Tuesday, July 10, 2018

Six Lies on Trade [feedly]

Six Lies on Trade
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/six-lies-on-trade

Six Lies on Trade

Dean Baker
Truthout, July 9, 2018

See article on original site

After 500 days of Donald Trump's presidency, it is clear that any relationship between his statements and the truth are purely coincidental. He even boasts about his lack of interest in the truth, touting the fact that he had no idea what our trade deficit was with Canada when he confronted Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau over our "$100 billion trade deficit." (The actual figure is around $20 billion.)

But Donald Trump's contempt for the truth should not cause the rest of us to become liars also. In fact, it is more important than ever that progressives ground arguments in reality.

This is especially the case with trade, where lying was standard fare long before Donald Trump entered politics. Here are six common lies which deserve major pushback any time they appear. 

1. Everyone gains from trade.

This is not even the textbook story. The textbook tells us there are winners and losers. In the standard story, the winners gain more than the losers lose. This means that the winners could compensate the losers so that everyone is better off. In the real world, this compensation never takes place, so the losers just lose.

If this is hard to understand, suppose we arranged for 300,000 highly qualified doctors from other countries to start practicing in the United States. This influx would probably lower our doctors' pay by around $100,000 a year each to roughly European levels. This would save us close to $100 billion annually ($700 per family) on health care costs. That's a big gain to the rest of us, but a big loss to US doctors. That's basically the story of trade, but the competition has been for manufacturing workers.

2. The loss of manufacturing jobs was due to productivity growth, not trade.

This is a classic economist's sleight of hand. Manufacturing productivity typically increases at the rate of 2-3 percent annually. (It has been much slower in the last dozen years.) This is also roughly the rate of growth of demand, which means that increased demand for goods typically offset the jobs lost to productivity growth.

The data are clear. In the three decades from December 1970 to December 2000, manufacturing employment only fell by 100,000, less than 1 percent. By contrast, we lost more than 3.4 million manufacturing jobs from 2000 to 2007 (before the crash), which was more than 20 percent of total employment.

This was due to the explosion of the trade deficit in these years, which peaked at almost 6 percent of GDP in 2005 and 2006. That would be equal to $1.2 trillion annually in today's economy. There were benefits from getting cheap imports, but it is incredibly dishonest not to acknowledge the enormous job loss associated with the expansion of the trade deficit in those years.

And of course, over the last 50 years, many more manufacturing jobs were lost to productivity than trade. This is true, but completely irrelevant.   

3. It is inevitable that less-educated workers lose jobs to the developing world.

This is a great example where the classism of our elites obstructs clear thinking. It is absolutely true that there are hundreds of millions of people in the developing world who are willing to work in factories at a fraction of the wages that US manufacturing workers receive. This means that opening to trade puts downward pressure on the wages of US manufacturing workers, and less-educated workers more generally, as they either accept large pay cuts or lose their jobs.

The complication is that there are also tens of millions of very smart hard-working people in the developing world who would be happy to work in the United States as doctors, dentists, lawyers or as other highly paid professionals at a fraction of the pay of our professionals. They could train to our standards and learn English where necessary. This would drive down the salary in highly paid professions, and thereby lead to savings to consumers, but we don't allow it. Trade deals have been about lowering the pay of less-educated workers, while highly paid professionals continue to enjoy protection from international competition.

4. Trade deficits don't cost jobs.

It is very popular among pundits to claim that trade deficits don't cost jobs by pointing to our current 3.8 percent unemployment rate, even as the deficit is on a course to exceed $600 billion (3 percent of GDP) this year. While it is true that a trade deficit does not necessarily cost jobs, in a period where we are below full employment, a $100 billion increase in the trade deficit reduces demand and employment in the same way that a $100 billion reduction in investment would reduce demand and employment.

The large trade deficit in the last decade was certainly a big factor in the weak labor market recovery from the 2001 recession. We eventually filled the demand gap from the trade deficit with the demand generated by the housing bubble. This is hardly a good model for the future.

5. It is important that other countries respect "our" intellectual property.

This is a line that has come up repeatedly in Trump's trade war with China. We have been told that we have an interest in making China pay for the intellectual property of US corporations that it allegedly steals.

Okay, it is clear that Pfizer has an interest in having its drug patents respected by China, as does Microsoft with its software copyrights and patents. But what about the vast majority of us who don't own lots of stock in these or other companies that have intellectual property claims at risk?

The standard trade theory tells us that if China and other countries have to pay less money to Pfizer and Microsoft due to patent and copyright monopolies, they have more money to spend on other items we produce. In other words, the money they pay to these companies increases the trade deficit in other areas.

We do have to support innovation, but that is a separate issue. There are far more efficient mechanisms than patent and copyright monopolies for financing innovation in the 21st century.

6. The developing world needed to kill US manufacturing to allow people to escape poverty.

Hundreds of millions of people in the developing world have seen huge improvements in living standards over the last three decades, especially in China. These people went from living near or below poverty levels to enjoying middle-class living standards.

This is indeed a great story, but it is not true that this rise in living standards had to come at the expense of manufacturing workers in the United States and other wealthy countries. In the 1990s, the countries of East Asia (the big success stories) had even more rapid growth than they did in the last decade. This was a period in which they were running large trade deficits, with the important exception of China, which had nearly balanced trade.

In principle, there is no reason these countries could not have continued on a path where domestic demand fueled growth and was funded by foreign investment flows. However, the East Asian financial crisis hit in 1997. The United States led the bailout organized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and essentially required that these countries run large trade surpluses as a condition of getting aid.

The shift from running trade deficits to running trade surpluses was a requirement of the IMF, not a law of economic development. If these countries were allowed to continue to be importers of foreign investment (the standard textbook model), and sustained the 1990s growth path, they would be far richer today. In fact, countries like South Korea and Malaysia would now be richer than the United States on a per person basis.

In short, it is simply not true that the pain to factory workers, who lost their jobs in the United States, was somehow a necessary condition for hundreds of millions of people in the developing world to escape poverty. Other paths would have allowed for even more rapid growth in these countries.

Getting to a Reality-Based Trade Policy

It seems likely that Trump's trade war will go down in flames when Trump eventually loses interest and goes back to the hunt for President Obama's Kenyan birth certificate. His reckless actions deserve all the ridicule and contempt they have received.

However, we should not go back to a trade policy that was based on lies. We need a trade policy that is about raising the living standards of working people in the United States and the developing world, not just giving all the money to the rich. 



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Trump, Tariffs, Tofu and Tax Cuts [feedly]

Trump, Tariffs, Tofu and Tax Cuts
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/trump-tariffs-tofu.html

Trump, Tariffs, Tofu and Tax Cuts

Paul Krugman

By Paul Krugman

Opinion Columnist

  • July 9, 2018

According to early indications, recent U.S. economic growth was full of beans.

No, seriously. More than half of America's soybean exports typically go to China, but Chinese tariffs will shift much of that demand to Brazil, and countries that normally get their soybeans from Brazil have raced to replace them with U.S. beans. The perverse result is that the prospect of tariffs has temporarily led to a remarkably large surge in U.S. exports, which independent estimates suggest will add around 0.6 percentage points to the U.S. economy's growth rate in the second quarter.

Unfortunately, we'll give all that growth back and more in the months ahead. Thanks to the looming trade war, U.S. soybean prices have plummeted, and the farmers of Iowa are facing a rude awakening.

Why am I telling you this story? Partly as a reminder of the unintended consequences of Donald Trump's trade war, which is going to hurt a lot of people, like Iowa farmers, who supported him in 2016. In fact, it looks as if the trade war is in general going to hurt Trump's supporters more than his opponents.

Meanwhile, Trump's trade war will benefit some unexpected parties. Was making Brazil great again part of his agenda?

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But mainly I offer the parable of the soybeans as a warning against what's going to happen later this month, when the advance estimate of second-quarter G.D.P. comes in. The headline number is probably going to look good, possibly over 4 percent growth. If so, Trump will trumpet the news as proof that his economic policies are working — and some gullible journalists may go along with his claim.

So what you need to know is that (a) quarterly fluctuations in growth are mainly noise, telling you very little about long-term economic prospects, and (b) more fundamental indicators show that Trump's main policy achievement to date, last year's tax cut, is basically delivering none of what its backers promised.

About those quarterly growth rates: By historical standards, the economic recovery since the end of the global financial crisis has been remarkably consistent. If you look at job growth you see a steady upward trend, seemingly unaffected by political events. Quarterly G.D.P. growth has, however, fluctuated wildly, with a couple of negative quarters and a high of 5.2 percent in the third quarter of 2014.

The moral is clear: Pay little or no attention to short-term growth wobbles, which can be driven by transitory stuff like the reshuffling of world soybean trade.

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But in that case, how can we evaluate Trump's economic policies? The answer is, by looking at how those policies were supposed to work, and comparing that with what's actually happening.

Let me damn the 2017 tax cut with some faint praise: While the logic of the Trump trade war is completely muddled — never mind how it's supposed to work, it's not even clear what it's supposed to achieve — the drafters of the tax bill did have a theory of the case. The story went like this: Lower taxes on corporations would lead to a huge surge of investment, which would raise productivity, which would eventually be passed on to workers in higher wages.

By the way, the idea that workers would see an immediate benefit was always obvious nonsense, and sure enough, they didn't. In fact, adjusted for inflation, the hourly wages of ordinary workers were slightly lower in May than they were a year earlier.

Anyway, when I say a huge surge in investment, I mean huge. Last year I looked at estimates from the Tax Foundation, the only independent institution (well, supposedly independent, anyway) willing to endorse highly optimistic assessments of the tax cut. Those estimates, it turned out, implied a boost in business investment of around $600 billion a year, or 3 percent of G.D.P.

Nothing like that is happening, and leading indicators of business investment, like orders of capital goods, show no sign of an investment boom ahead. Corporations have gotten a really big tax cut: The tax take on corporate profits has fallen off a cliff since the tax cut was enacted. But they're using the extra money for stock buybacks and higher dividends, not investment.

As a result, there's no reason to believe that the U.S. economy's potential growth — the rate of growth it can achieve on a sustained basis — will rise from the 2 percent or less expected by most analysts. The tax cut has been good for stockholders — about a third of whom are foreigners, by the way. Working Americans, not so much.

So how is the Trump economic policy doing? The tax cut is utterly failing to deliver on its advocates' promises. It's early days in the trade war, but the administration's strategy seems designed to inflict maximum self-harm, and first reports suggest that trade conflict is leading to reduced, not increased, investment.

Against that background, how much should we care about whatever headlines are generated by the next set of growth numbers? Very little, if at all. (To be clear, this statement also applies if the quarterly numbers come in worse than expected.) Short-term growth is noise, signifying nothing.



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How to Lose a Trade War [feedly]

How to Lose a Trade War
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/07/opinion/how-to-lose-a-trade-war.html

How to Lose a Trade War

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President Trump talking about fair trade at the Group of 7 summit last month.CreditDoug Mills/The New York Times

Trump's declaration that "trade wars are good, and easy to win" is an instant classic, right up there with Herbert Hoover's "prosperity is just around the corner."

Trump obviously believes that trade is a game in which he who runs the biggest surplus wins, and that America, which imports more than it exports, therefore has the upper hand in any conflict. That's also why Peter Navarro predicted that nobody would retaliate against Trump's tariffs. Since that's actually not how trade works, we're already facing plenty of retaliation and the strong prospect of escalation.

But here's the thing: Trump's tariffs are badly designed even from the point of view of someone who shares his crude mercantilist view of trade. In fact, the structure of his tariffs so far is designed to inflict maximum damage on the U.S. economy, for minimal gain. Foreign retaliation, by contrast, is far more sophisticated: unlike Trump, the Chinese and other targets of his trade wrath seem to have a clear idea of what they're trying to accomplish.

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The key point is that the Navarro/Trump view, aside from its fixation on trade balances, also seems to imagine that the world still looks the way it did in the 1960s, when trade was overwhelmingly in final goods like wheat and cars. In that world, putting a tariff on imported cars would cause consumers to switch to domestic cars, adding auto industry jobs, end of story (except for the foreign retaliation.)

In the modern world economy, however, a large part of trade is in intermediate goods – not cars but car parts. Put a tariff on car parts, and even the first-round effect on jobs is uncertain: maybe domestic parts producers will add workers, but you've raised costs and reduced competitiveness for downstream producers, who will shrink their operations.

So in today's world, smart trade warriors – if such people exist – would focus their tariffs on final goods, so as to avoid raising costs for downstream producers of domestic goods. True, this would amount to a more or less direct tax on consumers; but if you're afraid to impose any burden on consumers, you really shouldn't be getting into a trade war in the first place.

But almost none of the Trump tariffs are on consumer goods. Chad Bown and colleagues have a remarkable chart showing the distribution of the Trump China tariffs: an amazing 95 percent are either on intermediate goods or on capital goods like machinery that are also used in domestic production:

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Is there a strategy here? It's hard to see one. There's certainly no hint that the tariffs were designed to pressure China into accepting U.S. demands, since nobody can even figure out what, exactly, Trump wants from China in the first place.

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China's retaliation looks very different. It doesn't completely eschew tariffs on intermediate goods, but it's mostly on final goods. And it's also driven by a clear political strategy of hurting Trump voters; the Chinese, unlike the Trumpies, know what they're trying to accomplish:

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What about others? Canada's picture is complicated by its direct response to aluminum and steel tariffs, but those industries aside it, too, is following a far more sophisticated strategy than the U.S.:

Except for steel and aluminum, Canada's retaliation seemingly attempts to avoid messing up its engagement in North American supply chains. In broad terms, Canada is not targeting imports of American capital equipment or intermediate inputs, focusing instead on final goods.

And like China, Canada is clearly trying to inflict maximum political damage.

Trade wars aren't good or easy to win even if you know what you're trying to accomplish and have a clear strategy for getting there. What's notable about the Trump tariffs, however, is that they're so self-destructive.

And we can already see hints of the economic fallout. From the Fed's most recent minutes:

[M]any District contacts expressed concern about the possible adverse effects of tariffs and other proposed trade restrictions, both domestically and abroad, on future investment activity; contacts in some Districts indicated that plans for capital spending had been scaled back or postponed as a result of uncertainty over trade policy. Contacts in the steel and aluminum industries expected higher prices as a result of the tariffs on these products but had not planned any new investments to increase capacity.

So Trump and company don't actually have a plan to win this trade war. They may, however, have stumbled onto a strategy that will lose it even more decisively than one might have expected.



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China resets the tone of US-North Korea talks [feedly]

China resets the tone of US-North Korea talks
http://www.atimes.com/article/china-resets-the-tone-of-us-north-korea-talks/

China resets the tone of US-North Korea talks

Beijing appears to have leveraged its influence on Pyongyang to set back recent progress towards peace on the Korean Peninsula

 JULY 10, 2018 3:06 PM (UTC+8)
Image of US President Donald Trump, China's leader Xi Jinping and North Korea's Kim Jong-un. Photo: Getty Image
Image of US President Donald Trump, China's leader Xi Jinping and North Korea's Kim Jong-un. Photo: Getty Image

Nobody expected a rapprochement between the United States and North Korea would be easy. And few likely expected China to take advantage of the diplomatic opening to further advance its geo-strategic interests in region.

But US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's recent setback in Pyongyang, where North Korean state media effectively referred to America's top diplomat's overtures as "gangsterism", showed that's the case on both fronts.

The US and North Korea, of course, are still technically at war and it was only a few months ago that US President Donald Trump branded North Korean leader Kim Jong-un a madman. Kim retorted by referring to Trump as "incurably mentally deranged."

Such calumny and slight was set aside when Kim and Trump met for a historic summit in Singapore in June. But Pyongyang's inimitable anti-US rhetoric was back on the vitriolic airwaves after Pompeo's third visit to Pyongyang earlier this month.

On July 7, the official Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) lashed out against what it called Pompeo's "unilateral and gangster-like demand for denuclearization" which it said ran "counter to the spirit of the Singapore summit meeting and talks."

The statement came after Pompeo, who notably did not meet with Kim during his highly anticipated visit, had said the talks were "productive" and that significant progress had been made "in every element."

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (L) and Kim Yong Chol, North Korean senior ruling party official and former intelligence chief, depart following two days of meetings at Park Hwa Guest House in Pyongyang on July 7, 2018.Pompeo held talks in an elegant Pyongyang guest house for a second day with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's right-hand man Kim Yong Chol. / AFP PHOTO / POOL / Andrew Harnik
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (L) and North Korean senior ruling party official and former intelligence chiefKim Yong Chol depart following two days of meetings at Park Hwa Guest House, Pyongyang, July 7, 2018. Photo: AFP

The following day, US Republican Senator Lindsey Graham blamed China for the debacle, saying "I see China's hand all over this. We're in a fight with China." Graham linked North Korea's statement to the intensifying trade war between US and China.

Trump followed up with tweets critical of China's role in the debacle, saying in a heated post: "We agreed to the denuclearization of North Korea. China, on the other hand, may be exerting negative pressure on a deal because of our posture on Chinese Trade – Hope Not!"

While both Trump and Graham are likely right that Beijing had a hand in North Korea's recalcitrant statement on Pompeo, the turn is likely part of a wider strategy to supplant America's geopolitical dominance in Asia rather than a reaction to the tiff on tariffs.

A breakdown in the still incipient US-North Korea talks could drive a diplomatic wedge between the US and South Korea, where hopes are high for a normalization of relations between the two long-separated Koreas.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in is known to want a formal peace treaty with the North, one that will pave the way for other agreements on trade and bilateral cooperation. After Pompeo's visit, that prospect in the short-term again looks remote, and many South Korean policymakers are likely to blame the US for the reversal.

In May, Chang Dong Young, who served as unification minister in a previous government and is currently a lawmaker, openly blamed hardline US National Security Adviser John Bolton for problems in talks between the various players with interests on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un (L) walks with US President Donald Trump (R) at the start of their historic US-North Korea summit, at the Capella Hotel on Sentosa island in Singapore on June 12, 2018.Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un have become on June 12 the first sitting US and North Korean leaders to meet, shake hands and negotiate to end a decades-old nuclear stand-off. / AFP PHOTO / SAUL LOEB
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) walks with US President Donald Trump (R) at the start of their historic US-North Korea summit at the Capella Hotel on Sentosa island, Singapore, June 12, 2018. Photo: AFP/Saul Loeb

Such criticism has been muted since the Trump-Kim Singapore summit but could easily flare up again with North Korea's apparent return to confrontational official rhetoric.

North Korea's reaction to Pompeo's visit also underlined the fundamentally different interpretations of the purpose of the talks. The US wants North Korea to comply with a "complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization" before lifting sanctions and normalizing bilateral relations.

The North, on the other hand, wants a formal declaration ending the 1950-53 Korean War, which ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty.

Such an accord, signed by the signatories of the 1953 armistice – with North Korea and China's so-called "volunteer forces" on one side and US-led United Nations forces on the other – would give Pyongyang the recognition and prestige it desires and in its ideal scenario pave the way for the withdrawal of US forces from the Korean peninsula.

North Korea still sees weapons of mass destruction as its only life insurance. Leaders in Pyongyang are cognizant of the US-orchestrated violent overthrows of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.

After Trump's backtracking on his predecessor Barack Obama's nuclear deal with Iran, there is little reason why Pyongyang would trust Washington's promises of "security guarantees" in exchange for denuclearization.

Many nuclear missiles with North Korean flag. 3D rendered illustration. Photo: iStock
Nuclear missiles with North Korean flags in a 3D rendered illustration. Photo: iStock

Indeed, there are no signs yet that North Korea is moving in that direction. 38 North, a website dedicated to Korean Peninsula analysis run by the Washington-based Stimson Center think tank, reported on June 21 that commercial satellite imagery of North Korea's missile engine-testing Sohae Satellite Launching Station near the Chinese border shows "no apparent activity related to dismantlement."

The report appeared to contradict Trump's post-Singapore summit tweets that, in apparent reference to Sohae, said North Korea is "destroying their engine site. They're blowing it up."

Other satellite imagery indicates that North Korea has finished work on a secondary cooling system for its five megawatt reactor at the nuclear research center situated at Yongbyon north of Pyongyang.

According to 38 North, "the North's nuclear cadre can be expected to proceed with business as usual until specific orders are issued from Pyongyang."

China's leading role in the US-North Korean diplomatic dance became obvious when in March Kim made his first foreign trip since taking power after the death of his father Kim Jong-il in December 2011. Until then, many observers felt that the younger Kim had deliberately avoided visiting China.

In May, Kim made a second surprise trip to China ahead of his Singapore summit with Trump. Few missed the symbolism of Kim arriving and departed from Singapore aboard an Air China jet plane.

While Beijing says it's committed to peace on the Korean peninsula, any deal will need to meet its terms. The Global Times, a daily tabloid under the auspicious of the Chinese Communist Party's People's Daily, said in a June 4 op-ed that China's involvement in any deal to formally end the Korean conflict was essential, otherwise it would be invalid and could be overturned.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Photo: AFP
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Photo: AFP

KCNA's reference to Pompeo's demands as "gangsterism" made clear that Pyongyang wants much more than just the suspension of joint US-South Korean military exercises, which Trump announced after the Singapore summit before substantive talks can advance, to start dismantling its nuclear deterrent.

KCNA referred to Trump's suspension of the joint exercises as "highly reversible" and that the drills could be "resumed anytime at any moment" without "scraping even a rifle." So why should North Korea unilaterally give up its arsenal of nuclear weapons in exchange for nothing more than vague US promises of security guarantees?

According to an April statement by South Korean leader Moon, North Korea had dropped its demand for the withdrawal of the 28,000 US troops now stationed in South Korea as a precondition for its denuclearization.

In light of recent events and rhetoric – and in the absence of any official statement directly from Pyongyang – that pledge can no longer be taken at face value. Indeed, the KCNA statement cryptically said that "it seems that the US misunderstood our goodwill and patience."

China has also long desired for US troops to leave South Korea. The US, on the other hand, has maintained that the withdrawal of its troops is a non-starter, though North Korea and China will argue that the troops would need to leave as part of any final peace agreement.

If no such agreement materializes and Washington is blamed by Seoul for the failure, it could possibly lead to more interaction between China and South Korea in pursuit of alternative avenues out of the decades-long stand-off between the two Korean states.

That divide-and-rule agenda could explain why North Korea's mouthpiece media undiplomatically referred to Pompeo's overtures as "gangsterism", while the American diplomat maintained after his Pyongyang visit that the denuclearization talks were still on track.



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