Friday, September 20, 2019

Harvest of Discontent: Trump’s trade war and the rural fight for survival [feedly]

Harvest of Discontent: Trump's trade war and the rural fight for survival
https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/harvest-of-discontent-trumps-trade-war-and-the-rural-fight-for-survival/

There is nothing normal about this September for farmers in the U.S. Midwest

Typically, at this midpoint in the month, farmers would be finishing up their small grains harvest and begin taking stock of other crops planted later in the season.

Harvest season this year, though, is well behind schedule.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture's September crop report, while slightly higher than the August estimates, shows corn and soybean yields are down from 2018 and lower than the projections shown in the last month's crop production report.

Chinese responses to U.S. tariffs have been substantive, but not proportional, so far. Here, the amounts of tariffs now in place and those threatened are shown. | U.S. Census Bureau and Stats.com

And while yes, excessive spring rains and flooding across the Midwest can be blamed for delayed and prevented plantings, it's only one half of the issue.

For soybean farmers, in particular, their crop's supply and demand all depend on how the "Trump" card is played.

It's a high-stakes economic gambling match between the U.S. and China; a trade war fueled by the president's ego and a desire to contain growing Chinese power in the global economy.

The problems with political gambles like this one are simple and cruel: Human beings and their economic survival are the bargaining chips. And the "success" of such a strategy does not require a workable solution for all—just one side repeating the lie "We're winning!" while whittling away at peoples' livelihoods in pursuit of imperial ambition.

"We're tightening our belt, said farmer and president of the Iowa Farmers Union Aaron Lehman. "We're talking to our lenders, our landlords, and our input suppliers."

The IFU says its members are trying to cut costs any way they can just to make ends meet. The escalating trade war is their biggest concern now.

Instead of negotiating over trade disagreements, the U.S. has chosen "to insult our trade allies, pick all sorts of fights with our trade allies," said Lehman. "And then go to China and make outrageous demands that we knew were not going to be met."

A body blow to farmers and ranchers

For the last two years, the Trump administration has been in a tit-for-tat with the People's Republic of China, an ever-escalating battle of tariffs and import penalties. Trump has long accused China of unfair trading practices and intellectual property theft—actions which China of course disputes.

The fights over trade are episodes in a much bigger and longer-term campaign by the U.S.—no matter whether Republicans or Democrats are in power—to contain the growth of Chinese influence globally and maintain U.S. imperial dominance in East Asia.

Currently, the U.S. has hit China with tariffs on almost $550 billion worth of Chinese products, while China has hit back with tariffs on $185 billion worth of U.S. goods, primarily agricultural ones.

In a recent "gesture of goodwill," signaling the start of another ceasefire, Trump announced through Twitter the delay of a 5% tariff hike on another $250 billion worth of Chinese goods by two weeks—a departure from last month's plan to increase the tariff from 25% to 30%.

The gesture was not initiated by the Trump administration. The decision to delay followed China's decision to exempt more tariffs on 16 American products—fish meal, shrimp, and cancer treatment drugs, but did not spare the major goods subject to tariffs: soybeans and meat.

China did, however, buy $67 million worth of soybeans, but that's pennies compared to their $12.2 billion purchase in 2017.

These peaceful overtures come as the U.S. and China prepare to go back to the negotiation table in Washington in early October. Tensions remain high and substantial progress isn't likely, yet.

The lowering of crop prices, rainfall, and the trade war have created a perfect storm for farmers—leaving many without a roof over their heads.

"It already has driven some farmers off the farm, which not only hurts the farming community, but it hurts rural—small rural communities," said Gary Wertish president of the Minnesota Farmers Union. "It's been very devastating to rural America."

Farmers work to live, not to get rich.

They have high fixed costs, including the land they own, the tools and equipment, and the seed they need to grow crops. And while people can't control the weather, they can control the policies and tactics putting the squeeze on farmers and farm workers—it's a self-inflicted injury courtesy of the Trump administration.

How bad is it? 

report in July by the American Farm Bureau Federation revealed farm bankruptcy filings had risen by 13%. The report also found "the delinquency rates for commercial agricultural loans in both the real estate and non-real estate lending sectors are at a six-year high" and "above the historical average of 2.1 percent."

The Midwest and Southeast had the highest number of Chapter 12 farm bankruptcy filings. The Midwest is up from 215 filings in all of 2018 to 240 so far this year, a 12% increase. The biggest increase in bankruptcies, about 50%, happened in the Northwest, including Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming.

"The deteriorating financial conditions for farmers and ranchers are a direct result of several years of low farm income, a low return on farm assets, mounting debt, more natural disasters, and the second year of retaliatory tariffs on many U.S. agricultural products," said Farm Bureau chief economist John Newton.

Newton also found that farm income should increase by 10% in 2019 from 2018, but those results would still be in the bottom quarter of annual results for the past 90 years. And the number includes direct payments from Trump's bailout package.

All roads, it seems, lead to a farm crisis not seen since the 1980s.

What about government aid?

Well, a cotton farmer in Texas gets $145 an acre for financial distress caused by the president. But a Minnesota farmer only gets $35 an acre for the hardest-hit crop.

"It makes no sense," said Betsy Jensen, the soybean farmer, in an interview with Reuters.

The payment discrepancies can be traced to the system set up to allocate the funds.

During the first round of bailouts, $12 billion total in 2018, farmers received money based on estimated lost sales by crop. Soybean farmers benefitted much more than others less impacted by the tariffs.

For the second round, payments are distributed based on the overall impact on agriculture in a particular county, and even with a rule preventing corporate farms from disproportionally benefiting from the plan, "the USDA's $16 billion bailout would still make rich farmers richer, thereby hurting small farmers," says the Environmental Working Group.

The National Farmers Union sees only one solution to this current crisis: "The president's erratic and destructive actions must end. All countries must be treated with respect and dignity and America's reputation as a reliable trading partner must be restored. Further, actions that have undermined the RFS must be rectified.

"Until these actions are corrected, and the markets rebound, we urge the administration to work with Congress to fundamentally reform and significantly strengthen the existing farm safety net."

Elections 2020: Candidates come courting

It's no secret rural voters helped elect Donald Trump in 2016.

Democratic presidential candidates are all pitching their solutions to the rural Midwest. Here, Sen. Bernie Sanders speaks at the Des Moines Register Soapbox during a visit to the Iowa State Fair, Aug. 11, 2019, in Des Moines, Iowa. | Charlie Neibergall / AP

His campaign rhetoric of "being an outsider," focused on "draining the swamp and running the country like a business" resonated with a lot of rural voters.

They feel their communities are dying while their needs continue to be ignored.

Exit poll breakdowns from 2016 showed Trump winning between 65-70% of the vote in rural areas with populations less than 20,000, not near metro areas.

And despite the pain and further looming threats of financial and personal ruination caused by Trump's trade war, his presidential approval rating in rural areas is better than his nationwide standing.

Currently, Trump's favorable rating in rural areas is 55%, with 40% unfavorable in the nine states polled by a Change Research survey sponsored by the American Federation of Teachers and One Country Project, a rural voter outreach group.

The survey also found a plurality of rural voters, 39%, who said the trade war with China is hurting small towns in the short term, but it's necessary to restore a global trade balance. On the other side, 36% said the trade war is harmful in the short and long term, and it should be ended immediately.

"I am hearing from farmers in communities in North Dakota, and rural Americans across the United States, that the president's trade war is devastating their family farms and manufacturing communities—closing markets and leaving harvests to rot," said former North Dakota Senator and One Country Project founding board member Heidi Heitkamp. "Farmers are fed up, and I believe it is clear that rural Americans are looking for an alternative to Trump's failed leadership."

Democratic presidential hopefuls will need to learn from the mistakes of 2016 and do a better job addressing rural communities' common concerns and be able to talk to rural voters directly.

And as Democratic candidates begin flocking to Iowa to present their plans, there are signs that the large number of competing hopefuls in the primary may force them to pay attention to forging new connections to rural America. Candidates are eager to show they understand rural communities' economic pain; they're offering solutions and trying to show they are far removed from the preconceived notions rural voters have regarding the Democratic Party—and Republican Party for that matter, as distrust in both institutions was also seen in the Change Research survey.

"We cannot create an economy that works for all Americans if we continue to neglect the needs of rural America," Sen. Bernie Sanders said back in May during a visit to Osage, Iowa, going furthest in pointing out who some of the real enemies of small farmers are.

"In rural America, we are seeing giant agribusiness conglomerates extract as much wealth out of small communities as they can, while family farmers are going bankrupt and, in many cases, treated like modern-day indentured servants."

Meanwhile, it was just reported that fifteen members of Trump's 2016 campaign Agriculture and Rural Advisory Committee have collectively received over $2 million in trade war bailout payments. These payouts are among the billions of dollars that have flowed to owners of mega-farms rather than family farmers.


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Krugman: Trump Declares War on California [feedly]

Trump Declares War on California

Paul Krugman (text only, no links)
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/opinion/trump-california.html

I'm on a number of right-wing mailing lists, and I try to at least skim what they're going on about in any given week; this often gives me advance warning about the next wave of manufactured outrage. Lately I've been seeing dire warnings that if Democrats win next year they'll try to turn America into (cue scary background music) California, which the writers portray as a socialist hellhole.

Sure enough, this week Donald Trump effectively declared war on California on two fronts. He's trying to take away the Golden State's ability to regulate pollution generated by its 15 million cars, and, more bizarrely, he's seeking to have the Environmental Protection Agency declare that California's homeless population constitutes an environmental threat.

More about these policy moves in a moment. First, let's talk about two Californias: the real state on America's left coast, and the fantasy state of the right's imagination.

The real California certainly has some big problems. In particular, it has sky-high housing costs, which in turn are probably the main reason it has a large population of homeless residents.


But in many other dimensions California does very well. It has a booming economy, which has been creating jobs at a much faster pace than the nation as a whole.

It has the nation's second-highest life expectancy, comparable to that in European nations with much higher life expectancy than America as a whole. This is, by the way, a relatively new development: Back in 1990, life expectancy in California was only average.

At the same time, California, having enthusiastically implemented Obamacare and tried to make it work, has seen a sharp drop in the number of residents without health insurance. And crime, although it has ticked up slightly in the past few years, remains near a historic low.

That is, as I said, California's reality. But it's a reality the right refuses to accept, because it wasn't what was supposed to happen.

You see, modern California — once a hotbed of conservatism — has become a very liberal, very Democratic state, in part thanks to rapidly rising Hispanic and Asian populations. And since the early years of this decade, when Democrats won first the governorship, then a supermajority in the State Legislature, liberals have been in a position to pursue their agenda, raising taxes on high incomes and increasing social spending.


Conservatives confidently predicted disaster, declaring that the state was committing "economic suicide." You might think that the failure of that disaster to materialize, especially combined with the way California has outperformed states like Kansas and North Carolina that turned hard right while it was turning left, might induce them to reconsider their worldview. That is, you might think that if you haven't been paying any attention to the right-wing mind-set.

[For an even deeper look at what's on Paul Krugman's mind, sign up for his weekly newsletter.]

What is happening instead, of course, is that the usual suspects are trying to portray California as a terrible place — beset by violent crime and rampant disease — in sheer denial of reality. And they have seized on the issue of homelessness, which is, to be fair, a genuine problem. Furthermore, it's a problem brought on by bad policy — not high taxes or excessively generous social programs, but the runaway NIMBYism that has prevented California from building remotely enough new housing to accommodate its rising population.

The striking thing about the right's new focus on homelessness, however, is that it's hard to detect any concern about the plight of the homeless themselves. Instead, it's all about the discomfort and alleged threat the homeless create for the affluent.

Which brings me to Trump's war on California.

The attempt to kill the state's emissions rules makes a kind of twisted sense given Trump's policy priorities. His administration is clearly dedicated to the cause of making America polluted again, and in particular to ensuring that the planet cooks as quickly as possible. California is such a big player that it can effectively block part of that agenda, as shown by the willingness of automakers to abide by its emissions rules. Hence the attempt to strip away that power, never mind past rhetoric about states' rights.

Declaring the homeless an environmental threat, however, aside from being almost surreal coming from an administration that in general loves pollution, is pure nonsense. It can be understood only as an attempt both to punish an anti-Trump state and to blacken its reputation.

What should you take away from Trump's war on California?

First, it's yet another illustration of the intellectual imperviousness of the modern right, which never, ever lets awkward facts disturb its preconceptions.

More ominously, the apparent weaponization of the Environmental Protection Agency is more evidence that Trump — whose party fundamentally doesn't believe in democracy — is following the modern authoritarian playbook, in which every institution is corrupted, every function of government is perverted into a tool for rewarding friends and punishing enemies.

It's an ugly story, and it's scary, too.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We'd like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here's our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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Paul Krugman has been an Opinion columnist since 2000 and is also a Distinguished Professor at the City University of New York Graduate Center. He won the 2008 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his work on international trade and economic geography. @PaulKrugman
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Thursday, September 19, 2019

Piketty: What is a fair pension system? [feedly]

What is a fair pension system?

Thomas Piketty

Even if the timing remains vague and the conditions uncertain, the government does seem to have decided to launch a vast reform of the retirement pensions system, with the key element being the unification of the rules applied at the moment in the various systems operating (civil servants, private sector employees, local authority employees, self-employed, special schemes, etc).

Let's make it clear: setting up a universal system is in itself an excellent thing, and a reform of this type is long overdue in France. The young generations, particularly those who have gone through multiple changes in status (private and public employees, self-employed, working abroad, etc.,), frequently have no idea of the retirement rights which they have accumulated. This situation is a source of unbearable uncertainties and economic anxiety, whereas our retirement system is globally well financed.

But, having announced this aim of clarification and unification of rights, the truth is that we have not said very much. There are in effect many ways of unifying the rules. Now there is no guarantee that those in power are capable of generating a viable consensus in this respect. The principle of justice invoked by the government seems simple and plausible: one Euro contributed should give rise to the same rights to retirement, no matter what the scheme, and the level of salary or of earned income. The problem is that this principle amounts to making the inequalities in income as they exist at present sacrosanct, including when they are of mammoth proportions (under-paid piece work for some, excessive salaries for others), and to perpetuating them at the age of retirement and dependency which is in no way particularly "fair".

Aware of the difficulty, the High Commissioner Jean-Paul Delevoye's Plan stipulates that a quarter of the contributions will continue to be allocated to "solidarity', that is to say, for example, to subsidies for children and interruptions of career, or to finance a minimum retirement pension for the lowest salaries. The difficulty is that the way this calculation has been made is highly controversial. In particular, this estimate purely and simply takes no account of social inequalities in life expectancy. For example, if a low wage earner spends 10 years in retirement while a highly-paid manager spends 20 years, we have forgotten to take into account the fact that a large share of the contributions of the low wage earner serves in practice to pay the retirement of the highly-paid manager (which is in no way compensated for by the allowance for strenuous and tedious work)

More generally, there are naturally multiple parameters to be fixed to define what one considers to be "solidarity". The government's proposals are respectable but they are far from being the only ones possible. It is essential that a broad public debate take place and that alternative proposals should emerge. The Delevoye Plan for example provides for a replacement rate equal to 85% for a full career (43 years of contributions) at Minimum Wage level. This rate would then very rapidly fall to 70%, to only 1,5 Smic (Minimum Wage) before stabilising at this precise level of 70% until approximately 7 Smic ( 120,000 Euros gross annual salary). This is one possible choice, but there are others. One could thus imagine that the replacement rate would go gradually from 85% of the Smic to 75%-80% around 1.5 – 2 Smic, before gradually falling to around 50%-60%, approximately 5-7 Smic.

Similarly the government's project provides for a financing of the system by a retirement contribution of which the global rate would be fixed at 28.1% on all the gross incomes below 120,000 Euros per annum, before falling suddenly to only 2.8% beyond this threshold. The official justification is that retirement rights in the new system would be capped at this wage level. The Delevoye Report goes as far as congratulating themselves because the super-managers will nevertheless be subject to this contribution (which will not be capped) of 2.8%, to mark their solidarity with the older generations. In passing, once again no account is taken of the salaries between 100,000 Euros and 200,000 Euros which usually correspond to very long life expectancies and which benefit greatly from the contributions paid by the lower waged with shorter life expectancies. In any event, this contribution of 2.8% to solidarity by those earning over 120,000 Euros is much too low, particularly given the levels of remuneration; their very legitimacy is open to challenge.

More generally it is perhaps time to abandon the old idea according to which reduction of inequalities should be left to income tax, while the retirement schemes should content themselves with reproducing them. In a world in which fabulous salaries and questions of retirement and dependency have taken on a new importance, the most legible norms of justice could be that all levels of salary (including the highest) should finance the retirement scheme at the same rates (even if the pensions themselves are capped) while leaving to income tax the task of applying higher levels to the top incomes

To be clear: the present government has a big problem with the very concept of social justice. As everyone knows, it has chosen from the outset to grant huge fiscal gifts to the richest (suppression of the wealth tax (the ISF), the flat tax on dividends and incomes). If today it does not demand a significant effort from the most privileged it will have considerable difficulty in convincing the public that its pension reform is well-founded.


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Josh Bivens: Why is the economy so weak? Trade gets headlines, but it’s more about past Fed rate hikes and the TCJA’s waste [feedly]

Why is the economy so weak? Trade gets headlines, but it's more about past Fed rate hikes and the TCJA's waste
https://www.epi.org/blog/why-is-the-economy-so-weak-trade-gets-headlines-but-its-more-about-past-fed-rate-hikes-and-the-tcjas-waste/

Josh Bivens, director of research at EPI

The Federal Reserve meets this week against a backdrop of mounting evidence of a slowing economy. Since the last Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, revised data on gross domestic product (the widest measure of the nation's economic activity) and job growth have shown that 2018 saw much slower growth than previously reported.

Between April 2018 and March 2019, for example, the economy created 500,000 fewer jobs than had originally been reported. Only 105,000 jobs were created in August if temporary Census positions are excluded: this is roughly half the pace of growth that characterized pre-revision estimates of average job growth in 2018.

These clear signs of an economic slowdown raise the obvious question, "Why has growth faltered?"

While many pundits and economists have blamed the escalating trade conflict between the Trump administration and China, there are much more obvious sources of this slowdown: the Fed's own premature interest rate increases between December 2015 and 2018 and the utter waste of fiscal resources that was the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) passed at the end of 2017.

To be clear, the Trump administration's trade conflict is stupid and destructive, and its attempt to pin the blame for the slowdown on the Fed is self-serving. And the Trump administration's scapegoating others for the weak economy takes real hubris given that its signature economic policy initiative—the TCJA—has been such an obvious failure in terms of spurring growth.

But the evidence is growing that the Fed did indeed raise interest rates too soon in the recovery and that this premature liftoff has begun dragging on growth. Worse, because raising rates slows growth more powerfully than lowering rates spurs growth, the Fed likely lacks the ability to offset this earlier mistake by pulling down rates going forward. The FOMC should certainly reduce rates at this week's meeting, but it will need help from other policy levers—particularly effective fiscal stimulus—in the coming year.

Evidence of premature interest rate hikes

As Figure A below shows, after seven years of holding the effective federal funds rate at essentially zero, in December 2015 the Federal Reserve raised this rate by a quarter point. While many argued that a quarter-point increase in interest rates would not snuff out the ongoing recovery, I noted that raising rates while unemployment remained elevated and there was no sign of inflation made little economic sense. Worse, by increasing interest rates before any sign of inflation appeared in the data, the Fed clearly signaled that it was not eager to aggressively plumb just how low unemployment could be allowed to fall. This was a troubling signal: the Fed's failure to aggressively target as low an unemployment rate as possible in recent decades has been a major reason why wage growth over this time has been so anemic. It took a year before the Fed followed up the December 2015 rate increase with another in December 2016, but in 2017 and 2018, it undertook seven quarter-point increases in the federal funds rate.

Figure A

Given this short history of interest rates, it makes sense to look at the evidence on the effect of these rate hikes on growth. The most obvious place to look is at the performance of "interest-sensitive" components of gross domestic product since the rate hikes began in 2015. Generally, residential investment, business fixed investment, durable goods purchases, and net exports are thought to be the components of GDP that will be slowed by interest rate hikes.

Figure B charts how the average contribution of various components of GDP made to overall GDP growth changed between two time periods: the era of zero federal funds rates (from the second quarter of 2009 to the end of 2015) and the era of rising federal funds rates (from the first quarter of 2016 to the most recent quarter available, the second quarter of 2019). For three of these components (residential investment, business fixed investment, and net exports) their contributions to growth slowed notably as interest rates rose. For durable goods, the contribution to growth is roughly the same in both periods, but this is striking given that personal consumption expenditures besides durable goods saw a sharp upswing in the latter period. In short, there is ample evidence that rising interest rates have worked as expected in slowing interest-sensitive components of GDP growth.

Figure B

To its credit, the Fed seems to have recognized that past rate hikes have dragged too much on growth and reduced rates at the last FOMC meeting in July. But research has shown that rate cuts spur growth less powerfully than equivalent rate increases restrain growth. This problem of "pushing on a string" was a prime argument made by those arguing that the Fed should err on the side of letting growth continue and letting unemployment continue to fall. If the economy continues to slow, the Fed will need help from fiscal policymakers to avert a recession; rate cuts by themselves are unlikely to do that job.

Very little sign of 'trade war' fingerprints on growth slowdown

The slight deceleration of net exports' contribution to growth shown in Figure B may make some think there is a trade war–based explanation. There may be some influence of trade conflict on slowing growth, but this influence is likely pretty weak. For one, tariffs do not reliably reduce net exports—they instead reduce both exports and imports, with their effect on the trade balance (which is what matters for short-run growth) largely ambiguous. What is not ambiguous is the effect of a strengthening dollar on net exports—it reliably slows them. And since 2014, the dollar has risen sharply, driven strongly by developments in monetary policy in both the United States and its trading partners. It is important to realize that interest rate cuts made by the European Central Bank (ECB) late last week will put further upward pressure on the dollar going forward.

Some have noted that aside from the direct effect of tariffs, policy-induced uncertainty stemming from the Trump administration's trade conflict might be holding back other components of growth, such as business fixed investment. Perhaps. But "uncertainty" is an awfully hard influence to define. And some of the only attempts to empirically measure this uncertainty actually show it is lower today than at many points in the last decade or more. Memories are short, but as recently as 2011 a Republican-led Congress seriously threatened to drive the federal government into totally unnecessary default on its debt if the Republican Party's policy preferences were not signed into law by the Obama administration. This episode, it hardly needs to be said, created plenty of policy uncertainty.

The squandered opportunity of 2018's TCJA

So if the recent economic slowdown is mostly not the fault of the Trump administration's trade conflict, and it is mostly the fault of a too-hawkish Federal Reserve, does the president have a leg to stand on in scapegoating of Fed chair Jerome Powell? Not really. The reason why is simple: if President Trump had wanted faster growth, he should not have championed the waste of fiscal resources that was the TCJA, and instead should have used those resources to do things that actually would have created jobs and growth.

The TCJA is a debt-financed tax cut that will cost $150 billion annually over the next 10 years (before interest costs are added). Because the lion's share of these tax cuts are accruing to rich households (mostly because the TCJA is primarily a corporate tax cut and owners of corporations are rich households), they have done very little to spur growth in aggregate demand (spending by households, businesses, and governments) in the short run. Rich households' spending is not constrained by too-low disposable income, so boosting this disposable income largely does not lead to more spending. Poorer and moderate-income households, on the other hand, are indeed income-constrained in their current spending, so tax cuts or direct transfers to them would have boosted demand growth significantly. Direct spending—say on infrastructure or providing needed public investments like high-quality early child care—would have stimulated demand even more.

For a time, many credited the slight acceleration in growth in 2018 to fiscal stimulus generally. But revisions to 2018 data show this acceleration was even more subdued than previously thought. Further, the growth in government spending brought forth by a budget deal in 2018 actually provided much more stimulus than the more-expensive TCJA (see Figure B for this increase in government spending's contribution to growth). The major component of GDP that has accelerated in recent years is consumption spending. Even if the entirety of the pickup in consumer spending shown in Figure B was attributed to the TCJA (and much of this pickup was surely driven by other factors, like tightening labor markets finally pushing up wage growth modestly), it would indicate that the TCJA was deeply inefficient as stimulus. TCJA proponents long argued that the main benefit stemming from it would not be short-run stimulus but a long-run increase in investment. This is awfully hard to see in the data—and as shown in Figure B investment (both business and residential) has been a prime source of weakness, not strength in recent years.

Essentially, President Trump and the Republican-led Congress largely squandered $150 billion in potential fiscal stimulus by prioritizing tax cuts for the rich over anything that would have plausibly created faster growth and jobs (see Table 1 in this report for a list of more and less effective fiscal policies to spur near-term growth). They are hence really the only economic observers in the world who have no standing to criticize the Fed for its clearly too-aggressive path of interest rate increases in recent years.

Despite bad-faith jawboning from President Trump, the Fed should cut rates

But just because President Trump calls for something—an interest rate cut in this case—doesn't always mean it's the wrong thing to do. The economy really is weakening, and this weakness has been led by sectors adversely affected by the Fed's interest rate increases in recent years. Unfortunately, we could well find, a year from now, that rate cuts alone were not sufficient to avoid a recession—or even just a prolonged slowdown that pushes up unemployment. In that case, the Fed will need help from fiscal policymakers. But in the meantime, the Fed should take its role as the early-warning system on economic slowdowns seriously by cutting rates this week. This rate cut would provide a clear alert to other policymakers.


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Tim Taylor: A Road Stop on the Development Journey [feedly]

Tim Taylor reviews a new collection of essays on economic development, which is actually a different subject matter than economics per se. Thing of 3D Geometry equations (spheres, cubes, etc), where every dimension now has a time series added! Every object or item swims in the rivers of time. Where, indeed, are we going?

A Road Stop on the Development Journey
http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2019/09/a-road-stop-on-development-journey.html

Economic development is a journey that has no final destination, at least not this side of utopia. But it can still be useful to take a road stop along the journey, see where we've been, and contemplate what comes next. Nancy H. Chau and Ravi Kanbur offer such an overview in their essay "The Past, Present, and Future of Economic Development," which appears in a collection of essays called
Towards a New Enlightenment? A Transcendent Decade (2018, pp. 311-325). It was published by Open Mind, which in turn is a nonprofit run by the Spanish bank BBVA (although it does have a US presence, mainly in the south and west).

(In the shade of this parenthesis, I'll add that if even or especially if your interests run beyond economics, the book may be worth checking out. It includes essays on the status of physics, anthropology, fintech, nanotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence, gene editing, social media, cybersecurity, and more.)

It's worth remembering and even marveling at some of the extraordinary gains in the standard of living for so much of the globe in the last three or four decades. Chau and Kanbur write:
The six decades after the end of World War II, until the crisis of 2008, were a golden age in terms of the narrow measure of economic development, real per capita income (or gross domestic product, GDP). This multiplied by a factor of four for the world as a whole between 1950 and 2008. For comparison, before this period it took a thousand years for world per capita GDP to multiply by a factor of fifteen. Between the year 1000 and 1978, China's income per capita GDP increased by a factor of two; but it multiplied six-fold in the next thirty years. India's per capita income increased five-fold since independence in 1947, having increased a mere twenty percent in the previous millennium. Of course, the crisis of 2008 caused a major dent in the long-term trend, but it was just that. Even allowing for the sharp decreases in output as the result of the crisis, postwar economic growth is spectacular compared to what was achieved in the previous thousand years. ...
But, World Bank calculations, using their global poverty line of $1.90 (in purchasing power parity) per person per day, the fraction of world population in poverty in 2013 was almost a quarter of what it was in 1981—forty-two percent compared to eleven percent. The large countries of the world—China, India, but also Vietnam, Bangladesh, and so on—have contributed to this unprecedented global poverty decline. Indeed, China's performance in reducing poverty, with hundreds of millions being lifted above the poverty line in three decades, has been called the most spectacular poverty reduction in all of human history. ...
Global averages of social indicators have improved dramatically as well. Primary school completion rates have risen from just over seventy percent in 1970 to ninety percent. now as we approach the end of the second decade of the 2000s. Maternal mortality has halved, from 400 to 200 per 100,000 live births over the last quarter century. Infant mortality is now a quarter of what it was half a century ago (30 compared to 120, per 1,000 live births). These improvements in mortality have contributed to improving life expectancy, up from fifty years in 1960 to seventy years in 2010.

It used to be that the world's poorest people were heavily clustered in the world's poorest countries. But as the economies of countries like China and India have grown, this is no longer true: "[F]orty years ago ninety percent of the world's poor lived in low-income countries. Today, three quarters of the world's poor live in middle-income countries." In this way, the task of thinking about how to help the world's poorest has changed its nature. 

Of course, Chau and Kanbur also note remaining problems in the world's development journey. A number of countries still lag behind. There are environmental concerns over air quality, availability of clean water, and climate change. I was especially struck by their comments about the evolution of labor markets in emerging economies. 
[L]abor market institutions in emerging markets have also seen significant developments. Present-day labor contracts no longer resemble the textbook single employer single worker setting that forms the basis for many policy prescriptions. Instead, workers often confront wage bargains constrained by fixed-term, or temporary contracts. Alternatively, labor contracts are increasingly mired in the ambiguities created in multi-employer relationships, where workers must answer to their factory supervisors in addition to layers of middleman subcontractors. These developments have created wage inequities within establishments, where fixed-term and subcontracted workers face a significant wage discount relative to regular workers, with little access to non-wage benefits. Strikingly, rising employment opportunities can now generate little or even negative wage gains, as the contractual composition of workers changes with employment growth. ...
[A]nother prominent challenge that has arisen since the 1980s is the global decline in the labor share. The labor share refers to payment to workers as a share of gross national product at the national level, or as a share of total revenue at the firm level. Its downward trend globally is evident using observations from macroeconomic data (Karababounis and Neiman, 2013; Grossman et al., 2017) as well as from firm-level data (Autor et al., 2017). A decline in the labor share is symptomatic of overall economic growth outstripping total labor income. Between the late 1970s and the 2000s the labor share has declined by nearly five percentage points from 54.7% to 49.9% in advanced economies. By 2015, the figure rebounded slightly and stood at 50.9%. In emerging markets, the labor share likewise declined from 39.2% to 37.3% between 1993 and 2015 (IMF, 2017).
A running theme in work on economic development is that there is a substantial gap in low- and middle-income countries between those who have a steady formal job with a steady paycheck, and those who are scrambling between multiple informal jobs. Thinking about how to encourage an economic environment where employers provide steady and secure jobs is just one of the ways in which issues in modern development economics often have interesting overlaps with the economic policy issues of high-income countries. 

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Bloomberg: Mass downgrades on growth estimates

Intensifying trade conflicts have sent global growth momentum tumbling toward lows last seen during the financial crisis, and governments are not doing enough to prevent long-term damage, the OECD said in its latest outlook.

The Paris-based organization cut almost all economic forecasts it made just four months ago, as protectionist policies take an increasing toll on confidence and investment, and risks continue to mount on financial markets. It sees world growth at a mere 2.9% this year.

The OECD lowered its growth forecasts for most major economies

Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

"Our fear is that we are entering an era where growth is stuck at a very low level," OECD Chief Economist Laurence Boone said. "Governments should absolutely take advantage of low rates to invest in the future now so that this sluggish growth doesn't become the new normal."

2019 GDP REVISION2020 GDP REVISION
World2.9% (3.2%)3% (3.4%)
Euro area1.1% (1.2%)1% (1.4%)
Japan1% (0.7%)0.6% (0.6%)
U.K.1% (1.2%)0.9% (1%)
U.S.2.4% (2.8%)2% (2.3%)

The OECD is the latest institution sounding the alarm over the state of the global economy. In the past two weeks, the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the People's Bank of China and numerous of their peers have eased policy to shore up demand, urging governments at the same time that fiscal stimulus will be needed to ensure their efforts won't be futile.

Lower Track

OECD sees global economic growth slowing to post-crisis pace

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Manufacturing has born the brunt of the economic crisis brought about by a tit-for-tat trade war between the U.S. and China. The services sector has proved unusually resilient to the malaise so far, but the OECD warned that "persistent weakness" in industry will weigh on the labor market, household incomes and spending.

Additional risks stem from a sharper slowdown in China and a no-deal Brexit that could push the U.K. into a recession and would considerably reduce growth in Europe, according to the report.

What Bloomberg's Economists Say

"Trump's brinkmanship on trade with China has left consumers, businesses and financial markets on edge. Not knowing whether the next Presidential tweet will ease or exacerbate tensions makes for an environment of extreme uncertainty, pushing businesses to turn cautious on investment and hiring, and households to swing from spending to saving."

--Dan Hanson, Jamie Rush and Tom Orlik.

Read the GLOBAL INSIGHT

The OECD said "collective effort is urgent," and the effectiveness of monetary policy could be enhanced by "stronger fiscal and structural policy support."

It's a point central bankers have made for months, and their requests are getting more intense. Following the ECB's latest monetary stimulus push, President Mario Draghi said it's "high time" for fiscal policy to take charge, signaling there's not much more his institution can do.

"The takeaway for the euro zone today is do not rely on monetary policy to do the job alone," Boone said. "Start investing to do the structural reforms that need to be done for more sustainable growth, and do it now."

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