Sunday, December 25, 2016

A Sacred Populist: Pope Francis Shakes Up His Church [feedly]

A Sacred Populist: Pope Francis Shakes Up His Church
http://prospect.org/article/sacred-populist-pope-francis-shakes-his-church

Rex Features via AP Images)

For years, the solemn benediction given by the Pontiff of the Catholic Church to the City of Rome and the world on Christmas Day has been urbi et orbi, a blessing that conveys nothing less serious than the full absolution of his flock's sins. (The phrase translates literally as: "to the city and to the world.")

But when thousands of faithful Catholics gather on St. Peter's Square in Rome this Christmas, the current head of their church, Pope Francis, might be just as likely to wish them—along with the hundreds of millions tuning in via radio, TV, and the internet—a very down-to-earth buon pranzo, which literally means "enjoy your lunch." Francis has issued this unconventional greeting on previous occasions, eliciting horror from Vatican officials of all ranks.

It's just one of the many ways that Pope Francis has broken ranks with the conservative wing of the Catholic Church, especially on issues that involve the church's moral teachings, like divorce and sexual orientation. At a time of worldwide political upheaval, Francis has flouted Catholic pageantry and customs, and aligned himself with everyday people, disfavored groups, and the poor. It's a stance that delivers a populist message unsettling to many in the Vatican. 

This challenge departs sharply from papal traditions. For centuries, papal rituals and customs have made the Vatican look like the last bastion of absolute monarchy. Starting with Pope John Paul II, the bishops of Rome have loosened some of these ties of protocol. Yet the steps Pope Francis has taken since ascending St. Peter's Cathedral have broken those constraints wide open. On his election, the Argentinian-born pope refused to wear the sumptuous papal vestments, telling the cleric in charge of the liturgy that he could wear that outdated ornament himself if he were so intrigued by it. The current pontiff never moved into the papal palace, and refuses to drive in a fancy car.

On his first papal visit—to Lampedusa, a refugee island in the Mediterranean Sea—Pope Francis criticized capitalism and globalization as demons of our times that treat humans like leftovers. He performed a foot-washing ritual that traditionally takes place on the Thursday before Easter on female and Muslim prisoners, raising eyebrows among conservatives. In his sermons, Francis uses simple rhetoric that caters to the common woman and man, whom he emulates.

While liberals have welcomed this Pope's approach to his office, church conservatives are outraged. Some see Francis as an antichrist bent on nothing less than the destruction of a church order that they perceive as sacred and God-given. When Francis issued a papal document that is widely interpreted as relaxing the punishments the church imposes on divorced Catholics, many church elders saw the beginning of the end of Catholicism as they knew it.

 

FRANCIS CAME INTO OFFICE AS THE SUCCESSOR to Joseph Ratzinger, who goes by the name Benedict XVI. In the Catholic conclave that followed the death of John Paul II in 2005, the German cardinal had been regarded as a safe bet. He had been a close ally of John Paul II, who had been mourned by hundreds of thousands, and whose funeral had been attended by queens and kings, heads of state, prime ministers, and other power brokers. Ratzinger knew the Vatican inside out, and was the clear choice of the establishment.

Tellingly, Pope Francis had never seen eye-to-eye with Ratzinger, the papal insider. After Benedict XVI abdicated from the throne of Saint Peter in 2013, the cardinals who supported the man then known as Bergoglio took advantage of a moment of turmoil within the church. The abdication of a sitting pontiff had not taken place in centuries. The legal questions of how the Catholic Church deals with an acting pope who serves alongside a retired one have yet to be answered. This uncertainty weakened traditionalists, who were losing a champion in Benedict, and created an opening for the more controversial Francis.

Unlike his predecessor, Francis does not identify with or have any interest in intellectuals. He's been known to attack and criticize priests and bishops, accusing them of clericalism—that is, taking advantage of their privileges in the parishes and communities. This particularly irritates critics of Pope Francis, who as the church's highest clergyman has himself shown no interest in minimizing his papal authority. At a time of populist insurgencies around the globe, Francis turns out to be something of a populist himself.

Vatican higher-ups are close to mutiny. They accuse Francis of pandering to the public on such issues as marriage and divorce, without thinking through the implications. The pope's public pronouncements do not convert directly into doctrine; but Vatican leaders fret that churchgoers may not know the difference. They also reject his unconventional style as "unfit for the office," criticizing him for not speaking well in foreign languages, and for making off-hand remarks about whether parents should smack kids who misbehave ("if their dignity is maintained") and that Catholics need not breed "like rabbits."

It's still not clear where Francis is leading his church. So far, he has managed to draw critics from both left and right. Liberals are disappointed because his pronouncements have so far sparked no substantive changes. Conservatives are irate that their supreme pontiff may step onto the loggia of Saint Peter's on Christmas Day and utter what they regard as yet another unprecedented or foolish statement. To them, Francis never will be more than a "buon pranzo" pope. But like many political leaders around the globe, Pope Francis appears determined to shake up the established order.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

More alarms on devastating resurgence of black lung disease, but where’s the political outrage? [feedly]

More alarms on devastating resurgence of black lung disease, but where's the political outrage?
http://blogs.wvgazettemail.com/coaltattoo/2016/12/16/more-alarms-on-devastating-resurgence-of-black-lung-disease-but-wheres-the-political-outrage/

If you happened to be a regular reader of the CDC's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, yesterday's bombshell about black lung disease was enough to frighten you.

In the paper, researchers at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health reported that they had confirmed a cluster of the mostly deadly form of the disease — Progressive Massive Fibrosis, or PMF — at a clinic in the Kentucky coalfields. This cluster hadn't been discovered during the regular NIOSH routines that track black lung, and raised serious questions that the extent of the crisis was far worse than previously explained:

… Cases in this report were not identified through standard coal workers' pneumoconiosis surveillance, and whether similar clusters of cases exist in other communities is not known. Thus, the actual extent of PMF in U.S. coal miners remains unclear.

But if you happened to be listening to NPR's All Things Considered later in the day, you heard the results of a new investigation by the great Howard Berkes:

Across Appalachia, coal miners are suffering from the most serious form of the deadly mining disease black lung in numbers more than 10 times what federal regulators report, an NPR investigation has found.

The government, through the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, reported 99 cases of "complicated" black lung, or progressive massive fibrosis, throughout the country the last five years.

But NPR obtained data from 11 black lung clinics in Virginia, West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Ohio, which reported a total of 962 cases so far this decade. The true number is probably even higher, because some clinics had incomplete records and others declined to provide data.

The reaction from experts in the field — people who have spent their adult lives studying black lung and trying to fight the disease — was nothing short of terrifying.

Robert Cohen of the University of Illinois, Chicago:

I can't say that I've heard really anything worse than this in my career.

Edward "Lee" Petsonk of West Virginia University:

I've spent much of my career trying to find ways to better protect miners' respiratory health. It's almost like I've failed.

Scott Laney, one of the authors of the NIOSH paper:

The current numbers are unprecedented by any historical standard. We had not seen cases of this magnitude ever before in history in central Appalachia.

I guess it's still early, but the thing I notice is that my email inbox is pretty empty today.

Where are the formal statements from West Virginia political leaders expressing their outrage at this situation? Where are the press releases demanding action?

When anyone releases a new regulation aimed at fighting climate change or trying to curb mountaintop removal pollution, the last place you want to be is between any of our state's politicians and a microphone or camera. But 1,000 cases of the most severe and deadly form of a disease that has killed 78,000 coal miners since 1969?

Crickets.

Of course, nobody really much campaigns around these parts on a platform of promising to protect the health and safety of coal miners. Those days are gone, especially now that Ken Hechler has passed.

We're hearing a lot right now from politicians and the political media echo chambers about the middle class, the working class, people who live in middle America. What I can't understand is how it is that issues like black lung — or any number of a long list of worker health and safety threats — isn't really talked about like it's a working class issue.

During this year's presidential campaign, Democrat Hillary Clinton did mention black lung, but only briefly on her website and in context of protecting the program that provides benefits to victims of black lung. She didn't propose more steps to end this terrible disease. Secretary Clinton did talk a bit about coal miner safety, after former Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenship showed up at an anti-Clinton rally. She expressed her support for making crimes like Blankenship's a felony, instead of a misdemeanor with a maximum of one year in prison.

If President-elect Donald Trump talked about black lung, I must have missed it. But does anyone really believe a Trump administration will make tougher regulations and enforcement of mine safety and health protections a priority?

When mine safety and health came up during our state's gubernatorial campaign, it was in the form of a ridiculous attack by the United Mine Workers on Republican Bill Cole and in defense of Democrat Jim Justice, our now-Governor-elect who can't seem to pay all his mine safety fines on time, and over a bill that was signed into law by Democratic Gov. Earl Ray Tomblin.

What people who are truly friends of coal miners ought to do is make sure that all of our elected officials have to sit down and listen to what it sounds like for Mackie Branham — one of the coal miners Berkes interviewed — just trying to breathe.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Hidden Anxieties of the White Working Class [feedly]

Hidden Anxieties of the White Working Class
https://workingclassstudies.wordpress.com/2016/12/19/hidden-anxieties-of-the-white-working-class/


Donald Trump won the election by what once seemed a far-fetched strategy: energize working-class whites, especially those in rural locales and the Rust Belt. Trump's economic and cultural appeals to working-class whites have been widely analyzed by the media. He promised to bring back factory jobs. In struggling Appalachian states, he promised to bring back coal. He addressed concerns about undocumented immigrants and terrorism. With varying degrees of enthusiasm, working-class voters responded to his promises; no one else was promising them anything.

But many analysts were still puzzled by his appeal. Why were many working-class voters willing to put their trust in a billionaire businessman from New York City, a place so clearly identified with elites? They don't understand that instead of alienating these voters, Trump's lifestyle probably enhanced his appeal. The combination of his performance of masculinity and his conspicuous consumption spoke to fears that working-class voters have not only about economic decline but also about the potential toll of upward mobility. In Trump, working-class voters saw both the promise of economic regeneration, and the possibility that they or their children could move into a more privileged class without forsaking their cultural identity.

Trump's version of masculinity—angry, blunt-speaking, and indifferent to sensitivities called "political correctness"—reflects a stereotype of working-class men reminiscent of figures such as Archie Bunker from the 1960s sitcom All in the Family and Walt Kowalski from Clint Eastwood's Gran Torino (2008). Trump carried himself with a determined swagger and wore a trucker's cap. While some saw Trump playing a character, as he did on The Apprentice, working-class viewers found him familiar, a man who spoke like people they knew. While working-class voters perceived the East and West Coast elites as looking down on them, they felt that Trump understood and shared their views. In other words, he inspired working-class nostalgia not only for lost jobs, but also for the social status that accompanied these jobs. When these jobs disappeared, the very fabric of working-class communities was torn

Some have argued that Rust Belt residents from places like Pennsylvania or Ohio could easily improve their lives by relocating. This suggestion implicitly dismisses the many family and community ties that bind people to locations, and, as Paul Lauter once stated, working-class people must rise in solidarity with their class or leave it. Further, well-meaning elites don't understand that a working-class person's decision to stay put is likely motivated by both personal and economic factors. A recent study by the Pew Research Center found that those who moved long distances from their communities of origin were more likely to have graduated from college than those who remained.  A worker with only a high-school education will not necessarily fare better in relatively affluent Maryland than in Ohio. Class mobility, not geographical mobility, is required. As working-class scholar Barbara Jensen has argued, changing classes involves changing cultures and too often devaluing one's culture of origin.

In their seminal The Hidden Injuries of Class Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb explore how blue-collar men deal with the emotional toll of lifelong unrewarding work.  (Not all blue-collar work is unrewarding, of course, but that's a subject for another essay.) Knowing they themselves will not advance, they labor for their children's futures. Middle-class parents also sacrifice for their children, but they usually have more rewarding jobs. To paraphrase Sennett and Cobb, middle class jobs are "models," working-class jobs are "warnings." The status of unemployment is a starker warning. In effect the working-class parent must tell his or her children, "Whatever you do, don't be like me." If the working-class parent is successful in launching his or her children into the middle-class, those children may look down upon their parents' lives and values. Anthologies of essays by academics from the working class such as my co-edited Working-Class Women in the Academy and C.L. Barney Dews and Carol Leste Laws's This Fine Place So Far from Home depict academics from the working class struggling to adjust to the academy's middle-class culture and remain true to their working-class roots. Academia, like many social and cultural institutions, is predominately composed of middle- and upper-class people who do not understand the working-classes and often disdain them. While many working-class and middle-class people these days worry that their children will fall down the class ladder, many also worry about what would happen if their children do manage to move up.

Enter Donald Trump, an extraordinarily wealthy man with about 500 businesses around the world. He talks and behaves like one of the guys, one of the white working-class guys. Working-class voters saw Trump as speaking to them, not down to them. He seemed like one of them, just one with more money. His promise to revive blue-collar jobs was likely read as a promise to preserve working-class values and cultures. Trump embodied the possibility that working-class people, or at least their progeny, could rise in income without changing their values and behavior. They needn't join the ranks of the elites.

I am not negating Trump's appeal as a political outsider at a time when Americans affiliated with both parties were disillusioned with elected politicians. Neither am I minimizing the suffering of Rust Belt working-class whites or the fear that Trump's election sent through many communities. I also think we should be concerned that so many voters, including many from the working-class voted for a man who regularly made racist, xenophobic, and misogynistic statements. These votes are extremely unsettling, at the very least.

But if we want to understand white working-class voters' support for Trump, we have to unpack not only their economic anxieties and political resentments, but also their cultural fears, including their concerns about the costs of elusive upward mobility.

Michelle M. Tokarczyk

Michelle M. Tokarczyk is a Professor of English at Goucher College who has published widely in Working-Class Studies.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

The top charts of 2016: 13 charts that show the difference between the economy we have now and the economy we could have [feedly]

The top charts of 2016: 13 charts that show the difference between the economy we have now and the economy we could have
http://www.epi.org/publication/the-top-charts-of-2016-13-charts-that-show-the-difference-between-the-economy-we-have-now-and-the-economy-we-could-have/

The election of Donald Trump alerted many to what should have been obvious long ago: the U.S. economy has failed to deliver the goods to the vast majority of American families for decades. In the context of Trump's election, this economic failure was often characterized as being unique to white working-class voters in the upper Midwest. But this is wrong. Income growth has been sluggish, and hourly wage growth near zero, for low- and middle-income families across the board. The fact is, our economy has generated enough income in recent decades to deliver very substantial wage gains for all workers—men and women, people of color and whites. Our economy has the capacity to provide not just decent wages but labor protections that support strong families and policies that provide security in retirement. These charts show the gap between what is and what could be. (For policies to close the gaps, see EPI's Real agenda for working people.)

The minimum wage would be much higher if it had kept up with a growing economyThe inflation-adjusted minimum wage, and hypothetical minimum wage values if it had grown with average wages and productivity since 1968

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The federal minimum wage is meant to ensure a fair wage for the nation's lowest-paid workers. But it hasn't done that since 1968. Since the inception of the federal minimum wage in 1938, Congress has periodically raised it, ostensibly so that its real (inflation-adjusted) value would reflect changing economic circumstances. Before 1968, the real value of the federal minimum wage grew at roughly the same pace as the growth in labor productivity—i.e., the rate at which the average worker can produce income from each hour of work. This makes sense: if the economy as a whole can produce more income per hour of work, it means there is capacity for wages across the distribution to grow at a similar rate. But after 1968, when the real value of the minimum wage in today's dollars was $9.63, the minimum wage stopped rising at the same pace as productivity. As the top line in the graph shows, had the minimum wage kept pace with rising productivity, it would be nearly $19 per hour today. Not $7.25.

This is only one way in which policymakers have failed to ensure that the lowest-paid Americans get their fair share of economic growth and improving labor productivity. As the middle line in the figure shows, if, since 1968, the minimum wage had even just been raised at the same growth rate as average hourly wages of typical U.S. workers, the minimum wage would be $11.35 today. To sum up, minimum wage workers are falling behind not only productivity growth but typical worker pay growth and pay growth of their 1968 counterparts! And as the next chart shows, typical workers (measured here as the nonsupervisory production workers who constitute roughly 80 percent of all private-sector U.S. workers) themselves are lagging behind highly paid supervisors and executives when it comes to claiming a share of economic growth.

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CEOs make 276 times more than typical workersCEO-to-worker compensation ratio, 1965–2015

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The compensation of the CEOs of the largest firms has grown much faster than stock prices, corporate profits, and the wages of the top 0.1 percent. But the most dramatic difference is between the compensation of CEOs and the compensation of typical workers. From 1978 to 2015, CEO compensation grew 941 percent compared with just 10 percent for the compensation of a typical worker (annual compensation of the workers in the key industries represented by the sample).

The figure illustrates the gap in pay between CEOs and employees by tracking the ratio of CEO compensation to that of the typical worker. CEOs of major U.S. companies earned 20 times more than a typical worker in 1965; this ratio grew to 59-to-1 by 1989, and then it surged in the 1990s, hitting 376-to-1 by the end of the 1990s recovery, in 2000. The two stock market crashes after 2000 reduced CEO stock-related pay and caused CEO compensation to tumble. But by 2014, the stock market had recouped all of the value it lost following the 2008 financial crisis and the CEO-to-worker compensation ratio was back to 302-to-1. A dip in the stock market and the value of associated stock options led to a decline in CEO compensation in 2015 and, correspondingly, the CEO-to-worker pay ratio fell to 276-to-1, similar to what happened in other stock market declines at the start of the new millennium and during the Great Recession. Though the CEO-to-worker compensation ratio remains below the peak values achieved earlier in the 2000s, it is far higher than it was in the previous four decades.

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Boosting productivity is necessary but not sufficient for wage growthDisconnect between productivity and a typical worker's compensation, 1948–2015

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The root cause of the extraordinary rise in inequality and the near-stagnant growth of wages for typical workers over most of the past generation is the pay-productivity gap. Before the late 1970s, wages of the vast majority of workers grew in line with productivity. In the late 1970s, typical worker pay growth split from economy-wide productivity growth. Productivity is a measure of how much income is generated in an average hour of work in the economy. While productivity after 1979 grew more slowly relative to previous decades, it did grow steadily, offering the potential for broad-based wage gains. But income gains were not broad-based. In fact, average pay (wages plus benefits) for the 80 percent of the private-sector workers who are not supervisors barely budged in that time. The growing wedge between productivity and pay is the income generated by workers in the economy that has been claimed by corporate owners and managers and others at the very top of the pay scale.

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Eliminating the gender and inequality wage gaps would raise women's wages by 69%Median hourly wages for men and women, compared with wages for all workers had they increased in tandem with productivity, 1979–2015

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Closing the pay-productivity gap must be a part of an agenda to improve women's economic security. Although the gap between what median men and median women are paid has narrowed (albeit too slowly) since 1979, the gap between typical workers' compensation and economy-wide productivity growth has widened. Tackling both gaps would also raise the economic security of men. One example of why the pay-productivity gap needs to inform our thinking about progress in closing gender pay gaps is the fact that roughly a third of the progress made in closing the median gender wage gap since 1979 was due to the decline in men's wages in an era of increasing inequality. Remedying unfairness of pay for women is necessary, but wage parity gained simply because male wages dropped is no cause for celebration.

The figure shows how high median wages for women could be if gender wage disparities had been closed between 1979 and today and if the economy had generated wage growth for all workers that matched economy-wide productivity growth. If the gender wage gap were closed and the economy's gains broadly shared, women's median hourly wages would be 69 percent higher today ($26.47 instead of $15.67). Notably, men's median hourly wages would also be 40 percent higher. (To see how these differences compare for age and education cohorts, check out EPI's new gender wage calculator.) These figures show that getting to gender pay equity is not a zero-sum game—if we also tackle inequality, typical men and women have much to gain.

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Though all workers' wages have failed to rise in tandem with productivity, black men have suffered mostHourly median wage growth by gender, race, and ethnicity, compared with economy-wide productivity growth, 1979–2014

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In the wake of Trump's election, some commentators have focused on the economic failures afflicting white working-class men. White working-class men are suffering, but they are not the only group suffering from the chasm between what the economy can provide and what it is providing, and their loss has not translated into gains made by typical workers of other races. In fact, wage gaps between workers of different races have widened at the same time that economy-wide productivity and wages for typical workers overall have diverged. In short, what has caused sluggish wage growth for the vast majority of all workers is the rise of inequality that has redistributed income toward the very top of the income distribution.

The figure shows that between 1979 and 2015, median hourly real wage growth fell far short of productivity growth—a measure of the potential for pay increases—for men as well as for women and for both black and white workers. And white workers are not losing income to their black counterparts. Median hourly wages of black men fell 5.7 percent, compared with a 1.0 percent decline for white men. Median hourly wages of white women grew 31.6 percent, compared with 15.2 percent for black women.

What this figure does not show is that black workers already start out with a big pay disparity. In 2015, black workers overall were paid 26.2 percent less than their white peers. What has this double penalty of overall wage stagnation and regress on racial pay disparities cost black workers? Quite a lot, according to a 2016 report by Valerie Wilson. If the 1979 racial wage gap at the median had closed by 2015 and the overall median had grown with productivity (63.9 percent) between 1979 and 2015, the median black worker would be earning an hourly wage of $26.47 instead of $14.14—an increase of $12.33. That means the hourly wage of the median black worker would be an astounding 87.2 percent higher! And under this scenario, the median white worker would also receive an hourly pay increase of $7.30—the difference between $26.47 and $19.17—boosting their wages by 38.1 percent. The vast majority of workers of all races would be better off if we addressed both class and racial inequalities, with larger gains for African Americans because of the dual penalties imposed by class and race.

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Drop in union membership has taken $14 to $52 out of nonunion workers' weekly wagesAdditional weekly wages that nonunion private-sector workers would earn, had the share of workers in a union (union density) remained the same as in 1979, 1979–2013 (2013 dollars)

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All workers would be better off in terms of wage levels had the right of workers to associate and bargain collectively not been severely eroded in recent decades. Between 1979 and 2013, the share of private-sector workers in a union fell from about 34 percent to 10 percent among men, and from 16 percent to 6 percent among women. This decline in union density has eroded wages for nonunion workers at every level of education and experience, costing billions in lost wages. For the 32.9 million full-time nonunion women working in the private sector and the 40.2 million full-time men working in the private sector, there is a $133 billion loss in annual wages because of weakened unions. This translates to real weekly wage losses for workers. Women would be making $13.80 more a week and men would be making $52.39 more a week, had union density (the share of workers in similar industries and regions who are union members) remained the same as in 1979.

Unions keep wages high for nonunion workers for several reasons. Union agreements set wage standards that nonunion employers follow. And a strong union presence prompts managers to keep wages high to prevent workers from organizing or leaving. Unions also set industry-wide norms, influencing what is seen as a "moral economy."

Though not shown in the graph, working-class men have felt the decline in unionization the hardest. Specifically, nonunion men lacking a college degree would have earned 8 percent, or $3,016, more in 2013 if unions had remained as strong as they were in 1979.

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Yet another data source documents the enormous surge in American inequalityPost-tax-and-transfer household income growth from the distributional national accounts data, by income percentile

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A new data set confirms what we know about the enormous increase in income inequality after 1979. This data set allows us to take another cut at this issue, with all of total national income and its distribution accounted for—market-based incomes like wages and dividends, transfer incomes like Social Security and Medicare, and even the income stemming from direct government purchases. The figure charts incomes (indexed to be 100 in 1979) for the bottom 50 percent of households, bottom 90 percent of households, households between the 50th and 90th percentiles, households in subgroups of the top 10 percent, and the top 0.1 percent of households. The results are clear: households nearer the top of the income distribution have seen far more rapid growth in recent decades. And counting income in the form of government benefits does not close the gap between income growth at the top and the income growth of everybody else.

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The gap between the retirement 'haves' and 'have-nots' has grown since the recessionRetirement account savings of families age 32–61 by savings percentile, 1989–2013 (2013 dollars)

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Over the past generation of economic life, the U.S. economy undertook a grand experiment in making defined-contribution (DC) pension plans such as 401(k)s, often financed directly by workers' savings themselves, the primary vehicle of private retirement security. This experiment has decisively failed. Overall pension coverage has not increased, and fewer Americans are in defined-benefit (DB) plans (think company pensions). The DB plans crowded out by DC plans were more secure, providing a guaranteed income for life that was not subject to the vagaries of the stock market. They were also much more equal than DC plans because they were employer-funded and participation was automatic (rather than workers bearing most of the costs and all of the risks).

Nearly half of working-age families have nothing saved in retirement accounts, and the median working-age family had only $5,000 saved in 2013. Meanwhile, families in the 90th percentile of retirement savings had $274,000 in retirement, and the top 1 percent of families had $1,080,000 or more (not shown on chart). These huge disparities reflect a growing gap between the haves and the have-nots since the Great Recession, as accounts with smaller balances have stagnated while larger ones have rebounded.

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Fiscal austerity explains why recovery has been so long in comingChange in per capita government spending during recoveries of the last four recessions

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The agonizingly slow pace of recovery from the Great Recession is easy to explain: it is the result of austerity policies championed by Republican policymakers at the federal and state levels. Like every other postwar recession before it, the Great Recession was caused by a shortfall in aggregate demand, meaning that the spending of households, businesses, and governments was not sufficient to keep the economy's resources fully employed.

Despite the Great Recession being the sharpest and longest on record since World War II, and despite monetary policy reaching its conventional limits to boost spending early in the recession, policymakers made damaging decisions to limit public spending following the recession's trough in 2009. This growth has been historically slow relative to other business cycles even as the economy needed substantially faster-than-average growth to mount a full and timely recovery.

The figure shows the growth in per capita spending by federal, state, and local governments following the troughs of the four recessions. Astoundingly, per capita government spending in the first quarter of 2016—27 quarters into the recovery—was nearly 3.5 percent lower than it was at the trough of the Great Recession. By contrast, 27 quarters into the early 1990s recovery, per capita government spending was 3 percent higher than at the trough; 23 quarters following the early 2000s recession (a shorter recovery), it was 10 percent higher; and 27 quarters into the early 1980s recovery, it was 17 percent higher.

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Nominal wage growth shows economy is not overheatingYear-over-year change in private-sector nominal average hourly earnings, 2007–2016

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The year 2017 looks to be the year that the Fed begins raising short-term interest rates in earnest. The Fed should raise rates only when it fears the economy is growing too fast and pushing unemployment low enough that workers are empowered to demand (and get) raises above what their productivity justifies. Data on nominal wage growth show that the economy is not getting overheated and thus a rate increase is not justified.

The pace of economic growth should be considered unsustainable only when increases in labor costs force firms to raise prices enough to accelerate inflation above the Federal Reserve's stated goal of 2 percent inflation. An absolutely crucial link in this chain is wage growth. If nominal (i.e., not inflation-adjusted) wages simply grow at the rate of economy-wide productivity, then wages are putting no upward pressure on prices. To see why, think of a 2 percent raise in hourly pay of a worker whose productivity (how much they produce in an hour) also rises 2 percent. The worker is getting 2 percent more, but is also producing 2 percent more. So the labor cost per unit of output is unchanged, and there is zero upward pressure on firms' costs, or overall inflation. And the goal of Federal Reserve policy is not zero upward pressure on prices (or 0 percent inflation). Their stated target is 2 percent inflation. This means that nominal wages can grow at the rate of economy-wide productivity growth plus 2 percent before they are putting enough upward pressure on prices to make the Fed rein them in. EPI's nominal wage tracker looks are how wages have grown over this recovery relative to a target of 1.5 percent (a common estimate of long-run, trend productivity growth) plus 2 percent. Nominal wage growth has been consistently below this target, meaning there is very little reason to worry about overheating in the economy.

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The U.S. has a lower share of prime-age women with a job than do peer countriesEmployment-to-population ratio of women workers age 25–54, select countries, 1995–2014

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Reducing gender and inequality wage gaps and lowering unemployment enough to spur sustainable wage growth are absolutely essential steps if we are serious about restoring economic security to millions of working families. But a working labor market requires more than just jobs and wages. It requires a policy infrastructure that enables workers to enter the labor market and be productive in their roles as employees because they don't have to make difficult choices between their careers and their caregiving responsibilities.

Paid family leave and subsidized child care provide family security, which benefits employers and the economy. But there are currently no national standards regarding paid family leave or subsidized child care. Each worker is left to the whims of individual company policies, which often means no allowance or support for family leave or child care. Therefore, workers have to make difficult choices between their careers and their caregiving responsibilities precisely when they need their paychecks the most, such as following the birth of a child or when they or a loved one falls ill. The lack of these policies particularly affects women, as they currently take on the lion's share of unpaid care work. In contrast, many of our peer nations have such policies. Not surprisingly, the United States has fallen far behind some of our international peers in the share of women who are working. The graph shows the share of women age 25–54 with a job between 1995 and 2014. While the share of prime-age women with a job rose in Germany, Canada, and Japan, in the United States it actually fell. Policies that help workers, particularly women, balance work and family could meaningfully increase women's employment, which would also mean more earnings for families and more economic activity for the country. (See EPI's latest investigation into child care for how progressive child care policy, in particular, can benefit families, reduce inequality, and increase economic growth.)

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The number of salaried workers guaranteed overtime pay has plummeted since 1979Number of salaried workers* covered by overtime salary threshold, 1979–2014 (in millions)

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Work-life balance is a fundamental goal of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Its requirement that employers pay hourly and lower-earning salaried employees a premium for time worked beyond 40 hours a week makes the FLSA the most family-friendly law ever passed in the United States. Excessive work is detrimental to family life, health, well-being, and productivity, and the law aims to protect workers who are junior enough that they can be forced to work extra hours. If not for the law's overtime rules, tens of millions more workers would be working 50, 60, or 70 hours a week for no additional pay, just as millions of Americans did before the FLSA was enacted in 1938.

But millions more are still dealing with this overwork and stress on families, in part because the salary threshold that determines whether workers are automatically eligible for overtime pay is set for a 1970s economy, not a 2010s economy. As shown in the graph, in 1979 more than 12 million salaried workers earned less than the salary threshold and were therefore automatically guaranteed the right to overtime pay, regardless of their duties. Today, with a 50 percent bigger workforce, only 3.5 million salaried employees are automatically protected.

A new rule that guaranteed overtime protection to salaried workers making between $23,660 and $47,476 was instituted by the Department of Labor and was supposed to go into effect on December 1, 2016. But an egregiously bad legal decision has delayed enforcement of this common-sense rule.

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It's not technology killing manufacturing—employment was steady for 35 years between 1965 and 2000Manufacturing employment and trade deficit with China, 1965–2015

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The presidential campaign often highlighted the decline of American manufacturing jobs. An incorrect conventional wisdom among economic commentators holds that the decline of manufacturing employment has been driven by automation. This explanation does not fit the facts. Manufacturing employment was actually quite stable (aside from business cycle fluctuations) for 35 years between 1965 and 2000. But certainly there was plenty of automation between 1965 and 2000. Indeed productivity growth (a proxy for automation) was just as rapid in those years as thereafter.

But 3 million jobs were lost in the 2001–2003 recession and jobless recovery from that recession. Then rapidly growing trade deficits—particularly with China—kept the subsequent recovery from aiding manufacturing jobs. This meant that manufacturing entered the Great Recession without having regained the jobs lost in the previous recession, and in fact having lost a small number more as the rest of the economy recovered. As a result of two recessions and the "China shock," the manufacturing sector today has nearly 5 million fewer jobs than it did in 2000.


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Trump’s Policy Toward China is Already a Disaster, Even Before Taking Office [feedly]

Trump's Policy Toward China is Already a Disaster, Even Before Taking Office
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/trump-s-policy-toward-china-is-already-a-disaster-even-before-taking-office

Mark Weisbrot
The Sacramento Bee, December 22, 2016

Bellingham Herald, December 22, 2016
McClatchy News Service, December 22, 2016
Tribune News Service, December 22, 2016

See article on original site

Donald Trump's December 2 phone call with Tsai Ing-wen, the president of Taiwan, sent shock waves through China and much of the world. For nearly four decades it has been Washington's official policy to recognize only China, and not Taiwan. Trump has indicated that he thought he could threaten China with abandoning this policy, in order to bargain for other concessions.

This has to be one of the worst diplomatic miscalculations of all time for a president-elect, and we should add, his incoming administration ― since it was apparently not just another foot-in-mouth event for Trump but a deliberate strategy complete with lobbyist influence. China considers Taiwan to be a breakaway province, and would go to war to prevent its secession, just as President Lincoln went to war to keep the South within the United States.

In fact, there were calls in the Chinese media for narrowing the gap between China's nuclear arsenal and capability and that of the US. Don't be fooled by the Chinese government's relatively restrained reaction: they are giving Trump a chance to chart a different course before he takes office on January 20.

Bullying may have helped Trump in his real estate career, but it is not going to move China. The Chinese economy is now bigger than ours, on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, which is what matters when we are talking about such things as military expenditure: the cost of a Chinese-made plane or a Chinese pilot is considerably less than its dollar equivalent (at current exchange rates) in the US. When we had an arms race with the Soviet Union, its economy was a fraction the size of ours. If we have an arms race with China, we can forget about things like Medicare, which the Republicans already want to privatize.

Trump's ostensible reason for the hard line against China is that he wants to negotiate a better deal for US manufacturing, including for workers in the US. The big complaint here is that China has manipulated its currency, keeping it undervalued against the US dollar. This would make US imports from China artificially cheap, and US exports more expensive. But there is an easy way to deal with this: as any economist knows, the US Treasury Department and Federal Reserve can move the value of the dollar against foreign currencies, like any other country. In fact it is even easier for us than for other countries, since the world accepts the US dollar as the major international reserve currency.

Blaming China for the value of the dollar against their currency is therefore mistaken. The reason that our government doesn't intervene to push down the dollar is that powerful US transnational corporations (like Walmart) prefer an overvalued dollar because it makes imports and overseas labor cheaper for them. The financial sector also prefers it because it lowers inflation. These people don't care about manufacturing jobs in the US. When our government has negotiated with China over economic issues, it has fought for things that profit US corporations, like more patent and copyright protection and greater access for US financial corporations.

Ironically, China has actually been intervening to keep its own currency from falling, and has burned through about a quarter of its international reserves (about $1 trillion) since June 2015 doing this. At this point, the Chinese would likely welcome US intervention in the same direction, at least to keep the dollar from rising further.

So we will soon see if the new US presidential administration actually wants to do anything to preserve US manufacturing jobs. In the meantime, picking a fight with China over Taiwan is about the worst way it could start out, short of actual warfare.


Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C., and the president of Just Foreign Policy. He is also the author of the new book "Failed: What the 'Experts' Got Wrong About the Global Economy" (2015, Oxford University Press). You can subscribe to his columns here.


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Institutions, Rule of Law, and Civil Rights Deteriorate in Brazil as Government Doubles Down on Failed Economic Policies [feedly]

Institutions, Rule of Law, and Civil Rights Deteriorate in Brazil as Government Doubles Down on Failed Economic Policies
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/brazil-clamps-down-on-civil-rights-doubles-down-on-failed-economics

Institutions, Rule of Law, and Civil Rights Deteriorate in Brazil as Government Doubles Down on Failed Economic Policies

Mark Weisbrot
The Hill, December 22, 2016

Folha de São Paulo, December 22, 2016
The Huffington Post, December 22, 2016

See article on original site

Em Portuguese

When Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff was impeached in May and removed from office in August, many called it a coup.

The president was not charged with anything that could legitimately be called a crime, and the leaders of the impeachment appeared, in taped conversations, to be getting rid of her in order to cut off a corruption investigation in which they and their political allies were implicated. 

Others warned that once starting down this road, further degradation of state institutions and the rule of law would follow. And that's just what has happened, along with some of the political repression that generally accompanies this type of regime change.

On Nov. 4, police raided a school run by the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), in Guararema, São Paulo. They fired live (not rubber bullet) ammunition and made a number of arrests, bringing international condemnation. There had previously been eight arrests of MST organizers in the state of Paraná. The MST is a powerful social movement that has won land rights for hundreds of thousands of rural Brazilians over the past three decades, and has also been a prominent opponent of the August coup.

The politicization of the judiciary was already a major problem in the run-up to Rousseff's removal. Now we have seen further corrosion of institutions when a justice of the Supreme Court issued an injunction removing Senate President Renan Calheiros because he had been indicted for embezzlement.

Calheiros defied the order, whereupon the sitting president of the republic, Michel Temer, negotiated with the rest of the Supreme Court to keep Calheiros in place. The great fear of Temer and his allies was that Calheiros's removal could have derailed an outrageous constitutional amendment that would freeze real (inflation-adjusted) government spending for the next 20 years, which has now been passed by the Congress.

Given that Brazil's population is projected to grow by about 12 percent over the next 20 years, and the population will also be aging, the amendment is an unprecedented long-term commitment to worsening poverty. It will "place Brazil in a socially retrogressive category all of its own," noted Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, describing the measure as an attack on the poor.

The government's proposed public pension cuts would hit working and poor people the hardest.

The deterioration of democracy, the rule of law and civil rights is what happens when a corrupt elite uses illegitimate regime change to ram through big, regressive, structural changes for which it could never win support at the ballot box.

The international media tells us that budget tightening is necessary and will actually help pull Brazil out of its depression. But this goes against basic economic and accounting logic, as well as empirical evidence, including Brazil's own disastrous experience since the beginning of 2014.

Brazil's exorbitantly high interest rates, with the current Selic (policy) rate at 13.75 percent, are another failed macroeconomic policy that is blocking the country's economic recovery. These are set by the Central Bank, and have been among the highest in the world, in real terms, for decades.

The current government has nothing to offer but a repeat of the long-term economic failure of 1980–2003 — during which time there was about 0.2 percent per capita gross domestic product annual growth — which the population will not accept.

Hence its degradation of the country's most important political institutions. 


Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C., and the president of Just Foreign Policy. He is also the author of the new book "Failed: What the 'Experts' Got Wrong About the Global Economy" (2015, Oxford University Press). You can subscribe to his columns here.


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Repealing Health Reform’s Medicaid Expansion Would Cause Millions to Lose Coverage, Harm State Budgets [feedly]

Repealing Health Reform's Medicaid Expansion Would Cause Millions to Lose Coverage, Harm State Budgets
http://www.cbpp.org/research/health/repealing-health-reforms-medicaid-expansion-would-cause-millions-to-lose-coverage



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