Wednesday, December 13, 2017

The Utterly Terrible GOP Tax "Reform" Scam [feedly]

The Utterly Terrible GOP Tax "Reform" Scam
http://ataxingmatter.blogs.com/tax/2017/12/the-utterly-terrible-gop-tax-reform-scam.html

The Republicans in the House and Senate continue on their downhill rush to pass their so-called "tax reform" plan before the holiday break.  It's a mad rush to nowhere, a corrupt process of "please the oligarch" that will cause a huge deficit increase (on the scale of $1 to $1.5 TRILLION over ten years) and be used by the Ryan, McConnell and Trump cadre of liars to justify a domino effect of Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security cuts.

Almost all the provisions in the bill are designed to be generous to the ultra wealthy and stingy to the middle class and poor. 

Corporations and their owners and managers--among the wealthiest people in the country--get the only permanent tax breaks.  It's done in the name of competitiveness, but that's bunk.  It essentially encourages corporations to continue to move profits out of the US because foreign profits are taxed at zero while US profits are taxed at 20%.  It pretends that the multiple tax breaks for big corporations are necessary (under disproven trickle-down and supply-side theories) to lead to more investment in business in the US and to more jobs and higher pay for workers.  But in fact corporations are enjoying record profits under current law and they aren't using those record profits to pay their workers more or to create more jobs or even necessarily to invest in the US.  Mostly they are just doing share buybacks for shareholders (ie, owners/managers and other shareholders) that include the  wealthiest people who own the most corporate stock.  That's because it is demand, not capital, that determines what business expansion is needed and results in labor shortages that give workers leverage to demand more pay.  Tax cuts for corporations just add to the already existing capital glut.

The estate tax cut (elimination in the House bill; doubling the exemption to levels that only the very few multi-billionaires will pay any at all in the Senate) ensures that the wealthy will pay almost no tax at all.  They borrow against their wealth while alive.  Their estates pay no tax on the accumulated wealth when they die.  Their children inherit with a "step up" in basis so they get a huge windfall.  And their children can pay off the parents' debt by selling a few items (because of the basis step-up, with no taxes either) and live on their windfall without ever lifting a finger to do any real work.

Individual workers really lose out in these bills.  Under the House bill, the rate on the lowest wage earners is INCREASED 20%--from 10% to 12%.  And all of the 'tax cuts' for ordinary taxpayers sunset after a few years, while the corporate cuts are permanent.  Shows where the GOP loyalties lie--not to the worker base that put them in office, but to the wealthy oligarchs like the Koch Brothers who donate to the GOP political campaign chests.

The pass-through provisions (a 23% "deduction" from income before tax is one version)--along with the ability of businesses but not individuals to deduct state and local taxes--are a great boon for wealthy owners of real estate partnership interests, like the Trump family.  But they make no sense at all.  The more different kinds of income categories that are created with different rates, the more you empower the wealthy to gamesmanship with the tax system.  That's what this legislation does in spades.

And after the American people spoke up in Town Hall after Town Hall that they wanted the Affordable Care Act health insurance system protected, the Senate's version of the so-called "tax reform" bill (developed in utter secrecy by Republicans bargaining with Republicans as though nobody else counts) eliminates the individual health insurance mandate (and accompanying penalty).  Without that, the entire idea of affordable insurance through government-operated exchanges fails, because the only people on those exchanges will be those who are sick enough or old enough or vulnerable enough to realize that they will need health insurance soon.  Insurance works by diversification of risk--that's why the Republican insurance plan in Massachusetts, the model for Obamacare, called for an individual mandate and penalty.  Without that core feature, the exchanges can't work because the risk isn't sufficiently diversified.  The Republicans who are trying to gut Obamacare know that, and apparently they don't care that this particular "tax cut" will in fact cost more than 8 million Americans the possibility of having affordable health care, likely leading to early deaths for a large number of that group.  They don't care, I guess, because "those people" are less likely to be wealthy and less likely to vote Republican.  If you are so blinded by partisan fealty that you no longer care about legislating for the good of the nation, you descend to the garbage dump level of this Republican tax bill.

Of course, the elimination of the individual tax cuts, the expansion of the real-estate-industry favorable tax cuts, the inclusion of what can only be called a 'mock' provision to deal with carried interest (it doesn't), the elimination of the medical expense deduction (in the House bill) that will leave the disabled, the injured, and the elderly in dire straits, the decimation of the casualty loss provision that helps ordinary people recover from natural disasters, the huge cutback to the state and local tax deduction for individuals (while continuing to allow it for all businesses)--all these provisions prove that Republicans don't care a fig about ordinary people.  We won't be spending money on basic scientific research (needed to be competitive in a global marketplace and needed to save lives from cancer and other diseases).  We won't be spending money on infrastructure (needed to have safe roads, trains, airports. etc).  We won't be spending money on  education (other than Betsy DeVos's favored religious charter schools that teach falsehoods on a daily basis).  We won't be creating a sustainable economy that serves all of our citizens.

Oh, but we will be decimating the environment, as Trump's lineup of industry trolls continues to reduce wilderness areas, as Lisa Murkowski sells her tax and healthcare vote to get to open pristine and irreplaceable Arctic wildlife refuge to the oil and gas fossils that have grown obese off 200 years of government subsidies, as Zinke reduces FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER national monuments set aside by other presidents so that those obese coal and oil and gas guys can get even wealthier, as Pruitt ensures that nobody at the EPA does anything to protect the air, water and land from industry pollution.....

The passage of a tax bill that will create an additional one-to one-point-five trillion-dollar deficit is proof that the Republicans don't care if they destroy this country in their effort to return to the Gilded Age of the past (or, in Roy Moore's definition of the time that America was great, the slavery era when (white) families stayed together and were able to sell black babies away from their black mothers (or half white babies away from their raped black mothers)).

What is the Republican response to the deficit and mal-distribution problems created by such a huge tax cut for the already wealthy?

1) The tax cut will pay for itself.  This is trickle-down gobbledy-gook.  The vast majority of economists and tax experts are quite clear that this is simply not a supportable claim.  It's pie-in-the-sky ideology with no basis in fact when there have been a number of attempts to find such a basis.  It wasn't true for Reagan, back in an economy for which tax cuts held much more promise of economic stimulus than they do for our current situation.  The Kansas experiment shows this trickle-down reasoning is without foundation.  But the Treasury secretary put out a one-page analysis--compared to the careful, extensive, fact-based analyses usually prepared to support well-researched tax proposals--saying that the GOP plan would produce record growth and that growth would pay for the tax cuts.  It's pure fiction.

2) Medicare, Social Security, Medicaid (the "entitlement" programs) will have to be cut to make up for any deficits.  That, of course, is the underlying plan.  Create a deficit and use it to 'starve the government' to justify cutting any programs that don't serve the oligarchs.  Most of that minority of people who voted Trump into the presidency (assuming there wasn't a good bit of ballot falsification, which I think went on in Detroit to not count everyone's ballot) will suffer from this--they depend on Social Security when they retire and on Medicaid when they become incapacitated in their old age and need nursing home or assisted living care.  Under the Republicans, we'll return to the "good old days" of the Great Depression when old folks became homeless and the government didn't have to bother with caring about the vulnerable.

We all should be hitting the phones and telling every GOP member of Congress that they are not there to protect their wealthy donors: they are there to protect us and ensure that the economy is sustainable and viable for all of us.

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Enlighten Radio Podcasts:Podcast: The Moose Turd Cafe: a "No Turds Breakfast" celebration!

John Case has sent you a link to a blog:



Blog: Enlighten Radio Podcasts
Post: Podcast: The Moose Turd Cafe: a "No Turds Breakfast" celebration!
Link: http://podcasts.enlightenradio.org/2017/12/podcast-moose-turd-cafe-no-turds.html

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Enlighten Radio Podcasts:Podcast: Winners and Losers: Stephen Skinner goes after Pharma

John Case has sent you a link to a blog:



Blog: Enlighten Radio Podcasts
Post: Podcast: Winners and Losers: Stephen Skinner goes after Pharma
Link: http://podcasts.enlightenradio.org/2017/12/podcast-winners-and-losers-stephen.html

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Tuesday, December 12, 2017

SPLC: SOUTHEAST IMMIGRANT FREEDOM INITIATIVE (SIFI)

They should ADD West Virginia's Eastern Panhandle!!!

Southeast Immigrant Freedom Initiative

Only one in six immigrants detained in the Southeast has access to an attorney in removal proceedings. 

These proceedings will determine whether they have a right to remain in the United States, to live the lives they have built here alongside their families, or whether they are forced to return to a country they may not even recognize as home. For some, winning or losing is a matter of life or death.

The Southeast Immigrant Freedom Initiative aims to safeguard due process by providing high-quality, pro bono legal representation to detained immigrants.  We operate at three (soon to be four) immigrant detention centers in the Deep South: 

Our objectives:

  • Protect immigrants' due process rights
  • Challenge the deportation machine,
  • Educate the public about immigrants and thereby change the narrative
  • Hold law enforcement and detention facility personnel accountable for violations of immigrants' civil rights
  • Cultivate and expand attorney engagement.

For more information, or to get in touch, email us.


--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV

The Winners and Losers Radio Show
7-9 AM Weekdays, The Enlighten Radio Player Stream, 
Sign UP HERE to get the Weekly Program Notes.

New perspectives on Chinese authoritarianism [feedly]

New perspectives on Chinese authoritarianism
http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2017/12/new-perspectives-on-chinese.html

The question of China's political future is an important one and a difficult one. Will China evolve towards a political system that embodies real legal protections for the rights of its citizens and some version of democratic institutions of government? Or will it remain an authoritarian single-party state in which government and the party decide the limits of freedom and the course of economic and social policy?

Two recent books are worth reading in this context, and they seem to point to rather different answers. Ya-Wen Lei's The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media, and Authoritarian Rule in China makes the case for a broadening sphere of public discourse and debate in China, which seems to suggest the possibility of a gradual loosening of governmental control of thought and action. Wenfang Tang's Populist Authoritarianism: Chinese Political Culture and Regime Sustainability on the other hand makes the case for a distinctive version of populist authoritarianism in China that may have the resources it needs to retain power for a very long time. Neither scholar is dogmatic about his or her findings, but they give rather different pictures of the evolution of China's polity in the next several decades.

The two books use rather different kinds of data. Tang relies primarily on various surveys of Chinese public opinion, whereas Lei's research relies on a range of qualitative and observational data about the contents of China's legal system, media, and social media. She makes use of newspaper archives, legal texts, interviews, online texts from Internet forums, and survey data (lc 466).

Tang's book begins with several paradoxical facts. One is that the Chinese state already embodies a kind of democratic responsiveness, which he refers to as "Mass Line" politics. According to this political ideology, the Party represents the interests of the masses, and it must be responsive to the interests and demands of workers and peasants. So the CCP is sometimes responsive to demands expressed through public demonstrations and protests. Here are a few of Tang's comments about the Mass Line ideology: "Some observers see the totalitarian nature of the Mass Line.... Other scholars, however, see the empowerment of society under the Mass Line.... Others describe the Mass Line as a democratic decision-making process" (kl 357-388). But Tang's own view appears to be that the Party's adherence to the ideology of the Mass Line makes for a compelling imperative towards paying attention to the attitudes and interests of ordinary peasants and workers, and towards improving their material conditions of life.

The other paradoxical fact in Tang's account is that China's government commands support from a remarkably high percentage of its citizens. Using survey research, Tang reports that there are issues of concern to the Chinese public (corruption, environment, land use policy), but that the large majority of Chinese people support the single-party government of the CCP.
The 2005–2008 5th wave of the WVS [World Values Survey] coordinated by the University of Michigan further indicated that Chinese respondents expressed the strongest support for political institutions including the military, the police, the legal system, the central government, the Communist Party, the national legislature, and the civil service. (kl 712)
But Tang also notes that surveys indicate a low level of "happiness" and satisfaction by Chinese citizens. In the WVS 2005-2008 survey "China ranked at the very bottom of this happiness index (65). Above China were eastern Germany (65.5), Slovenia and South Korea (66), India (67), Taiwan and Spain (68), Italy and Chile (69)," along with many other countries. This presents a third paradox in Chinese political realities; low citizen satisfaction is often associated with low approval of government, but this is not the case in China at present. Tang observes, "there seems to be a contradiction between the low level of happiness and the high level of regime support" (kl 774).

Here is how Tang characterizes China's particular version of "populist authoritarianism". China's particular version involves ...
the Mass Line ideology, strong interpersonal trust and rich social capital, individual political activism and political contention, weak political institutions and an underdeveloped civic society, an often paranoid and highly responsive government, and strong regime support. (kl 240)
What strategies and mechanisms permit an authoritarian state to maintain its stability over time, beyond the exercise of force? Tang supports the "political culture" strand of thinking about politics; he believes that the beliefs, identities, and attitudes that citizens have are crucial for the way in which politics unfolds in the country. One factor that Tang rates as particularly favorable for regime stability in China is the high degree of nationalism that Chinese people share, according to survey data. Survey data support the finding that Chinese people have a high level of identification with the value and importance of China as a nation. And, significantly, the central government makes explicit efforts to reinforce popular nationalist sentiment.
While Chinese civilization is an ancient concept, Chinese nationalism is a relatively new idea in contemporary China. It is constructed by the CCP to incorporate a multi-ethnic state that was inherited from the Qing dynasty. It has been used by the CCP to justify its resistance to liberal democracy which is often associated with Western imperialist invasion of China in the 19th and early 20th centuries. More importantly, nationalism is an inseparable component of contemporary Chinese political culture that provides the soil for the CCP to nurture its legitimacy. (kl 1364)
So Tang's conclusion about regime stability in China is tentative, but he leaves open the possibility that the CCP and single-party government has enough resources available to it to survive as a popular and populist government in China for an extended period of time. He suggests that populist authoritarianism is potentially a stable system of government -- anti-democratic in the traditional western sense, but responsive enough to the demands and interests of ordinary citizens to permit it to maintain high levels of legitimacy and acceptance by the broad public over an extended period of time.

Now let's look at the political dynamics described in Ya-Wen Lei's very interesting 2018 book, The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media, and Authoritarian Rule in China. Lei too regards China as an authoritarian state. And yet Chinese society possesses a surprising degree of public contestation over important social issues.
Authoritarian states, by definition, undermine civil society—the basis on which the public sphere is built—thus conventional wisdom tells us that the conditions for political life and a public sphere in such contexts are likely to be quite bleak and suffocating (Habermas 1996, 369). Yet, when I looked at what was going on in China, I saw lively political discussion, contention, and engagement—in short, the emergence of a vibrant public sphere, against all apparent odds. (kl 264)
In describing this "unruly sphere capable of generating issues and agendas not set by the Chinese state" (kl 278) Lei is primarily referring to the cell-phone supported social media world in China, within which Weibo is the primary platform. And Lei takes the position that the emergence of this public sphere in the early 2000s was an unintended consequence of "authoritarian modernization".
I argue that the rise of China's contentious public sphere was an unintended consequence of the Chinese state's campaign of authoritarian modernization. The government desperately needed to modernize in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. To do so, the state institutionalized the double-edged instruments of modern law, marketized media, and the Internet. It sought to utilize but also contain these instruments, recognizing the potential risk each posed of empowering professionals and citizens and destabilizing political control. Nonetheless, the state's choices set in motion complex and interconnected processes beyond its control. Building legal and media institutions and adopting information technologies, paired with political fragmentation and marketization, increased the capabilities of citizens and professionals, encouraged the formation of multiple overlapping social networks of collaboration, engendered widespread legal and rights consciousness, and created a space for contentious politics. Through everyday practices and the production of so-called public opinion incidents (yulun shijian), media and legal professionals, public opinion leaders, activists, NGOs, and netizens translated individual grievances into collective contention—and in so doing, facilitated the rise of a contentious public sphere. (kl 290)
Lei maintains that the state was aware of this risk and has taken measures to ameliorate it; but she also believes that the forces leading to open debate and social networks that are relatively free to engage in these kinds of discussions are more numerous than authoritarian censorship can manage to control. President Xi's current crackdown on ideological deviation is the most recent version of the state's effort at control; but the logic of Lei's argument suggests that these repressive measures will not succeed in eliminating the emerging public sphere. She refers to this situation as the "authoritarian dilemma of modernization":
Yet the Chinese state's authoritarian modernization project has encountered what I call an "authoritarian dilemma of modernization." On the one hand, the state has to build economic, legal, and political institutions to pursue socioeconomic development. The state also needs capable professionals and citizens to make institutions work, produce economic growth, and ultimately achieve the goal of modernization. These capable agents need to be educated and have knowledge, information, and even some autonomy to participate in the tasks designated by the state. (lc 354)
New legal institutions and new forms of information technology create opportunities for increasingly well-educated people to find new ways of pursuing debates and advocating for policies that the state would prefer not to have to consider.

In contrast to Tang's "populist authoritarianism", Lei refers to a "fragmented and adaptive authoritarianism" in China. And she argues that this fragmentation (through new institutions, new legal frameworks, and new ways of communicating and disseminating divergent opinions) has led to the possibility of social changes emerging that were not intended or sanctioned by the governing elites.

In an interesting way Lei's view of fragmented authoritarianism has some themes in common with Fligstein and McAdam's ideas of organizations as "strategic action fields" (link); different actors within the Chinese polity are able to gain resources and leverage to pursue their own concerns. Lei's analysis emphasizes the shifting resources available to various actors within the field of politics, including new legal institutions and new opportunities for communications and interaction through the Internet. The strategic-action-field theory does not presuppose that "governors" or "insurgents" automatically have the upper hand; instead, it posits that change within a strategic action field is highly contingent, with a variety of possible outcomes. And this indeed seems like a very good description of Chinese politics.

(Here is an earlier post on Martin Whyte's research on public opinions about social justice in China in Myth of the Social Volcano: Perceptions of Inequality and Distributive Injustice in Contemporary Chinalink.)

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Social Class and Trump Voters [feedly]

Social Class and Trump Voters
https://workingclassstudies.wordpress.com/2017/11/27/social-class-and-trump-voters/

Politico's Michael Kruse visited my hometown earlier this month to get a look at "one of the long-forgotten, woebegone spots in the middle of the country that gave Trump his unexpected victory last fall."  Kruse concluded that "Johnstown Never Believed Trump Would Help.  They Still Love Him Anyway."  The story, based on interviews with nine Trump supporters and one man who voted for Hillary Clinton, is part of a stream of articles attempting to explain why Trumpians have remained so loyal to a president who has failed to deliver on any of his campaign promises so far and, for the most part, hasn't even tried.  Problem is that about the same time as this spate of articles appeared a well-respected poll showed "Most White Workers Souring on Trump."

Photo by Scott Goldsmith for Politico

This sounds like a potentially important debate, but it never really becomes important because there is such a confusion of categories, often made worse by a lingering white-trash class prejudice that is sometimes used to resolve the confusion.  Different authors are simply looking at different parts of an elephant while thinking they're seeing the whole thing.

Kruse, for example, is focused on "Trump supporters," who are often referred to as "Trump's base" and who appear to be sticking with him come hell or high water.   References to "Trump's base" usually refer to "working-class whites," who are white people without bachelor's degrees and are generally thought to be a reservoir of racist, sexist, and other deplorable attitudes.  But this class language confuses more than it clarifies.  Whites without bachelor's degrees voted overwhelmingly for Trump, and they are by far the largest group of Trump voters.  But whites with bachelor's degrees also narrowly voted for Trump over Clinton.  Only 48% of Trump voters were working-class whites, while 38% were middle-class whites (by education), and 13% were nonwhite.

"Trump supporters" or "Trump's base" are somewhat smaller groups than "Trump voters," many of whom voted against Hillary rather than for Trump.  But the larger point is that whether voters or supporters, Trumpians are not all whites without bachelor's degrees – only about one-half of them are.  The identification of Trump with the white working-class is mostly not true.

When Michael Kruse searched out nine people to represent all of Johnstown, he found one retail worker, one retired nurse, two retired teachers, three small business owners, the Johnstown city manager, and a man who would not identify his occupation.  Kruse pays no attention to who does and does not have a bachelor's degree.  He very sensibly highlights their occupations, not their formal education. That means that Kruse's interviewees are much more likely to reflect the complex class make-up of Trump's base than the convenient belief that only un-college-educated white people would fall for a carnival-barker snake-oil salesman like Trump.   In fact, more than 24 million white people with college educations voted for the guy.

While most reports on votes or polling define the working-class by lack of a college education, others define the working class by income (usually households with annual incomes below $50,000). But that definition of class also doesn't support the idea that Trump won because of the white working class. Whites from households earning less than $50,000 are less likely to vote than other whites, and in 2016 those who did vote did not lopsidedly opt for Trump.

While education, occupation, and income are all reasonable ways to define a person's social class, each describes a somewhat different group whose voting behavior is significantly different — despite overlap among these three categories.  This generates constant confusion as different commentators make what seem like contradictory claims about the white working class when they are actually focused on somewhat different white working classes.

This is a legitimate intellectual confusion, especially common among well-educated journalists whose higher educations included little or nothing about class in America.  Less legitimate, and much more  false, is the growing willingness of political writers to use an educated/uneducated class binary among whites to distinguish between Trump voters in suburbs whose basic sense of decency can be appealed to and the Trump base which is seen as a hopelessly ignorant stew of economic nationalists who pine not just for lost jobs and economic prospects, but also for the good old days of patriarchy and white supremacy.  The latter group definitely exists and, as Kruse demonstrates, it is not hard to find examples in places like my hometown, but the educated/uneducated binary does not hold, as at least half of Kruse's sample likely have bachelor's degrees and some of the weirdest attachments to the man with orange hair seem to reside in white business owners, not workers.

But there are two other problems with contrasting Trump voters from suburbs to Trump supporters from "woebegone spots in the middle of the country" as if they represented a simple educated/uneducated class binary.  First, about two-thirds of adults who live in suburbs do not have bachelor's degrees, and therefore, would be classified as working class.  The suburban vote in large metropolitan areas is not synonymous with an educated white middle class – and hasn't been for decades.  Second, and even more elementary, just because you can easily find Trump supporters in woebegone spots doesn't mean that all white folks in those spots are Trump supporters, as Kruse's reporting so strongly implies.

Johnstown offers much more interesting fodder for political analysis than its woebegone-ness.   It is in a swing county that in the 21st century has swung from Al Gore to George W. Bush to Barack Obama to Mitt Romney and finally to Trump last year.  As British reporter Gary Younge found in his visit to Johnstown, economic desperation and every kind of decline you can think of accounts for both the area's swingy-ness and its large number of Trump voters in 2016.  Combining my own impressions with this county-wide voting data, here's how I'd characterize Cambria County's citizens:

The largest group among the white working class are non-voters, who either don't care about politics at all or are disdainful of politicians of all stripes. They simply believe voting makes no difference.  This group is itself complex, ranging from people who keep up with the news and have independent-minded opinions about issues to people who never watch or read much news at all and do not form opinions of their own about current issues.  Among regular voters, there are strong Democrats and strong Republicans, somewhat skewed by race and class, but both groups include people with and without bachelor's degrees.

But most importantly, Johnstown has swing voters, a group that has been growing larger as conditions in their communities and their lives continue to deteriorate.  This group, along with the Democrats, voted for Obama in 2008, and a sizeable part of it voted for him again in 2012.  But when Donald Trump came to Johnstown and promised to bring back coal mining and steel jobs, there was an enormous swing toward him in 2016.  Given what President Obama had produced – a steady, substantial, but exceedingly slow economic recovery during which their already diminished lives either did not change or got worse – and what Hillary Clinton was half-heartedly promising, the Cambria County swing to Trump had a what-the-hell quality to it that was neither pathological nor irrational.  As a former steelworker who voted for both Obama (twice) and Trump told Gary Younge, "I liked [Obama's] message of hope, but he didn't bring any jobs in."

Trump tapped into a large well of hateful resentments that were simmering in Johnstown before he showed up, resentments that so far as I can tell are no more common in the white working class than in the white middle class.  But if you focus on the swing voters, not the Trump zealots, you have to ask yourself what might swing these voters back to a more progressive politics. I suspect these alternative focuses are applicable across the Rust Belt states.

And this is part of the problem with the way reporters and other analysts focus on the Trump zealots as if they are the whole of the white working-class: they encourage Democrat politicians to aim to win over what they imagine as "traditional Republicans" in "affluent suburbs" – folks they hope will be increasingly disgusted by the character and behavior of our president.  That approach may yield some votes. But this merely anti-Trump focus allows Dems to avoid hammering out a governing vision, message, and program that could really make a difference to voters like many in Johnstown – those who are desperately swinging back and forth in the vain hope that voting in the world's oldest democracy might make a difference in the lives they get to live.

Jack Metzgar    


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In defence of the labour theory of value [feedly]

In defence of the labour theory of value
http://stumblingandmumbling.typepad.com/stumbling_and_mumbling/2017/12/in-defence-of-the-labour-theory-of-value.html

Lucius has been poorly recently, which has required some trips to the vet and therefore a bill of a size that only David Davis could negotiate*. This has made me wonder: is there more to be said for the labour theory of value than we like to think?

For a long time, I've not really cared about this theory one way or the other. This is partly because I've not bothered much with questions of value; partly because, as John Roemer has shown, we don't need (pdf) a labour theory of value to suggest workers are exploited; and partly because the main Marxian charges against capitalism – for example that it entails relationships of domination – hold true (or not!) independently of the theory.

As I approach retirement, however, I've begun to change my mind. I think of major expenses in terms of labour-time because they mean I have to work longer. A trip to the vet is an extra fortnight of work; a good guitar an extra month, a car an extra year, and so on.

When I consider my spending, I ask: what must I give up in order to get that? And the answer is my time and freedom. My labour-time is the measure of value.

This is a reasonable basis for the claim that workers are exploited. To buy a bundle of goods and services, we must work a number of hours a week. But taking all workers together, the hours we work are greater than the hours needed to produce those bundles because we must also work to provide a profit for the capitalist. As Marx put it:

We have seen that the labourer, during one portion of the labour-process, produces only the value of his labour-power, that is, the value of his means of subsistence…During the second period of the labour-process, that in which his labour is no longer necessary labour, the workman, it is true, labours, expends labour-power; but his labour, being no longer necessary labour, he creates no value for himself. He creates surplus-value which, for the capitalist, has all the charms of a creation out of nothing. This portion of the working-day, I name surplus labour-time.

For Marx, value was socially-necessary labour time: David Harvey is good on this.

From this perspective, exploitation and alienation are linked. Workers are exploited because they must work longer than necessary to get their consumption bundle. And they are alienated because this work is unsatisfying and a source of unfreedom.

Now, I'll concede that many people hate the labour theory of value. One reason for this is that many discussions of it quickly become obscurantist – as if "value" is some mystical entity embodied in commodities.

This, though, certainly was not Marx's intention. Quite the opposite. He intended his theory to be a demystification. He wanted to show how what looked like relations between things – the exchange of money for goods or labour-time – were in fact relations between people. And unequal ones at that.

What's more, the charge of obscurantism against Marx is an especially weak one when it comes from orthodox economics. Much of this invokes unobservable concepts such as the natural rate of unemployment, marginal productivity, utility, the marginal product of capital and natural rate of interest – ideas which, in the last two cases, might not even be theoretically coherent.

In fact, the LTV is reasonably successful by the standards of conventional economics: we have empirical evidence to suggest that it does (pdf) a decent (pdf) job of explaining (pdf)relative prices – not that this was how Marx intended it to be used.

You can of course, think of counter-examples to the theory. But so what? in the social sciences, no substantial theory is 100% true.

I suspect that some of the animosity to Marx's use of LTV arises because of a resistance to the inference that Marx drew from it – that workers are exploited. This issue, however, is independent of the validity of not of the LTV. For example, Roemer thinks workers are exploited without believing in the LTV, and Smith believed the LTV without arguing that workers were exploited.

By the (low) standards of economic theories, perhaps the LTV isn't so bad.

* He seems to be recovering now. The vet is also expected to make a full recovery eventually.


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