Monday, October 22, 2018

The “silver spoon” tax: how to strengthen wealth transfer taxation


The "silver spoon" tax: how to strengthen wealth transfer taxation

About the authorLily L. Batchelder is a professor of law and public policy at New York University School of Law.


Wealth transfer taxes are a critical policy tool for mitigating economic inequality, including inequality of opportunity. They are also relatively efficient. This essay summarizes why and how wealth transfer taxes should be strengthened. Reform options that our next President should consider include increasing the wealth transfer tax rate, broadening the base, repealing stepped-up basis, addressing talking points against wealth transfer taxes with little or no factual basis, and converting the estate and gift taxes into a direct tax on the recipients of large inheritances.

Why wealth transfer taxes
should be preserved and expanded

For those concerned about economic inequality, taxing wealth transfers is a critical policy tool, mitigating inequality in ways that other taxes cannot. Inheritances represent roughly 40 percent of all wealth1 and about 4 percent of annual household income.2 Bequests alone total about $500 billion per year.3

There are two types of inequality that policymakers should care about. The first is within-generation disparities in income, wealth, or other measures of economic well-being. Both income and wealth inequality are extremely high in the United States. The top 1 percent of households receives 15 percent of all income and holds 35 percent of all wealth.4Wealth transfers increase within-generation inequality on an absolute basis (See Figure 1), but not on a relative basis. This is because of what economists call regression to the mean.5 Someone who earns $100 million per year, for example, is likely to have a child whose income is slightly lower, even including the child's inheritance. Conversely, someone who earns $10,000 per year is likely to have a child whose income is slightly higher than her own.

Figure 1

But equally important is a second type of inequality: inequality of economic opportunity. A child whose parents earn $100 million will, on average, be radically better off than a child whose parents earn $10,000. The United States has one of the highest levels of opportunity inequality among its competitors.6 In the United States, a father on average passes on roughly half of his economic advantage or disadvantage to his son. Among most of our competitors, the comparable figure is less than one-third, and for several it is less than one-fifth.7

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Financial inheritances worsen this inequality of life chances dramatically. Indeed, 30 percent of the correlation between parent and child incomes—and more than 50 percent of the correlation between the wealth of parents and the wealth of their children— is attributable to financial inheritances.8 This is more than the impact of IQ, personality, and schooling combined.

Increasing the progressivity of income and payroll taxes would go a long way toward addressing both of these types of inequality.9 But it would leave significant holes if not accompanied by stronger taxes on wealth transfers. Under current law, for example, if a wealthy individual bequeaths assets with $100 million in unrealized gains, neither the donor nor the heir ever has to pay income or payroll tax on that $100 million gain. In addition, the recipients of large inheritances never have to pay income or payroll tax on the value of inheritances they receive, whether attributable to unrealized gains or not.10

Some argue that any income or payroll tax previously paid by a wealthy individual on gifts and bequests they make should count as tax paid by the heir. But they are two separate people. When a wealthy individual pays his assistant's wages out of after-tax funds, we don't think the assistant has thereby paid tax on their own wages. In short, today the income and payroll taxes effectively tax unearned income in the form of inheritances at a zero rate.

Wealth transfer taxes play an important role in partially addressing this inequity of excluding inherited income from the income and payroll tax bases.11 But inherited income is still taxed at less than one-quarter of the rate on income from work and savings. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2

A fairer tax system would tax income in the form of large inheritances at a higher rate than income from work. Recipients of large inheritances are better off than people who earn the same amount of money by working. In economist-speak, they have no "opportunity cost;" they have not had to give up any leisure or earning opportunities in order to receive the inheritance. All else equal, it is therefore fairer for them to pay more taxes, not less. But all else is not equal. Heirs of large inheritances also typically have a huge leg up in earning income if they choose to work—with access to the best education, influential family friends, interest-free or low-interest loans, and a safety net if they take risks that don't pan out. This further strengthens the case for taxing inheritances at a higher rate.

More progressive income and payroll taxes cannot address this inequity in the tax system and ensure that large inheritances are taxed at higher rates than wage income.12 The same is true of proposals to adopt a tax on wealth as opposed to wealth transfers.

Importantly, bipartisan experts agree that wealth transfer taxes are largely borne by the heirs of large estates, not their benefactors.13 As a result, it would be more accurate to call wealth transfer taxes "silver spoon" taxes, not "death" taxes as their opponents prefer.

In addition to playing a critical role in making the tax system fairer, wealth transfer taxes are relatively efficient. It is an article of faith among estate tax opponents that wealth transfer taxes harm the economy because they discourage work and saving among very wealthy individuals. But in order to have these effects, the wealthy would need place a high value on the amount their heirs will inherit after-tax when making work and saving decisions. In fact, a large body of empirical research finds this is not the case, and that the amount that the affluent accumulate for wealth transfers is relatively unresponsive to the wealth transfer tax rate.14

People with very large estates typically have saved for multiple reasons. They may enjoy being wealthy, with the prestige and power that it confers while they are alive. They may have saved to have enough for their retirement needs, including unanticipated health expenses. And they may, of course, have saved to give to their children. But the empirical evidence to date suggests the first two motivations are so strong that the wealthy do not reduce their saving by all that much if they expect their estate to be taxed at a high rate. Put differently, a lot of the reason why people save is to have wealth while they are alive, which wealth transfer taxes do not affect.

Moreover, any negative incentive effects of wealth transfer taxes on wealthy donors are at least partially offset by their positive incentive effects on the next generation. Such taxes induce heirs to work and save more because heirs do not have as large an inheritance to live off of as a result.15 Wealth transfer taxes also improve business productivity. Several studies have found that businesses run by heirs perform worse because nepotism limits labor market competition for the best manager.16

For all these reasons, wealth transfer taxes may be more efficient than comparably progressive income and wealth taxes17—in addition to playing a unique role in mitigating inequality of economic opportunity.

How to strengthen
wealth transfer taxes

There are two main components of the wealth transfer tax system: the estate tax on bequests and the gift tax on wealth transfers made during life.18 In 2016, transferors are entitled to a lifetime exemption of $5.45 million ($10.9 million per couple). If their combined gifts and bequests exceed this threshold, the excess is taxed at a rate of 40 percent. Transferors also can exclude $14,000 in gifts each year to a given heir from ($28,000 per couple), meaning such gifts don't even count toward the lifetime exemption. Currently only 0.2 percent of estates owe any estate tax.19

OPTION #1: RAISE THE RATE

The simplest way to strengthen wealth transfer taxes would be to raise the rate. Restoring the 2009 estate tax parameters (a $3.5 million exemption and a 45 percent rate) would raise $160 billion over 10 years.20Also raising the rate to range from 50 percent to 65 percent to the extent that estates exceed $10 million to $1 billion would raise about $235 billion over 10 years instead.21

At a minimum, large inheritances should be taxed at the top marginal tax rate that applies to labor income—roughly 50 percent when one includes state and local income taxes.22 But a higher rate would be fairer and more efficient. The optimal tax rate on extremely large inheritances is estimated to be between 50 percent and 80 percent.23

Reducing the lifetime exemption amount also is worth considering, but it should be a lower priority. A higher rate focuses wealth transfer taxes on the wealthiest heirs and limits compliance costs.

OPTION #2: REPLACE THE ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES WITH AN INHERITANCE TAX

A more fundamental improvement would be to replace the estate and gift taxes with an inheritance tax. The lifetime exemption for the estate and gift taxes applies to the amount transferred, not the amount inherited by the heir. Suppose Richie Rich is an only child and receives $5 million in bequests from each of his parents and stepparents. Under current law, the $20 million he inherits is exempt from estate and income taxes because each bequest is under the exemption. But under an inheritance tax, the exemption would be based on how much he receives instead.

I propose requiring heirs of large inheritances to pay income tax plus an inheritance surcharge on amounts they inherit above a large lifetime exemption. If the lifetime exemption were $2.1 million and the surcharge were 15 percent (roughly equal to the maximum payroll tax rate) then such an inheritance tax would raise roughly $200 billion more over 10 years than the current estate tax. Dialing the rates up or the exemption amount down could raise more revenue. (See Figure 3.)24 To state the obvious, $2.1 million is a lot of money. An individual who inherits $2.1 million at age 21 can live off her inheritance for the rest of her life without anyone in her house ever working and, on average, her annual household income will still be higher than about 7 out of 10 American families.25

Figure 3

There are several advantages of an inheritance tax relative to an estate tax. First, it would more equitably allocate wealth transfer taxes among heirs. Both types of taxes are borne by wealthy heirs and not their benefactors. But not all large inheritances come from the largest estates, and some small inheritances come from relatively large estates.

In addition, the type of inheritance tax outlined here would apply different rates to heirs based on their total income. As a result, about 30 percent of the burden of the inheritance tax in dollar terms would fall on different heirs than under a revenue-equivalent estate tax.26 While roughly one-third of heirs burdened by the estate tax have inherited less than $1 million, none would owe any inheritance tax.27

These differences should not be taken as a fundamental critique of the estate tax. It is overwhelmingly borne by the recipients of large inheritances: Less than 4 percent of the revenue comes from individuals inheriting less than $1 million. Its burdens are just allocated among the recipients of large inheritances less precisely than under an inheritance tax.

A second, and perhaps even more important, advantage of an inheritance tax is that it could better align public understanding of wealth transfer taxes with their actual economic effects. The structure of an estate tax makes it easy for opponents to characterize it as a double tax on the frugal, generous entrepreneur who just wants to take care of his family after his death. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The estate tax is actually the only tax that that ensures wealthy heirs pay at least some tax on their large inheritances—even if at a much lower rate than their personal assistants. But this imagery is powerful. Perhaps as a result, most countries around the world that historically had estate taxes have repealed them, while those with inheritance taxes have not.28

The structure of an inheritance tax makes the inequities of our current system clearer. It simply requires wealthy heirs to pay income tax on their large inheritances just as all American workers pay tax on their earnings. Even with a surcharge, wealthy heirs would still typically pay a lower rate of tax on their inherited income than workers pay on a similar amount of labor income because of the large exemption, which workers cannot claim on their wages.

There are ancillary advantages of an inheritance tax as well. It would be simpler because it permits a wait-and-see approach for split and contingent transfers, rather than requiring taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service to guess upfront what portion of the transfer will ultimately go to tax-exempt individuals or charities. At the margin, it could induce the wealthy to share their estates more broadly. And it is clearly administrable. Inheritance taxes are far more common than estate taxes cross-nationally.29

OPTION #3: REPEAL STEPPED-UP BASIS

Regardless of whether the estate tax is expanded or replaced with an inheritance tax, policymakers should repeal stepped-up basis.30 This is the provision that completely exempts all accrued gains on bequeathed assets from income and payroll taxes, by "stepping up" the basis of asset to its fair market value when it is transferred.

President Obama has proposed repealing stepped-up basis, subject to several carve-outs including an exemption for the first $100,000 in accrued gains ($200,000 per couple).31 Together with raising the capital gains rate to 28 percent, this proposal would raise $210 billion over 10 years and significantly more over time as it fully phases in.32 While not technically an estate or gift tax reform, repealing stepped-up basis would accomplish all the same objectives as strengthening those taxes. It is highly progressive because inheritances are distributed so unequally and accrued gains are distributed even more unequally.33

The U.S. Department of the Treasury estimates that 99 percent of the revenue raised would come from the top 1 percent and 80 percent from the top 0.1 percent.34 It helps ensure that large inheritances are taxed at a rate closer to income from working. And it is highly efficient. Indeed, repealing stepped-up basis is even more efficient than raising wealth transfer tax rates because it reduces current law's "lock-in" incentives to hold on to underperforming assets purely for tax reasons.

If repealing stepped-up basis is not an option then the next best solution would be to apply carryover basis to bequests.35 This would allow heirs to delay paying income tax on accrued gains on their inheritances indefinitely. But heirs would at least need to pay the associated income tax when they ultimately sell the asset. As a result, it would reduce lock-in incentives, but not by nearly as much as stepped-up basis repeal. It would also raise significantly less revenue.36

OPTION #4: BROADEN THE WEALTH TRANSFER TAX BASE

A number of smaller reforms to broaden the wealth transfer tax base should also be pursued. Many of these proposals, such as limiting gaming around grantor-retained annuity trusts, are in President Obama's budget. Together, these budget proposals would raise $17 billion over 10 years.37 The next President should also finalize the current Administration's recently issued regulation addressing loopholes using valuation discounts, and ensure that Congress does not repeal it.38

An additional option worth considering is harmonizing the tax treatment of gifts and bequests. Currently gifts are often tax-advantaged because of the annual gift tax exclusion, the lack of present-value adjustments when calculating the lifetime exemption, and the fact that the top rate on very large gifts is effectively 29 percent, compared to 40 percent for bequests.39 Cutting the other way, bequests are tax-advantaged because they are eligible for stepped-up basis while gifts are not. These countervailing incentives create substantial tax planning costs, traps for the unwary, and inequities between similarly situated heirs. These problems could be largely addressed by repealing stepped-up basis, indexing the value of gifts to a market interest rate when calculating the lifetime exemption, and taxing gifts at the same rate as bequests.40

OPTION #5: ADDRESS STRAWMAN ARGUMENTS AGAINST WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES

Finally, policymakers should consider addressing talking points against wealth transfer taxes that resonate but have little or no basis in fact. A prime example is family farms. A principal rallying cry against the estate tax has long been that it forces families to sell their farms. But neither the American Farm Bureau nor The New York Times has been able to identify a single instance of this happening, even when the exemption was much lower.41

To counter this argument, one option is to adopt the proposal by former Senate Finance Committee Chairman Baucus (D-MT) to allow taxpayers to defer indefinitely any estate tax payments due on farm land at a market interest rate, provided the farm continues to be actively managed by the family.42 Because it is so rare for such farms and ranches to be subject to the estate tax, the proposal would only cost $5 billion over 10 years.43

To be clear, this proposal should only be considered if it is includes all the guardrails in the full Baucus proposal and interest accrues at a market interest rate. Otherwise, it could become a large loophole and reduce the number of farms owned and actively managed by families as opposed to passive investors in large corporations.

Conclusion

Wealth transfer taxes play a critical role in mitigating economic disparities, especially inequality of opportunity. The proposals offered here would soften the relative advantages of being born at the very top while leaving more than 99 percent of financial gifts and bequests unaffected.44

At the same time, these reforms options would raise a significant amount of revenue that could be used to mitigate the barriers to economic mobility that children from low- and middle-income families face. Effectively, they could fund a form of social inheritance through investments that partially make up for such families being unable to fund large financial wealth transfers to their children. The hundreds of billions of dollars raised could be used to fund universal pre-Kindergarten, expand the child tax credit for low- and middle-income working parents with young children, or increase the wage subsidy provided by the Earned Income Tax Credit for childless, frequently young adults. These proposals are estimated to significantly improve infant health, heighten academic achievement, boost labor force participation, and increase lifetime earnings for children from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds.45

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt once said "inherited economic power is as inconsistent with the ideals of this generation as inherited political power was inconsistent with the ideals of the generation which established our government." The same could be said today. Rather than falling near the bottom among our competitors on this score, we can recommit to creating a society where one's financial success depends relatively little on the circumstances of one's birth. A first step is to start taxing extraordinarily large inheritances like we tax good, old hard work.

(I am grateful to Len Burman, Michael Graetz, Chye-Ching Huang, and Wojciech Kopczuk for helpful suggestions. All errors are mine.)



END NOTES

1 James B Davies and Anthony F. Shorrocks, "The Distribution of Wealth," chap. 11 in Handbook of Income Distribution, ed. Anthony B. Atkinson and Francois Bourguignon (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2000); Edward N. Wolff and Maury Gittleman, "Inheritances and the Distribution of Wealth or Whatever Happened to the Great Inheritance Boom?," Journal of Economic Inequality 12 (2014): 439; Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman, "Wealth and Inheritance in the Long Run," chap. 15 in Handbook of Income Distribution, ed. Anthony B. Atkinson and Francois Bourguignon, vol. 2B (Oxford: Elsevier 2015): 1334-42. While inheritances as a share of wealth has been rising in recent decades in several countries, it is unclear whether this is true in the U.S.

2 Lily L. Batchelder, "What Should Society Expect from Heirs? A Proposal for a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax," Tax Law Review 63 (2009): 20. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1274466

3 Ibid. $500 billion after adjusted for growth. David Joulfaian and Kathleen McGarry, "Estate and Gift Tax Incentives and Inter Vivos Giving," National Tax Journal 57 (2004): 439 tbl.5. Including transfers during life would increase this figure by about 8-16 percent.

4 Congressional Budget Office, The Distribution of Household Income and Federal Taxes, 2013, (June 8, 2016); Linda Levine, An Analysis of the Distribution of Wealth Across Households, 1989-2010 (CRS Report No. RL33433) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012): 4 tbl.2.

5 Batchelder, "What Should Society Expect from Heirs," 25, fig. 4. See also Edward N. Wolff, "Inheritances and Wealth Inequality, 1989‒1998," American Economic Review, 92, no. 2 (2002): 260–64.

6 See Miles Corak, "Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenerational Mobility," Journal of Economic Perspectives 27, no. 3 (2013): 79–102.

7 Ibid.

8 Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, and Melissa Osborne Groves, "Introduction," in Unequal Chances: Family Background and Economic Success (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 18-19. Financial inheritances account for 30 percent of the parent-child income correlation, while parent and child IQ, schooling, and personality combined only account for only 18 percent. Adrian Adermon, Mikael Lindahl, and Daniel Waldenström, "Intergenerational Wealth Mobility and the Role of Inheritance: Evidence from Multiple Generations," (working paper, July 26, 2016 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2831960). Bequests and gifts account for at least 50 percent of the parent-child wealth correlation, while earnings and education account for only 25 percent.

9 Lower levels of inequality are correlated with higher levels of relative intergenerational economic mobility. See Corak, "Income Inequality." However, this is less true when changes in inequality occur just in the upper tail of the economic distribution. See Raj Chetty, et al., "Is the United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in Intergenerational Mobility," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 19844 (2014): 11. This implies that, in order to improve relative economic mobility, more progressive taxes need not just to raise revenue from the wealthiest but also increase income after taxes and transfers for low- and middle-income households.

10 If it is saved, the earnings on those savings will be taxed, but not the amount inherited.

11 For 2016, the differential would be even larger because of cuts to the estate tax, the expiration of the high-income Bush tax cuts, and the tax increases on high-income households in the Affordable Care Act. Other income tax cuts (such as expansions to tax credits for low- and middle-income families) would partially but not fully offset these increased income taxes on the wealthy since 2009.

12 As explained below, more progressive income and payroll taxes could address this inequity if broadened to repeal exemptions specifically for inheritances.

13 "As a first approximation, it would make more sense to distribute the burden of the tax to the estate's beneficiaries rather than to the decedent." N. Gregory Mankiw, Remarks, National Bureau of Economic Research Tax Policy and the Economy Meeting from Council of Economic Advisers (Nov. 4, 2003) http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mankiw/files/npc.pdf. For an explanation of why this is the case, see Lily L. Batchelder and Surachai Khitatrakun, "Dead or Alive: An Investigation of the Incidence of Estate Taxes and Inheritance Taxes" (working paper, 2008). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134113

14 For a review of the empirical evidence on this issue, see Batchelder, "What Should Society Expect from Heirs," 41-44; Wojciech Kopczuk, "Taxation of Intergenerational Transfers and Wealth," chap. 6 in Handbook of Public Economics, vol. 5 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2013): 337-341.

15 See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, David Joulfaian, and Harvey S. Rosen, "The Carnegie Conjecture: Some Empirical Evidence," Quarterly Journal of Economics108, no. 2 (May 1993): 413–35; Jeffrey R. Brown, Courtney C. Coile, and Scott J. Weisbenner, "The Effect of Inheritance Receipt on Retirement," Review of Economics and Statistics 92, no. 2 (2010): 425–434.

16 See Francisco Pérez-González, "Inherited Control and Firm Performance," American Economic Review 96, no.5 (2006): 1559–88. For more studies see Batchelder, "What Should Society Expect from Heirs," note 251.

17 The empirical evidence is far from conclusive on this point and, when comparing the efficiency of different tax bases, it is important to compare comparably progressive taxes. But to a provide a rough sense, a review of the literature the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax income tax rate concluded that "the best available estimates range from 0.12 to 0.40." Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod, and Seth H. Giertz, "The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature 50 (2012): 42. In contrast, a review of the literature on the elasticity of estates to the net-of-tax estate tax rate concluded "all these papers estimate a similar baseline elasticity of net worth/reported estate estimates with respect to the net-of-tax rate of between 0.1 and 0.2." Kopczuk, "Intergenerational Transfers," 365. Several caveats are in order. These elasticities include avoidance responses as well as real behavioral changes. They are not strictly apples-to-apples because one is a stock and one is a flow. The taxable income elasticities include both capital and labor income and are not limited to the top of the income distribution. Nevertheless, they suggest that, as a first pass, wealth transfer taxes may be more efficient than comparably progressive income and wealth taxes. All of this is not to say that income taxes on high earners are as inefficient as some believe. Indeed, Saez et al., conclude in their review that "there is no compelling evidence to date of real economic responses to tax rates… at the top of the income distribution." Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, "Elasticity of Taxable Income," 42.

18 There is also a "generation-skipping" transfer tax on transfers to heirs who are two generations younger than the donor.

19 Joint Committee on Taxation, History, Present Law, and Analysis of the Federal Wealth Transfer Tax System (JCX–52–15), (March 16, 2015): 25, tbl.2. https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4744

20 Joint Committee on Taxation, Description of Certain Revenue Provisions Contained in the President's Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Proposal (JCS-2-16), (July 21, 2016). https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4936

21 Frank Sammartino et al., "An Analysis of Senator Bernie Sanders's Tax Proposals," (Tax Policy Center, March 4, 2016 http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/analysis-senator-bernie-sanderss-tax-proposals). Specifically Senator Sanders's proposal would raise the estate tax rate to 50 percent for estates between $10 million and $50 million ($20 to $100 million per couple), to 55 percent for estates between $50 million and $500 million ($100 million and $1 billion per couple), and to 65 percent for estates to the extent they exceed $500 million ($1 billion per couple).

22 This assumes a top state income tax rate of 6.6 percent. Tax Policy Center, "Individual State Income Tax Rates 2000-2015," (February 16, 2015 http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/individual-state-income-tax-rates-2000-2015). Actual top state income tax rates range from 0 percent to 13.3 percent.

23 Batchelder, "What Should Society Expect from Heirs," 39–46, 50; Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, "A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation," Econometrica 81, no. 5 (2013): 1851–86.

24 I have grossed up the exemptions in Batchelder, "What Should Society Expect from Heirs" for inflation, and the revenue estimates to account for the top income tax rate having risen from 35 percent to 39.6 percent since 2009 (estimates ignore FICA and SECA).

25 $2.1 million would produce inflation-adjusted annual income of about $102,000 to age 102, assuming a 5% real rate of return. The 60th percentile of household income was $72,000 in 2015 and the 80th percentile was $117,000. Bernadette D. Proctor, Jessica L. Semega, and Melissa A. Kollar, "Income and Poverty in the United States: 2015," (United States Census Bureau, September, 2016): 31, tbl. A-2. This example considers the expected, not guaranteed, consumption potential of such an heir. In order to guarantee income exceeding the 80th percentile household every year, the heir would need to purchase an annuity, which would presumably entail a lower rate of return.

26 Batchelder, "What Should Society Expect from Heirs," 76.

27 Batchelder and Khitatrakun, "Dead or Alive," 41, tbl.A14. 37% when lifetime exemption was $3.5 million.

28 Batchelder, "What Should Society Expect from Heirs," 117–18.

29 Ibid., 51.

30 For further discussion of this proposal, see David Kamin, "Taxing Capital: Paths to a Fairer and Broader U.S. Tax System," (Washington Center for Equitable Growth, August, 2016): 23–24; Laura E. Cunningham and Noël B. Cunningham, "Commentary: Realization of Gains Under the Comprehensive Inheritance Tax," Tax Law Review 63 (2009): 271–83.

31 Department of the Treasury, "General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals," February 2016: 156. The proposal would also exempt all gains on the sale of tangible personal property, and would effectively establish a $500,000 per-couple exemption for gains on residences.

32 JCT, "President's FY 2017 Budget Proposal;" Kamin, "Taxing Capital," 23.

33 James Poterba and Scott Weisbenner, "The Distributional Burden of Taxing Estates and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death," in Rethinking Estate and Gift Taxation, ed. William G. Gale, James R. Hines Jr., and Joel Slemrod (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001): 439–40. Untaxed accrued gains compose 36% of the value of all bequests, but 56 percent of bequests over $10 million.

34 Executive Office of the President and U.S. Treasury Department, The President's Plan to Help Middle-Class and Working Families Get Ahead, (April, 2015): 35, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/middle_class_and_working_families_tax_report.pdf. The distributional effects would be somewhat less concentrated if household pre-tax income was defined to include the portion of the gain accrued in the current year, rather than the full gain realized under the proposal—or if the burden of the tax was allocated to the heir(s).

35 Carryover basis currently applies to wealth transfers during life.

36 Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options (March, 2000): 311–12. This report estimated that replacing stepped-up basis with carryover basis would raise 61% of the revenue raised from repealing stepped-up basis.

37 JCT, "President's FY 2017 Budget Proposal."

38 See Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes, 81 Fed. Reg. 51413 (proposed August 4, 2016). For example, Sens. Rubio, Moran, and Flake have proposed legislation blocking the regulation. Protect Family Farms and Businesses Act, S. 3436, 114th Cong. (2016).

39 Unlike the estate tax, the gift tax applies to the after-tax transfer. For example, the gift tax is $40 on a pre-tax gift (above the lifetime exemption) of $140, for a tax rate of 29%.

40 For further potential base broadeners, see Paul L. Caron and James Repetti, "Revitalizing the Estate Tax: 5 Easy Pieces," Tax Notes 142, (2014): 1231–41.

41 David Cay Johnston, "Talk of Lost Farms Reflects Muddle of Estate Tax Debate," New York Times, April 8, 2001 http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/08/us/talk-of-lost-farms-reflects-muddle-of-estate-tax-debate.html?_r=0; Michael J. Graetz and Ian Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight Over Taxing Inherited Wealth (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005): 32–40. According to the Tax Policy Center, only about 20 small business and farm estates owed any estate tax in 2013, and their average estate tax rate was 4.9%. Chye-Ching Huang and Brandon DeBot, "Ten Facts You Should Know About the Federal Estate Tax," (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 23, 2015) http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/ten-facts-you-should-know-about-the-federal-estate-tax.

42 The Middle Class Tax Cut Act of 2010, S.A. 4727 to H.R. 4853, (proposed December 2, 2010). https://www.congress.gov/amendment/111th-congress/senate-amendment/4727/text

43 Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions Contained in the Senate Amendment to H.R. 4853 (JCX-53-10), (December 2, 2010).https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3713

44 Fewer than 0.3 percent of estates exceed $3.5 million. Tax Policy Center, "Baseline Estate Tax Returns; Current Law and Multiple Reform Proposals, 2011-2021," T11-0156 (June 1, 2011) http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/estate-tax-distribution/baseline-estate-tax-returns-current-law-and-multiple-reform. The inheritance tax proposal would similarly apply only to the most wealthy. Among those receiving a bequest, 99.1 percent inherit less than $1 million and 99.9 percent inherit less than $2.5 million. Batchelder, "What Should Society Expect from Heirs," 110, tbl. A1.

45 Chuck Marr, Chye-Ching Huang, Arloc Sherman, and Brandon DeBot, "EITC and Child Tax Credit Promote Work, Reduce Poverty, and Support Children's Development, Research Finds," (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, October 1, 2015) http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/6-26-12tax.pdf; Executive Office of the President and U.S. Treasury Department, The President's Proposal to Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit, (March, 2014). https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/eitc_report_0.pdf






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John Case
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Dean Baker on The Midterm Elections in the United States [feedly]

The Midterm Elections in the United States
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/the-midterm-elections-in-the-united-states

Dean Baker
The Hankyoreh, October 21, 2018

See article on original site

Usually the elections for federal and state offices that take place between the US presidential elections get considerably less attention than those taking place in the same year as the presidential race. This is not likely to be true in 2018.

As is always the case, the entire House of Representatives will be up for reelection. There will be elections for a third of the Senate (actually 35 of 100 senators because of a resignation) and state governors races in 36 of the 50 states, including nine of the ten largest. In addition, most state legislatures will be up for grabs in the election as well.

The main reason this election is so important is that Donald Trump has demonstrated an unprecedented level of disrespect for basic norms of democracy and the rule of law. Republicans in Congress, with almost no exceptions, have been willing to go along in his abuses of power. If the Republicans manage to maintain control of both houses of Congress, there will be little ability to block Trump's attack on the basic institutions of democracy.

Trump's contempt for long-standing norms is perhaps best demonstrated by his personal finances. For almost half a century it has been a standard practice for presidents and presidential candidates to release their income tax returns. This demonstrated that they paid their taxes and also indicated where potential conflicts of interest could arise.

Trump had promised to release his tax returns during the campaign but said that he was waiting for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to finish an audit. While it is not clear that Trump was ever being audited (he never produced an audit letter from the IRS), since the election he has indicated that he has no intention of ever disclosing his tax returns.

It also had been the practice of past presidents to put their assets in a blind trust or in a portfolio with assets like Treasury bonds, where there would be little question of potential financial conflicts. Trump has instead turned over the operation of his businesses to his children. He has also directly handed government money to his resorts with his frequent visits, which require payments not only for his family and friends but also accompanying officials and security, as well as visiting foreign dignitaries.

The sums involved in these resort visits are trivial relative to the federal budget, but they do show Trump's disdain for democratic norms and the rule of law. In other areas, they are of much greater consequence.

For example, he has repeatedly complained about his attorney general, at one point saying that, "I have no attorney general." His specific complaint is that Jeff Sessions, the person he appointed as attorney general, has allowed an independent prosecutor to continue to investigate the ties between the Trump campaign and the Russian government. He has also complained that Sessions has not used the Justice Department to harass his political enemies.

Trump has indicated that he will likely fire Sessions at some point in the not distant future and look to replace him with someone who will use the Justice Department to advance his political agenda. If the Republicans maintain control of both houses of Congress, they will likely not object to this blatant abuse of power.

Trump and the Republican party are also looking for ways to disenfranchise voters to maintain their grip on power. It is important to recognize that the Republicans depend on being able to rule as a minority.

In 2016 Trump lost the nationwide popular vote by almost 3 million votes, or 2.1 percentage points. He nonetheless won the election because the presidential race is decided by the Electoral College in which most states the winner takes all. While electoral votes are partially proportionate to population (each state gets at least three votes regardless of its size), Trump won several large states by tiny margins, allowing him to get a majority in the Electoral College.

There is a similar story in the US Senate. Each state has two senators, which means that Wyoming, with less than 600,000 people, has the same number of senators as California with almost 40 million. With Republicans winning most of the small states' senators, they are able to have a majority of the Senate even when they get much less than half of the vote for senators.

The House of Representatives awards seats to states based on the population. But because the Republicans controlled the last redistricting processes following the 2010 Census, they drew districts in a way that will require the Democrats to win the overall vote by 6 to 8 percentage points to retake the House. With a new Census in 2020, the governors who are elected this year will preside over the redistricting that takes place in 2021. This will be an opportunity for either party to lock in favorable districts for a decade.

There is also a basic issue of whether people are able to vote. Republicans have pursued a variety of measures intended to make it difficult for minorities to vote. In prior years, courts have overruled many of these measures since the right to vote is a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution. In more recent years, Republican-appointed judges have approved many blatant acts of disenfranchisement. If they can maintain control of both houses of Congress, Republicans at both the federal and state level are likely to move more aggressively in implementing obstacles to minority voting.

For these reasons, there any many basic issues about democracy that will be at stake with the outcome of the 2018 election. While the US government has a long-standing democratic tradition and respect for the rule of law, these are very much up for grabs this year. We have a president and a major political party that care about neither.


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Six reasons not to put too much weight on the new study of Seattle’s minimum wage [feedly]

Six reasons not to put too much weight on the new study of Seattle's minimum wage
https://www.epi.org/blog/six-reasons-not-to-put-too-much-weight-on-the-new-study-of-seattles-minimum-wage/

Seattle's minimum wage increases are one of the most important local policy developments in recent years, but the new study by University of Washington researchers Jardim et al (2018) is largely uninformative about the effects of the policy because it uses the same flawed methodology that economists criticized in connection with earlier studies by the group. But, even if you believe the results of the new study, a careful reading of its actual findings shows the minimum wage benefitted all of the city's low-wage workers who had jobs prior to the increase.

1. The new study is based on a flawed comparison between Seattle and other areas in Washington state. The comparison causes the study to measure a reduction in the number of new jobs under $15/hour, when in fact this is not a cause for concern.

By comparing workers in Seattle with workers elsewhere in Washington state, the study incorrectly assumes that the low-wage labor market in Seattle would have grown like other areas in Washington, were it not for the city's 2015-2016 minimum wage increases. This comparison is unreasonable because, as other researchers have demonstrated (Dube 2017Rothstein and Schanzenbach 2017Zipperer and Schmitt 2017), Seattle experienced much faster wage gains for reasons that had nothing to do with the minimum wage. Indeed, the authors of the new study find that Seattle had faster wage growth and diverged from other regions prior to the city's minimum wage increases (see their Table 8 for the 2012-2013 period).

The flawed comparison underlying the study causes it to mistakenly attribute negative employment changes to the minimum wage, when in reality Seattle's economic boom simply meant that low-wage jobs were converted into higher-wage jobs. For example, the authors document a decline in newly employed workers earning less than $15/hour and argue that the minimum wage is causing "losses in employment opportunities." Instead, as jobs in Seattle's tightening labor market were upgraded from lower-wage to higher-wage jobs, there was a mechanical decline in the number of new entrants under any given low-wage threshold. The purported decline in new entrants is not a cause for concern. The fast wage growth in Seattle relative to comparison regions prevents the study from making credible claims about the consequences of the city's minimum wage increases in 2015 and 2016.

2. The study's analysis excludes newly entering workers in chains or other multi-site working establishments—these multi-site businesses are more than a third of low-wage employment in Washington.

The study uses detailed individual-level data on hours and earnings, but omits all newly employed individuals who work for an employer with multiple locations, like a chain, because the data cannot identify the location of any multi-establishment business. According to the authors, this exclusion is more than one-third of all jobs in Washington paying under $11 or $13 per hour. If larger, multi-site employers are more likely to be hiring low-wage workers after the minimum wage increase, this would cause the study to measure a reduction in the number of new low-wage entrants, even when no such reduction is taking place.

3. Although the study is not a reliable guide to the effects of the policy, if its findings are actually correct, all of the groups of incumbent workers analyzed by the authors were better off after the minimum wage increase.

According to the study, the average low-wage worker with a job before the minimum wage increase received significant gains in take-home pay as a result of the policy–about $500 per year in 2016. Even those who worked very low hours prior to the minimum wage change benefitted. Workers who were working very low hours (about eight hours a week on average) experienced a small reduction in their hours, but it was fully offset by hourly wage increases–leaving these workers with the same take-home pay from fewer hours of work. Meanwhile, the group of workers with more working hours prior to the minimum wage increase saw a jump up in take-home pay, exactly as intended by the policy.

4. The hours reduction the study attributes to the minimum wage is very small: according to the study's findings, low-wage workers worked about 45 minutes less per week after the minimum wage increases.

The study finds that incumbent low-wage workers work fewer hours after the minimum wage increase, so much so that a group of workers with low hours during the baseline period did not see any change in total take-home pay. But the actual drop in hours estimated by the study is very small–about 45 minutes per week–the average estimated effect across all periods for those earning either under $11/hour or $13/hour prior to the minimum wage increases. This very small reduction in hours holds for those workers with both lower and higher baseline hours of work per quarter.

5. The study uses non-standard terminology about "experience" to describe those who worked different amounts of hours prior to the minimum wage increase.

What the authors call "low-experience" or "high-experience" workers are actually workers with lower or higher attachment to the workforce in the nine months before the minimum wage increases went into effect. These terms are not based on the usual definition of experience used by economists or the general public. The term experience as used in the University of Washington study does not refer to workers' age, their total time in the labor market, or their total time with a given employer. It is more accurate to label these individuals as low-hours or high-hours workers, or having low or high attachment to the labor market.

It is also important to note that the population analyzed in the study worked very few hours per week. On average, the sample worked 18 hours per week, and 93 percent worked fewer than 40 hours per week. While a high share of part-time work is characteristic of low-wage populations, the very high share reported in the study calls into question the representativeness of the study's data. National data from 2015, for example, shows about 74 percent of workers at or below the federal minimum wage worked fewer 40 hours per week.

As a consequence, when the study divides its sample into low-hours and high-hours groups, the low-hours group worked very few hours: about eight hours per week. Nationally, less than 5 percent of workers earning at or below the federal minimum wage work fewer than eight hours per week. Part of the reason behind the low hours worked in the study's sample may be related to the exclusion from the sample of larger, multi-site businesses, where employees may tend to work more hours.

6. Seattle was already a relatively high-wage city before the recent minimum-wage increases. The increases enacted in Seattle in 2015 and 2016 were not particularly high relative to the pre-existing wage levels in the city. As a result, other high-quality research, based on many historical minimum wage increases, is applicable to the 2015-2016 Seattle minimum wage increases.

In 2016, at the end of the study period, the highest minimum wages in Seattle were $12.50-$13.00/hour for large employers and $10.50-$12.00/hour for small employers. Although minimum wage increases to this level were substantial by national standards, given Seattle's already high wages, these minimum wages are well within the evidence base for which high-quality research, which on balance finds large increases in take-home pay for low-wage workers, with little-to-no employment consequences.

Key relevant studies include: Rinz and Voorheis (2018), who use high-quality, administrative tax records and find that minimum wage increases led to large annual earnings increases for those at the bottom of the income distribution. Allegretto et al's (2018) evaluation of six city-wide minimum wage increases, including Seattle's, which concluded that the policies raised earnings in the low-wage restaurant sector without any detectable change in employment. And Cenzig et al's (2018) analysis of 138 state-level minimum wage increases, including those as high as Seattle's, which finds no significant evidence of reduced employment among low-wage workers, including among new entrants and incumbents. Indeed, all of these studies rely on multiple historical state- or city-wide minimum wage increases and are therefore less likely to be affected by the kinds of economic shocks such as Seattle's rapidly tightening labor market, which can bias the results of a single case study.


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Enlighten Radio:Its Monday -- Story day on Enlighten Radio

John Case has sent you a link to a blog:



Blog: Enlighten Radio
Post: Its Monday -- Story day on Enlighten Radio
Link: http://www.enlightenradio.org/2018/10/its-monday-story-day-on-enlighten-radio.html

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Sunday, October 21, 2018

Economic Update - A Deepening Crisis of Capitalism - 10.20.18 [feedly]

Economic Update - A Deepening Crisis of Capitalism - 10.20.18
https://economicupdate.podbean.com

Updates on IMF prediction of slowing global growth, Bank of England warnings on accumulation of sub-prime debt, Nordhaus Nobel prize and market ideology, Dutch unions and others against corporate tax evasion, and signs of labor militancy in Marriott strike and profit-sharing demands of steelworkers. Interview Chris Hedges on his latest book: America: The Farewell Tour.  

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Saturday, October 20, 2018

The Powerlessness of the Most Powerful [feedly]

The Powerlessness of the Most Powerful
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/powerlessness-of-most-powerful-by-javier-solana-2018-10

Oct 20, 2018 JAVIER SOLANA

The president of the leading global power has made it clear that he has no interest in getting involved in resolving any of the world's shared problems, dressing up his foreign policy as one of "principled realism." But there is nothing principled or realistic about it.

MADRID – The annual General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly is one of the most notable events on the international diplomatic calendar. As usual, this year's meeting, during the last week of September, brought together a long list of world leaders, although perhaps the term "world leader" should no longer be used so lightly. The president of the leading global power has made it clear that he has no interest in getting involved in resolving any of the world's shared problems. Unfortunately, he is not alone.



For those of us who put our faith in international cooperation as a necessary complement to economic globalization, the General Assembly debate revealed a bleak panorama. Certain leaders' short-term interests, often presented as "national interests," are one of the factors roiling international relations more than any time since the end of the Cold War. But the rise of nationalist populism is less the cause than the result of rifts that have been forming for some time.

As with any economic process, globalization has a distributive dimension, which means that it is bound to generate frustration for some groups of people. The center of the Western political spectrum has tended to underestimate the impact of rising inequality within countries, focusing instead on the benefits of market opening and integration, such as the unprecedentedly rapid reduction in global poverty. Understandably, however, not everyone is consoled by such outcomes.

It is not only goods, services, and capital that circulate through the global economy. Ideas circulate, too. So globalization, like democracy, is vulnerable to itself, because it puts at its opponents' disposal a set of tools that they can use to sabotage it. Aware of this, the "nationalist international" driven by US President Donald Trump and his ideological fellow travelers has mobilized anxiety and alienation to launch a (somewhat paradoxical) crusade to globalize their particular anti-globalization discourse.

Addressing the UN General Assembly, Trump stated openly that, "We reject the ideology of globalism, and we embrace the doctrine of patriotism." He lavished praise on other states, such as Poland, that follow his example. Should Brazilians elect the far-right presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro, they will join the wave of national populism threatening to raze the world's multilateral institutions.

Yet globalism and patriotism are not incompatible concepts. Trump's invocation of patriotism has no aim other than to whitewash his nationalist and nativist tendencies. Rhetorical traps of this type can catch us with our guard down, above all when the person who resorts to them is a leader who is known for serving his ideas raw. But it is evident that the Trump administration, too, worries about keeping up appearances.

There are many other examples. At the UN, Trump sought to give his foreign policy a patina of coherence by calling it "principled realism." In international relations, realism is a theory that regards states as the central actors and units of analysis, relegating international institutions and law to an ancillary status. Principles such as human rights are usually set aside, though countries may deploy them selectively to advance their interests.

This is precisely what Trump does when he criticizes the repression of the Iranian regime, while failing to denounce similar practices in other countries. But no self-respecting realist would exaggerate the threat posed by Iran, or allow a flurry of compliments from Kim Jong-un to cloud their vision regarding North Korea.

"America will always choose independence and cooperation over global governance, control, and domination," Trump told the UN. In theory, cooperation is not incompatible with the realist paradigm. For example, realists could conceive of the US trying to offset China's geopolitical rise by bolstering its alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, especially with Japan and South Korea.

But the Trump administration has called into question the security umbrella that it provides for these countries, not even exempting them from its protectionist trade measures (although the recent update of the bilateral agreement with South Korea seems to have calmed the waters). This disconcerting behavior has extended to other traditional US allies, such as the European Union, revealing that Trump is extraordinarily reluctant to cooperate. When he does, he seldom favors the alliances that most fit his country's strategic interests.

Regarding China, US diplomacy openly uses the term "competition," despite the friendly relations that Trump claims to maintain with Xi Jinping. The ongoing trade (and technology) war between the two countries, along with the bouts of friction in the South China Sea, seem to presage an uncontrollable spiral of confrontation.

Nonetheless, this scenario (which the realist school might foresee) can be avoided, especially if we shore up the existing structures of multilateral governance, which can help us to manage shifts in the balance of power. It is clear that China does not always adhere to international norms, but the right response is to uphold these norms, not to bulldoze them. Unfortunately, the US is opting for the latter course in many areas, such as commercial relations.

In his General Assembly speech, China's foreign minister, Wang Yi, did not stress the realpolitik that his country often promotes; instead, he mentioned the concept of "win-win" no less than five times. If Trump – together with the rest of the nationalist international – continues to reject this notion of mutual benefits, he will likely manage to slow down not only China's growth, but also that of the US.

Even more alarming, spurning multilateral cooperation means dooming the world to resignation in the face of existential issues such as climate change, a negligent stance that the Trump administration has adopted with relish. America's abdication of leadership under Trump raises an obvious question: What good is it to be the world's dominant power if, in the face of the greatest global challenges, its government chooses to condemn itself to powerlessness?


Javier Solana

Writing for PS since 2004 
97 Commentaries

Javier Solana was EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary-General of NATO, and Foreign Minister of Spain. He is currently President of the ESADE Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, Distinguished Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a member of the World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on Europe.


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Notes on Global Convergence (Wonkish and Off-Point) [feedly]

Notes on Global Convergence (Wonkish and Off-Point)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/20/opinion/notes-on-global-convergence-wonkish-and-off-point.html


Figure 1CreditCreditConference Board, Total Economy Database

For readers obsessed with the Trumpification of America and the looming election, I'm with you – I try not to check FiveThirtyEight more than five times a day, but it's hard. If you can't bear to think about anything else, don't read this; rest assured that this blog post isn't coming at the expense of writing about the core issue of the moment, it's a rest break, a bit of vacation in the head.

OK, that said, I read two things in the past few days that had me thinking about the biggest economic story there is: the dramatic rise of some formerly very poor nations, and the concomitant shift of the world's economic center of gravity away from the West.

One was a new paper by Patel, Sandefur, and Subramanianpointing out that overall global convergence in per capita GDP, which used to be largely absent in the data, has become very pronounced since 1990, with really fast growth in middle-income economies. The other was a tweet by my CUNY Stone Center colleague Branko Milanovic, pointing out that convergence among Western economies seems to have stalled.

I'd argue that these observations are really part of the same story. Let me start with Branko's observation.  

The way I'd make sense of this observation is to argue that the West has already converged, in terms of technology and productivity. The remaining differences in GDP per capita mainly reflect different social choices over things like vacation time and retirement age, and there's no reason to expect those differences to go away.

I won't do a full statistical analysis, but let me give the example of France versus the US. Figure 1 shows French productivity – real GDP per hour worked – relative to the US, and relative real GDP per capita. What you see is that French productivity has matched that of the US for many years (it was actually higher for a while, although that was probably a composition effect reflecting an older work force.) French real GDP per capita has, however, slid relative to US levels. Why?

Image
Figure 1CreditConference Board, Total Economy Database

Partly it's fewer people working – not prime-age adults, who are more likely to be employed in France, but mainly pre-seniors, 55-65, encouraged to retire by more generous pension policies. Even more important, the French take vacations; we don't (and often aren't allowed to.) 

So these are just different choices. And while France does need more pension reform (it has done some already), it's far from clear that overall French choices are worse. On many quality of life indicators, like life expectancy (Figure 2), America has fallen behind.

Image
Figure 2CreditOECD

The end of Western convergence, then, isn't an indicator of some kind of failure. Meanwhile, the coming of rapid convergence by emerging markets is a huge success story.

When I was in grad school in the 1970s, I thought I should do development economics – because it was clearly the most important subject – but didn't, because it was too depressing. At that point it was mostly non-development economics, the study of why Third World countries seemed to fall ever further behind the West. True, we were already seeing a growth takeoff in smaller East Asian economies, but few saw this as a trend that would spread to China and India.

Then something happened; we still don't know exactly what. It's a good guess that it has something to do with hyperglobalization, the unprecedented surge in world trade made possible by breaking up value chains and moving pieces of production to lower-wage countries. But we don't really know even that.

One thing is clear: at any given time, not all countries have that mysterious "it" that lets them make effective use of the backlog of advanced technology developed since the Industrial Revolution. Over time, however, the set of countries that have It seems to be widening.

Once a country acquires It, growth can be rapid, precisely because best practice is so far ahead of where the country starts. And because the frontier keeps moving out, countries that get It keep growing faster. Japan's postwar growth was vastly faster than that of the countries catching up to Britain in the late 19th century; Korea's growth from the mid-60s even faster than Japan's had been; China's growth faster still.

The It theory also, I'd argue, explains the U-shaped relationship Subramanian et al find between GDP per capita and growth, in which middle-income countries grow faster than either poor or rich countries. Countries that are still very poor are countries that haven't got It; countries that are already rich are already at the technological frontier, limiting the space for rapid growth. In between are countries that acquired It not too long ago, which has vaulted them into middle-income status, but are able to grow very fast by moving toward the frontier.   

The result is a world in which inequality among countries is declining if you look from the middle upward, but rising if you look from the middle down. Fundamentally, however, it's a story of diminishing Western exceptionalism, as the club of countries that can take full advantage of modern technology expands.

Oh, and rising inequality within Western countries means that if you look at the global distribution of household incomes, you get Branko's elephant chart.

It's not entirely a happy story. That concentration of income and wealth at the top is worrisome, not just economically, but for its political and social implications; it's one reason US democracy is teetering on the edge. And there are still hundreds of millions of people left out. But there's also a lot of good news in the picture.

I now return you to our regular political anxiety.


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