https://www.cbpp.org/health/medicaid-expansion-continues-to-benefit-state-budgets-contrary-to-critics-claims
-- via my feedly newsfeed
So is Trump the worker's hero? Will increased tariffs return jobs to the US? The left has been weak on this issue. The left lacks a real program to address the real concerns of those impacted by trade deals. ,
Donald Trump voiced the real concerns of many Americans when he spoke of the need to bring jobs to communities and to end unfair trade deals. By blocking the Trans-Pacific Partnership, pushing a re-negotiation of NAFTA, and increasing tariffs on a range of imports, Trump has appeared to finally take seriously the needs of unemployed and underemployed workers. Some unions have been calling for tariffs for years, most notably the United Steelworkers. While Obama ran in 2008 on a promise to renegotiate NAFTA he never did so, and in fact became a relentless proponent of expanding "free trade." Meanwhile, the Trump administration recently announced details of the draft deal with Mexico, and it appears to contain benefits for U.S. and Mexican workers.
So is Trump the worker's hero? Will increased tariffs return jobs to the US? The left has been weak on this issue. On the one hand, we need to take economic development and job creation seriously. Workers are suffering. Even though official unemployment rates are low, more and more of the jobs people hold are low-wage, insecure, non-union, and dead-end. The left lacks a real program to address the real concerns of those impacted by trade deals. We need to better understand the history of tariffs and trade, and we need an international vision for economic development.
What are Tariffs?
Most rich countries have used import tariffs as a way to develop their own industries. Alexander Hamilton argued in the late 1700s for using tariffs to develop "infant industries" until they grew large enough to compete in a global market. In general, the idea was to allow raw materials in at a lower tax. The import tariff on intermediate or finished goods was much higher. This allowed manufacturers to import cheap inputs from other countries, and then manufacture the items domestically. Most of the profit in a good comes in the production stage. The goal for countries is to be able to "move up the economic ladder," where they can go from raw material exporters (at low profit rates), to finished goods exporters (at much higher profit rates).
Marx explained this process through the concept of socially-necessary labor time, or the average amount of labor time needed for a worker to produce a good for exchange. There is relatively little labor time needed to harvest a peanut and more labor time needed to manufacture peanut butter.
For example, in the 1400s Britain was making money by exporting raw wool, but Henry VII understood that there were much greater profits for those who converted the raw wool into clothing. He took a number of steps, including increasing the tax on raw wool exports and then banned the export of unfinished cloth. This forced British producers to process the wool and cloth into finished clothing. Only then did Britain lower tariffs. When Robert Walpole came in as British prime minister in 1721, he significantly raised tariffs on manufactured imports such as clothing and metal works, and reduced or eliminated import tariffs for primary commodities produced in the colonies, including wood, tobacco, clay and cotton.
The United States relied heavily on high import tariffs on a range of goods, for many decades. According to the economist Ha-Joon Chang, the U.S. had some of the highest tariffs in the world from 1816 to 1945.[1]
But tariffs were not the only tool governments used. Chang points out that every rich country became rich by using a range of government interventions. Tariffs are just one tool. Other tools include direct subsidies to firms, public investment in infrastructure that allows industries to develop and transport goods, public investment in research and development, public schools to train workers, financial regulations, banking systems to generate savings available for investment, nationalization of industries, and more. Governments have also used more insidious tools to develop their economies, including war, colonization, industrial espionage, and the trade in human beings forced into slave labor.
Many economists from a range of perspectives have argued the world as a whole benefits from "free trade": the idea that countries should be able to exchange goods and services without tariffs or other disincentives or barriers. The "free trade" school of thought has dominated economics since WWII. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established just after WWII as a diplomatic forum where states could meet and agree to reduce tariffs. In 1995 the World Trade Organization (WTO) was formed, with a mandate to govern the rules of trade between states, with the "goal of ensur[ing] that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible."
Alongside the WTO, countries signed "free trade" agreements and bilateral or multilateral investment treaties, designed to reduce tariffs further, and particularly to reduce other "barriers" to trade. The US signed its first free trade agreement in 1985, with Israel, and has since signed bilateral or multilateral agreements with 19 other countries. The U.S. now has a highly complex tariff schedule. There are three different rates of duty – the general rate, a "special" for "free trade" or "generalized system of preference" partners, and a third rate that applies to Cuba and North Korea.[2] Some products are free: there is no import tariff. Fresh plantains, for example, can come in with no tariff even from Cuba or North Korea. Dried plantains, however, require some processing. They have a 1.4% tariff for the general rate, free for the special rate, and 35% for our enemy countries. Chain saw blades have a 7.2% general tariff, free for the special rate, and 60% otherwise. Meanwhile, circular saw blades are free for the general and special rate, and 25% otherwise.
All of this highlights the reality that tariffs are greatly influenced by political processes as much as economic ones. Employer associations, powerful corporations, members of Congress, unions and consumers have all lobbied to set tariff rates for each of the tens of thousands of products. There is no other way to explain why tariff rates differ for forks versus spoons, or for almonds versus pistachios versus pecans versus chestnuts.
Another political consideration is how other countries respond to our tariffs. If we raise tariffs on Chinese steel, China might raise tariffs on our wheat. Since the end of World War 2, most Western countries have agreed to keep tariffs low and avoid this sort of scenario. In fact, tariffs have been so low that "free trade" agreements haven't lowered them much; the difference between, say, 1.4% and zero is trivial.
This raises the question: why has there been so much uproar about free trade agreements, since at least the "Battle of Seattle" in 1999? The answer is that modern "free trade" agreements aren't really about tariffs. Rather, they're about loosening restrictions on flows of international investment, which makes it easier for Western companies offshore jobs (and hide their profits from the tax authorities). (For more on this, see this comic).
Trade agreements have also been about lowering "non-tariff barriers to trade." These include things large sections of the population support, such as environmental protections, labor laws, or licensing restrictions (such as against genetically modified seeds). Many of these protections have been weakened or voided in the name of "free trade."
Should we support increased tariffs to save jobs?
It is impossible to say for sure why Trump is pushing for tariffs and some better terms for labor in a new NAFTA, but it is highly unlikely he is concerned with worker rights. His appointments for Secretary of Labor and the Supreme Court alone are evidence that that he is out to break unions and reduce worker wages and benefits. Trump's other great campaign promise to workers was to enact large infrastructure programs that would create jobs, but that has yet to happen. While spending tens of millions on military parades and Mar-a-Lago weekends and passing a $1.5 trillion tax cut, Trump has failed to bring his infrastructure proposal to light.
Instead, the Trump policy seems designed to redirect real worker frustrations about jobs and wages into anger at other countries (and immigrants), rather than at corporations.
Trump presents himself as the only politician willing to stand up for the blue-collar worker – and this is easy to do, because so few politicians have actually been champions of the working class. Action on tariffs and trade deals has won him support among certain voters and even union leaders who have felt long ignored.
The new NAFTA language is interesting because it seems to contain a number of advances on labor issues, including eliminating the controversial protections for investors and a requirement that at least 45 percent of an automobile, or 40 percent of auto parts be made by a worker earning at least $16 per hour. This seems a clear play to gain support from the United Auto Workers and rustbelt workers.
Yet even auto industry analysts don't think the proposal is likely to Just ask Kristin Dziczek, from the Center for Automotive Research, who said, "The big upshot is there's nothing in this agreement that looks like lots of jobs are coming to the U.S."
But Trump's stance on tariffs and trades appeals to workers who have lost their jobs and are looking for hope anywhere they can. It also plays with some of his supporters who are motivated more by nationalism and racism than economic concerns, so the fact that tariffs won't bring back many jobs doesn't matter to them. And while tariffs are a real problem for some of the capitalist class, not all are directly impacted, and for all of Trump's talk of NAFTA re-negotiation, his plans will leave the bigger problems with "free trade" (unregulated cross-border money flows and erosion of environmental and labor protections) untouched.
So what's really going on?
Here are a couple of key points that help us evaluate what to think about tariffs.
First, economic development is a complicated subject. No one has figured it out, and no one has the magic solution. Tariffs have in fact been a useful tool for economic development and job creation but they are only one tool. Tariffs on their own can backfire if they are used to protect corrupt or inefficient employers, or dying industries. They can also backfire if they provoke other countries to impose retaliatory measures.
Second, the package of tools that rich countries used to become rich have mostly been disallowed for developing economies under our trade and investment agreements. We do not allow partner countries to use tariffs or subsidies to develop their infant industries. We push them to privatize publically owned businesses. We do not allow them to keep our goods or our businesses out (imagine what Japan's situation would be today if Ford and GM had been able to freely sell cars there or open auto plants there; Toyota, Mitsubishi, and Nissan would never have had a chance). All the while we continue to use a range of these tools ourselves. For example; the Mexican government was forced to stop subsidizing Mexican corn growers under NAFTA, while opening their markets to US agriculture, even though US food is heavily subsidized (subsidies that violate every supposed principle of "free trade"). US food flooded the Mexican market, undercutting Mexican farmers and driving them off the land (bizarrely, many wound up moving north to grow food in the United States to be sent back to Mexico).
US unionists talk of unfair behavior in China: dumping, fixed currency rates, and intellectual property law violations. And these are real issues. But US corporations engage in a wide range of unfair activities as well, often supported by or protected by the US government. Any talk of tariffs should be situated in this context.
So yes, let's reform our economic relations with other countries. US trade and investment policy have been disastrous—damaging economies elsewhere, exacerbating global inequality and destabilizing the world economy, which has rebounded back on us. Let's talk about trade and economic development policies that allow workers to find living wage jobs in their own home countries. It can be hard to frame demands in an internationalist rather than nationalist framework. But in this moment of rising hate groups, anti-immigrant and nationalist movements, it is crucial that the left not be pulled into making alliances around nationalist policy.
Third: tariffs are not the only economic development tool. People may blame outsourcing or unfair trade, but in fact there are many policy options available to us to try right now to create good jobs. For example, one argument for steel tariffs was based on national security. But if security is really our concern, it is mistake to leave vital production of things like steel, oil, medicine, and food in the hands of unaccountable private corporations. Create public entities that can do this!
There is a wide range of policy options that we could pursue to create jobs, and to make bad jobs into better ones. These include:
- Raise taxes on the rich and corporations; use the money to bring back the federal and state jobs cut in recent years. Re-hire people to run our libraries, state parks, mail service, trains and more
- Public investment in education to expand the number of teacher jobs and raise salaries for educators
Real public investment in rebuilding our bridges and trains and tunnels
- Instituting universal health care would have many benefits, including greatly reducing the cost of production for US manufacturers
- Reform labor laws so that is it easier for workers to join unions. This would allow workers to convert many of the current low-wage, sometimes dangerous jobs, to good ones
- Free higher education! This allows more students to gain education and training, and it is an investment in research and development
Our demands must focus on ways to create jobs that also undercut the power of multi-national corporations to pit workers against one another. The principle must be job creation built on solidarity—with other workers, with workers in other industries, and with workers overseas—not competition.
Thanks to Michael Goodwin, Adam Hefty and Jonathan Kissam for input on this article.
Stephanie Luce is a professor at the School of Labor and Urban Studies/CUNY. She is the author of Labor Movements: Global Perspectives and Fighting for a Living Wage. Her writing can be found at stephanieluce.net.
[1] This of course can create strong tensions between different sections of the ruling class. For example, Southern plantation owners wanted low tariffs so that they could easily export raw cotton and import manufactured goods. Northern manufacturers wanted high tariffs on manufactured imports.
[2] See also the complicated rate of duties applied to "Products of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or a qualifying industrial zone." See General Notes chapter, pages 4-6. https://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/bychapter/index.htm
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The financial crisis ripped through Wall Street 10 years ago, pushing the global economy to the edge of the abyss. One might think those searing experiences would have created a learning opportunity -- for managing risk better, understanding structural imbalances in the financial markets, even learning a bit about how our own cognitive processes malfunction.
Instead, we have little new wisdom or self-awareness to show for that traumatic event.
That was one of the key takeaways of an extraordinary conference I attended last week called Risk: Retrospective Lessons & Prospective Strategies co-sponsored by the Santa Fe Institute and Morgan Stanley in New York. It left me excited, brimming with ideas and curious about how we could do better as investors.
I took notes -- and I never take notes. Every discussion topic had profound implications for the capital markets.
The opening panel, "Lessons Learned" had legendary stock picker Bill Miller, asset manager Cliff Asness and journalist Bethany McLean 1 recounting their experiences during the financial crisis. It made me sad, angry and hopeful all at the same time.
We tend to forget just how shocking that period was. 2 Some of the behavior Asness and Miller witnessed at various institutional investment funds was both hilarious and frightening. One large endowment fund, selling amid the collapse against Asness's recommendation, told him "We are not market-timing, but we will probably return to U.S. equities in the spring." Rarely at a loss for words, Asness was left sputtering and speechless.
Similarly, Miller told this crisis-era story: he presented the idea of buying junk bonds in December 2009 to a large firm's investment committee. At the time, the bonds were trading at 22 cents on the dollar, but the idea was rejected by the committee as too risky. Five years later the fund bought these same bonds at a much higher price and much greater risk. (Miller was not involved in that transaction).
These errors led Asness to observe "You can have a committee of 10 geniuses that proves collectively to be a moron."
The panel on behavioral finance was similarly thought-provoking. Jessica Flack, of the Santa Fe Institute, discussed research into "collective computation in nature" that has significant ramifications for various machine-human hybrid activities. It was hard not to listen to her discuss her research without thinking there is a warning for artificial-intelligence and algo-driven trading.
Behavioral finance looks at what economic actors are doing with their money, or what they say they are thinking when making financial decisions. Colin Camerer, a professor of behavioral finance and economics at the California Institute of Technology, researches issues of neuro-finance. This looks at what is occurs within the human cognitive system when risk and reward decisions are made.
After this panel, we discussed the issue of lack of temporal understanding among investors. I believe that humans only experience a rough version of NOW. In reality, the future and the past are false constructs. The future is little more than our faulty guesses about one outcome out of many possibilities; the past is an error-riddled set of recollections, filled with selective retention and ego-driven biases.
Camerer's work goes much deeper than that. He uses various technologies that help people "better imagine what various futures might be like." Once we can get people to visualize in life-like realism the impact of their behavior on their future selves, it leads to profound changes in how they behave. Consider the implications this has for investors' savings rates for their retirements.
Speaking of retirement, Charlie Ellis of Greenwich Associates and former member of Vanguard Group's board of directors, discussed the U.S.'s looming retirement crisis, noting "84 percent of U.S. mutual funds underperform their self-selected benchmark over any 10-year period." Even for those pensions that are adequately funded, the combination of high costs and underperformance are like termites eating away at the structure of a house. "We do not have nearly enough indexing," he said. "Not even close."
Ellis has been pushing to raise the retirement age from 65, a number he said is a historical accident. Given the financial realities of longer lifespans, 70 is much more realistic retirement age.
On the same panel, Salomon Brothers' Henry Kaufmann (aka Dr. Doom), now 91, made the observation that despite deregulation being a major factor in the crisis, it took less than a decade for many to forget. "A financial market deregulated is like a zoo without bars," he said.
As memories of the crisis fade as the economy recovers, we find the seeds of the next crisis are already being planted. They are the exact same issues of debt and mismanaging risk and not understanding our own limitations. Failing to learn from our prior experiences, we seem doomed to repeat them. We only have ourselves to blame.
The moderator was Martin Leibowitz, vice chairman of Morgan Stanley Research and former chief investment officer of TIAA-CREF.
Miller blamed former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson for misleading investors on the financial conditions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac duringthe summer of 2008, then effectively nationalizing them a few weeks later in September. He argued thatthis made the collapse of Lehman Brothers inevitable.
This year's Nobel Prize in Economics has been shared by Bill Nordhaus and Paul Romer for "integrating innovation and climate with economic growth." That is one way to thread the needle to link these fine recipients and I applaud the Nobel Committee for finding a way to do it. That said, there is a real reason that Nordhaus and Romer should be linked and it turns on the way they have made their ideas persuasive — not to the general public or even politicians but to economists.
Back in the 1980s, both climate policy and science/innovation policy faced significant barriers moving forward. In each case, the main constituents who were holding up such policies were economists — they were trained in textbook tools of economics and had very strong influence throughout governments due to their ability to frame arguments. In the case of climate policy, while the science pushed for action, the big unknown was precisely what the economic cost of mitigating greenhouse gases would be. In the case of innovation policy, while the costs were known, the big problem was what the return would be. Thus, for each type of policy, economists who had won the push for cost-benefit analysis in government, were able to point out — somewhat accurately — that one-side of the equation was missing in each case. My personal opinion is that uncertainty should not necessarily be a barrier to action but when it comes to dealing with policy advocacy uncertainty is a weapon that can be used by special interests to generate inaction and, at the time, economists were the, perhaps unwitting, wielders of that weapon.
Let me start will Bill Nordhaus. If we choose to mitigate greenhouse gas pollution, it will impact all manner of activity in the economy. From energy to food production to transportation networks, the effects would be widespread and profound. They would impact on different regions differently. In other words, the economic impact was complex and hard to think through. And there was a possibility the costs could be overwhelming.
What Nordhaus did was embed climate change and climate policy into our general equilibrium models of economic growth. He then found ways to quantify the costs that everyone was hitherto conjecturing about. As it turned out, the costs were significant but nowhere near the doomsday assertions that interested parties opposed to climate policy were claiming. Even without technological change, there were existing ways economies could adapt to climate policy and, in the process, self-limit the costs that many were worried about. It moved the debate away from economic assertion and I guess pushed interested parties from "reasonable" arguments to "denialism," thereby, exposing their naked interests more clearly. While progress has been far from what we would want, the progress that has happened can be attributed to this critical work.
Moving on now to Paul Romer. I have known Paul for 30 years since I was a graduate student. I was deeply interested in economic growth as an undergraduate and felt it had been neglected and was fortunate to be doing my PhD soon after Paul's work had been published. It drove my interest further and into the fields of innovation and entrepreneurship that I have worked on since. There was even a time I contemplated an offer to join Paul's education startup but that is another story.
Romer's contribution is the inventing of what has become termed, endogenous growth theory. The first real theories of economic growth — starting with Robert Solow and Trevor Swan — examined how investment could generate growth and found that it could not explain the growth we had seen over the past two centuries. The missing component was technological change but they had no theory of it. It was well-known that science and innovation were not costless and so such activity would likely be driven by markets, competition and prices just as other economic activity was. But it was also known that these activities were special in that they generated positive externalities although some returns could be internalised through the use of formal intellectual property protection. Many people knew this was the missing ingredient in growth as documented by David Warsh's terrific history of economic thought (including the contributions of Romer). As an undergraduate in Australia, even I saw this piece of the puzzle and, without knowledge of Romer and others, wrote my thesis about it leading to my very first published article.
I wasn't the only one. Phillipe Aghion, Peter Howitt, Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman all saw it too and made their own separate contributions to endogenous growth theory. Those models, however, still, in many respects, had a microeconomic flavour that meant their main contribution would be to an understanding of how competition (and its potential limitors including patents) would impact on innovation in a growth context. This is very important but it was not as closely related to the growth puzzle that Romer was tackling.
Romer took his time making progress. His PhD thesis led to some technical advances that showed it was possible to have a balanced growth path — consistent with what we knew about economic growth — and also have a role for increasing returns. But to do things properly, the standard assumption of perfect competition was not going to cut it. And so in 1990 Romer published his most famous paper that (a) put the foundations of growth on a model of monopolistic competition (as those in trade theory and economic geography had done previously) and (b) divided the economy into a real and an ideas sector (something that no one had really done). In so doing, the Romer model was able to articulate and identify the key determinants of the returns to innovation.
The first was that the returns to innovation were limited by competition. Even with perfect patents, knowledge itself would promote entry and compete both for profits and scarce resources that limit the returns to past innovation and, as a consequence, to future innovation itself. The second was that by allocating resources — particularly science and engineering human capital — to the production of ideas, those limitations could be mitigated and economic growth itself would accelerate. In other words, front and centre for the promotion of economic growth was the direct promotion of science. Yes, science had been seen as a public good before. But now science was firmly seen as an engine of economic growth. Things that promoted the creation and, importantly, diffusion of scientific research were not just like the arts — there for consumption — but instead were an economy and indeed world-wide force for economic prosperity. To be sure, identifying the precise returns to any particular project would be difficult. But the idea that it is was critical to have a system for science and innovation promotion was now on a solid foundation.
As a person who was closely involved in economic policy in Australia on both the environment and innovation, it is difficult to understate how important Nordhaus and Romer's work were. They were present in every, single policy discussion and tipped the balance towards action in cases where there were significant barriers and hurdles. In so doing, each showed how a careful accounting of economic forces can lead to progress, reduce uncertainty and make the case. That is what ties these two together and I am very pleased to see the Nobel committee recognising this long and sustained contribution to our knowledge and discourse.
ndia will defy US sanctions and continue importing oil from Iran after a November 4 deadline, easing concerns over the country's energy security but setting up a possible showdown with Washington.
Petroleum Minister Dharmendra Pradhan said two state-owned oil refiners, Indian Oil Corporation and Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals, had signed contracts to import 1.25 million tonnes of Iranian oil next month, Mint newspaper reported.
Reuters said that Indian Oil would buy six million barrels of oil and Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals three million barrels.
The Trump administration reimposed an initial tranche of economic sanctions on Iran in August, and will implement a second tranche in November. Last applied from 2012 to 2015, the sanctions are in retaliation for Iran's supposed nuclear proliferation program.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on a visit to India in September that some waivers from the sanctions might be granted to countries buying Iranian oil, but only if they agreed to cut their imports to zero. Pradhan admitted Monday he was not sure India would get a waiver.
The world's third-largest oil importer, India relies upon Iran for 9.4% of its crude supplies: in 2017-18 the country brought in 220.4 million metric tonnes of oil from a number of sources.
India also continued to buy Iranian oil in 2012-2015, but shipments had to be sharply reduced to avoid exposure to the US financial system. However, this time it is likely to skirt Washington's embargo on dollar payments by using rupees, while payments will probably be routed through Indian banks to avoid any US financial intervention.
Oil prices have soared in response to fears of supply cutbacks, putting pressure on the Indian economy and leaving Delhi with few options. Brent crude prices are now hovering around US$86 a barrel and global traders are betting that they will go past US$100. The weaker rupee has also pushed up procurement costs for Indian buyers.
Delhi is hopeful that Saudi Arabia and other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries will heed US calls for production to be boosted by one million barrels per day, as promised in June, which might help bring benchmark prices down.