Tuesday, September 20, 2016

New Census data show strong 2015 earnings growth across the board, with black and Hispanic workers seeing the fastest growth [feedly]

New Census data show strong 2015 earnings growth across the board, with black and Hispanic workers seeing the fastest growth
http://www.epi.org/blog/new-census-data-show-strong-2015-earnings-growth-across-the-board-with-black-and-hispanic-workers-seeing-the-fastest-growth/


Today's Census Bureau report on income, poverty, and health insurance coverage in 2015 shows that median household incomes for all race and ethnic groups increased between 2014 and 2015. Encouragingly, groups that, by and large, had seen the worst losses in the years since the Great Recession saw the biggest earnings gains in 2015. Real incomes increased 6.1 percent (from $42,540 to $45,148) among Hispanics, 4.4 percent (from $60,325 to $62,950) among non-Hispanic whites, 4.1 percent (from $35,439 to $36,898) among African Americans and 3.7 percent (from $74,382 to $77,166) among Asians. While the increase in incomes was statistically significant for all groups except Asians, racial income gaps remained unchanged between 2014 and 2015. The median black household earned just 59 cents for every dollar of income the white median household earned, while the median Hispanic household earned just 71 cents. Meanwhile, households headed by persons who are foreign born saw an increase in incomes of 5.3 percent between 2014 and 2015 (from $49,649 to $52,295), compared to an increase of 4.4 percent (from $54,741 to $57,173) among households with a native-born household head.

Based on EPI's imputed historical income values (see the note under Figure A for an explanation), real median household incomes for all groups, except Hispanics, remain well below their 2007 levels. Between 2007 and 2015, median household incomes declined by 6.8 percent (-$2,686) for African Americans, 3.2 percent (-$4,662) for whites and 5.4 percent (-$7,158) for Asians, but increased 5.4 percent ($2,310) for Hispanics. Asian households continue to have the highest median income, despite large income losses in the wake of the recession.

The primary driving force behind the slow return to pre-recession income levels has been stagnant wage growth. Real wages had been essentially flat since 2000, but wage growth received an added boost in 2015, as a result of low inflation. From the start of the recovery in 2009 through 2015, real earnings of men working full-time, full-year are up for all race and ethnic groups—white men (1.5 percent), Hispanic men (7.0 percent), and black men (3.4 percent). As a result, the black-white male earnings gap is unchanged, but the Hispanic-white male earnings gap narrowed. Black men earned 70 cents for every dollar earned by white men in 2015 (compared to 69 cents/dollar in 2009) and Hispanic men earned 63 cents on the dollar (compared to 60 cents/dollar in 2009).

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Poverty rates decrease throughout the states in 2015 [feedly]

Poverty rates decrease throughout the states in 2015
http://www.epi.org/blog/poverty-rates-decrease-states-2015/

The poverty rate fell in many states between 2014 and 2015, according to this morning's release of state poverty statistics from the American Community Survey (ACS). In 23 states, there were decreases in the poverty rate, with 6 states reaching their 2000 levels. 27 states and the District of Columbia saw no significant change in the poverty rate, and there were no states that had a statistically significant increase in their poverty rate.

In 2015, the national poverty rate, as measured by the ACS , fell 0.8 percentage points, to 14.7 percent. (The ACS has a different sample, and thus slightly different estimates, than the Current Population Survey, which provided Tuesday's national data.) Vermont saw the largest decline in its poverty rate (1.9 percentage points), followed by Tennessee (1.6 percentage point) and South Carolina (1.3 percentage point). The lowest poverty rates were in New Hampshire (8.2 percent) and Maryland (9.7 percent). While poverty did not rise in any state in 2015, there were still two states with poverty rates above 20 percent: New Mexico (20.4 percent) and Mississippi (22.0 percent).

Widespread income growth at the national level, driven by improvements in labor market conditions, was key to the reduction of poverty across the states. At the same time,minimum wage increases in many states and cities boosted wages for many of the country's lowest-paid workers. These factors, combined with the absence of any real inflation, provided a welcome reversal to the stagnation in wages and incomes that has prevented improvements in living standards since the late 1990s. Additionally, government programs, including Social Security, housing subsidies, and unemployment insurance, kept millions above the poverty line. While poverty remains far too high in virtually every state, today's data suggest that many states are heading in the right direction.

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Our Annual Labor Issue Is Out! [feedly]

Our Annual Labor Issue Is Out!
http://dollarsandsense.org/blog/2016/09/our-annual-labor-issue-is-out.html

Our September/October Annual Labor issue is printing now, and the full-color pdf has been sent to electronic subscribers.  (Not a subscriber? Click here to subscribe.)  We have posted our lead feature, Class Struggle By Other Means: Tennessee, Volkswagen, and the Future of Labor, by Chris Brooks, and also John Miller's "Up Against the Wall Street Journal column,"Equal Pay" Is Not So Equal.

This issue features a gorgeous cover collage and several interior illustrations by Brian Hubble.

Here is the pg. 2 editorial note from this issue:

If You're Not Moving Forward, You're Moving Backward

The U.S. labor movement has been in a rut for decades. Its problems, to be sure, are not all of its own making; it got into its predicament with no little amount of shoving from employers and the state. But the leadership of the "official" union movement has often been the movement's own worst enemy.

Conservative business unionism, a lack of attention to or enthusiasm for new organizing, and a cozy relationship with employers and the state contributed to a long downward slide from the 1950s on. Over sixty years later, we're still not out of the rut. The unions' tactics of "friendly" relations with employers and government officials simply do not cut it—not even in industries that used to be union strongholds.

In this issue's lead feature, Chris Brooks takes us to the auto industry, and the case of Volkswagen in Tennessee, against a backdrop of lavish government giveaways for companies and austerity for the working class. Instead of organizing aggressively around issues like the crushing pace of work, the United Auto Workers (UAW) staked itself on labor-management cooperation, loudly proclaiming its commitment to company "competitiveness." Brooks calls for a more militant approach, based not only on facing up to conflict with employers and the government, but also on championing a broader agenda for the working class as a whole.

There are several other ways, highlighted in this year's Annual Labor Issue, in which the labor movement's future depends on its ability to adapt and fight in a changing industrial and political landscape.

Labor lawyer Ira Sills puts an encouraging piece of breaking news—the National Labor Relations Board's recent ruling that graduate teaching assistants at private universities are, indeed, employees entitled to the protections of the National Labor Relations Act—into a broader historical context. As Sills points out, the NLRB became increasingly "politicized" from the 1980s on, especially with the appointment of anti-labor ideologues who were hell-bent on making things as hard on workers and unions as possible. The unions, accustomed to organizing within the NLRB election system, were not successful in finding other ways to organize. But the successes of graduate employee organization and public institutions and the struggles of graduate employees to organize at private institutions certainly provided some of the impetus behind the recent legal change.

The question of who is regarded as an "employee" has wider implications in the U.S. economy today, especially in light of the rise of contingent or "gig" employment. Economist Anders Fremstad looks at the reality of work today in one the highest-profile segments of the contingent labor market—"sharing economy" companies like Uber and Lyft. Fremstad argues that the "sharing economy" may work for underused physical assets (that, when lying unused, can be rented out at little cost to the owner), it's a different story when it comes to labor time. Using even spare time for labor takes something away from the "gig" worker, and the huge slice of revenue that companies like Uber take off the top makes it very hard for sharing-economy workers to scratch out a living. Fremstad argues, instead, for alternative types of "sharing economy" enterprises—such as public enterprises connecting workers with consumers, without the exploitive cut taken by private for-profit companies.

Jeremy Brecher tackles the question of labor and the vexing challenge of climate change. He outlines an appealing and feasible program, originated by the Labor Network for Sustainability, that would bring about needed reductions in greenhouse gas emissions while creating more robust job growth than a "business as usual" (fossil-fuel based) scenario. The aim is not just to defuse any possible labor opposition—founded on the canard that environmental regulations are "job killers"—to climate policy. It is also to create the foundation for a new relationship between the labor and environmental movements.
New visions for the labor movement like these—visions of broad solidarity rather than narrow interest, of alternative economic institutions, of active struggle for a sustainable future—show how labor can move forward again.

Also in this issue: John Miller on the gender wage gap, Arthur MacEwan on the supposed threat of artificial intelligence, Gerald Friedman on the bleak jobs picture, and more.


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Friday, September 16, 2016

Eastern Panhandle Independent Community (EPIC) Radio:Paris On the Potomac at EPIC Radio

John Case has sent you a link to a blog:



Blog: Eastern Panhandle Independent Community (EPIC) Radio
Post: Paris On the Potomac at EPIC Radio
Link: http://www.enlightenradio.org/2016/09/paris-on-potomac-at-epic-radio.html

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Monday, September 12, 2016

Capitalism as a heterogeneous set of practices [feedly]

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Capitalism as a heterogeneous set of practices
// UnderstandingSociety

Image: O. Beauchesnes, "Map of the Geographical Structure of Wikipedia Links" (link)

A key part of understanding society is making sense of the "economy" in which we live. But what is an economy? Existing economic theories attempt to answer this question with simple unified theories. The economy is a profit-driven market system of firms, workers, and consumers. The economy is a property system dependent upon the expropriation of surplus labor. The economy is a system of expropriation more or less designed to create great inequalities of income, wealth, and well-being. The economy is a system of exploitation and domination.

In Profit and Gift in the Digital Economy Dave Elder-Vass argues that these simple theories, largely the product of the nineteenth century, are flawed in several fundamental ways. First, they are all simple and unitary in a heterogeneous world. Economic transactions take a very wide variety of forms in the modern world. But more fundamentally, these existing theories fail completely to provide a theoretical vocabulary for describing what are now enormously important parts of our economic lives. One well-know blindspot is the domestic economy -- work and consumption within the household. But even more striking is the inadequacy of existing economic theories to make sense of the new digital world -- Google, Apple, Wikipedia, blogging, or YouTube. Elder-Vass's current book offers a new way of thinking about our economic lives and institutions. And he believes that this new way lays a basis for more productive thinking about a more humane future for all of us than is offered by either neoliberalism or Marxism. 

What E-V offers is the idea of economic life as a jumble of "appropriative" practices -- practices that get organized and deployed in different combinations, and that have better and worse implications for human well-being. 

From this perspective it becomes possible to see our economy as a complex ecosystem of competing and interacting economic forms, each with their own strengths and weaknesses, and to develop a progressive politics that seems to reshape that ecosystem rather than pursuing the imaginary perfection of one single universal economic form. (5)

The argument here is that we can understand the economy better by seeing it as a diverse collection of economic forms, each of which can be characterised as a particular complex of appropriative practices -- social practices that influence the allocation of benefits from the process of production. (9)

Economies are not monoliths but diverse mixtures of varying economic forms. To understand and evaluate economic phenomena, then, we need to be able to describe and analyse these varying forms in conjunction with each other. (96)

Capitalism is not a single, unitary "mode of production," but rather a concatenation of multiple forms and practices. E-V believes that the positions offered here align well with the theories of critical realism that he has helped to elaborate in earlier books (19-20) (link, link). We can be realist in our investigations of the causal properties of the economic practices he identifies.

This way of thinking about economic life is very consistent with several streams of thought in Understanding Society -- the idea of social heterogeneity (link), the idea of assemblage (link), and a background mistrust of comprehensive social theories (link). (Here is an earlier post on "Capitalism 2.0" that is also relevant to the perspective and issues Elder-Vass brings forward; link.)

The central new element in contemporary economic life that needs treatment by an adequate political economy is the role that large digital enterprises play in the contemporary world. These enterprises deal in intangible products; they often involve a vast proportion of algorithmic transformation rather than human labor; and to a degree unprecedented in economic history, they depend on "gift" transactions at every level. Internet companies like Google give free search and maps, and bloggers and videographers give free content. And yet these gifts have none of the attributes of traditional gift communities -- there is no community, no explicit reciprocity, and little face-to-face interaction. E-V goes into substantial detail on several of these new types of enterprises, and does the work of identifying the "economic practices" upon which they depend.

In particular, E-V considers whether the gift relation familiar from anthropologists like Marcel Mauss and economic sociologists like Karl Polanyi can shed useful light on the digital economy. But the lack of reciprocity and face-to-face community leads him to conclude that the theory is unpersuasive as a way of understanding the digital economy (86).

It is noteworthy that E-V's description of appropriative practices is primarily allocative; it pays little attention to the organization of production. It is about "who receives the benefits" (10) but not so much about "how activity and labor are coordinated, managed, and deployed to produce the stuff". Marx gained the greatest insights in Capital, not from the simple mathematics of the labor theory of value, but from his investigations of the conditions of work and the schemes of management to which labor was subject in the nineteenth-century factory. The ideas of alienation, domination, and exploitation are very easy to understand in that context. But it would seem that there are similar questions to ask about the digital economy shops of today. The New York Times' reportage of working conditions within the Amazon organization seems to reveal a very similar logic (link).  And how about the high-tech sweat shops described in a 2009 Bloomberg investigation (link)?

Elder-Vass believes that a better understanding of our existing economic practices can give rise to a more effective set of strategies for creating a better future. E-V's vision for creating a better future depends on a selective pruning of the more destructive practices and cultivation of the more positive practices. He is appreciative of the "real utopias" project (36) (link) and also of the World Social Forum. 

This means growing some progressive alternatives but also cutting back some regressive ones. It entails being open to a wide range of alternatives, including the possibility that there might be some valuable continuing role for some forms of capitalism in a more adequate mixed economy of practices. (15)

Or in other words, E-V advocates for innovative social change -- recognizing the potential in new forms and cultivating existing forms of economic activity. Marxism has been the impetus of much thinking about progressive change in the past century; but E-V argues that this perspective too is limited:

Marxism itself has become an obstacle to thinking creatively about the economy, not least because it is complicit in the discourse of the monolithic capitalist market economy that we must now move beyond.... Marx's labour theory of value ... tends to support the obsessive identification of capitalism with wage labour. As a consequence Marxists have failed to recognise that capitalism has developed new forms of making profit that do not fit with the classic Marxist model, including many that have emerged and prospered in the new digital economy. (45)

This is not a wholesale rejection of Marx's thought; but it is a well-justified critique of the lingering dogmatism of this tradition. Though E-V does not make reference to current British politics in the book, these comments seem very appropriate in appraisal of the approach to change championed by Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn.

E-V shows a remarkable range of expertise in this work. His command of recent Marxian thinking about contemporary capitalism is deep. But he has also gone deeply into the actual practices of the digital economy -- the ways Google makes profits, the incentives and regulations that sustain wikipedia, the handful of distinctive business practices that have made Apple one of the world's largest companies. The book is a work of theory and a work of empirical investigation as well.

Profit and Gift in the Digital Economy is a book with a big and important idea -- bigger really than the title implies. The book demands a substantial shift in the way that economists think about the institutions and practices through which the global economy works. More fundamentally, it asks that we reconsider the idea of "economy" altogether, and abandon the notion that there is a single unitary economic practice or institution that defines modern capitalism -- whether market, wage labor, or trading system. Instead, we should focus on the many distinct but interconnected practices that have been invented and stitched together in the many parts of society to solve particular problems of production, consumption, and appropriation, and that as an aggregate make up "the economy". The economy is an assemblage, not a designed system, and reforming this agglomeration requires shifting the "ecosystem" of practices in a direction more favorable to human flourishing.

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Building the case for greater infrastructure investment [feedly]

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Building the case for greater infrastructure investment
// Larry Summers

 

The issue now is not whether the US should invest more but what the policy framework should be

There is a consensus that the US should substantially raise its level of infrastructure investment. Economists and politicians of all persuasions recognise that this can create quality jobs and provide economic stimulus without posing the risks of easy-money policies in the short run. They also see that such investment can expand the economy's capacity in the medium term and mitigate the huge maintenance burden we would otherwise pass on to the next generation.

The case for infrastructure investment has been strong for a long time, but it gets stronger with each passing year, as government borrowing costs decline and ongoing neglect raises the return on incremental spending increases. As it becomes clearer that growth will not return to pre-financial-crisis levels on its own, the urgency of policy action rises. Just as the infrastructure failure at Chernobyl was a sign of malaise in the Soviet Union's last years, profound questions about America's future are raised by collapsing bridges, children losing IQ points because of lead in water and an air traffic control system that does not use GPS technology.

The issue now is not whether the US should invest more in infrastructure but what the policy framework should be. There are five key questions.

How much more do we need to invest? For the foreseeable future, there is no danger that the US will overinvest in infrastructure. An increase in investment of 1 per cent of gross domestic product over a decade would total $2.2tn and permit substantial steps both to catch up on deferred maintenance and embark on new projects.

What is the highest priority? The fastest, highest and safest returns are likely to be found where maintenance has been deferred. Maintenance outlays do not require extensive planning or regulatory approvals, so they can take place quickly. And they tend naturally to take place in areas where infrastructure is most heavily used.

How should investment be financed? There is a compelling case that infrastructure investments pay for themselves by expanding the economy and increasing the tax base. The McKinsey Global Institute has estimated a 20 per cent rate of return on such investments. If the return is only 6 per cent and the government collects about 25 cents on every dollar of GDP, it will earn 1.5 per cent on investments. This far exceeds the real cost of borrowing even over a horizon of 30 years. Debt financing of new infrastructure investment would be entirely reasonable. And if there is a desire to generate revenue to finance infrastructure investments, the best approaches would involve user fees. Thus, increased landing fees could help finance airports; tolls or taxes on miles driven could fund road improvements.

What about the private sector? Some infrastructure priorities, such as replacing coal-fired power plants with renewables, expanding broadband networks or building pipelines, are clearly the responsibility of the private sector. Policy frameworks that streamline regulatory decision-making and reduce uncertainty could spur investment in these sectors. There is a case for experimenting with mobilising private capital for use on infrastructure that has been a public-sector preserve, such as airports and roads. But, the reality that government borrowing costs are much lower than the returns demanded by private-sector infrastructure investors should lead to caution. It would be unfortunate if, in an effort to avoid deficits, large subsidies were given to private financial operators. Only when private-sector performance in building and operating infrastructure is likely to be better than what the public sector can do is there a compelling argument for privatisation.

How can we be sure investment is carried out efficiently? There is legitimate scepticism about this, and there is no silver bullet for this problem. Transparency of the type adopted for the Obama administration's fiscal stimulus should become the norm. Additionally, progressive advocates of more investment should compromise with conservative sceptics and, in the context of increased spending, accept regulatory streamlining, as well as requirements that projects undergo cost-benefit analysis. Minimising cost should be the objective of infrastructure procurement.

Every year that we allow our infrastructure to decay raises the burden that our generation places on the next. We will not always be able to borrow for the long term at a near zero interest rate. However the election turns out, a major infrastructure investment programme should be adopted by the president and Congress in the spring of 2017.

 

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Read this now: Fed governor Lael Brainard’s speech on the “new normal”/asymmetric risk [feedly]

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Read this now: Fed governor Lael Brainard's speech on the "new normal"/asymmetric risk
// Jared Bernstein | On the Economy

Don't have time to do justice to this speech given today by Fed governor Lael Brainard, but it's just a beautiful merging of common sense and very smart, contemporary macro and monetary policy.

I'm try to give more commentary later, but for now, I'll pull some key quotes (my bold in every case):

With the Phillips curve appearing to be a less reliable guidepost than it has been in the past, the anchoring role of inflation expectations remains critically important. On expected similar to realized inflation, recent developments suggest some reasons to be concerned more about undershooting than overshooting.

…we cannot rule out that the sustained period of undershooting the inflation target along with global disinflationary pressures are weighing on inflation expectations.

The apparent flatness of the Phillips curve together with evidence that inflation expectations may have softened on the downside and the persistent undershooting of inflation relative to our target should be important considerations in our policy deliberations. In particular, to the extent that the effect on inflation of further gradual tightening in labor market conditions is likely to be moderate and gradual, the case to tighten policy preemptively is less compelling.

This uncertainty about the true state of the economy suggests we should be open to the possibility of material further progress in the labor market. 

We cannot rule out that estimates of the natural unemployment rate may move even lower.

Of particular significance, the prime-age labor force participation rate, despite improvement this year, remains about 1-1/2 percentage points below its pre-crisis level, suggesting room for further gains.

…in the presence of uncertainty and the absence of accelerating inflationary pressures, it would be unwise for policy to foreclose on the possibility of making further gains in the labor market.

The experiences of these economies [Europe, Japan; JB] highlight the risk of becoming trapped in a low-growth, low-inflation, low-inflation-expectations environment and suggest that policy should be oriented toward minimizing the risk of the U.S. economy slipping into such a situation.

The fact that many advanced economies are suffering from deficient demand and have policy rates at or near the zero bound and that the U.S. dollar is a favored safe-haven asset may imply that adverse foreign demand shocks have a particularly strong effect on the value of the dollar, effectively transmitting the weakness to the U.S. economy.

From a risk-management perspective, therefore, the asymmetry in the conventional policy toolkit would lead me to expect policy to be tilted somewhat in favor of guarding against downside risks relative to preemptively raising rates to guard against upside risks.

In today's new normal, the costs to the economy of greater-than-expected strength in demand are likely to be lower than the costs of significant unexpected weakness.

For the time being, the most effective way to address these concerns is to ensure that our policy actions align with our commitment to achieving the existing inflation target, which the Committee has recently clarified is symmetric around 2 percent--and not a ceiling-along with maximum employment.

I really love the clarity, foresight, global perspective and balanced risk assessment.

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