enough to private enterprises to elicit the requisite information about the technological and market realities on the ground. For example, what are the fundamental reasons for the loss of manufacturing jobs in, say, automobile production, and how can the government help, if at all? But they cannot get so close to private firms that they end up in companies' pocket, or, at the other extreme, simply order them around.

And that is where industrial policy à la Trump fails to pass the test. On one hand, his appointments to key economic positions indicate he has little intention of severing government ties to Wall Street and big finance. On the other hand, his policymaking-by-tweet suggests he doesn't have much interest in building the institutionalized dialogue, with all the required safeguards, that sound industrial policy requires.

This means that we can expect the Trump administration's industrial policy to vacillate between cronyism and bullying. That may benefit some; but it will do little good for the overwhelming majority of American workers or the economy as a whole.


--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV

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The Earnings Gap between Black and White Men [feedly]

The Earnings Gap between Black and White Men
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2017/01/the-earnings-gap-between-black-and-white-men.html

John Laidler at the NBER Digest:

The Earnings Gap between Black and White Men: Since the end of slavery a century and a half ago, differences between the earnings of black and white Americans have been a reality of the U.S. labor market. Among working men, this gap narrowed sharply between 1940 and 1970 and has remained largely stable ever since. In Divergent Paths: Structural Change, Economic Rank, and the Evolution of Black-White Earnings Differences, 1940-2014, (NBER Working Paper No. 22797), Patrick Bayer and Kerwin Kofi Charles point out that focusing only on those who are employed fails to account for the growing numbers of men who are not working for a number of reasons. This group includes those who are unemployed, disabled, or no longer searching for work, as well as the rising number of individuals who are incarcerated.
Among working men, "the median earnings gap between blacks and white fell by almost 60 percent from 1940 to 1980 (with large decreases in the 1940s and 1960s) but has been essentially flat ever since, remaining in the 35-40 percent range in every sample from 1980-2014," the researchers report. But when they consider the entire population of men, they find that the earnings gap has actually widened substantially in recent decades. In 2010, the gap in the population as a whole was comparable to that in 1950. 

Their analysis, which focuses on the black-white earnings differences among prime-aged men from 1940 through the Great Recession, "points to the incredible lack of progress and, in many cases, regress in closing the gaps in labor market outcomes for black and white men."

The findings are most striking among median- and low-income blacks, whose position relative to median-income whites changed little in the seven-decade study period. In 1940, the earnings of a median-income black earner fell at the 24th percentile of the earnings distribution for whites. At the time of the Great Recession, the comparable black earners' earnings fall at the 27th percentile of the earnings distribution for whites—only a slight improvement in rank over the entire 75-year study period. 

In contrast, a black earner at the 90th percentile of the distribution for African Americans saw progress relative to the earnings of whites. In 1940, the earnings of the 90th percentile black were comparable to those of the median white, but by the late 2000s, this earnings level had risen to the 75th percentile in the white earnings distribution.

The racial earnings gap around the median narrowed from 1940-70, due largely to broad economic forces which reduced the income disparities among all workers. But since then, the relative gains made by low-skilled blacks through improved education have been countered by the growing overall connection between education and economic rank, the researchers find. "Racial convergence in educational attainment would have led to strong positional gains for black men at the median and below, except that these men faced strong structural headwinds from the simultaneously rising returns to education, both in terms of wages and in the probability of employment," the researchers find.

By contrast, high-skilled black men have moved closer to their white counterparts in income, which the researchers suggest has been due to more-equal access to quality higher education and high-skilled occupations. 

"While the entire economy has experienced a marked increase in earnings inequality, this increase has been even more dramatic for black men," the researchers find, "with those at the top continuing to make clear gains within the earnings distribution, and those at the bottom being especially harmed by the era of mass incarceration and the failing job market for men with low skills." The impact of rising incarceration is particularly striking: The incarceration rate tripled for black men between 1980 and 2010, from 2.6 percent to 8.3 percent of the population. The rate quintupled for white men, but remained much lower, at 1.5 percent of the population. 

The researchers conclude that education "has played a subtle but extremely important role in the evolution of the racial earnings gap," both fueling and stalling progress.

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There Will Be No Obamacare Replacement [feedly]


....really, Prof Krugman, only Comey and Putin?

There Will Be No Obamacare Replacement
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2017/01/there-will-be-no-obamacare-replacement.html

Paul Krugman:

There Will Be No Obamacare Replacement: You may be surprised at the evident panic now seizing Republicans, who finally — thanks to James Comey and Vladimir Putin — are in a position to do what they always wanted, and kill Obamacare. How can it be that they're not ready with a replacement plan?
That is, you may be surprised if you spent the entire Obama era paying no attention to the substantive policy issues — which is a pretty good description of the Republicans, now that you think about it.
From the beginning, those of us who did think it through realized that anything like universal coverage could only be achieved in one of two ways: single payer, which was not going to be politically possible, or a three-legged stool of regulation, mandates, and subsidies. Here's how I put it exactly 7 years ago...
It's actually amazing how thoroughly the right turned a blind eye to this logic, and some — maybe even a majority — are still in denial. But this is as ironclad a policy argument as I've ever seen; and it means that you can't tamper with the basic structure without throwing tens of millions of people out of coverage. You can't even scale back the spending very much — Obamacare is somewhat underfunded as is.
Will they decide to go ahead anyway, and risk opening the eyes of working-class voters to the way they've been scammed? I have no idea. But if Republicans do end up paying a big political price for their willful policy ignorance, it couldn't happen to more deserving people.

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Eastern Panhandle Independent Community (EPIC) Radio:How to get a raise, on Labor Beat Radio

John Case has sent you a link to a blog:



Blog: Eastern Panhandle Independent Community (EPIC) Radio
Post: How to get a raise, on Labor Beat Radio
Link: http://www.enlightenradio.org/2017/01/how-to-get-raise-on-labor-beat-radio.html

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Links for 01-12-17 [feedly]

Links for 01-12-17
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2017/01/links-for-01-12-17.html


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Congestion on the Last Mile [feedly]

Congestion on the Last Mile
http://www.digitopoly.org/2017/01/11/congestion-on-the-last-mile/

It has long been recognized that networked services contain weak-link vulnerabilities. That is, the performance of any frontier device depends on the performance of every contributing component and service. This column focuses on one such phenomenon, which goes by the label "congestion." No, this is not a new type of allergy, but, as with a bacteria, many users want to avoid it, especially advanced users of frontier network services.

Congestion arises when network capacity does not provide adequate service during heavy use. Congestion slows down data delivery and erodes application performance, especially for time-sensitive apps such as movies, online videos, and interactive gaming.

Concerns about congestion are pervasive. Embarrassing reports about broadband networks with slow speeds highlight the role of congestion. Regulatory disputes about data caps and pricing tiers question whether these programs limit the use of data in a useful way. Investment analysts focus on the frequency of congestion as a measure of a broadband network's quality.

What economic factors produce congestion? Let's examine the root economic causes.

The Basics

Congestion arises when demand for data exceeds supply in a very specific sense.

Start with demand. To make this digestible, let's confine our attention to US households in an urban or suburban area, which produces the majority of data traffic.

No simple generalization can characterize all users and uses. The typical household today uses data for a wide variety of purposes—email, video, passive browsing, music videos, streaming of movies, and e-commerce. Networks also interact with a wide variety of end devices—PCs, tablets, smartphones on local Wi-Fi, streaming to television, home video alarm systems, remote temperature control systems, and plenty more.

It is complicated, but two facts should be foremost in this discussion. First, a high fraction of traffic is video—anywhere from 60 to 80 percent, depending on the estimate. Second, demand peaks at night. Most users want to do more things after dinner, far more than any other time during the day.

Every network operator knows that demand for data will peak (predictably) between approximately 7 p.m. and 11 p.m. Yes, it is predictable. Every day of the week looks like every other, albeit with steady growth over time and with some occasional fluctuations for holidays and weather. The weekends don't look any different, by the way, except that the daytime has a bit more demand than during the week.

The bottom line: evenings require far greater capacity than other times of the day. If capacity is not adequate, it can manifest as a bottleneck at many different points in a network—in its backbone, in its interconnection points, or in its last mile nodes.

This is where engineering and economics can become tricky to explain (and to manage). Consider this metaphor (with apologies to network engineers): Metaphorically speaking, network congestion can resemble a bathtub backed up with water. The water might fail to drain because something is interfering with the mouth of the drain or there is a clog far down the pipes. So, too, congestion in a data network can arise from inadequate capacity close to the household or inadequate capacity somewhere in the infrastructure supporting delivery of data.

Numerous features inside a network can be responsible for congestion, and that shapes which set of households experience congestion most severely. Accordingly, numerous different investments can alleviate the congestion in specific places. A network could require a "splitting of nodes" or a "larger pipe" to support a content delivery network (CDN) or could require "more ports at the point of interconnection" between a particular backbone provider and the network.

As it turns out, despite that complexity, we live in an era in which bottlenecks arise most often in the last mile, which ISPs build and operate. That simplifies the economics: Once an ISP builds and optimizes a network to meet maximum local demand at peak hours, then that same capacity will be able to meet lower demand the rest of the day. Similarly, high capacity can also address lower levels of peak demand on any other day.

Think of the economics this way. An awesome network, with extraordinary capacity optimized to its users, will alleviate congestion at most households on virtually every day of the week, except the most extraordinary. Accordingly, as the network becomes less than awesome with less capacity, it will generate a number of (predictable) days of peak demand with severe congestion throughout the entire peak time period at more households. The logic carries through: the less awesome the network, the greater the number of households who experience those moments of severe congestion, and the greater the frequency.

That provides a way to translate many network engineering benchmarks—such as the percentage of packet loss. More packet loss correlates with more congestion, and that corresponds with a larger number of moments when some household experiences poor service.

Tradeoffs and Externalities

Not all market participants react to congestion in the same way. Let's first focus on the gazillion Web firms that supply the content. They watch this situation with a wary eye, and it's no wonder. Many third-party services, such as those streaming video, deliver a higher-quality experience to users whose network suffers less congestion.

Many content providers invest to alleviate congestion. Some invest in compression software and superior webpage design, which loads in ways that speeds up the user experience. Some buy CDN services to speed delivery of their data. Some of the largest content firms, such as YouTube, Google, Netflix, and Facebook, build their own CDN services to improve delivery.

Next, focus on ISPs. They react with various investment and pricing strategies. At one extreme, some ISPs have chosen to save money by investing conservatively, and they suffer the complaints of users. At the other extreme, some ISPs build a premium network, then charge premium prices for the best services.

There are two good reasons for that variety. First, ISPs differ in their rates of capital investment. Partly this is due to investment costs, which vary greatly with density, topography, and local government relations. Rates of investment tend to be inherited from long histories, sometimes as a product of decisions made many years ago, which accumulated over time. These commitments can change, but generally don't, because investors watch capital commitments and react strongly to any departure from history.

The second reason is more subtle. ISPs take different approaches to raising revenue per household, and this results in (effectively) different relationships with banks and stockholders, and, de facto, different budgets for investment. Where does the difference in revenue come from? For one, competitive conditions and market power differ across neighborhoods. In addition, ISPs use different pricing strategies, taking substantially different approaches to discounts, tiered pricing structures, data cap policies, bundled contract offerings, and nuisance fees.

The use of tiers tends to grab attention in public discussion. ISPs segment their users. Higher tiers bring more bandwidth to a household. All else equal, households with higher tiers experience less congestion at peak moments.

Investors like tiers because they don't obligate ISPs to offer unlimited service and, in the long run, raise revenue without additional costs. Users have a more mixed reaction. Light users like the lower prices of lower tiers, and appreciate saving money for doing little other than email and static browsing. In contrast, heavy users perceive that they pay extra to receive the bandwidth that the ISP used to supply as a default.

ISPs cannot win for losing. The archetypical conservative ISP invests adequately to relieve congestion some of the time, but not all of the time. Its management then must face the occasional phone calls of its users, which they stymie with phone trees that make service calls last 45 minutes. Even if users like the low prices, they find the service and reliability quite irritating.

The archetypical aggressive ISP, in contrast, achieves a high-quality network, which relieves severe congestion much of the time. Yet, such firms (typically) find clever ways to pile on fees, and know how to stymie user complaints with a different type of phone tree that makes calls last 45 minutes. Even when users like the quality, the aggressive pricing practices tend to be quite irritating.

One last note: It is a complicated situation where ISPs interconnect with content providers. Multiple parties must invest, and the situations involve many supplier interests and strategic contingencies.

Some observers have alleged that the biggest ISPs have created congestion issues at interconnection points for purposes of gaining negotiating leverage. These are serious charges, and a certain amount of skepticism is warranted for any broad charge that lacks specifics.

Somebody ought to do a sober and detailed investigation to confront those theories with evidence. (I am just saying.)

 

What does basic economics tell us about congestion? Congestion is inevitable in a network with interlocking interests. When one part of the network has congestion, the rest of it catches a cold.

More to the point, growth in demand for data should continue to stress network capacity into the foreseeable future. Since not all ISPs will invest aggressively in the presence of congestion, some amount of congestion is inevitable. So, too, is a certain amount of irritation.

Copyright held by IEEE. To view the printed essay, click here.


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