Friday, November 1, 2019

Saez and Zucman: How to Tax Our Way Back to Justice

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/opinion/sunday/wealth-income-tax-rate.html?emc=rss&partner=rss  

How to Tax Our Way Back to Justice

It is absurd that the working class is now paying higher tax rates than the richest people in America.

By Emmanuel Saez and 

The authors are economists at the University of California, Berkeley.


America's soaring inequality has a new engine: its regressive tax system. Over the past half century, even as their wealth rose to previously unseen heights, the richest Americans watched their tax rates collapse. For the working classes over the same period, as wages stagnated, work conditions deteriorated and debts ballooned, tax rates increased.

Stop to think this over for a minute: For the first time in the past hundred years, the working class — the 50 percent of Americans with the lowest incomes — today pays higher tax rates than billionaires.

The full extent of this situation is not visible in official statistics, which is perhaps why it has not received more attention. Government agencies like the Congressional Budget Office publish information about the distribution of federal taxes, but they disregard state and local taxes, which account for a third of all taxes paid by Americans and are in general highly regressive. The official statistics keepers do not provide specific information on the ultra-wealthy, who although few in number earn a large fraction of national income and therefore account for a large share of potential tax revenue. And until now there were no estimates of the total tax burden that factored in the effect of President Trump's tax reform enacted at the end of 2017, which was particularly generous for the ultra-wealthy.

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To fill this gap, we have estimated how much each social group, from the poorest to billionaires, paid in taxes for the year 2018. Our starting point is the total amount of tax revenue collected in the United States, 28 percent of national income. We allocate this total across the population, divided into 15 income groups: the bottom 10 percent (the 24 million adults with the lowest pretax income), the next 10 percent and so on, with finer-grained groups within the top 10 percent, up to the 400 wealthiest Americans.

The Regressive American Tax System

How combined federal, state and local taxes fall on American adults, by income percentile.

Three regressive taxes account for

most of the burden on the working class:

Consumption

taxes

Payroll

tax

Residential

property taxes

INCOME

PERCENTILE

TOTAL

TAX RATE:

Bottom

50%

12.3%

11.2%

25.6%

10

Working

class;

average

annual

pre-tax

income:

$18,500

10.3

11.3

24.2

20

9.1

11.7

24.5

30

7.7

10.6

23.5

40

6.7

10.6

24.2

50

Next

40%

6.4

10.5

25.4

60

Middle

class;

average

income:

$75,000

5.4

10.6

26.3

70

5.1

10.3

27.8

80

4.8

9.8

29.4

90

Top 9%

3.8

8.0

28.6

Avg.

$220,000

95

3.2

5.2

27.7

99

Top 1%

2.3

2.4

28.9

Avg.

$1.5

million

99.9

2.2

33.2

99.99

2.2

30.4

99.99+

The top 400

2.3

23.0

The richest 400 adults

pay a lower rate than

all other groups.

Estate

tax

Income

tax

Corporate and business

property taxes

By Bill Marsh/The New York Times | Source: Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, University of California, Berkeley; adults in analysis are age 20 and older.

Our data series include all taxes paid to the federal, state and local governments: the federal income tax, of course, but also state income taxes, myriad sales and excise taxes, the corporate income tax, business and residential property taxes and payroll taxes. In the end, all taxes are paid by people. The corporate tax, for example, is paid by shareholders, because it reduces the amount of profit they can receive in dividends or reinvest in their companies.

You will often hear that we have a progressive tax system in the United States — you owe more, as a fraction of your income, as you earn more. When he was a presidential candidate in 2012, Senator Mitt Romney famously lambasted the 47 percent of "takers" who, according to him, do not contribute to the public coffers. In reality, the bottom half of the income distribution may not pay much in income taxes, but it pays a lot in sales and payroll taxes. Taking into account all taxes paid, each group contributes between 25 percent and 30 percent of its income to the community's needs. The only exception is the billionaires, who pay a tax rate of 23 percent, less than every other group.

The tax system in the United States has become a giant flat tax — except at the top, where it's regressive. The notion that America, even if it may not collect as much in taxes as European countries, at least does so in a progressive way, is a myth. As a group, and although their individual situations are not all the same, the Trumps, the Bezoses and the Buffetts of this world pay lower tax rates than teachers and secretaries do.

This is the tax system of a plutocracy. With tax rates of barely 23 percent at the top of the pyramid, wealth will keep accumulating with hardly any barrier. So, too, will the power of the wealthy, including their ability to shape policymaking and government for their own benefit.

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From Kennedy Through Trump, the Rich Have Done Very, Very Well

Here's the change in total wealth per adult since 1962, on average, from the poorest to the richest slices of America. Circles representing wealth are proportionate, which is why they're almost too small to see for the bottom 50 percent of Americans. All wealth figures are in 2018 dollars.

CHANGE IN TAX RATE,

1962-2018

1962

2018

TOTAL

WEALTH:

TOTAL

WEALTH:

Bottom 50%

of Americans

Bottom 50%

of Americans

1.5 x

increase

UP

24.2%

$3,528

$5,156

22.5%

27.6

3.5

$73,703

$259,200

Next 40%

25.1

DOWN

3.5

$738,841

$2.6 million

Top 10%

33.2

29.0

4.7

Top 1%

$2.9 M

$13.5 M

43.1

30.1

Top 0.1%

$9.6 M

$70.2 M

7.3

51.1

31.4

Top 0.01%

$30.9 M

$349.9 M

11.3

53.6

29.4

Top 400

adults

24.4 x

increase

$276.2 M

$6.7 billion

54.4

23.0

Each of these richest 400 adults

has, on average, the same wealth as

1,308,440

average adults in the working class

(the bottom 50%)

By Bill Marsh/The New York Times | Source: Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, University of California, Berkeley; wealth includes all non-financial assets plus financial assets net of debts; tax rates account for all taxes paid at all levels of government (federal, state and local) and are expressed as a fraction of pre-tax income; adults in analysis are age 20 and older.

The good news is that we can fix tax injustice, right now. There is nothing inherent in modern technology or globalization that destroys our ability to institute a highly progressive tax system. The choice is ours. We can countenance a sprawling industry that helps the affluent dodge taxation, or we can choose to regulate it. We can let multinationals pick the country where they declare their profits, or we can pick for them. We can tolerate financial opacity and the countless possibilities for tax evasion that come with it, or we can choose to measure, record and tax wealth.

If we believe most commentators, tax avoidance is a law of nature. Because politics is messy and democracy imperfect, this argument goes, the tax code is always full of "loopholes" that the rich will exploit. Tax justice has never prevailed, and it will never prevail.

For example, in response to Elizabeth Warren's wealth tax proposal — which we helped develop — pundits have argued that the tax would raise much less revenue than expected. In a similar vein, world leaders have become convinced that taxing multinational companies is now close to impossible, because of international tax competition. During his presidency, Barack Obama argued in favor of reducing the federal corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 28 percent, with a lower rate of 25 percent for manufacturers. In 2017, under President Trump, the United States cut its corporate tax rate to 21 percent. In France, President Emmanuel Macron is in motion to reduce the corporate tax in 2022 to 25 percent from 33 percent. Britain is ahead of the curve: It started slashing its rate under Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2008 and is aiming for 17 percent by 2020. On that issue, the Browns, Macrons and Trumps of the world agree: The winners of global markets are mobile; we can't tax them too much.

But they are mistaken. Tax avoidance, international tax competition and the race to the bottom that rage today are not laws of nature. They are policy choices, decisions we've collectively made — perhaps not consciously or explicitly, certainly not choices that were debated transparently and democratically — but choices nonetheless. And other, better choices are possible.

Take big corporations. Some countries may have an interest in applying low tax rates, but that's not an obstacle to making multinationals (and their shareholders) pay a lot. How? By collecting the taxes that tax havens choose not to levy. For example, imagine that the corporate tax rate in the United States was increased to 35 percent and that Apple found a way to book billions in profits in Ireland, taxed at 1 percent. The United States could simply decide to collect the missing 34 percent. Apple, like most Fortune 500 companies, does in fact have a big tax deficit: It pays much less in taxes globally than what it would pay if its profits were taxed at 35 percent in each country where it operates. For companies headquartered in the United States, the Internal Revenue Service should collect 100 percent of this tax deficit immediately, taking up the role of tax collector of last resort. The permission of tax havens is not required. All it would take is adding a paragraph in the United States tax code.

The same logic can be applied to companies headquartered abroad that sell products in America. The only difference is that the United States would collect not all but only a fraction of their tax deficit. For example, if the Swiss food giant Nestlé has a tax deficit of $1 billion and makes 20 percent of its global sales in the United States, the I.R.S. could collect 20 percent of its tax deficit, in addition to any tax owed in the United States. The information necessary to collect this remedial tax already exists: Thanks to recent advances in international cooperation, the I.R.S. knows where Nestlé books its profits, how much tax it pays in each country and where it makes its sales.

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Collecting part of the tax deficit of foreign companies would not violate any international treaty. This mechanism can be applied tomorrow by any country, unilaterally. It would put an end to international tax competition, because there would be no point any more for businesses to move production or paper profits to low-tax places. Although companies might choose to stop selling products in certain nations to avoid paying taxes, this would be unlikely to be a risk in the United States. No company can afford to snub the large American market.

These examples are powerful because they show, contrary to received wisdom, that the taxation of capital and globalization are perfectly compatible. The notion that external or technical constraints make tax justice idle fantasy does not withstand scrutiny. When it comes to the future of taxation, there is an infinity of possible futures ahead of us.

What Taxes Should Look Like

A proposal to return tax rates at the top to where they were in 1950.

Proposed reform:

tax rate changes, in

percentage points

Current tax rates.

This includes the cost of health insurance, a mandatory expense

that is, in effect, a tax on working Americans.

INCOME

PERCENTILE

–3.1

Bottom 50%

of Americans

10

–5.4

20

Working class;

average annual pre-tax

income: $18,500

–6.8

30

–9.0

40

–9.1

50

–9.5

Next 40%

60

–8.0

Middle class;

avg. income: $75,000

70

–7.0

80

–5.1

90

–1.7

The top 9%

95

+2.4

Avg. income: $220,000

99

+10.9

99.9

+24.6

The top 1%

99.99

+40.2

Avg. income: $1.5 million

99.99+

+48.8

The richest 400 adults

10%

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

TAX RATE:

By Bill Marsh/The New York Times | Source: Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, University of California, Berkeley

Are these ideas for greater economic justice realistic politically? It is easy to lose hope — money in politics and self-serving ideologies are powerful foes. But although these problems are real, we should not despair. Before injustice triumphed, the United States was a beacon of tax justice. It was the democracy with the most steeply progressive system of taxation on the planet. In the 1930s, American policymakers invented — and then for almost half a century applied — top marginal income tax rates of close to 90 percent on the highest earners. Corporate profits were taxed at 50 percent, large estates at close to 80 percent.

The history of taxation is full of U-turns. Instead of elevating some supposedly invincible and natural constraints — that are often invincible and natural only in terms of their own models — economists should act more like plumbers, making the tax machinery work, fixing leaks. With good plumbing — and if the growing political will to address the rise of inequality takes hold — there is a bright future for tax justice.


--

Interview with Maureen Cropper: Environmental Economics [feedly]

Interview with Maureen Cropper: Environmental Economics
http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2019/10/interview-with-maureen-cropper.html



Catherine L. Kling and Fran Sussman have "A Conversation with Maureen Cropper" in the
Annual Review of Resource Economics (October 2019, 11, pp. 1-18). As they write in the introduction: Maureen has made important contributions to several areas of environmental economics, including nonmarket valuation and the evaluation of environmental programs. She has also conducted pioneering studies on household transportation use and associated externalities." There also is a short (~ a dozen paragraphs) overview of some of Cropper's best-known work,

I had not know that Cropper identified as a monetary economist when she was headed for graduate school. Here is her description of her early path to environmental economics:
My first formal introduction to economics was in college. I entered Bryn Mawr College in 1966. I had great professors at Bryn Mawr: Philip W. Bell, Morton Baratz, and Richard DuBoff. I learned microeconomics by reading James Meade's A Geometry of International Trade—that's how we were taught microeconomics by Philip Bell. It was really a very good grounding in economics. I got married as I graduated from college to Stephen Cropper (hence my last name), and I went to Cornell University because Stephen was admitted to the Cornell Law School. I was admitted to the Department of Economics at Cornell.
Frankly, my interests at the time were really in monetary economics, so I took several courses at the Cornell Business School, including courses in portfolio theory. My dissertation was on bank portfolio selection with stochastic deposit flows. My dissertation advisor was S.C. Tsiang. Henry Wan and T.C. Liu were also on my committee. Henry was a fantastic mentor and advisor. I would write a chapter of my dissertation and put it in his mailbox; the next day he would have it covered with comments. He was just an amazing advisor and very, very engaged. At this time, I was not doing anything in environmental economics. In fact, my first job offer was from the NYU Business School.
The reason I went into environmental economics is that I met Russ Porter in graduate school. Russ later became the father of my children. We decided that we would go on the job market together and looked for a place that would hire two economists. We wound up at the University of California, Riverside, which at the time was the birthplace of the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (JEEM). I was on the job market in 1973, just when this journal was launched. Ralph d'Arge was the chair of the department then. Tom Crocker also taught there, and Bill Schulze and Jim Wilen were students in the department.
It was going to UC Riverside that really caused me to switch fields and go into environmental economics. It was a very important decision, although I must say it was made partly for personal reasons. It's had a huge impact on my life.
In the interview and overview, it quickly becomes apparent that Cropper has worked on an unsummarizably wide array of topics. Examples include stated preference studies to estimate the value of a statistical life, which became the basis for estimates used by the OECD and in Canada.  Another study, which became the basis for EPA regulations, estimated the value of avoidint a case of chronic bronchitis through air pollution regulations. Cropper worked on whether or not to ban certain pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, what methods to use in cleaning up Superfund sites, and whether to ban  certain uses of asbestos in under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). She worked how to use trading allowances to reduce sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions under the Acid Rain Program.

Cropper worked on many issues involving air pollution in India. She worked on models of estimating household location choices in Baltimore and in Mumbai. The studies in Mumbai became the basis for looking at other policies: slum relocation or converting buses to compressed natural gas. She has estimated how the shapes of cities affect demand for travel, and studied cross-country data on relationships from growth to traffic fatalities.  The interview touches on these topics and more. Here's a description of one such study from Cropper:

When I first got to the World Bank I realized that, in India, there hadn't been any state-of-the-art studies on the impact of air pollution on mortality. This was around 1995, the time when important cohort studies by Arden Pope and Douglas Dockery were coming out in the United States.
There is also literature looking at the impact of acute exposures to air pollution—daily time-series studies of the impact of air pollution on mortality. With the support of the Bank, I was able to get information in Delhi from air quality monitors—four years of daily data, although monitoring was not done every day. I was also able to obtain data on deaths by cause and age. I worked with Nathalie Simon and Anna Alberini to carry out a daily time-series study of the impact of air pollution on mortality. ...
We had a hard time getting the study published in an epidemiological journal because economists write up their results differently than epidemiologists. But we did document significant effects of particulate matter on mortality. And, it was important to do something early on and convince people in India that this sort of work could be done. (There have been many subsequent studies.) It is also interesting that the results we obtained in Delhi were similar to results obtained in other time-series studies in the United States.
When those at the EPA or the World Bank or the National Academy of Sciences were setting up an advisory committee or a consensus panel to produce a report or an evaluation, Cropper's name was perpetually on the short list. Her memory of one such experience gives a sense of why she has been in such high demand:
I learned so much in my time serving on the EPA Science Advisory Board. I actually began there in the 1990s when the retrospective analysis of the Clean Air Act—the first Section 812 study—was being written. Dick Schmalensee was the head of that committee. I actually chaired the review of the first prospective 812 study of the benefits and costs of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
I also preceded you, Cathy, as the head of the Environmental Economics Advisory Committee at EPA. I learned a lot being on these EPA committees. In terms of the 812 studies, you've got a subcommittee that's dealing with the health impacts: epidemiologists and toxicologists. You have air quality modelers and people who are exposure measurement experts. And of course, you also have economists. It's a fantastic opportunity to be exposed to all parts of the analysis. If you are concerned about air pollution policy, which is what I've worked on the most, you need to get the perspective of all of these different disciplines. 
I was also interested in Cropper's comments on how, in environmental economics, theoretical research has diminished and empirical work has become more prominent. My sense is that this is broadly true for many fields of economics. Cropper says 
I think quasi-experimental econometrics are one of the things that graduate students really do learn nowadays. Graduate students are also learning structural approaches. If you want to estimate the welfare impacts of corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards on the new car market, you've got to use a structural model. You also have students who study empirical industrial organization, bringing those techniques to bear in environmental economics. In terms of the percentage of work that is done today that is more theoretically based, my impression is that theoretical research really has declined, in terms of the number of purely theoretical papers written or even papers that are using theoretical approaches.\
The emphasis on theory has also changed during the time I have been teaching. When I was teaching a graduate class a few years ago, we were talking about discounting issues and, of course, the Ramsey formula. Students had heard of the Ramsey formula, but when I asked students if they knew who Frank Ramsey was, I was surprised to find that they didn't know. The fact is, I think there has been this shift. When I teach environmental economics, the preparation of students in terms of econometric techniques is really quite impressive. I've got to say that has really been ramped up. That represents an important change in the profession ..

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Children’s Uninsured Rate Rose for Second Straight Year in 2018 [feedly]

Children's Uninsured Rate Rose for Second Straight Year in 2018
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/childrens-uninsured-rate-rose-for-second-straight-year-in-2018



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China Doubts Long-Term Trade Deal Possible With Trump [feedly]

An impressive news summary of the state of trade negotiations with China....there will be no peace under Trump, it appears.

China Doubts Long-Term Trade Deal Possible With Trump
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-31/china-said-to-doubt-long-term-trade-deal-possible-with-trump

TEXT ONLY

Terms of Trade is a daily newsletter that untangles a world embroiled in trade wars. Sign up here.

Chinese officials are casting doubts about reaching a comprehensive long-term trade deal with the U.S. even as the two sides get close to signing a "phase one" agreement.

In private conversations with visitors to Beijing and other interlocutors in recent weeks, Chinese officials have warned they won't budge on the thorniest issues, according to people familiar with the matter. They remain concerned about President Donald Trump's impulsive nature and the risk he may back out of even the limited deal both sides say they want to sign in the coming weeks.

Chinese policy makers concluded a key political gathering in Beijing on Thursday. In meetings ahead of that plenum some officials have relayed low expectations that future negotiations could result in anything meaningful -- unless the U.S. is willing to roll back more of the tariffs. In some cases, they've urged American visitors to carry that very message back to Washington, the people said.

Chilean President Sebastian Pinera threw up another hurdle when he announced Wednesday that the country had canceled the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit Nov. 16-17 -- where Trump and China's Xi Jinping hoped to meet -- because of social unrest in the country.

A protest at the Plaza Italia in Santiago, Chile, on Oct. 23.Photographer: Cristobal Olivares/Bloomberg

U.S. stocks were little changed and bond yields retreated on concern about a protracted trade war between the world's two largest economies. Earlier, a report showed a gauge of the outlook for China's manufacturing sector dropped to the lowest level since February. On Wednesday, a government report in Washington showed U.S. growth slowed to a 1.9% annual rate, the weakest since the end of 2018.

In a tweet on Thursday, Trump said the search is ongoing for a new location for Xi and him to sign the deal, which he said would be "about 60% of total deal."

That first step, according to the Trump administration, is meant to lead to a more comprehensive agreement involving more substantial economic reforms than those contained in the proposed initial phase. But Chinese officials are skeptical, saying that would require the U.S. to withdraw tariffs in place on some $360 billion in imports from China -- something many don't see Trump being ready to do.

Bloomberg Economics: Truce, Peace, or War? Three 2020 Trade Scenarios

The people familiar with China's position said the tariffs don't all have to be removed immediately, but they must be part of the next stage. China also wants Trump to cancel a new wave of import taxes due to take effect Dec. 15 on American consumer favorites such as smartphones and toys as part of the phase one deal, the people said.

Beijing is open and willing to continue talks after an initial phase, but both sides recognize that it will be very difficult to reach an agreement on the deep structural reforms the U.S. is pushing for, said one Chinese official familiar with the talks.

China has stated for months that a final deal must include the removal of all punitive tariffs, and has balked at reforms in areas such as state-run enterprises that could jeopardize the Communist Party's grip on power. It's politically unfeasible for Xi to accept any deal that would keep the punitive tariffs: Nationalists in the party have pressured him through state-run media editorials to avoid signing an "unequal treaty" reminiscent of those China signed with colonial powers.

Tariff Pressure

So far, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and his team, which declined to comment, have been adamant that the duties on $250 billion in Chinese goods -- imposed early in the trade war -- be maintained over the long term as a way to enforce any commitments China makes.

The questions over the future of negotiations reflect a change in U.S. strategy. After ramping up tariffs and pressure on China over the summer and saying he would settle only for an all-encompassing agreement, Trump in early October shifted to the step-by-step approach.

Terms of Trade: What's In, What's Out of Partial U.S.-China Deal

The first phase, which negotiators are still trying to nail down, is expected to include a resumption of Chinese purchases of U.S. farm goods and other products such as aircraft.

It's also expected to include Chinese commitments to protect American intellectual property and an agreement by both sides not to manipulate their currencies. In return, Trump agreed not to go ahead with an Oct. 15 tariff increase and aides have raised the possibility of canceling the Dec. 15 levies.

But missing from the deal now taking shape are many of the deeper economic reforms such as a changes to the regime of government subsidies Chinese companies benefit from that the Trump administration – and American businesses – have been seeking, raising questions over whether the economic cost of Trump's trade assault will have been worth it.

Trump has sought to preempt criticism that he's getting little from China by arguing that the tougher issues will be dealt with in future phases. "Phase two will start negotiations almost immediately after we've concluded phase one," he told reporters this month.

White House spokesman Judd Deere said Thursday, after this story was first published, that the president "wants real structural changes that yield actual, verifiable, and enforceable results" that lead to fairer trade with China.

Modelling Global GDP Impact of Trade War

Source: Bloomberg Economics, NiGEM

Yet the move to a phased approach reflects China's resistance to many U.S. demands and a concession by the White House to abandon its stance that nothing is agreed until all the thorny issues are resolved.

"Even if they do get a phase one, a phase two is going to be substantially more difficult because all the really difficult issues are being deferred," said Eswar Prasad, who once led the International Monetary Fund's China team and is now at Cornell University.

During recent conversations with senior Chinese policy makers, Prasad said the common theme they expressed was skepticism. "They are quite pessimistic," he said. "They fear that any deal that they negotiate with Trump could blow up in their face."

The differences were evident even as Trump announced the "substantial phase one deal" with China's lead negotiator, Vice Premier Liu He, and promised a broader thaw in relations as part of what he dubbed a "love-fest."

Liu He with Robert Lighthizer on Oct. 11.Photographer: Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg

Behind closed doors though, the mood was not quite as fulsome. According to people close to the talks, the sides were still debating how to apportion issues between phases and what to announce just minutes before reporters were let in for the announcement.

'Positive Direction'

Trump declared before the press that there could be as many as three phases to a deal while Liu declined to discuss details.

"We very much agree that to get the China-U.S. economic relationship right, it's something that is good for China, for the United States, and for the whole world and we are making a lot of progress toward a positive direction," Liu told reporters.

China's Ministry of Commerce did not immediately respond to a fax seeking comment on the trade talks. But a former official says there could still be a long road ahead.

"If the U.S. demands are too much, such as insisting on the so-called structural changes that will alter China's economic model, then the complete deal can't be finished during Trump's first term," said Zhou Xiaoming, a former Ministry of Commerce official. "Other than that, China wants to have a deal as quickly as possible" though a complete deal would include the removal of all punitive tariffs, he said.

That's far from what the Trump administration is prepared to offer. "It's not obvious that there is a real meeting of minds," Prasad said.

— With assistance by Miao Han, and Zoe Schneeweiss
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Wednesday, October 30, 2019

Josh Bivens (EPI): Wage growth targets are good economics—if you get the details right: EPI Macroeconomics Newsletter [feedly]

This is an interesting and powerful argument, and a possible policy angle for a progressive government seeking to sustainably raise incomes, especially wages.Very interesting,too,originating from Oliver Blanchard, former chief economist for the IMF -- showing that inequality is not and issue ONLY of concern to wage workers: it is having systematic negative effects.

The policy hinges in part on measuring "longer run" productivity trends. It makes sense that labor forces seek to proportion pay according to units of work (unit labor costs). It aligns with the principle of equal pay for equal or comparable work, which underpins most meritocracy social theories. Capitalism's philosophers -- especially in its youth -- claimed that the system was indeed, compared with feudalism, a path to justice on earth. nor just the Catholic, Hindu, Buddhist, etc., hereafters. The argument that lags in productivity may be directly influenced by the existing LOW wages is  also a very interesting and potentially very powerful one -- there should be a major effort to prove that thesis.

Unfortunately, productivity is becoming increasingly hard to measure in service, intangible and public sectors of the US economy.  "Units" of such labor are more difficult to define, requiring proxy arguments (e.g. 'cost' instead of 'price'). I suspect, but cannot prove, that this reflects a rather profound detachment of these modes of work from a capitalist mode of production. Meaning -- if price does not accurately reflect value, there will be serious market failures to allocate efficiently.

Bivens is a great labor economist in the partisan meaning of "labor".

Wage growth targets are good economics
—if you get the details right: EPI Macroeconomics Newsletter
https://www.epi.org/blog/wage-growth-targets-are-good-economics-if-you-get-the-details-right-epi-macroeconomics-newsletter/

Josh Bivens, Research Director, EPI

Earlier this month, Olivier Blanchard—the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund and an influential figure in macroeconomics—suggested that the Federal Reserve should consider targeting inflation in nominal wages rather than (or in addition to) inflation in prices. I was predictably intrigued by this: I proposed a nominal wage inflation target for the Fed a few years back.

This edition of the newsletter quickly sketches out the logic of a nominal wage inflation target to guide Fed decision-making on interest rates, and it highlights one particularly important detail: the assumed rate of productivity growth used to specify the target. If the rate of productivity growth is endogenous to the degree of labor market slack (as some evidence indicates), then using real-time estimates of productivity growth as an input into the wage target could threaten to lock in the damage to wage growth done by too-slack labor markets.

The key takeaways are:

  • A nominal wage growth target has many virtues over the Fed's current approach of targeting price inflation.
    • Price inflation is affected by many factors besides the pace of wage growth, yet only wage growth is the proper target for the Fed's aggregate demand management. A wage growth target hence carries more signal and less noise than the price inflation target.
    • One key determinant of price inflation—the size of markups of firms' prices over labor costs—actually varies countercyclically over wide phases of the business cycle. This introduces unuseful noise into the target the Fed is aiming for.
  • A relatively long-lagged measure of trend productivity growth is the best input to use for specifying a nominal wage target.
    • High-frequency (real-time) measures of productivity growth are notoriously volatile, making them a bad input for any policy target.
    • As the economy exits a steep recession, real-time measures of productivity growth can be dragged down by the wage-suppressing effects of lingering labor market slack. Using these real-time measures in the construction of a nominal wage target can lead to a too-conservative target and prompt the Fed to raise interest rates prematurely.
    • There is some preliminary evidence that the steady tightening of U.S. labor markets over the past decade seems to finally be pushing up productivity growth rates. This provides more evidence that accepting low productivity growth rates posted when there was substantial labor market slack as unchangeable could be a large policy error.

What is a nominal wage target and why does it makes sense?
It is relatively well known that the Fed has a target for price inflation—2%—and that this target guides its decisions on setting interest rates. Given this price inflation target, as long as one is willing to make an assumption about the underlying trend in productivity growth, it is possible to specify a nominal wage inflation target that is consistent with an overall price inflation target.

The short version of this nominal wage target is that it should equal the sum of the Fed's price inflation target plus the estimated trend rate of productivity growth. Productivity is simply the amount of output (i.e., income) produced in an average hour of work in the economy. As long as nominal wages are growing at or beneath the rate of productivity growth, then labor costs are putting no upward pressure on prices. Say that both nominal wages and productivity rose 2% in a year. Hourly wages climb 2%, but the amount produced in each hour of work—the definition of productivity—also rises by 2%, so costs per unit of output(i.e., prices) would not rise.

Of course, the Fed isn't committed to zero upward pressure on prices. Fed officials say they're comfortable with 2% price inflation. (I'd argue that they should be comfortable with inflation well above that, but we'll take their target for now.) This price inflation target means that nominal wage growth can be 2% higher than trend productivity growth before wages threaten to push price inflation over the Fed's target. If trend productivity growth is estimated to be 1.5%, this would mean that nominal wage growth of 3.5% would be needed before labor costs stopped dragging on the Fed's ability to push price inflation up to its 2% target.

However, while it's possible to specify a nominal wage growth target that is consistent with the Fed's 2% price inflation target, is it useful to do this? It is. Put simply, the only determinant of price inflation that the Fed should reliably try to control is wage growth. Wages (or labor costs generally) are by far the largest single component of costs, so the Fed having influence only over wages with its interest-rate setting is not a problem per se. But nonwage determinants of price inflation either cannot or should not be targeted by the Fed as it raises rates as the economy heats up or lowers rates as the economy cools down.

Take the most obvious case where nonwage determinants should not factor into the Fed's decision-making on inflation: the distinction between core and noncore prices. The Fed tends to ignore price inflation changes stemming from the volatile prices of food and energy. It is right to do this: Food or energy prices can spike upward even in a depressed economy simply because the weather changes. It would be a disaster if the Fed responded to food and energy price spikes when the economy is depressed by raising rates. This is not an academic concern: In 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) raised rates twice, hard on the heels of the Great Recession, because of a small transitory increase in inflation. This was a grievous policy mistake.

Take a less obvious case of when nonwage determinants of prices can send the wrong signal to the Fed: the rise and fall of profit margins. Given the large and prolonged rise in unemployment stemming from the Great Recession, one might have expected a collapse in price inflation, or maybe even deflation, in the years after 2009. Yet price inflation (after stripping out food and energy) held up reasonably well. In fact, looking only at the price data might have convinced some that aggregate demand (spending by households, businesses, and governments) was not really all that depressed relative to the economy's potential. But even as price inflation held up reasonably well, unit labor costs saw zero growth for a number of years. The only thing that kept price inflation from stagnating was an enormous increase in profit margins. In this case, trends in the labor market (flat unit labor costs stemming from anemic wage growth) were providing a much better signal of continued slack in aggregate demand than trends in price inflation (which was subdued, but not terribly so). In the years following the Great Recession, the Fed did the right thing in putting much more weight on wage growth than price inflation and kept monetary policy strongly expansionary. It was right to do so. Why not just operationalize this more formally by specifying a wage target?

Why the right productivity assumption is crucial for specifying the right wage growth target
In his remarks calling for a wage growth target, Blanchard argued that the target had essentially already been hit and that "we are more or less at full employment." More specifically, he indicated that 1% should be taken as the proper assumption regarding productivity growth: "So, when you see wage inflation at 3% and you see productivity [growth] of 1% then you're home."

But a 1% productivity growth assumption is too pessimistic. It's true that a three-year rolling average of productivity growth since 2008 saw it sit below 1% between 2011 and 2018. However, it has been shown decisively that when forecasting future productivity growth, one should use a long lag of past trends—even longer than seven years. In this longer run, 1.5% is a conservative estimate of trend productivity growth.

The need to examine long-run trends when making productivity forecasts is especially true given that the weak productivity growth of the current decade is almost certainly a casualty of the slack demand caused by the Great Recession. Surely it's not a coincidence that productivity growth collapsed right as the economy entered the worst recession in many generations. Further, there is compelling evidencethat a tightening labor market can spur labor-saving investments and organizational change. The logic is simple: When workers are plentiful and cheap because the economy is depressed, containing future labor costs is not a huge priority for businesses—and they certainly may be loath to borrow or take on other risk to make uncertain investments to keep labor costs in check. But when labor markets tighten and wage growth solidifies, investments to contain future labor costs make a lot more sense.

I noted nearly two years ago that tightening labor markets appeared to be nudging up productivity growth. This nudge seems to have become a shove in recent quarters. Figure A shows the three-year average of productivity growth (measured as total economy productivity—the broadest measure). Given how volatile short-run measures of productivity are, three years is essentially the shortest timespan over which one can look at these trends to get any signal at all through the noise. As we noted earlier, for forecasting future trends, one would want to look over a much longer past period. The spike in productivity shown on the graph during the worst of the Great Recession is a statistical fluke indicating only that employment actually fell faster than gross domestic product (GDP) in these years. The key thing to focus on is the sharp recent upturn within the last two years: Productivity growth is indeed closing in rapidly on the longer-run trend of 1.5%.

Figure A

Given that the Fed should be looking to overshoot any long-run wage target for a long spell to undo damage done by years of undershooting, the choice of productivity assumption matters a lot here. Figure Bcompares cumulative growth in (real) wages and productivity with productivity at a 1.5% growth trend. If wage levels just need to regain the level implied by growth in actual productivity in recent years (i.e., rise fast enough to close the gap between the bottom two lines), then this should not take too much more time. If, however, we want to target a clawback of productivity lost due to demand weakness in the post–Great Recession period (i.e., close the gap between the top and bottom lines by accelerating actual productivity growth), then labor markets will need to be hot for quite a long time.

Figure B

Year-over-year nominal wage growth has flattened out well below 3.5% in 2019. Adopting a 1.5% productivity growth assumption for nominal wage targeting implies that this is below full employment levels—and that a long period of being above full employment is still needed to undo the wage-flattening effects of the many years of below-target growth. Olivier Blanchard's reintroduction of nominal wage inflation as a target of monetary policy is most welcome, but we should be careful about what assumptions are being embedded in this target when we pin a number to it.


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Monday, October 28, 2019

En Guerre: Populism and a Plant Closing in France [feedly]

En Guerre: Populism and a Plant Closing in France
https://workingclassstudies.wordpress.com/2019/10/28/en-guerre-populism-and-a-plant-closing-in-france/

I've been interested in the economic history of capitalism since the 1970s, and there are a few titles that stand out in my memory. There were the Marxist and neo-Marxist economic historians (Marx's Capital, E.P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, Rodney Hilton, Robert Brenner, Charles Sabel); the debate over the nature of the industrial revolution (Deane and Cole, NFR Crafts, RM Hartwell, EL Jones); and volumes of the Cambridge Economic History of Europe. The history of British capitalism poses important questions for social theory: is there such a thing as "capitalism", or are there many capitalisms? What are the features of the capitalist social order that are most fundamental to its functioning and dynamics of development? Is Marx's intellectual construction of the "capitalist mode of production" a useful one? And does capitalism have a logic or tendency of development, as Marx believed, or is its history fundamentally contingent and path-dependent? Putting the point in concrete terms, was there a probable path of development from the "so-called primitive accumulation" to the establishment of factory production and urbanization to the extension of capitalist property relations throughout much of the world?

Part of the interest of detailed research in economic history in different places -- England, Sweden, Japan, the United States, China -- is the light that economic historians have been able to shed on the particulars of modern economic organization and development, and the range of institutions and "life histories" they have identified for these different historically embodied social-economic systems. For this reason I have found it especially interesting to read and learn about the ways in which the early modern Chinese economy developed, and different theories of why China and Europe diverged in this period. Kenneth Pomeranz, Philip Huang, William Skinner, Mark Elvin, Bozhong Li, James Lee, and Joseph Needham all shed light on different aspects of this set of questions, and once again the Cambridge Economic History of China was a deep and valuable resource.

A  new title that recently caught my eye is Pierre Dockès' Le Capitalisme Et Ses Rythmes, quatre siècles en perspective: Tome I Sous Le Regard Des Géants. Intriguing features of the book include the long sweep of the book (400 years, over 950 pages, with volume II to come), and the question of whether there is something new to say about this topic. After reading large parts of the book, I think the answer to the last question is "yes".

Dockès is interested in both the history of capitalism as an economic system and the history of economic science and political economy during the past four centuries. And he is particularly interested in discovering what we can learn about our current economic challenges from both these stories.

He specifically distances himself from "mainstream" economic theory and couches his own analysis in a less orthodox and more eclectic set of ideas. He defines mainstream economics in terms of five ideas: first, its strong commitment to mathematization and formalization of economic ideas; second, its disciplinary tendency towards hyper-specialization; third, its tendency to take the standpoint of the capitalist and the free market in its analyses; fourth, the propensity to extend these neoliberal biases to the process of selection and hiring of academics; and fifth, its underlying "scientism" and positivism leads its practitioners to devalue the history of the discipline or the historical conditions through which modern institutions came to be (9-12).
 
Dockès holds that the history of the economic facts and the ideas researchers have had about these facts go hand in hand; economic history and the history of economics need to be studied together. Moreover, Dockès believes that mainstream economics has lost sight of insights from the innovators in the history of economics which still have value -- Ricardo, Smith, Keynes, Walras, Sismondi, Hobbes. The solitary focus of the discipline of mainstream economics in the past forty years on formal, mathematical representations of a market economy precludes these economists from "seeing" the economic world through the conceptual lenses of gifted predecessors. They are trapped in a paradigm or an "epistemological framework" from which they cannot escape. (These ideas are explored in the introduction to the volume.)

The substantive foundation of the book is Dockès' idea that capitalism has long-term rhythms punctuated by crises, and that these fluctuations themselves are amenable to historical-causal and institutional analysis.
En un mot, croissance et crise sont inséparables et inhérents au processus de développement capitaliste laissé à lui-même.
[In a word, growth and crisis are inseparable and inherent in the process of capitalist development left to itself.] (13)
The fluctuations of capitalism over the longterm are linked in a single system of causation — growth, depression, financial crisis, and growth again are linked. Therefore, Dockès believes, it should be possible to discover the systemic causes of the development of various capitalist economies by uncovering the dynamics of crisis. Further, he underlines the serious social and political consequences that have ensued from economic crises in the past, including the rise of the Nazi regime out of the global economic crisis of the 1930s.
Etudier ces rythmes impose une analyse des logiques de fonctionnement du capitalism.
[Studying these rhythms imposes an analysis of the logic of functioning of capitalism.] (12).
Dockès is explicit in saying that economic history does not "repeat" itself, and the crises of capitalism are not replicas of each other over the decades or centuries. Historicity of the time and place is fundamental, and he underlines the path dependency of economic development in some of its aspects as well. But he argues that there are important similarities across various kinds of economic crises, and it is worthwhile discovering these similarities. He takes debt crises as an example: there are great differences among several centuries of experience of debt crisis. But there is something in common as well:
Permanence aussi dans les relations de pouvoir et dans let intérêts des uns (les créanciers partisans de la déflation, des taux élevés) et des autres (les débiteurs inflationnistes), dan les jeux de l'état entre ces deux groupes de pression. On peut tirer deux conséquences des homologies entre le passé et le présent.
[Permanence also in the relations of power and in the interests of some (creditors who favor deflation, high rates) and others (inflationary debtors), in the games of the state between these two pressure groups. We can draw two resulting homologies between the past and the present.] (20)
And failing to consider carefully and critically the economies and crises of the past is a mistake that may lead contemporary economic experts and advisors into ever-deeper economic crises in the future.
L'oubli est dommageable, celui des catastrophes, celui des enseignements qu'elles ont rendu possible, celui des corpus théoriques du passé. Ouvrir la perspective par l'économie historique peut aider à une meilleure compréhension du présent, voire à préparer l'avenir. (21)
[Forgetting is harmful, especially forgetting past catastrophes, forgetting the lessons they have made possible, forgetting the theoretical corpus of the past. Embracing the perspective of the concrete economic history can help lead to a better understanding of the present, or even prepare for the future.] (21)
The scope and content of the book are evident in the list of the book's chapters:
  1. Crises et rythmes économiques
  2. Périodisation, mutations et rythmes longs
  3. Le capitalism d'Ancien Régime, ses crises
  4. Le "Haut Capitalism", ses crises et leur théorisation (1800-1870)
  5. Karl Marx et les crises
  6. Capitalisme "Monopoliste" et grande industrie (1870-1914)
  7. Interlude
  8. Á l'âge de l'acier, les rythmes de l'investissement et de l'innovation
  9. Impulsion monétaire et effets réels
  10. La monnaie hégémonique
  11. "Le chien dans la mangeoire"
  12. La grande crise des années trente
  13. Keynes et la "Théorie Générale"La "Haute Théorie", la dynamique, le cycle (1926-1946)
  14. En guise de conclusion d'étape
As the chapter titles make evident, Dockès delivers on his promise of treating both the episodes, trends, and facts of economic history as well as the history of the theories through which economists have sought to understand those facts and their dynamics.


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The tempos of capitalism [feedly]

....fascinating survey of legacy and modern reading on "the history of capitalism". Dan Little is a wonderful sociologist and philosophy intellectual with nearly encyclopedic interests.


The tempos of capitalism
Dan Little
http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2019/10/the-tempos-of-capitalism.html
I've been interested in the economic history of capitalism since the 1970s, and there are a few titles that stand out in my memory. There were the Marxist and neo-Marxist economic historians (Marx's Capital, E.P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, Rodney Hilton, Robert Brenner, Charles Sabel); the debate over the nature of the industrial revolution (Deane and Cole, NFR Crafts, RM Hartwell, EL Jones); and volumes of the Cambridge Economic History of Europe. The history of British capitalism poses important questions for social theory: is there such a thing as "capitalism", or are there many capitalisms? What are the features of the capitalist social order that are most fundamental to its functioning and dynamics of development? Is Marx's intellectual construction of the "capitalist mode of production" a useful one? And does capitalism have a logic or tendency of development, as Marx believed, or is its history fundamentally contingent and path-dependent? Putting the point in concrete terms, was there a probable path of development from the "so-called primitive accumulation" to the establishment of factory production and urbanization to the extension of capitalist property relations throughout much of the world?

Part of the interest of detailed research in economic history in different places -- England, Sweden, Japan, the United States, China -- is the light that economic historians have been able to shed on the particulars of modern economic organization and development, and the range of institutions and "life histories" they have identified for these different historically embodied social-economic systems. For this reason I have found it especially interesting to read and learn about the ways in which the early modern Chinese economy developed, and different theories of why China and Europe diverged in this period. Kenneth Pomeranz, Philip Huang, William Skinner, Mark Elvin, Bozhong Li, James Lee, and Joseph Needham all shed light on different aspects of this set of questions, and once again the Cambridge Economic History of China was a deep and valuable resource.

A  new title that recently caught my eye is Pierre Dockès' Le Capitalisme Et Ses Rythmes, quatre siècles en perspective: Tome I Sous Le Regard Des Géants. Intriguing features of the book include the long sweep of the book (400 years, over 950 pages, with volume II to come), and the question of whether there is something new to say about this topic. After reading large parts of the book, I think the answer to the last question is "yes".

Dockès is interested in both the history of capitalism as an economic system and the history of economic science and political economy during the past four centuries. And he is particularly interested in discovering what we can learn about our current economic challenges from both these stories.

He specifically distances himself from "mainstream" economic theory and couches his own analysis in a less orthodox and more eclectic set of ideas. He defines mainstream economics in terms of five ideas: first, its strong commitment to mathematization and formalization of economic ideas; second, its disciplinary tendency towards hyper-specialization; third, its tendency to take the standpoint of the capitalist and the free market in its analyses; fourth, the propensity to extend these neoliberal biases to the process of selection and hiring of academics; and fifth, its underlying "scientism" and positivism leads its practitioners to devalue the history of the discipline or the historical conditions through which modern institutions came to be (9-12).
 
Dockès holds that the history of the economic facts and the ideas researchers have had about these facts go hand in hand; economic history and the history of economics need to be studied together. Moreover, Dockès believes that mainstream economics has lost sight of insights from the innovators in the history of economics which still have value -- Ricardo, Smith, Keynes, Walras, Sismondi, Hobbes. The solitary focus of the discipline of mainstream economics in the past forty years on formal, mathematical representations of a market economy precludes these economists from "seeing" the economic world through the conceptual lenses of gifted predecessors. They are trapped in a paradigm or an "epistemological framework" from which they cannot escape. (These ideas are explored in the introduction to the volume.)

The substantive foundation of the book is Dockès' idea that capitalism has long-term rhythms punctuated by crises, and that these fluctuations themselves are amenable to historical-causal and institutional analysis.
En un mot, croissance et crise sont inséparables et inhérents au processus de développement capitaliste laissé à lui-même.
[In a word, growth and crisis are inseparable and inherent in the process of capitalist development left to itself.] (13)
The fluctuations of capitalism over the longterm are linked in a single system of causation — growth, depression, financial crisis, and growth again are linked. Therefore, Dockès believes, it should be possible to discover the systemic causes of the development of various capitalist economies by uncovering the dynamics of crisis. Further, he underlines the serious social and political consequences that have ensued from economic crises in the past, including the rise of the Nazi regime out of the global economic crisis of the 1930s.
Etudier ces rythmes impose une analyse des logiques de fonctionnement du capitalism.
[Studying these rhythms imposes an analysis of the logic of functioning of capitalism.] (12).
Dockès is explicit in saying that economic history does not "repeat" itself, and the crises of capitalism are not replicas of each other over the decades or centuries. Historicity of the time and place is fundamental, and he underlines the path dependency of economic development in some of its aspects as well. But he argues that there are important similarities across various kinds of economic crises, and it is worthwhile discovering these similarities. He takes debt crises as an example: there are great differences among several centuries of experience of debt crisis. But there is something in common as well:
Permanence aussi dans les relations de pouvoir et dans let intérêts des uns (les créanciers partisans de la déflation, des taux élevés) et des autres (les débiteurs inflationnistes), dan les jeux de l'état entre ces deux groupes de pression. On peut tirer deux conséquences des homologies entre le passé et le présent.
[Permanence also in the relations of power and in the interests of some (creditors who favor deflation, high rates) and others (inflationary debtors), in the games of the state between these two pressure groups. We can draw two resulting homologies between the past and the present.] (20)
And failing to consider carefully and critically the economies and crises of the past is a mistake that may lead contemporary economic experts and advisors into ever-deeper economic crises in the future.
L'oubli est dommageable, celui des catastrophes, celui des enseignements qu'elles ont rendu possible, celui des corpus théoriques du passé. Ouvrir la perspective par l'économie historique peut aider à une meilleure compréhension du présent, voire à préparer l'avenir. (21)
[Forgetting is harmful, especially forgetting past catastrophes, forgetting the lessons they have made possible, forgetting the theoretical corpus of the past. Embracing the perspective of the concrete economic history can help lead to a better understanding of the present, or even prepare for the future.] (21)
The scope and content of the book are evident in the list of the book's chapters:
  1. Crises et rythmes économiques
  2. Périodisation, mutations et rythmes longs
  3. Le capitalism d'Ancien Régime, ses crises
  4. Le "Haut Capitalism", ses crises et leur théorisation (1800-1870)
  5. Karl Marx et les crises
  6. Capitalisme "Monopoliste" et grande industrie (1870-1914)
  7. Interlude
  8. Á l'âge de l'acier, les rythmes de l'investissement et de l'innovation
  9. Impulsion monétaire et effets réels
  10. La monnaie hégémonique
  11. "Le chien dans la mangeoire"
  12. La grande crise des années trente
  13. Keynes et la "Théorie Générale"La "Haute Théorie", la dynamique, le cycle (1926-1946)
  14. En guise de conclusion d'étape
As the chapter titles make evident, Dockès delivers on his promise of treating both the episodes, trends, and facts of economic history as well as the history of the theories through which economists have sought to understand those facts and their dynamics.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed