Tuesday, April 24, 2018

krugman: We Don’t Need No Education [feedly]

We Don't Need No Education
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/23/opinion/teachers-protest-education-funding.html

Matt Bevin, the conservative Republican governor of Kentucky, lost it a few days ago. Thousands of his state's teachers had walked off their jobs, forcing many schools to close for a day, to protest his opposition to increased education funding. And Bevin lashed out with a bizarre accusation: "I guarantee you somewhere in Kentucky today a child was sexually assaulted that was left at home because there was nobody there to watch them."

He later apologized. But his hysterical outburst had deep roots: At the state and local levels, the conservative obsession with tax cuts has forced the G.O.P. into what amounts to a war on education, and in particular a war on schoolteachers. That war is the reason we've been seeing teacher strikes in multiple states. And people like Bevin are having a hard time coming to grips with the reality they've created.

To understand how they got to this point, you need to know what government in America does with your tax dollars.

The federal government, as an old line puts it, is basically an insurance company with an army: nondefense spending is dominated by Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. State and local governments, however, are basically school districts with police departments. Education accounts for more than half the state and local work force; protective services like police and fire departments account for much of the rest. 

So what happens when hard-line conservatives take over a state, as they did in much of the country after the 2010 Tea Party wave? They almost invariably push through big tax cuts. Usually these tax cuts are sold with the promise that lower taxes will provide a huge boost to the state economy.

This promise is, however, never — and I mean never — fulfilled; the right's continuing belief in the magical payoff from tax cuts represents the triumph of ideology over overwhelming negative evidence.

What tax cuts do, instead, is sharply reduce revenue, wreaking havoc with state finances. For a great majority of states are required by law to balance their budgets. This means that when tax receipts plunge, the conservatives running many states can't do what Trump and his allies in Congress are doing at the federal level — simply let the budget deficit balloon. Instead, they have to cut spending.

And given the centrality of education to state and local budgets, that puts schoolteachers in the cross hairs.

How, after all, can governments save money on education? They can reduce the number of teachers, but that means larger class sizes, which will outrage parents. They can and have cut programs for students with special needs, but cruelty aside, that can only save a bit of money at the margin. The same is true of cost-saving measures like neglecting school maintenance and scrimping on school supplies to the point that many teachers end up supplementing inadequate school budgets out of their own pockets. 

So what conservative state governments have mainly done is squeeze teachers themselves.

Now, teaching kids was never a way to get rich. However, being a schoolteacher used to put you solidly in the middle class, with a decent income and benefits. In much of the country, however, that is no longer true.

At the national level, earnings of public-school teachers have fallen behind inflation since the mid-1990s, and have fallen even more behind the earnings of comparable workers. At this point, teachers earn 23 percent less than other college graduates. But this national average is a bit deceptive: Teacher pay is actually up in some big states like New York and California, but it's way down in a number of right-leaning states.

Meanwhile, teachers' benefits are also getting worse. In particular, teachers are having to pay a rising share of their health insurance premiums, a severe burden when their real earnings are declining at the same time.

So we're left with a nation in which teachers, the people we count on to prepare our children for the future, are starting to feel like members of the working poor, unable to make ends meet unless they take second jobs. And they can't take it anymore.

Which brings us back to Bevin's unhinged outburst.

One way to think about what's currently happening in a number of states is that the anti-Obama backlash, combined with the growing tribalism of American politics, delivered a number of state governments into the hands of extreme right-wing ideologues. These ideologues really believed that they could usher in a low-tax, small-government, libertarian utopia.

Predictably, they couldn't. For a while they were able to evade some of the consequences of their failure by pushing the costs off onto public sector employees, especially schoolteachers. But that strategy has reached its limits. Now what?

Well, some Republicans have actually proved willing to learn from experience, reverse tax cuts and restore education funding. But all too many are responding the way Bevin did: Instead of admitting, even implicitly, that they were wrong, they're lashing out, in increasingly unhinged ways, at the victims of their policies.

   

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Could the US Win World War III without using Nuclear Weapons? [feedly]

Could the US Win World War III without using Nuclear Weapons?
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/24/04/2018/could-us-win-world-war-iii-without-using-nuclear-weapons

As the US, Russia and China test each other's patience and strategic focus, speculation about the chances of a world war has hit a new high. But many of the people seriously engaged in this weighty discussion often get it wrong.

When it comes to estimating military capability, the Western media is principally concerned with the weapons capabilities of weaker states – and it rarely pays much attention to the colossal capability of the US, which still accounts for most of the world's defence spending.

Any sensible discussion of what a hypothetical World War III might look like needs to begin with the sheer size and force of America's military assets. For all that China and Russia are arming up on various measures, US commanders have the power to dominate escalating crises and counter opposing forces before they can be used.

Take missile warfare alone. The US Navy already has 4,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles, and the Navy and Air Force are currently taking delivery of 5,000 JASSM conventional cruise missiles with ranges from 200-600 miles. Barely visible to radar, these are designed to destroy "hardened" targets such as nuclear missile silos. Russia and China, by contrast, have nothing of equivalent quantity or quality with which to threaten the US mainland.

The same holds true when it comes to maritime forces. While much is made of Russia's two frigates and smaller vessels stationed off the Syrian coast, France alone has 20 warships and an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean – and US standing forces in the area include six destroyers equipped with scores of cruise missiles and anti-missile systems. At the other end of Europe, the Russian military is threatening the small Baltic states, but it is rarely noted that the Russian Baltic fleet is the same size as Denmark's and half the size of Germany's.

Meanwhile, China's aggressively expansionist behaviour in the South China Sea is reported alongside stories of its first aircraft carrier and long-range ballistic missiles. But for all that the Chinese navy is large and growing, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, it's still only numerically equivalent to the combined fleets of Japan and Taiwan, while the US boasts 19 aircraft carriers worldwide if its marine assault ships are included.

But overhanging all this, of course, is the nuclear factor.

Out of the sky

The US, Russia and China are all nuclear-armed; Vladimir Putin recently unveiled a new fleet of nuclear-capable missiles which he described as "invincible in the face of all existing and future systems", and some have suggested that China may be moving away from its no-first-use policy. This is all undeniably disturbing. While it has long been assumed that the threat of nuclear weapons acts as a deterrent to any war between the major powers, it's also possible that the world may simply have been riding its luck. But once again, the US's non-nuclear capabilities are all too often overlooked.

US leaders may in fact believe they can remove Russia's nuclear deterrent with an overwhelming conventional attack backed up by missile defences. This ability was cultivated under the Prompt Global Strike programme, which was initiated before 9/11 and continued during the Obama years. Organised through the US Air Force's Global Strike Command, it is to use conventional weapons to attack anywhere on Earth in under 60 minutes.

This is not to say the task would be small. In order to destroy Russia's nuclear missiles before they can be launched, the US military would need to first blind Russian radar and command and communications to incoming attack, probably using both physical and cyber attacks. It would then have to destroy some 200 fixed and 200 mobile missiles on land, a dozen Russian missile submarines, and Russian bombers. It would then need to shoot down any missiles that could still be fired.

Russia is not well positioned to survive such an attack. Its early warning radars, both satellite and land-based, are decaying and will be hard to replace. At the same time, the US has and is developing a range of technologies to carry out anti-satellite and radar missions, and it has been using them for years. (All the way back in 1985, it shot down a satellite with an F15 jet fighter.) That said, the West is very dependent on satellites too, and Russia and China continue to develop their own anti-satellite systems.

The air war

Russia's bomber aircraft date back to the Soviet era, so despite the alarm they provoke when they nudge at Western countries' airspace, they pose no major threat in themselves. Were the Russian and US planes to face each other, the Russians would find themselves under attack from planes they couldn't see and that are any way out of their range.

US and British submarine crews claim a perfect record in constantly shadowing Soviet submarines as they left their bases throughout the Cold War. Since then, Russian forces have declined and US anti-submarine warfare has been revived, raising the prospect that Russian submarines could be taken out before they could even launch their missiles.

The core of the Russia's nuclear forces consists of land-based missiles, some fixed in silos, others mobile on rail and road. The silo-based missiles can now be targeted by several types of missiles, carried by US planes almost invisible to radar; all are designed to destroy targets protected by deep concrete and steel bunkers. But a problem for US war planners is that it might take hours too long for their missile-carrying planes to reach these targets – hence the need to act in minutes.

One apparently simple solution to attacking targets very quickly is to fit quick nuclear ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads. In 2010, Robert Gates, then serving as secretary of defence under Barack Obama, said that the US had this capability. Intercontinental ballistic missiles take just 30 minutes to fly between the continental US's Midwest and Siberia; if launched from well-positioned submarines, the Navy's Tridents can be even quicker, with a launch-to-target time of under ten minutes.

From 2001, the US Navy prepared to fit its Trident missiles with either inert solid warheads – accurate to within ten metres – or vast splinter/shrapnel weapons. Critics have argued that this would leave a potential enemy unable to tell whether they were under nuclear or conventional attack, meaning they would have to assume the worst. According to US Congressional researchers, the development work came close to completion, but apparently ceased in 2013.

Nonetheless, the US has continued to develop other technologies across its armed services to attack targets around the world in under an hour – foremost among them hypersonic missiles, which could return to Earth at up to ten times the speed of sound, with China and Russia trying to keep up.

Missile envy

The remainder of Russia's nuclear force consists of missiles transported by rail. An article on Kremlin-sponsored news outlet Sputnik described how these missile rail cars would be so hard to find that Prompt Global Strike might not be as effective as the US would like – but taken at face value, the article implies that the rest of the Russian nuclear arsenal is in fact relatively vulnerable.

Starting with the "Scud hunt" of the First Gulf War, the US military has spent years improving its proficiency at targeting mobile ground-based missiles. Those skills now use remote sensors to attack small ground targets at short notice in the myriad counter-insurgency operations it's pursued since 2001.

If the "sword" of Prompt Global Strike doesn't stop the launch of all Russian missiles, then the US could use the "shield" of its own missile defences. These it deployed after it walked out of a treaty with Russia banning such weapons in 2002.

While some of these post-2002 missile defence systems have been called ineffective, the US Navy has a more effective system called Aegis, which one former head of the Pentagon's missile defence programs claims can shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles. Some 300 Aegis anti-ballistic missiles now equip 40 US warships; in 2008, one destroyed a satellite as it fell out of orbit.

War mentality

In advance of the Iraq war, various governments and onlookers cautioned the US and UK about the potential for unforeseen consequences, but the two governments were driven by a mindset impervious to criticism and misgivings. And despite all the lessons that can be learned from the Iraq disaster, there's an ample risk today that a similarly gung-ho attitudecould take hold.

Foreign casualties generally have little impact on domestic US politics. The hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who died under first sanctions and then war did not negatively impact presidents Clinton or George W. Bush. Neither might the prospect of similar casualties in Iran or North Korea or other states, especially if "humanitarian" precision weapons are used.

But more than that, an opinion poll run by Stanford University's Scott Sagan found that the US public would not oppose the preemptive use of even nuclear weapons provided that the US itself was not affected. And nuclear Trident offers that temptation.

The control of major conventional weapons as well as WMD needs urgent attention from international civil society, media and political parties. There is still time to galvanise behind the Nobel-winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and the nuclear ban treaty, and to revive and globalise the decaying arms control agenda of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which played a vital part in bringing the Cold War to a largely peaceful end.

Like the Kaiser in 1914, perhaps Trump or one of his successors will express dismay when faced with the reality a major US offensive unleashes. But unlike the Kaiser, who saw his empire first defeated and then dismembered, perhaps a 21st-century US president might get away with it.



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Monday, April 23, 2018

Russia Sanctions Push Kazakhstan Closer to China [feedly]

Russia Sanctions Push Kazakhstan Closer to China
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/23/04/2018/russia-sanctions-push-kazakhstan-closer-china

Tristan Kenderdine examines the growing dependency of global industrial output on Chinese policy and the risks this holds for a global trade perspective.

Ahead of the Astana Economic Forum in May, Kazakhstan will be looking to showcase its integration with the global economy and tout its attractiveness for global investment. Yet the reality of Kazakhstan's international trade and investment policy will be dominated by the twin pins of China's geoeconomic strategy and its continuing symbiotic economic relationship with Russia. And for the United States, the introduction of short-term exchange rate volatility via renewed Russian sanctions pushes Kazakhstan further towards China rather than pulling it into the global economy. Poor policy integration from the US, means that its Russian sanction policy is having spillover effects on Kazakhstan, while China's state policy finance architecture is standing ready to offer decade-length strategic investment in industrials.

 

Kazakhstan was hit in April 2018 with exchange rate volatility in a proxy effect from the US targeted weakening of the Russian ruble. The ruble lost 10 percent in value against the US dollar in the week following the introduction of sanctions, and as a result the tenge weakened 3 percent over the same week and 1.8 percent in the two days 9-10 Aprilalone. This falling tenge prompted central government ministries and the National Bank of Kazakhstan to draft an emergency government response plan.

 

Central bank officials have been in fire-fighting mode. Daniyar Akishev, director of the National Bank of Kazakhstan, reminded the population that it was normal for a floating tenge to go through weakening and strengthening cycles, and advised the government not to take any defensive monetary policy decisions. Alpysbai Akhmetov, vice director of the National Bank of Kazakhstan, reaffirmed that the recent mini devaluation had simply been market deviation, and that the national bank would not engage in active foreign exchange interventions. While Timur Suleimenov, Minister of National Economy, said that Kazakhstan would consider short-term trade and investment policy options rather than interventionist monetary policy.

 

Kazakhstan introduced a free-floating exchange rate regime for the tenge in August 2015 after having to weaken the national currency by 19 percent in 2014 to align the US exchange rate to Kazakhstan's ruble peg. Soon after floating, the tenge lost a further 40 percent in a move that devastated many working people, as real estate is routinely negotiated in US dollars. Kazakhs are wary of a repeat of the devaluations, and it will be a hard sell to reassure the public that the latest exchange rate volatility tied to the ruble is market-driven rather than state-directed currency devaluation.

 

While Russia ruble sanctions hit the Kazakhstan tenge by proxy, China's industrial transfer policy finance offers a long-term stability to finance economic development. Kazakhstan has benefited from clearer policy transmission from China than many other economies on the Belt and Road geoindustrial policy. This latest threat to the tenge comes as Kazakh Invest released a list of 658 industrial investment projects for 2018-2020 to better align with China's investment in the Kazakh leg of the Belt and Road.

 

China's geoindustrial macrostrategy to transfer industrial capacity to external geographies in Central Asia is becoming increasingly clear. China's domestic factory closures under the Supply-side Reform policy is forcing Chinese State-owned Enterprises to relocate abroad. This is guided by with soft policy bank loans to help them ease into external geographies, are guided by government policy to match certain provinces with certain Central Asian states to push outward direct investment in targeted industries. China's industrial transfer financing policy for Kazakhstan centres on Hebei province in a financing system known as 'One Province, One Country'.

 

At an International Capacity Cooperation conference in Astana in August last year, China's Hebei sent provincial representatives of the Development and Reform Commission, Department of Commerce, and Department of Agriculture to meet with Kazakh officials and leaders of China's enterprises to discuss deepening International Capacity Cooperation. This followed a meeting in Beijing in May which saw Hebei province pledge to focus on four areas of exporting factory capacity in steel, cement, glass, and photovoltaic cells as well as equipment manufacturing.

 

The pattern of one Chinese province being paired with one sovereign state is normal for the unfolding industrial transfer policy. Not only is Hebei province paired with Kazakhstan, Jilin province is matched with Russia, Henan with Uzbekistan, Guangdong with Pakistan, and Shanxi to Indonesia. This administrative matchmaking is then paired with access to preferential policy funding and guided by international industrial associations by sector. For example Jilin to Russia in agriculture, rail transport, and finance; Shanxi to Indonesia in nickel smelting, energy equipment and transport equipment.

 

The Hebei-Kazakhstan pairing focuses on aluminium, glass, cement, logistics and warehousing, pharmaceuticals, and agroindustrial machinery. Hebei province, due to be merged with Beijing and Tianjin into the Jingjinji super-province, is the most concentrated steel production complex on the planet. As the centre of China's coal-steel industrial complex and its peripheral industries, Hebei is to be the hardest hit of any provincial governments by the central government's plans to curb excess factory capacity in traditional polluting industries. Enterprises and projects that have already begun transferring abroad include the Astana Industrial Park Phase II project, a joint venture between Xingtai Road and Bridge Construction Corporation and Astana City Investment and Development Bureau; USD 200 million to establish industrial parks in North Kazakhstan's Petropavlovsk; JA Solar Holdings photovoltaic energy generation; and China Glass Holding's move to take over a 600 ton a day floating glass production line. Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Logistics has also established a cross-border e-commerce, warehousing and logistics deal with Hebei Good Hope Logistics Development.

 

Kazakhstan's national level economic planning is designed to utilise Chinese capital to leverage a 'third modernisation' into an open economic model. Policies such as the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, for long term post-hydrocarbon economic development, the USD9 billion Nurly Zhol (Bright Path) critical infrastructure investment plan to dock with China's Belt and Road transcontinental transport and logistics policy, and the Kazakhstan Industrial Innovation Development 2015-2019 short-term secondary industrial promotion strategy all exude an independent industrial strategy open to foreign investment. And the Russian Federation remains Kazakhstan's largest trading partner, with the countries tied together in the EEU customs union and sharing a high degree of economic complementarity. This means neither Moscow nor Astana have any need to fear Chinese industrial investment in Kazakhstan.

 

But Washington is now flirting with a geofinancial risk that it is unprepared to back. US destabilising the ruble risks pushing regional economies striving for greater integration with the global economy instead towards a ruble-yuan pact or a petro-yuan. And for recipient countries, China's closed capital account and unaudited state banking credit system means that investments in Kazakhstan carry with them an inherent financial risk tied to China's banking system. Suffering from a period of policy malaise, Washington is seeing decades of careful policy architecture in Central Asia being flattened with the broad, boorish strokes of sanctions and tariffs. Global trade calculus is more complicated than Washington can plan for, and in a battle of steel and aluminium, Kazakhstan will be happy to soak up China's excess capacity in both. The longer-term risk for the global trade perspective though is world-wide aggregate industrial output's growing dependency on Chinese policy bank capital.

 

For the United States, targeting the ruble hurts more than just Russia, and US foreign policy credibility in Central Asia is naturally taking a hit. For Kazakhstan, used to balancing geopolitical power, the rhetoric of global economic convergence may soon be muffled by the hard reality of rubles and yuan. Regardless of the Kazakhstan government's response to the short-term attack on the tenge, Kazakhstan's long-term investment strategy is banking on China.

 

 

 

Tristan Kenderdine is Research Director at Future Risk.



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Economic Update - Why People Struggle With The System - 04.22.18 [feedly]

Economic Update - Why People Struggle With The System - 04.22.18
http://economicupdate.podbean.com/e/economic-update-why-people-struggle-with-the-system-042218/

download (size: 107 MB )

 "Updates on teachers' strikes, capitalism abuses facebook, colleges reward privilege and reproduce it, Shell Oil knew about fossil fuels and global warming for last 50 years, UK housing size shrinks, Sinclair Broadcasting traps employees, US anti-depressant epidemic. Interview Rob Robinson: continuing discussion of water as human right vs for profit: how people fight and win."



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Links [feedly]

Sam Bowles: Marx and modern microeconomics

Marx and modern microeconomics

Samuel Bowles 21 April 2018




Economists, looking back, have not found much to admire in Karl Marx, the economist, the bicentennial of whose birth we commemorate next month. John Maynard Keynes referred to Capital as "an obsolete economic textbook [that is] not only scientifically erroneous but without interest or application to the modern world" (Keynes 1925). Paul Samuelson's judgement – "From the viewpoint of pure economic theory, Karl Marx can be regarded as a minor post-Ricardian" – was equally harsh, especially as he thought Ricardo was "the most overrated of economists"(Samuelson 1962). 

These assessments are based largely on our current – and correct in my view – understanding of Marx's labour theory of value as a pioneering, but inconsistent and outdated, attempt at a general equilibrium model of pricing and distribution. But there is another aspect of his work that has been strongly vindicated by theoretical advances in recent decades: the idea that the exercise of power is an essential aspect of the working of the capitalist economy, even in its idealised, perfectly competitive, state. 

Domination in liberal society

Marx used the labour theory of value to demonstrate that the exploitation of workers is a necessary condition for profits (Yoshihara 2017). The normative term 'exploitation' is justified by the claim that profit arises from a system of domination in which the wealthy, as owners of capital goods, direct the activities and limit the choices of employees (Vrousalis 2013). Domination in this sense could be sustained by an autocratic state acting on behalf of a capitalist class, or through the exercise of market power made possible by limited competition in goods markets.

But Marx chose to study a more challenging question: how could the domination of labour by capital take place in a private, perfectly competitive, economy governed by a liberal state? His answer was based on what seems a strikingly modern principal-agent representation of the employer-employee relationship, arising from a conflict of interest over the amount of labour effort performed that could be resolved in an enforceable contract. 

Marx stressed that the employer purchases the worker's time on the labour market, not the worker's work. The employee's supply of effort to the production process is not secured by contract but was rather an "extraction" that "only by misuse could ... have been called any kind of exchange at all" (Marx 1939).

To stress the distinctive aspect of the labour market, Marx (1867) pointed out that: 

"[T]he rise in ... wages may ... be unaccompanied by any change in the price of labour [meaning effort], or may even be accompanied by a fall in the latter."

The important consequence for the worker, "be his payment high or low," was "domination and exploitation" and "a form of despotism more hateful for its meanness" (ibid).

The final step in Marx's explanation of domination in a liberal capitalist economy was the process of accumulation and technical change that supports a permanent "reserve army" (ibid) of the unemployed, and which provides the basis of the employer's labour discipline strategy. The private ownership of the means of production conveys the right to exclude others from use of the firm's assets, and therefore the owners of firms have a powerful threat to induce workers to supply the effort that could not be secured by contract: work hard, or join the "reserve army".

The politics of production

Marx did not explain why the labour contract was incomplete. He assumed this was an uncontroversial empirical observation and used it as the starting point for his economic theory. In this, he resembles Charles Darwin who advanced a powerful theory of natural selection without an understanding of the mechanism by which it occurred. Genetic inheritance would later be explained by Gregor Mendel.

Just as Mendel underpinned Darwin, a more complete understanding of the incomplete labour contract developed in the twentieth century, but did not overturn Marx's conclusions. Like Marx, Ronald Coase (1937) stressed the central role of authority in the firm's contractual relations: 

"[N]ote the character of the contract into which a factor enters that is employed within a firm ...[T]he factor ... for certain remuneration agrees to obey the directions of the entrepreneur."

Indeed, Coase defined the firm by its political structure: 

"If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in prices but because he is ordered to do so ... the distinguishing mark of the firm is the suppression of the price mechanism." (ibid)

Herbert Simon provided the first Coasean model of the firm (Simon 1951). He represented the employment contract as an exchange in which the employees transfer control rights over their work tasks to the employer, in return for a wage. Simon stressed the advantage to the employer of this arrangement, because there was unavoidable uncertainty about the tasks that would be required over the course of the contract. Therefore there was a high cost of agreeing to a complete contractual specification of the activities to be performed. Simon did not know that he was modelling exactly the incomplete contract for labour that was the fulcrum of Marx's economic theory.

Coase or Simon did not directly explain why control rights confer power. As an empirical matter, the firm appears to be a political institution in the sense that some members of the firm routinely give commands with the expectation that they will be obeyed, while others are constrained to follow these commands. If we say that the manager has the right to decide what the worker will do, this means only that the manager has the legitimate authority, not the power to secure compliance. Given that, in a liberal society, the manager is restricted in the kinds of punishment that can be inflicted, and given that the employee is free to leave, it is a puzzle that orders are typically obeyed.

Noticing this, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz challenged the Coasean idea that the firm is a mini "command economy", suggesting that the employment contract is no different in this respect from other contracts:

"The firm ... has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two people ... Wherein then is the relationship between a grocer and his employee different from that between a grocer and his customer?" (Alchian and Demsetz 1972)

Oliver Hart (1989) responded:

'[T]he reason that an employee is likely to be more responsive to what his employer wants than a grocer is that the employer ... can deprive the employee of the assets he works with and hire another employee to work with these assets, while the customer can only deprive the grocer of his customer and as long as the customer is small, it is presumably not very difficult for the grocer to find another customer."

The exercise of power

This explanation requires a demonstration that power – in some well-defined sense – can be exercised by employers over employees in the equilibrium of a competitive economy. It is nevertheless puzzling that power is exercised in a competitive economy, in which each actor engages voluntarily in exchanges, from which each is equally free to walk away.

The following sufficient condition for the exercise of power captures the central features of Marx's (1867) representation of the "despotism" of the workplace: 

For B to have power over A, it sufficient that, by imposing or threatening to impose sanctions on A, B is capable of affecting A's actions in ways that further B's interests, while A lacks this capacity with respect to B. (Bowles and Gintis 1992)

The definition clarifies the difference between the employer and the grocer in Hart's response to Alchian and Demsetz. The sanctions imposed on the employee by depriving that employee access to the capital good are severe (technically, first order), while those imposed on the grocer by the departing customer are negligible or zero (second order). The disgruntled consumer who walks out the door does not impose a sanction on the grocer because the grocer (in competitive equilibrium) was maximising profits by selecting a level of sales that equates marginal cost to the exogenously given price. A small variation in sales has only a second-order effect on profits. But this is not the case for the employer-employee relationship. This is because involuntary unemployment is a characteristic of the competitive equilibrium of a market in which labour effort is not covered in an enforceable contract(Bowles 1985, Gintis and Ishikawa 1987, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1985). The employer's threat to terminate the worker's position wouldthus impose a first-order cost on the worker. This is the basis of the exercise of power by employers.

The incomplete nature of the labour contract is therefore essential to showing both why the employer's power over the worker is essential to profit-making, and also how it can be sustained by equilibrium unemployment. Marx understood the first but not the second, providing instead a dynamic (and not entirely convincing) account of how the reserve army would be sustained in the long run.

Microeconomist or precursor to modern micro? 

Marx was a pioneer in the study of principal-agent relationships, though of course he did not use the term. Principal-agent models now form the microeconomic foundation for the study of relationships among classes (though economists do not use that term) in capitalist and other economies, for example the standard treatments of the exchanges between employer and employee, or between lender and borrower. These models are essential to current analysis of workaday economic problems such as the cyclical patterns in wage-setting and productivity, and the quantity constraints that borrowers face in credit markets. Both of these problems have substantial microeconomic importance, but are also important foundations of macroeconomics.

Marx was a visionary precursor of modern microeconomics, and modern microeconomics has repaid him the favour by clarifying the limits of some of his most important ideas. Among them the labour theory of value as a representation of a general system of exchange (Morishima 1973, 1974), and his "theory of the tendency of the profit rate to fall" (Bowles 1981, Okishio 1961). As Michio Morishima (1974) pointed out, Marx did not resolve the outstanding theoretical problems of his day, but rather anticipated problems that would later be addressed mathematically.

Modern public economics, mechanism design and public choice theory has also challenged the notion – common among many latter-day Marxists, though not originating with Marx himself – that economic governance without private property and markets could be a viable system of economic governance. 

Political and economic problems

In 1972 Abba Lerner astutely identified one of the limits of the neoclassical paradigm. A contract transforms "a political problem into an economic problem. An economic transaction is a solved political problem ... Economics has gained the title Queen of the Social Sciences by choosing solved political problems as its domain." (Lerner 1972)

Whether this is a feature or a bug depends on your point of view. The Queen's domain has not seemed too cramped because the same paradigm provided a reason to think that unsolved "political problems", such as the incomplete nature of the labour contract, or the exercise of power byemployers over workers, were illusions. Joseph Schumpeter made this point: "What distinguishes directing and directed labour appears at first sight to be very fundamental," he wrote. But, he argued, in reality the difference "constitutes no essential economic distinction ... the conduct of the former is subject to the same rules as that of the latter ... and to establish this regularity ... is a fundamental task of economic theory." (Schumpeter 1934)

Why, one wonders, would Schumpeter consider this point to be of such exceptional importance? The answer is that if Marx's despotism of the workplace is real, then the liberal argument against economic democracy – there's nothing there to democratise – is false.

Editors' note: This column is based on a larger work of the same title to be published in Japanese in a special issue of Keizai Seminar, edited by Naoki Yoshihara. 

References

Alchian, A A and H Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", American Economic Review 62(5): 777-95.

Bowles, S (1981), "Technical Change and the Profit Rate: A Simple Proof of the Okishio Theorem", Cambridge Journal of Economics 5(2): 183–186.

Bowles, S (1985), "The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo- Hobbesian, and Marxian Models", American Economic Review 75(1): 16-36.

Bowles, S and H Gintis (1992), "Power and Wealth in a Competitive Capitalist Economy", Philosophy and Public Affairs 21(4): 324-53.

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--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV

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