Monday, January 23, 2017

The Economics of the Affordable Care Act [feedly]

The Economics of the Affordable Care Act
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/the-economics-of-the-affordable-care-act

The Economics of the Affordable Care Act

Dean Baker
Institute for New Economic Thinking, January 17, 2017

See article on original site

The Affordable Care Act (ACA), which President-elect Donald Trump and the Republican-controlled Congress have vowed to repeal, was crafted to overcome two basic problems in the provision of health care in the United States. First, the costs are incredibly skewed, with just 10 percent of patients accounting for almost two thirds of the nation's healthcare spending. The other problem is asymmetric information: Patients have far more knowledge about the state of their own health than insurers do. This means that the people with the largest costs are the ones most likely to sign up for insurance. These two problems make it impossible to get to universal coverage under a purely market-based system.

The problem with the skewing of health care costs is that while most people's health spending is relatively limited, it remains very expensive to provide care for the costliest 10 percent. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services projects that per capita spending on health care in the US will average $10,800 in 2017. But the cost for the most expensive 10 percent of patients will average $54,000 per person, compared to an average of just $6,000 for everyone else. The cost for the healthiest 50 percent of patients averages under $700 per person.

Covering the least costly 90 percent of patients is manageable, but the cost of covering the least healthy 10 percent is exorbitant. Very few people could afford to pay $54,000 a year for an individual insurance policy. Furthermore, if insurers were to set their premiums in accordance with overall averages, they could anticipate a skewed patient pool. The more healthy half of the population, with average costs of less than $700 a year, would either limit their insurance to catastrophic plans that only cover very expensive medical care, or go without insurance altogether.

This would leave insurers with a less healthy pool of patients, the treatment costs for which would drive them to raise their premiums. This leads to a death spiral of rising premiums and fewer insurees or, alternatively, a situation where insurers deny coverage to patients with pre-existing conditions. Either way, the people who most need insurance will be unable to get it.

The ACA gets around this problem by requiring that everyone buy insurance — a mandate that allows people with serious health problems to get insurance at a reasonably affordable price. Since many people cannot afford an insurance policy even if it's based on average costs, the ACA also provided subsidies to low and moderate income people. It pays for the subsidies primarily through a tax on the wealthiest households, those with incomes over $200,000.

Thus far, the ACA has actually worked better than expected in most respects. The number of uninsured actually dropped somewhat more than had been projected, despite the fact that a number of states controlled by Republican governors and/or legislatures opted not to expand Medicaid as had been required in the measure passed by Congress. The cost of the program has also been less than projected as health care cost growth has slowed sharply in recent years. The ACA likely contributed to slower cost growth, although that slowdown preceded the ACA, so other factors are clearly involved.

Insofar as the ACA has run into problems, those have been attributable to too few healthy people in the health care exchanges, and too little competition among insurers. Many commentators have wrongly blamed the problem in the exchanges on a failure of young healthy people to sign up for insurance. This is not the cause of the problem, since more people are getting insured than had been projected. The reason fewer healthy people are showing up on the exchanges is that fewer employers dropped insurance than had been projected. The problem this for the exchanges is that people who get insurance through an employer mostly work at full-time jobs, and people who are able to work at full-time jobs are healthier than the population as whole. By continuing to provide insurance for their workers despite the ACA, employers are effectively keeping healthy people out of the exchanges.

The other problem with the exchanges has been limited competition, as many insurers have dropped out after the first few years. The loss of competition has meant higher prices. This could have been addressed in part by offering a public plan through Medicare or Medicaid, as President Obama had originally proposed. Obama dropped this part of the plan in the face of opposition from the insurance industry, but reinstating it would increase competition in the exchanges.

A report from the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities estimated that the 400 richest households would get a tax cut averaging $7 million a year. CBO puts the total tax savings to the wealthy from eliminating these ACA taxes at $35 billion a year over the next decade.

The repeal of the ACA would also end the labor-market benefits of Obamacare. With workers no longer dependent on employers for insurance, there has been a jump of 2.4 million in the number of people choosing to work part-time. These new part-timers have been disproportionately young parents and workers slightly too young to qualify for Medicare.

One way to make insurance more affordable would be to reduce the costs of the health care system as a whole. Americans pay twice as much per person as people in other wealthy countries, with few obvious benefits in terms of outcomes. But such cost cutting would mean reducing the incomes of drug companies, doctors, and insurance companies — the big winners under the current system. It seems unlikely the Republicans will go this route. They are more likely to restore a version of the pre-ACA situation, in which many more people are uninsured and most workers know that their insurance is only as secure as their job. 


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The Global Economy Today, Part 1 [feedly]

The Global Economy Today, Part 1
http://triplecrisis.com/the-global-economy-today-part-1/

part series on the era of economic globalization, the distribution of power worldwide, and the current crisis. It was originally published in the January/February issue of Dollars & Sense, commencing the magazine's year-long "Costs of Empire" project.

How We Got Here and Where We Need to Go

Arthur MacEwan

Globalization has run into a backlash.

There has long been opposition to the efforts of governments and large corporations in the high-income countries—especially the United States—to establish new rules of global commerce. This opposition appeared in the protests against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s and against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the later 1990s. Remember the Zapatistas in 1994 and Seattle in 1999?

In 2016, however, the backlash against globalization became especially formidable. It emerged as a dominant theme in Donald Trump's ascendency to the U.S. presidency, and also was a major factor in Sen. Bernie Sanders' strong campaign for the Democratic nomination. In the United Kingdom, the Brexit vote to take the country out of the European Union was also in part a reaction against globalization, as has been the growing strength of right-wing politicians elsewhere in Europe. Globalization has become the focal point for the reaction of many to a wide range of social and economic ills, a reaction that has also been fueled by latent—and not so latent—xenophobia and racism.
Whatever other factors are involved, the backlash against globalization is based on the very real damage
that has been done to economic equality, security, and the overall well-being of many people by the way
international commerce has been organized. How did we get here—what's the history of our current situation?
Could international commerce be organized differently? Are there alternatives?

Not a New Phenomenon

At least since people began walking out of Africa tens of thousands of years ago, humans have been expanding the geographic realm of their economic, political, social, and cultural contacts. In this broad sense, globalization is nothing new, and it might reasonably be viewed as an inexorable process. To oppose it would be little different than trying to stop the ocean tides.

Globalization, however, is not one, well-defined phenomenon. It has taken different forms in different periods and has been connected to political power in different ways. It will certainly take new and different forms in the future. Colonialism, for example, has been a predominant form of globalization for thousands of years, and only disappeared—well, not entirely (consider Puerto Rico)—in the second half of the 20th century. Neo-colonialism, a system in which major powers exercise de facto control over the policies of lesser powers but without the formal, de jure controls of colonialism, often came into force as colonialism waned. From the 16th through the 18th century, under the ideology of mercantilism, European powers explicitly regulated their own countries' foreign commerce through import restrictions and export promotion. Mercantilism often went along with colonialism, and colonial powers also put economic restrictions on the countries they controlled. In the second half of the 20th century, the increasing integration of countries in Western Europe, leading to the formation of the European Union and creation of a common currency, is still another example of the varied forms of globalization.

Virtually everywhere among the now high income countries—the United Kingdom and the United States are prime cases—early industrialization was accomplished with high levels of government protection for manufacturing. At the same time, these countries' governments used their power to extend their global economic engagement, to seek resources or markets or both. For example, Britain developed a far-flung empire, and also employed its powerful navy to assure that, in regions outside the empire, markets and resources were available for British commerce—for the sale of textiles in Latin America, opium in China, etc. The United States, late to the era of colonialism, extended its realm of control, over land and other resources, by expanding westward across the continent. But the United States became a colonial power at the end of the 19th century, taking Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii, and Guam (and Cuba for a two and a half year period). At the same time, this country increasingly became a neo-colonial power, using military strength especially in the Caribbean and Central American to protect U.S. financial and other interests.

Interruption and Reassertion

Globalization was severely interrupted in the first half of the 20th century by two world wars and the Great Depression. Furthermore, after the wars, two major areas of the world—the Soviet Union and its "satellite" countries, as well as China—were largely outside of the international capitalist system. In this context, the United States—with only 6% of the world's population, but some 27% of the world's military strength, and the relative devastation of other economically advanced countries—was virtually able to dictate the terms, the rules of operation, in the international economic system.

The goal of the U.S. government in this regard was that U.S. firms would have access—indeed, they should have the right of access—to resources and markets throughout the international system. As one step toward accomplishing this end, the United States, with the acquiescence of other countries, established the dollar as the central currency of international commerce. Both directly and through its influence over international institutions (the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), the U.S. government pushed for the minimization of countries' barriers to foreign trade and investment—that is, "free trade." Trade barriers were, however, slow to come down as other advanced countries sought to rebuild their industries after the war and many lower-income countries sought to protect their nascent industries. Nonetheless, governments and business interests in these other countries also wanted foreign investment, resulting in the great expansion of U.S.-based multinational firms from the 1950s onward.

But trade barriers would eventually come down. The United States, which had built its own industrial capacity behind tariff walls in the 19th century, now insisted in the latter half of the 20th century that low-income countries abandon similar walls. Having reached the top, the United States was pulling the ladder up. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) played a major role in pushing low income countries to lower their import restrictions. When these countries turned to the IMF for financial assistance (especially during the debt crisis of the 1980s), the condition for that assistance was "structural adjustment," which included lowering import restrictions.

The efforts of the U.S. government began to achieve notable success in the 1990s, with NAFTA, which removed many trade barriers among the United States, Mexico, and Canada (and did a good deal more, as discussed below). Then it promoted the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which, according to its own website, "is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations." (The U.S. government, however, failed in its effort to establish the Free Trade of the Americas Agreement (FTAA)— about which negotiations took place through the 1990s and which would have included virtually all countries in the Western Hemisphere.)

The U.S. government has established either bilateral or small group (e.g., NAFTA) "free trade" agreements with 20 countries, most put into effect since 2000. Even without such agreements, access to the U.S. market and U.S. access to foreign markets have expanded considerably. There are still regions of the world, China and Russia for example, where significant restrictions on foreign trade and investment still apply and with which the United States has no general trade agreements. Yet U.S. firms are nonetheless heavily involved in these countries as well. Compared to the situation after World War II, to say nothing of the 19th century, tariffs and other trade restrictions are now quite low.

The changes are illustrated, in Table 1, with data from the world's twelve largest economies. It is not simply tariff changes, however, that have brought about a burgeoning of international commerce. Other sorts of restrictions on trade (e.g., quantitative import restrictions, or "import quotas") have come down. And major advances in transportation and communications technology have also played a role. All in all, the rising role of international trade and investment has been huge—making the current age truly an era of economic globalization (at least in the broad sense).

In the decade of the 1960s, world exports averaged 12% of world GDP, but in the recent ten-year span of 2006-2015, the figure was 30%. The international trade of the U.S. economy also grew over the same period, though at a much lower level. (Larger countries tend to have lower imports and exports, relative to the size of their economies, than small countries.) Foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown especially rapidly in recent decades, with annual net inflows of FDI in the world rising 100 fold between the 1970s, when the average was $21 billion, and the period 2006-2015, with an average of over $2.1 trillion. (FDI includes investment that establishes control or substantial influence over the decisions of a foreign business—such as a wholly owned subsidiary—plus purchases of foreign real assets such as land and buildings.)

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New results on structural change during the recent growth boom in developing countries [feedly]



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New results on structural change during the recent growth boom in developing countries
// *Dani Rodrik's* weblog

http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2017/01/new-results-on-structural-change-during-the-recent-growth-boom-in-developing-countries.html

The last two decades have been a rare period of rapid convergence for the world's developing economies. Everyone is familiar with China and India's experience, but growth went beyond these two large economies. Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America had their best performance in decades, if not ever.

In a new paper, my co-authors Xinshen Diao (IFPRI) and Margaret McMillan (Tufts and IFPRI) and I examine this experience. We ask what drove this growth and how sustainable is it. Looking at recent growth through the lens of structural change proves particularly insightful.

Here is our decomposition of recent growth accelerations into the within-sector and between-sector terms. The latter term captures the growth contribution of structural change -- the reallocation of labor across sectors with different labor productivities.



What stands out in the analysis is that recent growth accelerations were based on either rapid within-sector labor productivity growth (Latin America) or growth-increasing structural change (Africa), but rarely both at the same time. In Latin America, within-sector labor productivity growth has been impressive, but growth-promoting structural change has been very weak. In fact, structural change has made a negative contribution to overall growth excluding agriculture, meaning labor has moved from high-productivity sectors to low-productivity activities. In Africa, the situation is the mirror image of the Latin American case. Growth-promoting structural change has been significant, especially in Ethiopia, Malawi, Senegal, and Tanzania. But this has been accompanied in these countries by negative labor productivity growth within non-agricultural sectors.

This is not how growth is supposed to happen. As we show in the paper, the East Asian pattern of growth was very different, with both terms contributing strongly to overall growth in high-growth periods. We develop a simple two-sector general equilibrium model in the paper to shed light on these patterns, especially the contrast between the African and Asian models.

We show that the Asian pattern of strong "within" and "between" components is consistent with growth being driven mainly by positive productivity shocks to the modern sectors. The African model, by contrast, is consistent with growth being driven not by the modern sector, but by positive aggregate demand shocks (due to foreign transfers, for example) or by productivity growth in the traditional sector (agriculture). In this version of the model, the modern sector expands and growth-promoting structural change takes place as increased demand spills over to the modern sector. (Our assumptions on preferences ensure that demand shifts are sufficiently biased towards the modern sector to ensure the modern sector expands in both cases, despite relative-price adjustments.) But labor productivity in the modern sector is driven down as a by-product, as diminishing returns to capital set in and less productive firms are drawn in. This is also consistent with the relatively poor performance of manufacturing in Africa.

For more, see the paper.


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Economy under Trump: Plan for the worst [feedly]



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Economy under Trump: Plan for the worst
// Larry Summers

http://larrysummers.com/2017/01/17/economy-under-trump-plan-for-the-worst/

An ironic contradiction is likely to define the global economic community's convocation in Davos this week as it awaits Donald Trump's inauguration. There has not been so much anxiety about U.S. global leadership or about the sustainability of market-oriented democracy at any time in the past half-century. Yet with markets not only failing to swoon as predicted, but actually rallying strongly after both the Brexit vote and Trump's victory, the animal spirits of business are running hot.

Many chief executives are coming to believe that, whatever the president-elect's infirmities, the strongly pro-business attitude of his administration, combined with Republican control of Congress, will lead to a new era of support for business, along with much lower taxes and regulatory burdens. This in turn, it is argued, will drive major increases in investment and hiring, setting off a virtuous circle of economic growth and rising confidence.

While it has to be admitted that such a scenario looks more plausible today than it did on Election Day, I believe that it is very much odds-off. More likely is that the current run of happy markets and favorable sentiment will be seen, with the benefit of hindsight, as a sugar high. John Maynard Keynes was right to emphasize the great importance of animal spirits, but other economists have also been right to emphasize that it is political and economic fundamentals that dominate in the medium and long terms. History is replete with examples of populist authoritarian policies that produced short-run benefits but poor long-run outcomes.

The new U.S. president will be operating on a weak political foundation, is unlikely to be able to deliver the results he has promised to key constituencies and seems likely to take dangerous gambles in the international arena. This makes it probable that a cycle of growing disillusion, disappointment and disapproval will set in within a year.

Trump will likely be the first modern U.S. president to come into office with more public disapproval than approval. No outsider can know the validity of allegations regarding his campaign's involvement with Russia, but the shadow of possible scandal is far more present in the pre-inaugural press than it was even before Richard Nixon's second term in the White House. And the Trump family's continued operation of his business interests offers potential for at least the allegation of serious misconduct.

Nor is Trump likely to be able to keep his promises to key middle-class constituencies. The consequence of the weak Mexican peso that has been a consequence of his rhetoric is more Mexican immigration to the United States and more businesses choosing Mexico over Ohio as a location for production.

Moreover, it is not possible to repeal Obamacare without taking health insurance away from millions of Americans and placing new burdens on those with preexisting conditions. If Trump follows through on proposed increases in tariffs, the result will be lower real wages and incomes as prices rise faster than wages. All in Congress agree that tax reform will not happen in a few months, and it is impossible to reconcile the president-elect's stated goals of major reductions in corporate and top rates, a fair distribution of the benefits of tax cuts and preventing a huge increase in federal debt.

Finally, Trump will be taking some major risks. Seeking to use the one- China policy as a lever for extracting trade concessions from China risks major confrontation and will complicate cooperation on critical issues such as North Korean nuclear proliferation. Questioning the value of the European Union and NATO risks undermining our principal democratic allies at a time when they are already politically fragile. Unilateral imposition of tariffs or enactment of a tax system that subsidizes exports and penalizes imports risks both retaliatory protectionism and a spiking dollar, with potentially grave consequences for the global economy. And threatening businesses, as happened with the attack on the pharmaceutical industry during Trump's last news conference, risks major increases in uncertainty and even questions about the rule of law.

Animal spirits are as fickle as they are important. Right now they certainly are an impetus to economic growth. The speed with which they changed after the Brexit vote and after the U.S. election should be cautionary. They can easily change again. If ever there were a time to hope for the best but plan for the worst, it is now.

 


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So-called “right-to-work” laws will lower wages for union and nonunion workers in Missouri [feedly]



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So-called "right-to-work" laws will lower wages for union and nonunion workers in Missouri
// Economic Policy Institute Blog


http://www.epi.org/blog/so-called-right-to-work-laws-will-lower-wages-for-union-and-nonunion-workers-in-missouri/
The Missouri legislature is poised to pass bills to weaken unions and clear the way for corporate dominance in the state. So-called "right-to-work" laws force unions to represent employees who pay nothing toward the costs of collective bargaining. It's bad enough that these laws allow them to get the benefits of higher wages and better fringe benefits without paying their fair share. What's worse is that these laws force unions to defend non-dues payers when they need to be defended against unjust discipline or being fired. Arbitration can cost thousands of dollars, including the cost of hiring lawyers.

These bills won't lead to more manufacturing plants or better jobs or anything good. They lead only to weaker unions, less bargaining power for Missouri workers, and lower wages.

Wages are 3.1 percent lower in so-called "right to work" (RTW) states, for union and nonunion workers alike—after correctly accounting for differences in cost of living, demographics, and labor market characteristics.  The negative impact of RTW laws translates to $1,558 less a year in earnings for a typical full-time worker.

Washington University in St. Louis professor Jake Rosenfeld finds that the dramatic decline in union density since 1979 has resulted in far lower wages for nonunion workers, an impact larger than the 5 percent effect of globalization on their wages. Specifically, nonunion men lacking a college degree would have earned 8 percent or $3,016 annually, more in 2013 if unions had remained as strong as they were in 1979.

Between 1979 and 2013, the share of private sector workers in a union has fallen from about 34 percent to 11 percent among men, and from 16 percent to 6 percent among women. The authors note that unions keep wages high for nonunion workers for several reasons: union agreements set wage standards and a strong union presence prompts managers to keep wages high in order to prevent workers from organizing or their employees from leaving. Moreover, unions set industry-wide norms, influencing the moral economy.

Rosenfeld's report shows that working class men have felt the decline in unionization the hardest; their paychecks are noticeably smaller than if unions had remained as strong as they were almost 40 years ago. Rebuilding collective bargaining is one of the tools we have to reinvigorate wage growth, for low and middle-wage workers.

That's why the so called "right-to-work" efforts make no sense. We need workers to have more bargaining power, to negotiate for higher wages. The RTW laws are designed by the business lobby to benefit corporate titans.

One wonders why state legislators go along with them when they hurt the vast majority of their constituents.

 

 

 


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Is Global Equality the Enemy of National Equality? [feedly]



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Is Global Equality the Enemy of National Equality?
// *Dani Rodrik's* weblog

http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2017/01/is-global-equality-the-enemy-of-national-equality.html

The question in the title is perhaps the most important question we confront, and will continue to confront in the years ahead. I discuss my take in this paper.

Many economists tend to be global-egalitarians and believe borders have little significance in evaluations of justice and equity. From this perspective, policies must focus on enhancing income opportunities for the global poor. Political systems, however, are organized around nation states, and create a bias towards domestic-egalitarianism. 

How significant is the tension between these two perspectives? Consider the China "trade shock." Expanding trade with China has aggravated inequality in the United States, while ameliorating global inequality. This is the consequence of the fact that the bulk of global inequality is accounted for by income differences across countries rather than within countries. 

But the China shock is receding and other low-income countries are unlikely to replicate China's export-oriented industrialization experience. So perhaps the tension is going away?

Not so fast. The tension is even greater somewhere else: Relaxing restrictions on cross-border labor mobility would have an even stronger positive effect on global inequality, at the cost of adverse effects at the lower end of labor markets in rich economies. On the other hand, international labor mobility has some advantages compared to further liberalizing international trade in goods.

I discuss these issues and more here.


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The Tip of the Iceberg: The Implications of Climate Change on Financial Markets [feedly]


http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2017/01/the-tip-of-the-iceberg-the-implications-of-climate-change-on-financial-markets.html
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The Tip of the Iceberg: The Implications of Climate Change on Financial Markets
// Economist's View

Yuliya Baranova, Carsten Jung, and Joseph Noss at Bank Underground:

The tip of the iceberg: the implications of climate change on financial markets: There has been a recent increase in awareness of investors that limiting emissions to prevent climate change might leave a substantial proportion of the world's carbon reserves unusable, and that this could lead to revaluations across a range of financial assets. If risks are left unaddressed, this could result in large losses for some investors. But is this adjustment in financial market prices likely to be abrupt?  And – even if it is – is it likely to pose risks to financial stability?  We argue that the answer to both these questions could be yes:  financial valuations can move sharply even if the transition to sustainable energy were smooth.  And exposures are sufficiently large to warrant attention from both investors and policymakers. ...


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