Sunday, April 5, 2020

The tip of the wave: Jobs report shows large losses, but predates the worst of it [feedly]

Note the caution on reported wage hikes: larger numbers of layoffs of low paid workers may have contributed to an entirely "ephemeral" wage hike. 

The tip of the wave: Jobs report shows large losses, but predates the worst of it

http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/the-tip-of-the-wave-jobs-report-shows-large-losses-but-predates-the-worst-of-it/

Payrolls fell by 701,000 in March, their first monthly decline in almost 10 years, and the jobless rate ticked up to 4.4 percent (from 3.5) as the coronavirus and efforts to contain it pounded the U.S. labor market last month. Because of the timing in the surveys in this report, it only picks up the front end of tsunami of layoffs that occurred in the second half of March, when initial claims for Unemployment Insurance rose by almost 10 million, an increase most economists would have considered inconceivable before this crisis. But the report clearly identifies the tip of the wave.

The surveys were fielded in the middle of March, and thus better reflect conditions in the first half of the month, when containment measures were just taking hold. Commerce, travel, and broad consumer activity was slowing but hadn't shut down as they would in March's second half. Even so, the report is far more negative than recent vintages, and shows how remarkably quickly conditions have reversed in the job market.

For example, the 0.9 point increase in the jobless rate was the largest one-month increase since 1975; the 1.7 point increase in the underemployment rate, to 8.7 percent, is the largest increase on record since this measure was introduced in 1994. The Bureau reports that the "bulk of the increase in unemployment occurred among people on temporary layoff, which increased 1.0 million in March to 1.8 million." Measures of labor market participation also fell sharply, a clear reflection of the reversal in labor demand. This shift is especially disheartening as prior to the virus, the tight job market was pulling typically left-behind workers into the job market. Such gains are quickly unraveling, a point I return to below.

As readers know, we typically feature our jobs smoother which averages monthly payroll changes over 3, 6, and 12 month windows in order to pull out the underlying signal. We print the smoother below, but it too is less informative this month, since a backwards looking average by definition downplays the sharp shift in trend that occurred in the past two weeks (to emphasize this point, we include a bar for the 701K loss in March alone).

A better, simpler approach this month is to plot monthly payroll levels, which show the sharp trend reversal in March.

Source: BLS

Hourly pay stayed on track last month, up 3.1 percent and beating inflation that's been running just north of 2 percent, though price growth will likely slow (boosting real wage growth) due to very low energy prices. However, wage trends can be deceptive at times like this because of "composition effects." For example, as more low-wage workers face layoffs relative to high-wage workers, this can show up as accelerating wage growth. I'll try to parse out this potential bias in forthcoming reports.

Different sectors have different degrees of exposure to the jobs impact of the virus, of course. One way to think of this difference is that if you can draw a paycheck by clicking into Zoom meetings, you're in a less exposed sector. So, restaurant, hotel workers, flight attendants and anyone in a face-to-face services (and their suppliers) has a much higher chance of a layoff relative to many in professional services like legal, accounting, or research. The food vendor who works at a professional sports venue is directly exposed; the team's lawyer is not.

For example, employment in restaurants and bars fell by over 400,000 in March, a one-month loss of over 3 percent, by far the sector's worse month on record. Conversely, employment in professional and technical services was up slightly in March, by about 6,000. True, that's a weak month for the sector, and most sectors (outside of those that are directly responsive to containment efforts) are being hit by the sharp downturn. But magnitudes of losses will differ by exposure.

It is far from incidental, of course, that there's an inequality divide implicit in that distinction. A useful analysis from the St. Louis Federal Reserve split workers by occupations into high and lower risk of unemployment. About half of the workforce fell into each category (to be clear, that doesn't mean unemployment will hit 50 percent; not every exposed worker will get laid off). The analysis found that "the highest risk of unemployment also tend to be lower-paid occupations. The average annual earnings of the low-risk occupations is $64,600, about 75% higher than earnings in the high-risk occupations, at $36,600. This indicates the economic burden from this health crisis will most directly affect those workers who are likely in the most vulnerable financial situation."

Source: Charles Gascon, St. Louis Fed.

We've never shut the U.S. economy down as we have done in response to the virus. This was a wholly necessary response to its threat, but it came at point when the labor market was persistently closing in on full employment, providing meaningful employment and wage gains for workers who are often left behind under more slack conditions. Much as full employment provides out-sized benefits for the most vulnerable workers, the reversal we're now witnessing metes out the most pain on those same groups of workers. Many of these laid off workers lack paid leave and their savings rate is zero or negative. That is, they are the least insulated among us against this sort of sudden shock.

That is why our relief efforts must scale to the unprecedented size of the problem. Recent stimulus measures, with their emphasis on checks to household and expanded Unemployment Insurance, are a good start but we a) must ensure these measures are quickly implemented, and b) we will need further trips back to this well.

The risk at times like these–risks we've seen borne out in both the health and economic responses–is doing too little. As Dr. Fauci said the other day (paraphrasing): If you think I'm overreacting, I'm probably getting it right.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

https://equitablegrowth.org/the-long-term-consequences-of-recessions-for-u-s-workers/

https://equitablegrowth.org/the-long-term-consequences-of-recessions-for-u-s-workers/

The long-term consequences of recessions for U.S. workers

Shutterwstock

Policymakers have asked—in some cases, demanded—that people stay home and businesses shutter as a public health crisis has unfolded across the United States, inducing an economic downturn. Despite positive developments in legislation passed last week, those policymakers have not put in place all the steps needed to protect workers and businesses from a full-scale recession that may cast a shadow for years to come. Given the likely scope and scale of this crisis and the current public policy response—which, from both a public health and economic perspective, has been insufficient—it is looking increasingly likely that the United States may be on the cusp of a severe economic recession.

What does the evidence from the Great Recession of 2007–2009 say about what an extended recession could mean for working people over the long term, especially young workers?

There is extensive research on the effects that economic downturns have on workers' employment and earnings, not just during a recession but also lingering for years and decades afterward. In a new working paper, University of California, Berkeley economist Jesse Rothstein finds that workers who happen to be entering the labor market when there's a recession have both permanently lower employment rates and lower earnings long after the recession has ended. These effects for recent entrants are even worse than for other members of the U.S. labor force who have been in it longer, as Rothstein explains in a column about the paper:

Workers from these cohorts saw their annual employment rates drop by 2 percentage points to 4 percentage points per year, relative to older workers in the same labor market. Those who were established in the workforce by the beginning of the recession—those who graduated college in 2005 and earlier—essentially returned to prerecession levels of employment by 2014. But those who entered after 2005 have not; their employment rates remain depressed even as the overall market has recovered.

Unfortunately, these effects are not temporary. Rothstein estimates that the permanent effects, or scarring, of the Great Recession on young workers will result in those individuals earning 2 percent less through the early years of their careers and will reduce their employment throughout the course of their career by about one week. While these amounts might sound small for one individual, aggregated across an entire generation, they represent a large loss of earnings and employment.

Another new working paper that explores the negative effects the Great Recession had on young workers in particular is by U.S. Census Bureau economist Kevin Rinz. He finds that from 2007 to 2017, millennials whose local labor markets had higher unemployment lost 13 percent in cumulative earnings, compared to 9 percent for Generation X and 7 percent for the baby-boom generation. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

These worse earnings outcomes relative to older workers persisted even as these millennials were more likely to be employed again by 2017. Rinz then discusses a few different reasons why younger workers' earnings would still be depressed even as their employment improves.

One of those ways is that younger workers, especially millennials, were still less likely to be working for high-paying employers even as their employment recovered. Meanwhile, older workers saw their chances of working for high-paying employers improve roughly proportionately to their likelihood of being employed. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2

You can read more about Rinz's paper in this column by Equitable Growth Director of Labor Market Policy Kate Bahn.

One of the reasons it's so concerning to see that recessions have such negative consequences for young workers is because where you start out in the earnings distribution has important implications for your long-term earnings trajectory—even if you don't have the bad luck to be entering the labor market during a recession. Research funded by Equitable Growth by Syracuse University economist Emily Wiemers and University of Massachusetts Boston economist Michael Carr found that people are less likely to move up the earnings distribution over the course of their career than they used to. They find that the likelihood of a worker who starts their career in the middle of the earnings distribution moving to the top decile of the earnings distribution has declined approximately 20 percent over the past 40 years.

This means people are more "stuck in place" in the earnings distribution throughout the course of their careers, with less chance of earning more as they grow older and more experienced. This also means that where one starts on the earnings ladder is more indicative of where you will finish in the earnings ladder than used to be true. This is true even for college-educated workers, who may have higher earnings overall but have actually seen their lifetime earnings mobility decline the most.

The combination of these cyclical factors caused by recessions and structural factors driven by long-term changes in earnings mobility have profound implications for the long-term economic opportunity that young workers face. As my co-author Elisabeth Jacobs and I explain in our report, "Are today's inequalities limiting tomorrow's opportunities?," these changes together represent one way in which even highly skilled and highly "human capitalized" workers face lower prospects of economic mobility relative to prior generations.

This means that while much of our political and policy rhetoric continues to emphasize the role of individual skills, education, and hard work to explain economic outcomes, the reality is that far too often, economic outcomes reflect factors beyond an individual's control, from racial and gender discrimination to the dumb luck of happening to be a young adult entering the labor market during a recession.

Research from the Great Recession indicates that the 2007–2009 downturn had deep and long-lasting negative economic impacts on people. The current downturn caused by our coronavirus-driven economic shutdown has already had dire impacts on workers, seen last week in the unprecedented jump in Unemployment Insurance claim filings. But as we have seen from the research above, recessions' negative economic effects also linger for years afterward in depressed earnings and employment, and this current downturn may linger even longer due to underlying fragilities in the U.S. economy caused by historically high economic inequality and a porous social safety net.

That's why it's crucial that policymakers take swift and decisive action to ensure not only that income keeps flowing in the short term but also that permanent, inequality-fighting policy changes are enacted to improve the country's safety net and enhance automatic fiscal stabilizers in the long term. The legislation enacted last week is a good down payment on that goal, but further interventions may be needed as our economy continues to suffer from the consequences of the coronavirus.

https://equitablegrowth.org/getting-money-urgently-to-low-wage-u-s-workers/

https://equitablegrowth.org/getting-money-urgently-to-low-wage-u-s-workers/

Getting money urgently to low-wage U.S. workers

Lisa Cook

To cushion the blow of the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. Congress last week passed and President Donald Trump signed the $2.2 trillion emergency stimulus package, including provisions to send checks of up to $1,200 to each tax-paying citizen and hundreds of billions of dollars more to small businesses to cushion the blow for their laid-off employees. The flow of this emergency relief from the federal government should prioritize low-wage earners, who are at significant health, economic, and financial risk due to the coronavirus and the looming recession. Mobile payments, using electronic transfers and mobile applications, could get money into their hands quickly.

A record number of people are losing jobs. In Michigan, Monday through Thursday last week, 80,000 people, many of whom are low-wage workers, filed Unemployment Insurance claims—a number which exceeds the 60,000 filings at the peak of unemployment following the Great Recession of 2007–2009. Across the United States, nearly 3.3 million people filed for Unemployment Insurance this past week, with expectations of millions more doing so in April.

Low-wage workers, who account for 44 percent of all U.S. workers (roughly 53 million people), are their families' primary wage earners. These breadwinners are disproportionately women and minorities who live paycheck to paycheck and are therefore most at risk. With no income, these workers are unable to pay bills—rent, mobile phone, health insurance, car and student loans, and mortgages. Consumer spending drives more than two-thirds of Gross Domestic Product. Every bill they cannot pay (to a landlord, a mortgage lender, or a car company) and every business they cannot patronize (their mechanic, favorite restaurant, or neighborhood clothing store) starts a chain reaction that will only deepen this coronavirus recession.

Too little of this federal emergency relief money may well get into these consumers' hands too late. Most people and small businesses have bills due at the end of the month. They need cash immediately. Direct payments will eventually reach most small businesses and families, but getting these funds to them could take several weeks or perhaps much longer. The most vulnerable who do not file taxes and do not receive benefits, such as Social Security, will be the hardest to reach.

Mobile money could be the answer. The federal government should learn from the decades-long experience with mobile money in developing countries and more recently in the United States. Mobile phone networks sent all Americans with a cell phone an emergency text alert this past October. They could get them money today, especially the most vulnerable.

Mobile payments use electronic transfers and mobile applications. In the United States, mobile payments connect to banks and other financial institutions. Ninety-six percent of American adults have cell phones, and 81 percent have a smartphone that could receive and make mobile payments. Thirty percent of smartphone users made mobile payments in 2019, and this amount was projected to grow before the COVID-19 pandemic. Mobile payments are faster than traditional payments and offer a good way to send money to the 16 percent of Americans who are underbanked.

Smartphone penetration is high among workers most likely to be missed by traditional payment mechanisms—people who have changed addresses and low-wage earners. Ninety-eight percent of adults ages 18 to 29 have smartphones, compared to 81 percent of adults overall. Nearly three-quarters of those earning less than $30,000 have smartphones. The share of African Americans (80 percent) and Hispanics (79 percent) who own smartphones is comparable to the total, but there are larger shares of blacks (23 percent) and Hispanics (25 percents) who use smartphones rather than broadband at home compared to whites (12 percent), according to the Pew Research Center.

Mobile payments preserve the value of the per-person amount distributed by the government by limiting high fees associated with using bank alternatives. With mobile payments, the recipient can choose a platform, such as Zelle and Paypal/Venmo, to connect to a bank. Most services have caps on daily transfers ($2,000 for Zelle and $10,000 for PayPal) and other security features to prevent fraud.

For all Americans, and especially the underbanked, the federal government's forthcoming stimulus payments should be made available by allowing people to decide which credit union, community bank, or commercial bank to use with a guarantee of no or minimal fees for the recipient. Financial institutions should be reimbursed a small flat rate for these transactions. The U.S. Treasury Department should then use community banks, credit unions, and commercial banks affiliated with mobile payment platforms to facilitate not only the distribution of this emergency relief cash but onward mobile payments to landlords, mortgage servicers, and other creditors. Zelle, for example, is affiliated with 766 such financial institutions across the country.

This possibly very sharp but short economic downturn or an even longer recession is happening at an unparalleled pace. Mobile payments can get cash out fast, particularly to the most vulnerable.

—Lisa D. Cook is a professor of economics at Michigan State University. She was a senior economist at the White House Council of Economic Advisers and led the Harvard University team advising Rwanda on its first post-genocide IMF program.

Comments on March Employment Report [feedly]

Comments on March Employment Report
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2020/04/comments-on-march-employment-report.html

The March report was much worse than expected (due to uncertainty about the timing of layoffs), but the report is already "stale". The April report will be much worse with job losses in the millions (The April report will show the most job losses ever).

The headline number for March was 701 thousand jobs lost, and the previous two months were revised down 57 thousand, combined. The unemployment rate increased to 4.4%. The BLS noted many issues with the employment report this month (see Frequently asked questions: The impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic on The Employment Situation for March 2020) and it appears the unemployment rate might be a percentage point higher (but that will seem like a small error next month). 

Earlier: March Employment Report: 701,000 Jobs Lost (718,000 Lost ex-Census), 4.4% Unemployment Rate

In March, the year-over-year employment change was 1.504 million jobs including Census hires. The year-over-year change will turn negative next month.

"Scariest Job Chart Ever"

During the Great Recession, I posted a graph each month comparing the percentage job losses to previous recessions. This became known as the "scariest job chart".

Click on graph for larger image.

Here is an updated version of the scariest chart. The 2020 Sudden Stop is in Red (just one month) - next month will be stunning.

The Great Recession is in blue. What made the 2007 recession so scary, was both the depth and duration of the job losses.

The 2020 recession will have the sharpest decline in jobs, but we don't know about the duration of the losses.  Duration will depend on the battle against the virus.

Average Hourly Earnings

Wage growth was at expectations. From the BLS: 
"In March, average hourly earnings for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls increased by 11 cents to $28.62. Over the past 12 months, average hourly earnings have increased by 3.1 percent."
This graph is based on "Average Hourly Earnings" from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) (aka "Establishment") monthly employment report. Note: There are also two quarterly sources for earnings data: 1) "Hourly Compensation," from the BLS's Productivity and Costs; and 2) the Employment Cost Index which includes wage/salary and benefit compensation.

The graph shows the nominal year-over-year change in "Average Hourly Earnings" for all private employees.  Nominal wage growth was at 3.1% YoY in March. 

Prime (25 to 54 Years Old) Participation

Since the overall participation rate has declined due to cyclical (recession) and demographic (aging population, younger people staying in school) reasons, here is the employment-population ratio for the key working age group: 25 to 54 years old.

In the earlier period the participation rate for this group was trending up as women joined the labor force. Since the early '90s, the participation rate moved more sideways, with a downward drift starting around '00 - and with ups and downs related to the business cycle.

The 25 to 54 participation rate decreased in March to 82.6%, and the 25 to 54 employment population ratio decreased to 79.6%.

Part Time for Economic Reasons 

From the BLS report:
"The number of persons employed part time for economic reasons, at 5.8 million, increased by 1.4 million in March. These individuals, who would have preferred full-time employment, were working part time because their hours had been reduced or they were unable to find full-time jobs."
The number of persons working part time for economic reasons increased sharply in March to 5.765 million from 4.318 million in February.

These workers are included in the alternate measure of labor underutilization (U-6) that increased to 8.7% in March.

Unemployed over 26 Weeks

This graph shows the number of workers unemployed for 27 weeks or more. 

According to the BLS, there are 1.164 million workers who have been unemployed for more than 26 weeks and still want a job. This was up from 1.102 million in February.

Summary:

The headline jobs number was well below expectations, and the previous two months were revised down.  The headline unemployment rate increased to 4.4%.   These are horrible numbers, but the report for April will be much worse.  

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Virus lays bare the frailty of the social contract

Virus lays bare the frailty of the social contract


via Financial Times, H/T Joe Sims
text only

If there is a silver lining to the Covid-19 pandemic, it is that it has injected a sense of togetherness into polarised societies. But the virus, and the economic lockdowns needed to combat it, also shine a glaring light on existing inequalities — and even create new ones. Beyond defeating the disease, the great test all countries will soon face is whether current feelings of common purpose will shape society after the crisis. As western leaders learnt in the Great Depression, and after the second world war, to demand collective sacrifice you must offer a social contract that benefits everyone.

Today's crisis is laying bare how far many rich societies fall short of this ideal. Much as the struggle to contain the pandemic has exposed the unpreparedness of health systems, so the brittleness of many countries' economies has been exposed, as governments scramble to stave off mass bankruptcies and cope with mass unemployment. Despite inspirational calls for national mobilisation, we are not really all in this together.

The economic lockdowns are imposing the greatest cost on those already worst off. Overnight millions of jobs and livelihoods have been lost in hospitality, leisure and related sectors, while better paid knowledge workers often face only the nuisance of working from home. Worse, those in low-wage jobs who can still work are often risking their lives — as carers and healthcare support workers, but also as shelf stackers, delivery drivers and cleaners.

Governments' extraordinary budget support for the economy, while necessary, will in some ways make matters worse. Countries that have allowed the emergence of an irregular and precarious labour market are finding it particularly hard to channel financial help to workers with such insecure employment. Meanwhile, vast monetary loosening by central banks will help the asset-rich. Behind it all, underfunded public services are creaking under the burden of applying crisis policies.

The way we wage war on the virus benefits some at the expense of others. The victims of Covid-19 are overwhelmingly the old. But the biggest victims of the lockdowns are the young and active, who are asked to suspend their education and forgo precious income. Sacrifices are inevitable, but every society must demonstrate how it will offer restitution to those who bear the heaviest burden of national efforts.

Radical reforms — reversing the prevailing policy direction of the last four decades — will need to be put on the table. Governments will have to accept a more active role in the economy. They must see public services as investments rather than liabilities, and look for ways to make labour markets less insecure. Redistribution will again be on the agenda; the privileges of the elderly and wealthy in question. Policies until recently considered eccentric, such as basic income and wealth taxes, will have to be in the mix.

The taboo-breaking measures governments are taking to sustain businesses and incomes during the lockdown are rightly compared to the sort of wartime economy western countries have not experienced for seven decades. The analogy goes still further.

The leaders who won the war did not wait for victory to plan for what would follow. Franklin D Roosevelt and Winston Churchill issued the Atlantic Charter, setting the course for the United Nations, in 1941. The UK published the Beveridge Report, its commitment to a universal welfare state, in 1942. In 1944, the Bretton Woods conference forged the postwar financial architecture. That same kind of foresight is needed today. Beyond the public health war, true leaders will mobilise now to win the peace.

--

Saturday, April 4, 2020

New Issue: The Coronavirus Economy [feedly]

New Issue: The Coronavirus Economy
http://dollarsandsense.org/blog/2020/04/new-issue-the-coronavirus-economy.html

Our March/April issue is out, with coverage of the emerging coronavirus economic crisis. Today we posted Gerald Epstein's piece on Fed Policy, The Fed and the Coronavirus Crisis.

Here is the p. 2 editors' note for the issue:

The Coronavirus Crisis

We're still in the early days of the economic crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic, yet the economic data are already unprecedented—and frightening. Our cover art by Brian Hubble includes a stunning graph showing how the spike of 3.3 million new unemployment claims from the third week of March towered above the one-week claims over the previous 20 years. Now we have data for the last week of March—an even more astonishing 6.6 million initial claims, for a total of 10 million new claims so far, just weeks into the crisis. By all accounts, we are facing a severe recession, even with the unprecedented multi-trillion-dollar spending by the federal government.

The virus is not the sole cause of this economic meltdown. A political and economic system that was unprepared for either a pandemic or its economic fallout has made both crises far worse than they needed to be, as Richard D. Wolff points out in the first of three "Making Sense" pieces on the coronavirus crisis in this issue. The private profits of capitalist firms didn't give them the incentive to prepare for a pandemic, and a corporate-minded government wasn't able to put public health first, as governments elsewhere have been able to. Leaving such a system intact after all of this "will guarantee the next catastrophe."

Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman offer a proposal for social insurance to deal with the economic disruption of stay-at-home orders during the pandemic, based on the idea that the government should act as a "buyer of last resort." Such a plan would keep businesses alive through the crisis, preserving difficult-to-restore relationships between businesses and employees until demand picks up and social distancing is no longer required.

Gerald Epstein's contribution to this issue helps us understand the Federal Reserve's actions so far in response to the crisis. The Fed must deal with both its traditional mandate of managing unemployment and price stability and also with preventing a meltdown of the financial sector. Epstein's analysis puts the Fed's actions in the context of the mostly unregulated financial system outside the banks and the troubles in the corporate bond market that were already brewing even before the pandemic hit. Epstein's prescription is to turn the Fed into more of a public bank, but with greater accountability, transparency, and help for the (non-financial) "real economy" than we saw in the last crisis.
Paul Engler's feature article depicts the pandemic as a "trigger event" that should show us the need to remake our social, political, and economic landscape through social movements. Reactionary forces will push austerity and a corporate agenda, so activists need to have plans for how to seize the moment and push forward "a counter-agenda rooted in a commitment to democracy and a deep sense of collective empathy."

When you publish a bimonthly magazine, most articles are in the works for two months or more. But D&S's perennial topics like inequality (the focus of John Miller's column in this issue) and the need to move to a green-energy economy (the focus of Arthur MacEwan's column) are as salient as ever. Débora Nunes's feature on Brazil's Movement of People Affected by Dams shows the struggles of activists in a country with a reactionary leadership whose response to the current pandemic will likely be catastrophic.

Our May/June issue will be our Annual Labor Issue, and we have lots of coverage in the works on the ongoing crisis and the labor movement's response to it. Until then, stay healthy and safe. We will weather the storm.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Tim Taylor: Is It Getting Harder for Research to Boost Productivity? [feedly]

Is It Getting Harder for Research to Boost Productivity?
http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2020/04/is-it-getting-harder-for-research-to.html

New technologies are the beating heart of productivity growth and a rising standard of living. But Nicholas Bloom, Charles I. Jones, John Van Reenen, and Michael Webb ask "Are Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find?" (American Economic Review, April 2020, pp. 1104-44, not freely available online). The fact that the are asking you the question tells you that their answer is a pessimistic one. This economics research article will be tough sledding for the uninitiated, but the heart of their case is made with some graphs suitable for anyone to mull over.

For example, take an overall look at the US economy, considering the number of researchers and productivity growth. You find that the number of researchers grows by multiples, but productivity growth rises and falls by small amounts. The inference is that it's taking a lot more researchers just to keep productivity growth at the same level.
For a specific example, consider Moore's law, the notion that the density of semiconductors on a computer chip will double every two years or so. Moore's law turned 50 a few years ago, and as I noted at the time, it's been getting more and more expensive and difficult to keep doubling the density of chips. As Bloom, Jones, van Reenen and Webb write: "In particular, the number of researchers required to double chip density today is more than 18 times larger than the number required in the early 1970s. At least as far as semiconductors are concerned, ideas are getting harder to find. Research productivity in this case is declining sharply, at a rate of 7 percent per year."
Or how about agricultural crop yields? The green lines show the number of researchers, rising; the blue line shows agricultural productivity growth, falling.
Or how about inventions of new drugs? The authors write:

New molecular entities (NMEs) are novel compounds that form the basis of new drugs. Historically, the number of NMEs approved by the Food and Drug Administration each year shows little or no trend, while the number of dollars spent on pharmaceutical research has grown dramatically ... We reexamine this fact ... The result is that research effort rises by a factor of 9, while research productivity falls by a factor of 11 by 2007 before rising in recent years so that the overall decline by 2014 is a factor of 5.
Or how about reductions in cancer? Yes, death rates for cancer are falling, but research into fighting cancer has been rising quite rapidly. As a result, it seems to be taking more and more research publications about cancer and more and more clinical trials to reduce cancer deaths by an equivalent amount.
Based on these and other examples, the authors write: "[J]ust to sustain constant growth in GDP per person, the United States must double the amount of research effort every 13 years to offset the increased difficulty of finding new ideas."

In the fashion of honest academics, the authors note in a number of places and in a number of ways that examples like these don't prove conclusively that it's becoming more costly to find ideas and harder for research to boost productivity. For example:

  • Perhaps the measured growth of GDP doesn't capture many of the gains that are happening, like free or zero-marginal-cost access to so many goods and services over the internet. 
  • Perhaps  there are other examples measures of the gains from research would be rising, not falling. 
  • Perhaps Moore's law is a bad example, because it involves running into physical  limits, and thus isn't representative of other research efforts. 
  • Perhaps we are doing fine at discovering new ideas, but our economy is doing a poor job of turning these ideas into commercial products and at diffusing the ideas and products across a wide spectrum of industries and companies. 
  • Perhaps the shift away from "basic research" funded by governments and toward applied research largely funded by companies has reduced the number of big new ideas. 
  • Perhaps more firms are using intellectual property as a defensive technique for warding off competition rather than as a method of moving forward with productivity gains. 
  • Overall US R&D spending has been pretty flat for several decades at about 2.5% of GDP, and maybe that's the measure of "research" on which we should be focusing.
  • Perhaps there is some technology threshold for technologies like artificial intelligence, such that once that threshold is reached, very large productivity gains will then be possible, but we just haven't hit the threshold yet.   

You can probably add some possibilities to this list. But the weight of the argument from Bloom, Jones, van Reenen and Webb is that if we want technology and new ideas to ride to our rescue in a variety of areas--productivity growth, reducing pollution, improving health care and education, and many others--we need to step up our efforts considerably.  

 -- via my feedly newsfeed