Monday, August 12, 2019

Warren on Trade


Last month, I released my economic patriotism agenda — my commitment to fundamentally changing the government's approach to the economy so that we put the interests of American workers and families ahead of the interests of multinational corporations. I've already released my ideas for applying economic patriotism to manufacturing and to Wall Street. This is my plan for using economic patriotism to overhaul our approach to trade.

For decades, big multinational corporations have bought and lobbied their way into dictating America's trade policy. Those big corporations have gotten rich but everyone else has paid the price. We've lost millions of jobsto outsourcing, depressed wages for American workers, accelerated climate change, and squeezed America's family farmers. We've let China get away with the suppression of pay and labor rights, poor environmental protections, and years of currency manipulation. All to add some zeroes to the bottom lines of big corporations with no loyalty or allegiance to America.

We need to completely transform our approach to trade. America enters into trade negotiations with enormous leverage because America is the world's most attractive market. As President, I won't hand America's leverage to big corporations to use for their own narrow purposes — I'll use it to create and defend good American jobs, raise wages and farm income, combat climate change, lower drug prices, and raise living standards worldwide. We will engage in international trade — but on our terms and only when it benefits American families.

A New Approach to Trade

My plan is a new approach to trade — one that is different from both the Washington insider consensus that brought us decades of bad trade deals and from Donald Trump's haphazard and ultimately corporate-friendly approach.

Unlike the insiders, I don't think "free trade" deals that benefit big multinational corporations and international capital at the expense of American workers are good simply because they open up markets. Trade is good when it helps American workers and families — when it doesn't, we need to change our approach. And unlike Trump, while I think tariffs are an important tool, they are not by themselves a long-term solution to our failed trade agenda and must be part of a broader strategy that this Administration clearly lacks.

To ensure that American families benefit from international trade in the decades to come, I want to invest in American workers and to use our leverage to force other countries to raise the bar on everything from labor and environmental standards to anti-corruption rules to access to medicine to tax enforcement. If we raise the world's standards to our level and American workers have the chance to compete fairly, they will thrive — and millions of people around the world will be better off too.

Achieving this vision isn't about tough talk or tweets. We must do the hard work of transforming every aspect of our current approach to trade: from our negotiating process to the negotiating objectives we pursue to the way we enforce agreements. That's what I intend to do.

A Trade Negotiation Process that Reflects America's Interests

Our current approach to negotiating trade agreements works great for the wealthy and the well-connected. The negotiating text is kept confidentialfrom all but a small set of advisory groups comprised mostly of corporate executives and industry trade group representatives. Once those corporate interests are finished whispering in the ears of our negotiators, the completed text is released. Then, under the expedited "Fast Track" procedure Congress typically uses to approve trade agreements, our elected representatives must vote up or down on the agreement with no ability to propose and secure any changes to it. Meanwhile, the negotiators who constructed it often breeze through the revolving door to take jobs with the corporations whose interests underlie the deal.

This is undemocratic and obviously corrupt. In a Warren Administration, we will negotiate and approve trade agreements through a transparent process that offers the public a genuine chance to shape it:

  • Trade negotiators will publicly disclose negotiating drafts and provide the public with an opportunity to comment. When federal agencies write new rules, they typically must publish a proposed version of the rule and permit the public to submit comments on it. I will adopt a similar approach for our trade deals. Prior to negotiations, our negotiators will publish a draft of their proposals in the Federal Register, let the public offer comments on the draft, and take those comments into consideration during negotiations. And then as talks proceed, they will publish drafts of the negotiating texts so the public can monitor the negotiations.
  • Trade advisory committees will prioritize the views of workers and consumers. I will ensure that there are more representatives from labor, environmental, and consumer groups than from corporations and trade groups on every existing advisory committee. And I'll expand the current list of advisory committees to create one for consumers, one for rural areas, and one for each region of the country, so that critical voices are at the table during negotiations.
  • The US International Trade Commission will provide a regional analysis of the economic effects of a trade agreement. Trade agreements can hollow out communities and transform regional economies. Yet the report the ITC provides before Congress considers a trade agreement only includes a nationwide analysis of a trade deal's economic impact. I will push for the agency to provide a region-by-region analysis so the public and Members of Congress can understand how an agreement is likely to affect the places they live and represent.
  • The congressional approval process will offer more opportunities for the public and elected representatives to shape trade agreements. I will seek expedited congressional approval of trade agreements only when every regional advisory committee and the labor, consumer, and rural advisory committees unanimously certify that the agreement serves their interests. I will also expand the list of congressional committees that must review any agreement before it is eligible for expedited consideration.

Together, these changes will ensure that our negotiations reflect the views of American families, not corporate interests.

Using Our Leverage to Demand More for American Families and to Raise the Global Standard of Living

While a better process will produce better agreements, we also must fundamentally shift the goals of our trade agenda so they are aligned with the interests of America's families.

With certain important exceptions, we live in a low-tariff world. Modern trade agreements are less about the mutual reduction of tariffs and more about establishing regulatory standards for everything from worker rights to pollution to patent protections.

My approach to trade reflects that reality. For too long, we have entered into trade deals with countries with abysmal records on laborenvironmental, and human rights issues. In exchange for concrete access to the American market, we get vague commitments to do better, which we then hardlyenforce. The result is that millions of people in our trading-partner countries don't gain the benefits of higher standards — and companies can easily pad their profits by shifting American jobs to countries where they can pay workers next to nothing and pollute the air and water freely.

That will end under my Administration. I am establishing a set of standards countries must meet as a precondition for any trade agreement with America. And I will renegotiate any agreements we have to ensure that our existing trade partners meet those standards as well.

My preconditions are that a country must:

  • Recognize and enforce the core labor rights of the International Labour Organization, like collective bargaining and the elimination of child labor.
  • Uphold internationally recognized human rights, as reported in the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights, including the rights of indigenous people, migrant workers, and other vulnerable groups.
  • Recognize and enforce religious freedom as reported in the State Department's Country Reports.
  • Comply with minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
  • Be a party to the Paris Climate agreement and have a national plan that has been independently verified to put the country on track to reduce its emissions consistent with the long-term emissions goals in that agreement.
  • Eliminate all domestic fossil fuel subsidies.
  • Ratify the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
  • Comply with any tax treaty they have with the United States and participate in the OECD's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project to combat tax evasion and avoidance.
  • Not appear on the Department of Treasury monitoring list of countries that merit attention for their currency practices.

A country should only be considered an acceptable partner if it meets these basic standards. Shamefully, America itself does not meet many of these labor and environmental standards today. I am committed to fixing that as President. And to help bring other countries up to these standards, I'll revitalize our commitment to providing technical assistance to help countries improve.

I will also go beyond these minimum standards in key areas to promote the interests of American workers and families.

LaborI will ensure trade agreements protect Buy American and other programs designed to develop local industry, contain strong rule-of-origin standards to promote domestic manufacturing, protect worker pensions, promote equal pay for equal work for women, and prohibit violence against workers. Unlike previous trade deals agreements that have put labor standards in side agreements that are difficult to enforce, I will make labor standards central to any agreement.

Climate Change and the Environment. Climate change is real, it's man-made, and we're running out of time to address it. America should be leading this fight, but we have turned our backs on our responsibilities — withcommunities of color in the U.S. and developing countries bearing a disproportionate amount of the harm.

Trump is moving us in the wrong direction — withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord, renegotiating NAFTA without even a mention of climate change, and handing special carve outs to oil and gas companies.

Beyond requiring implementation of the Paris Climate accord and the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies as preconditions for any trade agreement, I have already proposed a Green Marshall Plan to dedicate $100 billion to helping other countries purchase and deploy American-made clean energy technology.

But we must do more. I will push to secure a multilateral agreement to protect domestic green policies like subsidies for green products and preferential treatment for environmentally sustainable energy production from WTO challenges. And because big corporations will move their production to the countries with the weakest greenhouse gas emissions standards — undermining global efforts to address climate change and penalizing countries that are doing their part — I will impose aborder carbon adjustment so imported goods that these firms make using carbon-intensive processes are charged a fee to equalize the costs borne by companies playing by the rules.

Prescription Drugs. Last year, Americans spent more than $500 billion on prescription drugs. That's a 50% increase since 2010. Nearly 3 in 10Americans report not taking their medicine as directed because of costs. And yet, one of the core elements of America's current trade agenda is guaranteeing pharmaceutical firms monopoly protections so they can avoid competition from generic drugs — driving up costs and reducing access to necessary medicine abroad, and undermining our efforts to reduce drug prices here at home. That's exactly what the Trump Administration has done as part of their failed effort to renegotiate NAFTA.

While medical innovation is important, there is no link between extremely long exclusivity periods and pharmaceutical innovation. These are giveaways to drug companies, plain and simple, which allow them to maintain ludicrously high drug prices.

As President, I will fight to bring down the costs of prescription drugs here and around the world. I will never use America's leverage to push another country to extend exclusivity periods for prescription drugs. I will support efforts to impose price controls on pharmaceuticals. And I will actively seek out opportunities to reduce exclusivity periods in our existing trade deals in exchange for securing other changes that will help America's working families.

Agriculture. For decades, trade deals have squeezed family farmers, with Black farmers losing their land particularly quickly. Between the trade fights incited by Trump's haphazard tariffs and a series of natural disasters, America's farmers are now facing the worst crisis in almost 40 years. They are also facing unprecedented levels of uncertainty and instability. Trump's tariffs have reduced crop prices, threatened farmers already operating on razor-thin margins, and opened up new non-American markets against which our farmers are now forced to compete. Like trade deals of the past, Trump's NAFTA 2.0 is written to help giant multinational agribusinesses at the expense of family farms, and it will do nothing to solve the newly created market insecurity Trump's tariffs have caused.

As President, I will fight for trade agreements that reward American farmers for their hard work by negotiating for fair prices for goods, breaking up the monopolies in grain trading and meat packing, and protecting domestic markets to create stability for America's family farms. And I will impose Country-of-Origin Labeling rules to protect American producers and provide transparency to consumers.

Consumer protection. We must ensure that the food we eat is high-quality and safe. But our trade agreements have limited safety standards and the inspection of imported foods, while simultaneously enabling a new flood of food imports that overwhelm food safety inspectors. In my Administration, our trade pacts will require imported food to meet domestic food safety standards, including enhanced border inspection requirements.

As with imported food, our current trade deals require us to allow imports of other products and services that do not meet domestic safety and environmental standards. My trade agreements will ensure that imported products and services must meet the same standards as domestic products and services.

Antitrust. We are in an era of massive consolidation across many sectors of the economy. One of the reasons why is that we have a narrow, permissive approach to mergers that looks only at economic efficiency and consumer welfare instead of assessing the impact that a merger will have on competition itself.

In recent years, we have added this problematic standard into trade agreements and proposed it as the defining objective for competition policy in new and renegotiated agreements. Under my administration, we will not propose this standard in any new agreement, and we will work to renegotiate agreements to remove it.

Delivering for American Families with Stronger Enforcement

Our approach to enforcing trade agreements drives down standards worldwide and undermines American families. We offer big corporations fast and powerful methods to enforce the provisions that benefit them but make it nearly impossible for Americans to enforce labor and environmental protections. Foreign governments only fear a challenge to strong rules that might hurt corporate bottom lines, not to weak rules that might not adequately protect workers, the environment, or public health.

I will entirely reorient our approach to enforcement so we drive standards up, not down. I'll start by ending "Investor-State Dispute Settlement," or ISDS, the favorable enforcement approach we offer corporations. Under ISDS, a company that believes that a new law violates some aspect of a trade agreement can skip the courts and challenge the law before an international panel of arbitrators. If the company wins, the panel can order that country's taxpayers to pay out billions in damages — with no review by an actual court. What's worse, the arbitration panels handing out these binding rulings are often made up of corporate lawyers whose day jobs are representing the very same companies that seek judgments before them.

Companies have used ISDS to undermine laws intended to benefit the public interest. A French company challenged Egypt when it increased the minimum wage. A Swedish company challenged Germany when it decided to cut back on nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster. These cases have real effects across the globe: an ISDS panel's decision to hear a challenge that Philip Morris brought against Uruguay's anti-smoking campaign prompted several other countries to abandon similar public health efforts.

As President, I will not include ISDS in any new agreement and will renegotiate existing agreements to remove ISDS from them.

And I'll strengthen our approach to enforcing labor and environmental standards. Unlike a corporation under ISDS, a labor union seeking to enforce labor standards can't bring a claim on its own — it must convince the federal government to bring a claim on its behalf. Even in the face of overwhelming evidence, our government can refuse to act for diplomatic or other unrelated reasons.

As a result, the federal government has only pursued one such claim in the last 25 years. In that one case, the American government, AFL-CIO, and Guatemalan unions spent nine years trying to challenge the Guatemalan government for violating the labor chapter of one of our trade deals because Guatemalan workers were being murdered for trying to join a union. In the end, we lost because the trade agreement required a showing that the violations had affected trade.

I will replace this broken process by creating independent commissions — made up of experts in the area — to monitor potential violations, respond to complaints, and investigate claims. The commissions must review and investigate claims promptly so that claims don't languish for years. If one of these commissions recommends that the United States bring a claim against another country, the United States will be required to do so, without exception.

I will also fix the problem that arose in the Guatemala case by pushing to remove language from our deals that require us to show that a violation of rights was "sustained or recurring" and "affecting trade or investment." A violation is a violation, and I won't let another case like Guatemala happen ever again.

I will strengthen our enforcement approach in other ways as well:

  • Under WTO rules, a country designated as a "non-market economy" can face more serious trade penalties. I will push for a new "non-sustainable economy" designation that would allow us to impose tougher penalties on countries with systematically poor labor and environmental practices. We cannot allow countries that treat their workers and the environment poorly to undercut American producers that do things the right way.
  • I already have a plan to move the lead American trade negotiator — the Office of the United States Trade Representative — within my new Department of Economic Development. That will ensure that America's trade policy supports our broader economic agenda of defending and creating good American jobs. I will also create a new labor and environment enforcement division at the USTR to more effectively enforce obligations, and embed a labor attache at U.S. embassies to monitor compliance with our labor standards.
  • Unlike the current approach that lets our government ignore unfair trade practices, my administration will create automatic triggers to initiate investigations into unfair trade practices. If those investigations produce compelling evidence of a violation, the Department will impose trade remedies immediately until the offenders show they are no longer engaging in an unfair trade practice. These automatic triggers will also apply to violations of labor and environmental standards.
  • Finally, when we impose duties to support particular domestic industries, I want to ensure that the money we collect actually goes to American workers, instead of being sucked up by executives and shareholders. I will fight to change our trade laws so that we review duties every six months and lift the duties if companies can't demonstrate the benefits of the duties are going to their workers.

Trade can be a powerful tool to help working families but our failed pro-corporate agenda has used trade to harm American workers and the environment. My plan represents a new approach to trade — one that uses America's leverage to boost American workers and raise the standard of living across the globe. The President has a lot of authority to remake trade policy herself. When I'm elected, I intend to use it.

--

Saturday, August 10, 2019

5 Lessons from China on How to Drive Sustainable Growth [feedly]

A Chinese view...

5 Lessons from China on How to Drive Sustainable Growth

https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/09/08/2019/5-lessons-china-how-drive-sustainable-growth

Journalists, politicians and regular citizens have spent much time in recent years discussing the 'Chinese dream'. It's our vision of China's journey into the future.

I believe the Chinese dream will see us break the link between growing incomes, rising production and degradation of the environment. Our businesses should continue to grow even as our cities, farmland and entire ecosystems become greener and more sustainable.

Long-term wealth creation should go hand-in-hand with sustainability. Earlier this year, Lyu Jun, Chairman of COFCO Corporation, described how the commercial case for sustainable production is lagging behind the moral one. Since his article was published as part of the World Economic Forum 2019 Annual Meeting, we have been actively demonstrating the commercial value of sustainability.

In July, my company partnered with a consortium of 21 banks to engineer a $2.3 billion loan. Under the terms of this loan, we pay a lower interest rate if we can meet a series of annual targets on sustainability. Any interest saved will be re-invested into initiatives that increase our sustainability performance even further. Sustainability earns us money.

This loan demonstrates some of the keys to sustainable growth. Here are five of them:

1) Finance is emerging as a major driver of sustainability.

Government policy and consumer preferences can certainly shift corporate behaviour, as tariffs on soy have shown. And most consumer-facing businesses are adapting to their customers' preferences for more sustainability.

But I see a more interesting role for the banks, whose influence is immense. The financial sector is shifting quickly towards sustainability as the links to reduced risk and better financial performance become clear. In the first half of this year, the issuance of sustainability-linked loans leapt 63% to $44 billion, as much as in all of 2018. Money talks.

2) Innovation will be part of any solution.

While the public sector has limited funding resources, private investment and capability could play an instrumental role in achieving sustainable agricultural development goals. But current levels are not enough to meet global food security challenges in the long term. Private investors remain reluctant to invest in sustainable agriculture because of the perceived uncertainties and high risks. Furthermore, conventional financing models have their limits, particularly in developing countries where most of the growth in food demand and production will come from.

We need more innovative financing in which public and private sectors can work together, to create the necessary policy and investment environment for private finance in sustainable farming.

We should look at the renewable energy sector for new ideas, where public-private partnerships (PPPs) have successfully delivered mechanisms for pooling public and private financing and risk mitigation.

People may not like change, but they like innovation. People don't like to give things up, but they like to have new options. Innovation is the answer. It is essential to change.

3) Success depends on collaboration. Bringing people on board is a must.

To identify a solution is much easier than to implement it. In theory, everybody wants a more sustainable food system. But not everybody wants or is able to pay the price. That's why sustainable change requires us to bring on board all those who are affected. In order to achieve a sustainable food chain, farmers and producers may need further incentives.

China's sizeable Grain for Green project offered grains, tax and other encouragements so that farmers would protect, instead of clear, their forested slopes.

And agribusinesses will be wise to adopt the same principle. Sustainable farming will only be possible if farmers are on board.

4) China is serious about sustainability.

President Xi has been consistent about the need for green policies "to protect the common home we live in". His position is also consistent with recent Chinese history, which teaches us that only sustainable agriculture can deliver meaningful food security.

Between 1978 and 2015, China invested a total of $378.5 billion in 16 major sustainability programmes, most of it in the latter 20 years. The investment involved more than 500 million people and far exceeds any other national sustainability programme. On the commercial side of sustainability, China is now at the cutting edge of solar technology, low-carbon transport, the circular economy, carbon trading, and more. We are serious about sustainability.

5) Success requires solutions at scale and China is well-placed to deliver them.

The urgency of our biodiversity and climate crises means that we need to have solutions in place right now. And these solutions need to be at scale.

The sustainability-linked loan mentioned above is not the first in the agricultural trading sector, but it is the largest so far. It demonstrates our intention to join hands with others in our industry and to contribute to sustainable growth in the global agriculture sector. That is part of the Chinese dream.

 

 

Johnny Chi Jingtao, Executive Vice-President, COFCO.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Innovation Policy: Federal Support for R&D Falls as its Importance Rises [feedly]

Innovation Policy: Federal Support for R&D Falls as its Importance Rises
http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2019/08/innovation-policy-federal-support-for-r.html

  One of those things that "everyone knows" is that continued technological progress is vital to the continued success of the US economy, not just in terms of GDP growth (although that matters) but also for major social issues like providing quality health care and education in a cost-effective manner, addressing environmental dangers including climate change, and in other ways. Another thing that "everyone knows" is that research and development spending is an important part of generating new technology. But total US spending on R&D as a share of GDP has been nearly flat for decades, and government spending on R&D as a share of GDP has declined over time.

Here's a figure on funding sources for US R&D from the Science and Engineering Indicators 2018.  The top line shows the rise in R&D spending in the 1960s (much of it associated with the space program and the military), a fall in the 1970s, and then how R&D spending has bobbed around 2.5%  of GDP since then. The dark blue line shows the rise in business-funded R&D, while the light blue line shows the fall in government funding for R&D.
One underlying issue is that business-funded R&D is more likely to be focused on, well, the reasonably short-term needs of the business, while government R&D can take a broader and longer-term perspective,

One signal of this dynamic is that the share of patents which rely on government government funding is on the rise. L. Fleming, H. Greene, G. Li, M. Marx, and D. Yao describe the pattern in "Research Funding: Government-funded research increasingly fuels innovation" (Science, June 21, 2019, pp. 11139-1141).



Of course, the relationship between R&D spending and broader technological progress is complicated. Translating research discoveries into goods and services isn't a simple or mechanical process. Other important elements include the economic and regulatory environment for entrepreneurs, the diffusion of new technologies across firms,  and the quantity of scientists and researchers. For an overview of the broader issues, Nicholas Bloom, John Van Reenen, and Heidi Williams offer "A Toolkit of Policies to Promote Innovation"in the Summer 2018 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. They explain the case for government support of innovation:
Knowledge spillovers are the central market failure on which economists have focused when justifying government intervention in innovation. If one firm creates something truly innovative, this knowledge may spill over to other firms that either copy or learn from the original research—without having to pay the full research and development costs. Ideas are promiscuous; even with a well-designed intellectual property system, the benefits of new ideas are difficult to monetize in full. There is a long academic literature documenting the existence of these positive spillovers from innovations. ...
As a whole, this literature on spillovers has consistently estimated that social returns to R&D are much higher than private returns, which provides a justification for government- supported innovation policy. In the United States, for example, recent estimates in Lucking, Bloom, and Van Reenen (2018) used three decades of firm-level data and a production function–based approach to document evidence of substantial positive net knowledge spillovers. The authors estimate that social returns are about 60 percent, compared with private returns of around 15 percent, suggesting the case for a substantial increase in public research subsidies.
Along with  pointing out some advantages of government-funded R&D, Bloom, van Reenen, and Williams also point out that when it comes to tax subsidies for corporate R&D, the US lags well behind. They write: 
The OECD (2018) reports that 33 of the 42 countries it examined provide some material level of tax generosity toward research and development. The US federal T&D tax credit is in the bottom one- third of OECD nations in terms of generosity, reducing the cost of US R&D spending by about 5 percent. ...  In countries with the most generous provisions, such as France, Portugal, and Chile, the corresponding tax incentives reduce the cost of R&D by more than 30 percent. Do research and development tax credits actually work to raise R&D spending? The answer seems to be "yes."
Here's their toolkit of pro-innovation policies, with their own estimates of effectiveness along various dimensions. 


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

The Return of the Right in Latin America [feedly]

The Return of the Right in Latin America
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/the-right-has-power-in-latin-america-but-no-plan

Alexander Main
Jacobin, August 2019

Le Monde diplomatique, July 1, 2019

See article on original site

En français

Two days after the November 2016 elections that brought him to office, president-elect Donald Trump had a 90-minute meeting with President Barack Obama in the Oval Office of the White House. "We discussed a lot of different situations, some wonderful, some difficulties," Trump told the media afterward. He later revealed that the major "difficulty" discussed was the North Korean nuclear threat.
 
We know little else about the two men's conversation that day, but it is likely that one particularly "wonderful situation" they touched on was a part of the world where the US had gained enormous ground during Obama's presidency: Latin America.
 
When Obama first took office in January 2009, much of Latin America and the Caribbean was dominated by independent-minded left-leaning governments, despite the previous Republican administration's aggressive attempts to turn back the "pink tide" of progressive movements that had come to power in the early twenty-first century.
 
But by the end of Obama's two terms, Latin America had swung decisively back to the Right. Groundbreaking regional integration schemes spearheaded by left-wing governments, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), were paralyzed or floundering. Meanwhile, a US-backed bloc had emerged ― the Pacific Alliance, made up of Chile, Mexico, Colombia, and Peru, all signatories to "free trade" agreements with the US. Openly dismissive of UNASUR and the Venezuela- and Cuba-led Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), the Pacific Alliance has embraced many of the neoliberal policies that led to two decades of economic stagnation and increased inequality in the region during the 1980s and '90s (and which subsequently fueled support for "pink tide" policy alternatives).
 
There are a number of factors that led to the return of the Right in Latin America, including economic downturns resulting in large part from the ripple effects of the global financial crisis, politicized corruption scandals, the political influence of powerful ultraconservative evangelical movements, and the expanding influence of financial capital. Undemocratic coups also brought down left governments: a military coup, in the case of Honduras in 2009; and the parliamentary coups that resulted in the unconstitutional removals of President Fernando Lugo of Paraguay in 2012 and President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil in 2016.
 
In nearly every case, the US provided a helping hand to right-wing forces. For instance, the Obama administration helped prevent the toppled left-wing leader of Honduras from returning to power and provided strong diplomatic support for the ousting of Lugo and Rousseff. It deepened a financial crisis under Argentina's left-wing government by blocking loans from US-dominated international financial institutions, and it blatantly intervened in Haiti's 2010–2011 elections in the interest of preventing a left-leaning party from remaining in office. Throughout the region, the US deployed various "soft power" tactics to support the electoral victories of right-wing movements.
 
And so, by the end of Obama's presidency, pliant pro-US governments abounded, eager to demonstrate their loyalty to Washington. The new right-wing governments of the biggest economies of South America — Brazil and Argentina — clamored for "free trade" agreements with the US. Only 11 years earlier, their left-wing predecessors had shattered Washington's dream of a Free Trade Area of the Americas.
 
President Trump has shown limited interest in nurturing relations with his many avid allies in Latin America. He has cancelled several trips to the region, including two to Colombia and one to the eighth Summit of the Americas, in Peru, even though the themes of the agenda ― focused on countering Venezuela's left-wing government and promoting anticorruption campaigns ― could have been designed by the US State Department. As of June 2019, his only presidential trip south of the border has been to Buenos Aires, for the December 2018 G20 summit.
 
When he has paid attention to the region, Trump has often antagonized friends and foes alike. He has hurled threats and insults at Central American and Mexican migrants; rolled back Obama's popular Cuba normalization policy; and sharply criticized Colombia's far-right president Iván Duque, saying that he had "done nothing" to stem the country's booming cocaine industry. His harsh words horrified the US foreign policy establishment, which considers Colombia to be a crucial political and military ally, regardless of the government's appalling human rights record.
 
For their part, Trump officials have sought to attenuate some of this friction by traveling frequently to Latin America. Vice President Mike Pence has made five Latin America trips. Mike Pompeo traveled to Colombia and Mexico as CIA director and then made six more trips during his first year as secretary of state. National Security Advisor John Bolton has also ventured to the region, most notably to Brazil where he heralded extreme-right president Jair Bolsonaro as a "like-minded partner."
 
Unsurprisingly, given Trump's protectionist tendencies, new trade agreements usually haven't been a topic of discussion during these high-level visits, with the exception of Mexico and its renegotiation of NAFTA, now billed as the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Instead, State Department press releases indicate that Venezuela has been at the top of nearly every bilateral meeting agenda. China, which Pompeo and others have accused of "imperial" ambitions in the region, with no apparent intended irony, often appears next on these agendas.
 
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has had little success in persuading even its most stalwart allies to weaken their relations with China ― admittedly a difficult feat given that Chinese trade and investment has helped keep many of their economies afloat. Most have gone in the opposite direction: Chile's right-wing president Sebastián Piñera has said he wants to "transform Chile into a business center for Chinese companies"; Argentine president Mauricio Macri signed a multibillion-dollar five-year economic cooperation plan with China; even Jair Bolsonaro, who has parroted Trump's anti-China rhetoric, has recently engaged in a diplomatic charm offensive with Beijing.
 
Where Trump's foreign policy team has gotten a great deal of traction is on Venezuela, a country whose enduring left-wing leadership had previously been a regional obsession for both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. Venezuela had apparently not initially been on Trump's radar. During his presidential campaign, he rarely mentioned the economically beleaguered South American nation. All of that changed after Trump and former election rival Marco Rubio (R-FL) met repeatedly and made peace in the spring of 2017. Soon after, the president announced his intention to reverse Obama's Cuba normalization policy. Then he turned his sights on the government of Nicolás Maduro, first announcing that there might be a "military option" for Venezuela, then imposing crippling financial sanctions in August of 2017.
 
It is clear that Rubio, who is beholden to right-wing Cuban-American and Venezuelan-American donors and voters in South Florida, has had an outsized role in determining Trump's Latin American policy. In fact, many believe that he convinced Trump that supporting a hard-line regime change strategy toward Venezuela could significantly improve Trump's odds of winning Florida in the 2020 presidential elections. Whatever the case, Trump officials have zealously rallied regional governments to support such a strategy. Their efforts have borne fruit.


Regional Right-Wing Alliances Emerge

In August 2017, representatives from a dozen right-wing Latin American governments and Canada established the Lima Group in Peru, signing a declaration that denounced the alleged "rupture of democratic order" and "violation of human rights" in Venezuela and committing to work together to regionally isolate the Maduro government. The Lima Group has met repeatedly since then, focusing exclusively on Venezuela and ignoring particularly troubling attacks on democracy and human rights in countries like Honduras and Colombia, both Lima Group members.
 
Though the US isn't officially part of the group, high-level US representatives have attended nearly all of its meetings. Much as the Obama administration cheered on the Pacific Alliance and downplayed its close coordination with the group, Trump officials have constantly cited Lima Group positions to create the impression that US strategy is rooted in a sort of regional multilateral consensus. Major international media outlets and think tanks have helped reinforce this impression by systematically ignoring the right-wing ideological bent of many of the signers of the group's resolutions.
 
When Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó proclaimed himself interim president of Venezuela in January 2019, the Lima Group, the US, and dozens of other countries around the world recognized him as president. The Lima Group took a harder line, actively supporting a strategy of regime change through a military coup against Maduro, who had been reelected in contested elections in May the previous year. Mexico, where a progressive government had just taken office, refused to sign the group's resolution, instead proposing, jointly with the left-leaning government of Uruguay, a "dialogue mechanism" to address Venezuela's political crisis.
 
However, soon afterward, the Lima Group's positions began to diverge from those of the Trump administration. In late February, when Guaidó began floating the idea of enlisting outside military support in his effort to oust Maduro, Lima Group members published a declaration saying that a solution to the crisis should come from Venezuelans themselves. Regardless of their ideological bent and affinity for Washington, these governments stopped short of supporting foreign military intervention.
 
As the political stalemate continued in Venezuela, the Lima Group began expressing support for a negotiated solution, a possibility that the US ― still focused on achieving regime change through a military coup ― strongly rejected. Then, after Guaidó staged a failed uprising on April 30, the group began to appeal to Cuba to help with negotiations. This idea was particularly abhorrent to Trump's Latin America team, which now included Elliott Abrams, a Cold War hawk who in the 1980s had defended Central American death squads and lied to Congress about the Iran-Contra scandal.
 
Abrams and other officials claimed, without evidence, that Cuba had thousands of troops and intelligence agents in Venezuela and was responsible for "propping up" Maduro. In fact, after Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau reached out to Cuban authorities on behalf of the Lima Group to ask for their help in advancing negotiations, he received an irate call from Vice President Pence calling on him to instead help expose Cuba's "malign influence" in Venezuela.
 
The Trump administration has also failed in its public efforts to lobby Lima Group members to implement broad economic sanctions against Venezuela. Some right-wing governments in the region implemented sanctions targeting individual Venezuelan officials, but none of them sought to replicate the US's devastating financial or oil sector sanctions against Venezuela.
 
It appears then that even the US's most compliant right-wing allies retain a basic aversion to the extreme forms of interventionism promoted by Trump's team. It has probably not helped that John Bolton and other officials have recently trumpeted the virtues of the Monroe Doctrine, the nearly 200-year-old imperial policy that has served to justify countless US interventions throughout the hemisphere. No Latin American leaders have shown support for a revived Monroe Doctrine, and few appear to agree with Bolton or Pompeo's claims that China or Russia represent a serious threat to the region that necessitates supporting the US in vigorously opposing their presence.
 
Nor is it likely that any government in Latin America was pleased to hear Bolton state on Fox Business that Venezuela's vast oil reserves were a key motivation for US intervention there as it would "make a big difference to the United States economically if we could have American oil companies invest in and produce the oil capabilities in Venezuela."
 
There is a certain irony in the fact that the Latin American geopolitical panorama hasn't been this favorable to US interests since at least the late '90s, yet the stridently imperialistic approach of the current administration risks alienating even those in the region most supportive of US hegemony.
 
But even if the Trump team's behavior grows more unacceptable to Latin America's right-wing governments, it appears unlikely that these governments will succeed in developing a coherent, collective project in defense of their vision for the region. This is because, for the most part, the main actors of the Latin American right have not promoted any alternative strategy in international relations that does not involve US leadership.
 
This is apparent in the strikingly meager record of the regional groupings that conservative governments have developed since the region's rightward shift. The Pacific Alliance, for its part, doesn't have much to show for the eight years it has existed. Its biggest "achievement" is the integration of its four member states' stock markets in a common trading platform, but there is little evidence that this has provided a significant boost to these countries' faltering economies. And the biggest right-wing regional bloc, the Lima Group, is a one-trick pony focused on Venezuela.
 
In contrast, the previous progressive decade's regional groupings had a real impact, with extensive cooperation mechanisms in infrastructure, defense, investment, trade, energy, social programs, and various other areas, and ― perhaps most importantly ― systematic diplomatic consultations and coordination around common challenges and crises as they emerged.
 
The most recent alliance to emerge is the eight-member Forum for the Progress and Development of South America ― or "Prosur" ― presented by its right-wing cofounders ― as essentially an anti-UNASUR (a body they deemed to be too pro-Venezuela). Officially founded in March of 2019, the group includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, and Peru. So far, it appears to be a repeat performance encompassing the positions of both the Lima Group and the Pacific Alliance.

If the Left wins a few elections in the coming years, then a progressive generation of regional alliances could make a comeback. These groups ― UNASUR, CELAC, ALBA ― have structural flaws that should be addressed, but continue to offer a compelling vision for the region, one that puts the welfare of the peoples of Latin America first and maps out a path toward genuine political and economic independence, without the interference or tutelage of outside powers.


Alexander Main is Director for International Policy at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, DC.



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