Tuesday, January 16, 2018

Economic Update - Capitalism and Addiction: The Opioid Epidemic - 01.14.18 [feedly]

Economic Update - Capitalism and Addiction: The Opioid Epidemic - 01.14.18
http://economicupdate.podbean.com/e/economic-update-capitalism-and-addiction-the-opioid-epidemic-011418/

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

TimTaylor:Some Economics for Martin Luther King Day


Some Economics for Martin Luther King Day

On November 2, 1983, President Ronald Reagan signed a law establishing a federal holiday for the birthday of Martin Luther King Jr., to be celebrated each year on the third Monday in January. As the legislation that passed Congress said: "such holiday should serve as a time for Americans to reflect on the principles of racial equality and nonviolent social change espoused by Martin Luther King, Jr.." Of course, the case for racial equality stands fundamentally upon principles of justice, not economics. But here are a few economics-related thoughts for the day from the archives:

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1) Inequalities of race and gender impose large economic costs on society as a whole, because one consequence of discrimination is that it hinders people in developing and using their talents. In "Equal Opportunity and Economic Growth" (August 20, 2012), I wrote:

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A half-century ago, white men dominated the high-skilled occupations in the U.S. economy, while women and minority groups were often barely seen. Unless one holds the antediluvian belief that, say, 95% of all the people who are well-suited to become doctors or lawyers are white men, this situation was an obvious misallocation of social talents. Thus, one might predict that as other groups had more equal opportunities to participate, it would provide a boost to economic growth. Pete Klenow reports the results of some calculations about these connections in "The Allocation of Talent and U.S. Economic Growth," a Policy Brief for the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

Here's a table that illustrates some of the movement to greater equality of opportunity in the U.S. economy. White men are no longer 85% and more of the managers, doctors, and lawyers, as they were back in 1960. High skill occupation is defined in the table as "lawyers, doctors, engineers, scientists, architects, mathematicians and executives/managers." The share of white men working in these fields is up by about one-fourth. But the share of white women working in these occupations has more than tripled; of black men, more than quadrupled; of black women, more than octupled.


Moreover, wage gaps for those working in the same occupations have diminished as well. "Over the same time frame, wage gaps within occupations narrowed. Whereas working white women earned 58% less on average than white men in the same occupations in 1960, by 2008 they earned 26% less. Black men earned 38% less than white men in the typical occupation in 1960, but had closed the gap to 15% by 2008. For black women the gap fell from 88% in 1960 to 31% in 2008."

Much can be said about the causes behind these changes, but here, I want to focus on the effect on economic growth. For the purposes of developing a back-of-the-envelope estimate, Klenow builds up a model with some of these assumptions: "Each person possesses general ability (common to
all occupations) and ability specific to each occupation (and independent across occupations). All groups (men, women, blacks, whites) have the same distribution of abilities. Each young person knows how much discrimination they would face in any occupation, and the resulting wage they would get in each occupation. When young, people choose an occupation and decide how
much to augment their natural ability by investing in human capital specific to their chosen
occupation."

With this framework, Klenow can then estimate how much of U.S. growth over the last 50 years or so can be traced to greater equality of opportunity, which encouraged many in women and minority groups who had the underlying ability to view it as worthwhile to make a greater investment in human capital.

"How much of overall growth in income per worker between 1960 and 2008 in the U.S. can be explained by women and African Americans investing more in human capital and working more in high-skill occupations? Our answer is 15% to 20% ... White men arguably lost around 5% of their earnings, as a result, because they moved into lower skilled occupations than they otherwise would have. But their losses were swamped by the income gains reaped by women and blacks."

At least to me, it is remarkable to consider that 1/6 or 1/5 of total U.S. growth in income per worker may be due to greater economic opportunity. In short, reducing discriminatory barriers isn't just about justice and fairness to individuals; it's also about a stronger U.S. economy that makes better use of the underlying talents of all its members.

____________________________
2) The black-white wage gap--and the share of the gap that is "unexplained"-- is rising, not falling. Here's part of what I wrote about in "Breaking Down the Black-White Wage Gap (September 6, 2017):

---------
Mary C. Daly, Bart Hobijn, and Joseph H. Pedtke set the stage for a more insightful discussion in their short essay, "Disappointing Facts about the Black-White Wage Gap," written as an "Economic Letter" for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (September 5, 2017, 2017-26). Here are a couple of figures showing the black-white wage gap, and then seeking to explain what share of that gap is associated with differences in state of residence, education, part-time work, industry/occupation, and age. The first figure shows the wage gap for black and white men; the second for black and white women.






Here are some thoughts on these patterns:

1) The black-white wage gap is considerably larger for men (about 25%) than for women (about 15%). Also, the wage gaps seem to have risen since the 1980s.

2) The three biggest factors associated with the wage gap seem to be education level, industry/occupation, and "unexplained."

3) The "unexplained" share is rising over time time. As the authors explain: "Perhaps more troubling is the fact that the growth in this unexplained portion accounts for almost all of the growth in the gaps over time. For example, in 1979 about 8 percentage points of the earnings gap for men was unexplained by readily measurable factors, accounting for over a third of the gap. By 2016, this portion had risen to almost 13 percentage points, just under half of the total earnings gap. A similar pattern holds for black women, who saw the gaps between their wages and those of their white counterparts more than triple over this time to 18 percentage points in 2016, largely due to factors outside of our model. This implies that factors that are harder to measure—such as discrimination, differences in school quality, or differences in career opportunities—are likely to be playing a role in the persistence and widening of these gaps over time." The authors also cite this more detailed research paper with similar findings.

4) In looking at the black-white wage gap for women, it's quite striking that this gap was relatively small back in the 1980s, at only about 5%, and that observable factors like education and industry/occupation explained more than 100% of the wage gap at the time. But as the black-white wage gap for women increased starting in the 1990s, an "unexplained" gap opens up.

5) It is tempting to treat the "unexplained" category as an imperfect but meaningful measure of racial discrimination, but it's wise to be quite cautious about such an interpretation. On one side, the "unexplained" category may overstate discrimination, because it doesn't include other possible variables that affect wages (for example, one could include previous years of lifetime work experience, or length of tenure at a current job, scores on standardized tests, or many other variables). In addition, the variables that are included like level of education are being measured in broad terms, and so it is possible that, say, a blacks and whites with a college education are not the same in their skills and background. On the other side, the "unexplained" category could easily understate the level of discrimination. After all, education levels and industry/occupation outcomes don't happen in a vacuum, but are a result of the income, education, and jobs of family members. For this reason, noting that a wage gap is associated with some different in education or industry/occupation may reflect aspects of social discrimination. The kinds of calculations presented here are useful, but they don't offer final answers.

In short, the black-white wage gap is rising, not falling. The wage gap is also less associated with basic measures like level of education or industry/occupation than it was before. I can hypothesize a number of explanations for this pattern, but none of my hypotheses are cheerful ones.

___________________

3) The patterns in which speeding tickets are given for those just a little over the speed limit can  reveal discrimination. I discuss some evidence on this point in "Leniency in Speeding Tickets: Bunching Evidence of Police Bias" (April 5, 2017):

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Imagine for a moment the distribution of speed for drivers who are breaking the speed limit. One would expect that a fairly large number of drivers break the speed limit by a small amount, and then a decreasing number of drivers break the speed limit by larger amounts.

But here's the actual distribution of amount over the speed limit on the roughly 1 million tickets given by about 1,300 officers of the Florida Highway Patrol between 2005 and 2015. The graph is fromFelipe Goncalves and Steven Mello, "A Few Bad Apples? Racial Bias in Policing," Princeton University Industrial Relations Section Working Paper #608, March 6, 2017. The left-hand picture shows the distribution of the amount over the speed limit on the speeding ticket given to whites; the right-hand picture shows the distribution the amount over the speed limit on the speeding tickets given to blacks and Hispanics.



Some observations:

1) Very few tickets are given to those driving only a few miles per hour over the speed limit. Then there is an enormous spike in those given tickets for being about 9 mph over the speed limit. There are also smaller spikes at some higher levels. In Florida, the fine for being 10 mph over the limit is substantially higher (at least $50, depending on the county) compared to the fine for being 9 mph over the limit.

2) The jump at 9 mph is sometimes called a "bunching indicator" and it can be a revealing approach in a number of contexts. For example, if being above or below a certain test score makes you eligible for a certain program or job, and one observes bunching at the relevant test score, it's evidence that the test scores are being manipulated. If being above or below a certain income level affects your eligibility for a certain program, or whether you owe a certain tax, and there is bunching at that income level, it's a sign that income is being manipulated. Real-world data is never completely smooth, and always has some bumps. But the spikes in the figure above are telling you something.

3) Goncalves and Mello note that the spike at 9 mph is higher for whites than for blacks and Hispanics. This suggests the likelihood that whites are more likely to catch a break from an officer and get the 9 mph ticket. The research in the paper investigates this hypothesis in some detail ...

In the big picture, one of the reminders from this research is that bias and discrimination doesn't always involve doing something negative. In the modern United States, my suspicion is that some of the most prevalent and hardest-to-spot biases just involve not cutting someone an equal break, or not being quite as willing to offer an opportunity that would otherwise have been offered.

____________________

4) Many of the communities that suffer the most from crime are also the communities where the law-abiding and the law-breakers both experience a heavy law enforcement presence, and where large numbers of young men end up being incarcerated. Here are some slices of my discussion from "Inequalities of Crime Victimization and Criminal Justice" (May 20, 2016):

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And law-abiding people in some communities, many of them predominantly low-income and African-American, can end up facing an emotionally crucifying choice. One one side, crime rates in their community are high, which is a terrible and sometimes tragic and fatal burden on everyday life. On the other side, they are watching a large share of their community, mainly men, becoming involved with the criminal justice system through fines, probation, fines, or incarceration. Although those who are convicted of crimes are the ones who officially bear the costs, in fact the costs when someone needs to pay fines, or can't earn much or any income, or can only be visited by making a trip to a correctional facility are also shared with families, mothers, and children. Magnus Lofstrom and Steven Raphael explore these questions of "Crime, the Criminal Justice System, and Socioeconomic Inequality" in the Spring 2016 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. ...


It's well-known that rates of violent and property crime have fallen substantially in the US in the last 25 years or so. What is less well-recognized is that the biggest reductions in crime have happened in the often predominantly low-income and African-American communities that were most plagued by crime. Loftrom and Raphael look at crime rates across cities with lower and higher rates of poverty in 1990 and 2008:
"However, the inequality between cities with the highest and lower poverty rates narrows considerably over this 18-year period. Here we observe a narrowing of both the ratio of crime rates as well as the absolute difference. Expressed as a ratio, the 1990 violent crime rate among the cities in the top poverty decile was 15.8 times the rate for the cities in the lowest poverty decile. By 2008, the ratio falls to 11.9. When expressed in levels, in 1990 the violent crime rate in the cities in the upper decile for poverty rates exceeds the violent crime rate in cities in the lowest decile for poverty rates by 1,860 incidents per 100,000. By 2008, the absolute difference in violent crime rates shrinks to 941 per 100,000. We see comparable narrowing in the differences between poorer and less-poor cities in property crime rates. ... "
It remains true that one of the common penalties for being poor in the United States is that you are more likely to live in a neighborhood with a much higher crime rate. But as overall rates of crime have fallen, the inequality of greater vulnerability to crime has diminished.

On the other side of the crime-and-punishment ledger, low-income and African-American men are more likely to end up in the criminal justice system. Lofstrom and Raphael give sources and studies for the statistics: "[N]nearly one-third of black males born in 2001 will serve prison time at some point in their lives. The comparable figure for Hispanic men is 17 percent ... [F]or African-American men born between 1965 and 1969, 20.5 percent had been to prison by 1999. The comparable figures were 30.2 percent for black men without a college degree and approximately 59 percent for black men without a high school degree."

I'm not someone who sympathizes with or romanticizes those who commit crimes. But economics is about tradeoffs, and imposing costs on those who commit crimes has tradeoffs for the rest of society, too. For example, the cost to taxpayers is on the order of $350 billion per year, which in 2010 broke down as "$113 billion on police, $81 billion on corrections, $76 billion in expenditure by various federal agencies, and $84 billion devoted to combating drug trafficking." The question of whether those costs should be higher or lower, or reallocated between these categories, is a worthy one for economists. ... Lofstrom and Raphael conclude:
"Many of the same low-income predominantly African American communities have disproportionately experienced both the welcome reduction in inequality for crime victims and the less-welcome rise in inequality due to changes in criminal justice sanctioning. While it is tempting to consider whether these two changes in inequality can be weighed and balanced against each other, it seems to us that this temptation should be resisted on both theoretical and practical grounds. On theoretical grounds, the case for reducing inequality of any type is always rooted in claims about fairness and justice. In some situations, several different claims about inequality can be combined into a single scale—for example, when such claims can be monetized or measured in terms of income. But the inequality of the suffering of crime victims is fundamentally different from the inequality of disproportionate criminal justice sanctioning, and cannot be compared on the same scale. In practical terms, while higher rates of incarceration and other criminal justice sanctions may have had some effect in reducing crime back in the 1970s and through the 1980s, there is little evidence to believe that the higher rates have caused the reduction in crime in the last two decades. Thus, it is reasonable to pursue multiple policy goals, both seeking additional reductions in crime and in the continuing inequality of crime victimization and simultaneously seeking to reduce inequality of criminal justice sanctioning. If such policies are carried out sensibly, both kinds of inequality can be reduced without a meaningful tradeoff arising between them."
______________

5) An "audit study" of housing discrimination involves finding pairs of people, giving them similar characteristics (job history, income, married/unmarried, parents/not parents) and sending them off to buy or rent a place to live. In "Audit Studies and Housing Discrimination" (September 21, 2016), I wrote in part:
______________

Cityscape magazine, published by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development three times per year, has a nine-paper symposium on "Housing Discrimination Today" in the third issue of 2015. The lead article by Sun Jung Oh and John Yinger asks: "What Have We Learned From Paired Testing in Housing Markets?" (17: 3, pp. 15-59). ...

There have been four large national-level paired testing studies of housing discrimination in the US in the last 40 years. "The largest paired-testing studies in the United States are the Housing Market Practices Survey (HMPS) in 1977 and the three Housing Discrimination Studies (HDS1989, HDS2000, and HDS2012) sponsored by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)." Each of the studies were spread over several dozen cities. The first three involved about 3,000-4,000 tests; the 2012 study involved more than 8,000 tests. The appendix also lists another 21 studies done in recent decades.

Overall, the findings from the 2012 study find ongoing discrimination against blacks in rental and sales markets for housing. For Hispanics, there appears to be discrimination in rental markets, but not in sales markets. Here's a chart summarizing a number of findings, which also gives a sense of the kind of information collected in these studies.


However, the extent of housing discrimination in 2012 has diminished from previous national-level studies. Oh and Yinger write (citations omitted): "In 1977, Black homeseekers were frequently denied access to advertised units that were available to equally qualified White homeseekers. For instance, one in three Black renters and one in every five Black homebuyers were told that there were no homes available in 1977. In 2012, however, minority renters or homebuyers who called to inquire about advertised homes or apartments were rarely denied appointments that their White counterparts were able to make

--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV

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Monday, January 15, 2018

Links; more on heating vs. overheating. [feedly]

Links; more on heating vs. overheating.
http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/links-more-on-heating-vs-overheating/

Medicaid is a highly efficient program (see figure below), delivering health coverage to 70 million low-income persons while conveying many ancillary benefits on its beneficiaries, as Hannah Katch and I point out in the NYT oped.

So, of course, Republicans want to lay waste to it. They were blocked from doing so through their ACA repeal, they did a bit of it in their tax plan, and now they're going after Medicaid through the waiver process (which skirts Congress), by adding a work requirement. As Hannah and I stress, you can't feed or house your family on health coverage, so the incentive to work is already built into the program, which is why most able-bodied beneficiaries already work.

At any rate, it's going to take action at the state level to block this latest attack.

Turning to other current events, I wrote about jittery bond markets yesterday, trying to emphasize that heating is not overheating. We should expect to see inflation and interest rates on the rise, given how low they've been and the stage we're at in the expansion. Though granted, the Fed must try to look around corners, I don't see much evidence of real resource constraints building up.

Yet, bond rates spiked when the core CPI came out this AM at 0.3% over the month instead of 0.2%. Note that yr/yr core CPI came in at 1.8%, which, given that the CPI runs ~30bps hotter than core PCE, is much like the growth rate of the core PCE, which last come in at 1.5% (Nov/Nov). Both are well below the Fed's target rate.

As the next figure shows, breakeven rates, a measure of inflation expectations measured as the spread between rates on 10-yr TIPS and 10-yr Treasuries, have spiked a bit in recent days, as has the 10-year yield. But they're only back to levels from about a year ago, and, as noted, CPI core inflation itself remains well below target (which is 2.3-2.5 for core CPI).

This all comes down to a few key questions:

Q: Are resource constraints building in the economy?

A: Not that you'd see in inflation (realized or expected), interest rates, or wage growth. As for employment, the jobless rate is low but employment rates may have room to run.

Q: Have the benefits of the recovery reached deeply enough into all corners of the country?

A: It's getting there, but wage growth is under-performing and there are areas where the job market has not yet firmed up.

Perhaps most importantly:

Q: Are the risks to the Fed hitting the growth brakes symmetric or asymmetric?

A: They are asymmetric. Since inflation has been below target for years on end, achieving the Fed's 2% target, on average, requires some period of  being above the target rate. Similarly, the least advantaged don't catch a buzz from the recovery until we hit and stay at chock-full employment. Both of these factors point to the likelihood of greater damage from pushing back too hard on growth right now than from maintaining a largely accommodative stance.



 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Saturday, January 13, 2018

Fighting for public sector union rights 50 years after MLK’s assassination [feedly]

Fighting for public sector union rights 50 years after MLK's assassination
http://www.epi.org/blog/struggling-for-public-sector-union-rights-50-years-after-mlks-assassination/

The night before his assassination in April 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King spoke before a group of striking sanitation workers in Memphis, Tennessee as they prepared for a march for civil rights, union recognition, and economic justice. The movement behind the strike started earlier that year, when two Memphis garbage collectors, Echol Cole and Robert Walker, were sucked in by a malfunctioning compactor mechanism on a garbage truck and crushed to death. On the same day, when a heavy rainstorm hit, the city sent 22 black sewer workers home without pay while their white supervisors were retained with a full-day's pay. 12 days later, more than 1,100 black men from the Memphis Department of Public Works went on strike, demanding recognition of their union, better safety standards, and a decent wage. The sanitation workers were led by garbage-collector-turned-union-organizer, T. O. Jones, and supported by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).

Memphis Mayor Henry Loeb fought to break the workers' strike, and "refused to take dilapidated trucks out of service or pay overtime when men were forced to work late-night shifts. Sanitation workers earned wages so low that many were on welfare and hundreds relied on food stamps to feed their families." As Michael K. Honey writes in Going Down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, Martin Luther King's Last Campaign, one of the things Loeb was most fervent about opposing was the dues-checkoff provisions that the sanitation workers wanted in their union contract. The workers on strike in Memphis knew that a dues checkoff—whereby union members voluntarily authorize the employer to make regular deductions from an employee's wages to pay their union dues—was crucial to the union's survival, especially given that Tennessee had passed a so-called "right-to-work" law, which allowed nonunion members to refuse to pay their fair share of dues but still collect the same benefits as union members. Loeb surely knew that the powers conferred to workers in the union contract—including an increase in black sanitation workers' wages, protections for black workers from race-based employment discrimination, and a procedure for the black sanitation workers to file grievances against their white supervisors—would become wholly ineffective if the union could not collect dues to support its basic operations. More than once, the city had offered to settle the strike on the condition that dues checkoff be prohibited from their contract—but workers persisted, knowing that the "dues checkoff remained crucial, for without it, the union would not survive." One of the cofounders of the Community on the Move for Equality, Reverend Malcom Blackburn, even embodied dues checkoff in his call to action.

Our Henry, who art in City Hall,

Hard-headed be thy name.

Thy kingdom C.O.M.E.

Our will be done,

In Memphis, as it is in heaven.

Give us this day our Dues Checkoff,

And forgive us our boycott,

As we forgive those who spray MACE against us.

As lead us not into shame,

But deliver us from LOEB!

For OURS is justice, jobs, and dignity,

Forever and ever. Amen. FREEDOM!

"Sanitation Workers' Prayer,"

Recited by Reverend Malcom Blackburn

The day after King arrived in Memphis the night of April 3, 1968, to speak to the group of sanitation workers, he was shot and killed stepping out of his room at the Lorraine Motel. On April 8, Coretta Scott King, the Southern Christian Leaderships Conference, and union leaders led approximately 42,000 people on a silent march through Memphis in Dr. King's honor, demanding that Loeb recognize the sanitation workers' requests. On April 16, the city finally recognized the sanitation workers' union and negotiated a contract, which included a dues checkoff.

Now, fifty years after Martin Luther King's efforts to help the sanitation workers gain union recognition, corporate interests are still fighting to undercut public-sector unions by crippling their financial support. On February 28, 2018, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in a case called Janus v. AFSCME. Just as the funding for the sanitation workers union was at issue in their battle over a dues-checkoff provision in their contract, the financial stability of public-sector unions at issue in the Janus case.

Janus v. AFSCME could profoundly affect the ability of public-sector workers to improve their wages and working conditions. The case threatens the right of the majority of workers, through their democratically elected union, to bargain a contract with their public employer that requires every employee covered by the contract to pay their fair share of the costs of negotiating it, administering it, and enforcing it. The Supreme Court decided this issue forty years ago in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and it has been the law of the land since.

Janus is nothing more than the latest attack on workers' rights to organize and bargain collectively. The Supreme Court considered this issue in its 2016-2017 term in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, which resulted in a 4-4 split decision upholding a lower court decision that permits public employee unions to assess fees on non-members who benefit from collective bargaining and union representation and who unions are required to represent. In any other circumstance, it would be outrageous to demand the benefits of a common enterprise without paying one's fair share. Union representation is no different. Eliminating fair share fees protects people who want to get something for nothing and as a result, starves unions. It is also profoundly undemocratic to elevate the objections of a minority over the democratically determined choices of the majority of workers.

This principle is what Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was fighting for on the day he was killed, and it is what's at stake in Janus. The decision in this case will determine the future of effective unions, democratic decision making in the workplace, and the preservation of good, middle class jobs in public employment.



 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Friday, January 12, 2018

Is history probabilistic? [feedly]

Is history probabilistic?
http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2017/12/is-history-probabilistic.html



Many of our intuitions about causality are driven by a background assumption of determinism: one cause, one effect, always. But it is evident in many realms -- including especially the social world -- that causation is probabilistic. A cause makes its effects more likely than they would be in the absence of the cause. Exposure to a Zika-infected mosquito makes it more likely that the individual will acquire the illness; but many people exposed to Zika mosquitoes do not develop the illness. Wesley Salmon formulated this idea in terms of the concept of causal relevance: C is causally relevant to O just in case the conditional probability of O given C is different from the probability of O. (Some causes reduce the probability of their outcomes.)

There is much more to say about this model -- chiefly the point that causes rarely exercise their powers in isolation from other factors. So, as J.L. Mackie worked out in The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation, we need to be looking for conjunctions of factors that jointly affect the probability of the occurrence of O. Causation is generally conjunctural. But the essential fact remains: no matter how many additional factors we add to the analysis, we are still unlikely to arrive at deterministic causal statements: "whenever ABCDE occurs, O always occurs."

But here is another kind of certainty that also arises in a probabilistic world. When sequences are governed by objective probabilities, we are uncertain about any single outcome. But we can be highly confident that a long series of trials will converge around the underlying probability. In an extended series of throws of a fair pair of dice the frequency of throwing a 7 will converge around 6/36, whereas the frequency of throwing a 12 will converge around 1/36. So we can be confident that the eventual set of outcomes will look like the histogram above.

Can we look at history as a vast series of stochastic events linked by relations of probabilistic causation? And does this permit us to make historical predictions after all?

Let's explore that idea. Imagine that history is entirely the product of a set of stochastic events connected with each other by fixed objective probabilities. And suppose we are interested in a particular kind of historical outcome -- say the emergence of central states involving dictatorship and democracy. We might represent this situation as a multi-level process of social-political complexification -- a kind of primordial soup of political development by opportunistic agents within a connected population in a spatial region. Suppose we postulate a simple political theory of competition and cooperation driving patterns of alliance formation, institution formation, and the aggregation of power by emerging institutions. (This sounds somewhat similar to Tilly's theory of state formation in Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 990 - 1992 and to Michael Mann's treatment of civilizations in The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760.)

Finally we need to introduce some kind of mechanism of invention -- of technologies, institutions, and values systems. This is roughly analogous to the mechanism of genetic mutation in the evolution of life.

Now we are ready to ask some large historical questions about state formation in numerous settings. What is the likelihood of the emergence of a stable system of self-governing communities? What is the likelihood that a given population will arrive at a group of inventions involving technology, institutions, and values systems that permit the emergence of central state capable of imposing its will over distance, collecting revenues to support its activities, and conducting warfare? And what is the likelihood of local failure, resulting in the extinction of the local population? We might look at the historical emergence of various political-economic forms such as plunder societies (Genghis Khan), varieties of feudalism, and medieval city states as different outcomes resulting from the throw of the dice in these different settings. 

Self-governance seems like a fairly unlikely outcome within this set of assumptions. Empire and dictatorship seem like the more probable outcomes of the interplay of self-interest, power, and institutions. In order to get self-governance out of processes like these we need to identify a mechanism through which collective action by subordinate agents is possible. Such mechanisms are indeed familiar -- the pressures by subordinate but powerful actors in England leading to the reform of absolutist monarchy, the overthrow of the French monarchy by revolutionary uprisings, the challenges to the Chinese emperor represented by a series of major rebellions in the nineteenth century. But such counter-hegemonic processes are often failures, and even when successful they are often coopted by powerful insiders. These possibilities lead us to estimate a low likelihood of stable self-governance. 

So this line of thought suggests that a stochastic model of the emergence of central states is possible but discouraging. Assign probabilities to the various kinds of events that need to occur at each of the several stages of civilizational development; run the model a large number of times; and you have a Monte Carlo model of the emergence of dictatorship and democracy. And the discouraging likelihood is that democratic self-governance is a rare outcome. 

However, there are several crucial flaws in this analysis. First, the picture is flawed by the fact that history is made by purposive agents, not algorithms or mechanical devices. These actors are not characterized by fixed objective probabilities. Historical actors have preferences and take actions to influence outcomes at crucial points. Second, agents are not fixed over time, but rather develop through learning. They are complex adaptive agents. They achieve innovations in their practices just as the engineers and bureaucrats do. They develop and refine repertoires of resistance (Tilly). So each play of the game of political history is novel in important respects. History is itself influenced by previous history. 

Finally, there is the familiar shortcoming of simulations everywhere: a model along these lines unavoidably requires making simplifying assumptions about the causal factors in play. And these simplifications can be shown to have important consequences for the sensitivity of the model. 

So it is important to understand that social causation is generally probabilistic; but this fact does not permit us to assign objective probabilities to the emergence of central states, dictatorships, or democracies. 

(See earlier posts on more successful efforts to use Bayesian methods to assess the likelihood of the emergence of specific outcomes in constrained historical settings;
link, link.)

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Making America White Again: Trump’s Pardon of Joe Arpaio [feedly]

Making America White Again: Trump's Pardon of Joe Arpaio
https://workingclassstudies.wordpress.com/2018/01/08/making-america-white-again-trumps-pardon-of-joe-arpaio/

Trump's pardon of Joe Arpaio, former Sheriff of Maricopa County in Arizona, was a major set-back for immigrant and human rights activists who fought to remove him from office in 2016. The pardon gives a pass for elected officials and police to violate the civil rights of Latinos, primarily low-wage working-class Mexicans. Trump's critics explain the pardon by pointing to the President's history of racial discrimination. For Trump supporters, the pardon is a logical piece of his "Make America Great Again" campaign, which he announced with these now-familiar claims about Mexican immigrants: "When Mexico sends it people, they're not sending the best. . . . they're sending people that have lots of problems and they're bringing those problems. They're bringing drugs, they're bringing crime. They're rapists and some, I assume, are good people, but I speak to border guards and they're telling us what we're getting." Arpaio's description of his raids as "crime suppression sweeps" echoes this claim, but the court ruled that he had violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead of arresting criminals with outstanding warrants, the raids arrested day laborers and other low-wage workers. Targeting workers in immigration law enforcement and in legislations, such as Arizona's anti-immigrant SB 1070, is so obvious that industries relying on these workers have joined civil rights organizations in filing lawsuits to stop the rampant racial profiling of Latino workers.

To understand the impact of Trump's pardon of Joe Arpaio, we have to remember that the foundation for claiming that Mexican immigrants are criminals – rapist and drug dealer – was solidified in the legislation passed after the Oklahoma bombing to deter terrorism, which blurred the distinctions between "alien immigrant" and "criminal."  In previous laws, being an "alien immigrant" was an administrative violation attached to one's status upon entering the U.S. without documentation. This category included people who had overstayed their visas or had expired green cards, as well as some other noncriminal circumstances. "Criminal aliens" referred to immigrants engaged in illegal behavior. AEDPA broadened the definition of "aggravated felony" for alien immigrants to include less serious convictions. The third category of alien immigrants are persons the state identifies as posing a grave risk to national security and are deportable as terrorists. By blurring the distinction between undocumented workers and criminals, the 1995 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provided Arpaio the opportunity to enter center stage in the immigration debate.

Arpaio's reputation as the "toughest sheriff" was not solely based on establishing a tent prison in the Arizona desert, banning coffee and cooked meals, or restoring chain gangs, but he first pushed the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) toward immigration law enforcement by offering ICE county resources to hold suspected "alien immigrants" and "criminal immigrants" until deportation. The formal partnership between ICE and MCSO allowed local law enforcement to engage in immigration law enforcement. MCSO was not only among the first local police forces to sign a contract with ICE; its agreement was one of the most expansive in the country. Along with obtaining military equipment to set up command centers during immigration raids, the MCSO, along with a volunteer posse, prioritized immigration law enforcement over local responsibilities.

Photo by Patrick Breen, The Arizona Republic

Maricopa County sheriff's deputies targeted Latinos during traffic stops on the presumption that they had entered the country illegally. This highly selective policing of Latinos cast a wide net, but it primarily targeted day laborers, and it resulted in some arrests of immigrants without documentation and even a few with minor offences. Businesses known to hire Mexican workers were targeted by following drivers to and from work. These raids were publicly reported as "crime suppression sweeps" but generally focused on law abiding alien immigrants. Selective stops of only persons appearing to be of Mexican ancestry reflected popular belief that Mexicans and other dark Latinos are immigrants, not citizens. The MCSO built on this problematic assumption by establishing a hotline for residents to report undocumented immigrants and criminals engaged in trafficking. Arpaio encouraged community support of his immigration law enforcement with ads like this: "HELP SHERIFF JOE ARPAIO FIGHT ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION & TRAFFICKING CALL 602.876.4145 WITH TIPS ON ILLEGAL ALIENS."

A class action lawsuit, Ortega Melendres vs. Arpario, finally ended Arpaio's career. Plaintiffs in the case identified a wide-range of MCSO policing practices in raids conducted between 2007-2008 that violated the agreement with ICE, such as using pretextual and unfounded stops, racially motived questioning, searches and other mistreatment, and often baseless arrests of Latinos. Deputies and members of the volunteer posse abused the unchecked discretion Sheriff Arpaio gave them, which established the conditions for these violations. In general, Arpaio condoned and participated in circulating racist commentary about Latinos, creating a general cultural of bias in the sheriff's office. U.S. District Judge G. Murray ruled that practices based on race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In 2011, Judge Snow issued a preliminary injunction against MCSO prohibiting further illegally targeting of Latinos. In 2013, the judge mandated changes to eliminate misconduct and future violations of the community's constitutional rights by the MCSO. Arpaio violated court orders to audio and video record all traffic stops, increase training and monitoring employees, and maintain comprehensive records.

Court monitoring found that Arpaio ignored the order and had not stopped enforcing immigration enforcement. Judge Snow found him in contempt of court and scheduled sentencing for October, 2017. Even though Arpaio was unlikely to do jail time, Trump pardoned him on August 25th.

Over his 24 years as sheriff, Arpaio was accused of numerous practices of police misconduct, mistreatment of prisoners, abuse of power, misuse of funds, failure to investigate sex crimes, unlawful enforcement of immigration laws, and election law violations. Over 2,700 law suits, concerning violations at the county's prisons alone, were filed against Arpaio in federal and county courts.  The cost of paying law suits fell on the shoulders of hard working taxpayers in Maricopa County. The pardon is not only another step in normalizing xenophobia and hate in immigration law enforcement and a move toward Making America White Again, it also serves to enforce the vulnerability of undocumented workers.

Mary Romero

Mary Romero is a Professor of Justice and Social Inquiry at Arizona State University and President-Elect of the American Sociological Association. She has published articles on race, immigration, and law, and her most recent book is Introducing Intersectionality (Polity Press, 2017).



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