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Saturday, April 17, 2021

Policy workshop addressed promises and challenges of using carbon pricing to combat climate change

Climate change might be the world's most complex public policy problem. It is more global, more long-term, more irreversible, and more uncertain than most other policy challenges and probably unique in the combination of all four factors. Given this daunting mix, it is all too tempting to look for a simple fix.

Economists have long pointed to carbon pricing as just such a fix: Increase the price of carbon emissions and watch emissions decline. The theory is indeed compelling. In fact, it is based on the one and only law in all of economics—as the price of something goes up, the quantity demanded goes down.

The practice, alas, is not quite as simple. For one, there are other market failures and hurdles to overcome in transforming the world's economies from their current high-carbon, low-efficiency path toward a low-carbon, high-efficiency one. Second, politics. Despite the ample warnings and evidence we have been receiving for decades, the United States and others have taken only modest steps to reducing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change.

To help provide a path forward for policymakers, Jesse Jenkins of Princeton University, Leah Stokes of the University of California, Santa Barbara, and I convened a virtual workshop of academic and policy experts in March 2020 to discuss the current state of policy in the United States and around the world. The discussions addressed such challenges as how to:

  • Price carbon and establish a politically viable regimen to significantly reduce its use
  • Allocate any revenues that might accrue from a carbon pricing policy, including addressing effects on low-income households and communities, as well as those economically dependent on the production or use of fossil fuels
  • Make such policies fit in with measures that regulate emissions and fuel use
  • Foster low-carbon innovation

The participants included economists, political scientists, energy and innovation experts, lawyers, and leaders and experts from government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and advocacy groups. More than 70 individuals gathered online to help make the workshop a success.

The convening was made possible by financial support from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, and the Niskanen Center, and it was hosted and facilitated by New York University's Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service. The resulting workshop report  summarizes the discussions and conclusions of the participants. I summarize these results below.

Carbon pricing

Carbon pricing can be one of many effective tools available for harnessing market forces to reduce the use of carbon-based fuels, drive innovation, and spur the adoption of clean energy technologies. Carbon pricing can be deployed through taxes or through a cap-and-trade system that limits overall greenhouse gas emissions from factories, utilities, and other facilities, and permits owners to buy and sell the ability to emit greenhouse gases within that overall limit, thus establishing a price for each ton emitted.

Political constraints, however, have made carbon pricing a difficult proposition in the United States and elsewhere for policymakers seeking to set either carbon taxes or cap-and-trade limits at levels sufficient to have a meaningful impact on emissions.

Carbon taxes are a direct means of both reducing the use of fuels that emit greenhouse gases and raising revenues to ameliorate the impact on low-income households—through such measures as "carbon dividends"—and invest in such initiatives as clean energy and mass transit. But while the public is supportive of some versions of a carbon tax, voters have a history of rejecting them at the polls when given the chance, often due to significant opposition from the fossil fuel industry.

The use of revenues can affect a policy's effectiveness and political feasibility. Dedicating some of or all revenues toward clean energy projects, research and development, and such infrastructure investments as smart grids and mass transit not only contributes to decarbonization but also increases public support. But the use of revenue to ameliorate the inequitable distribution of the costs and risks of climate change across households, firms, and regions can help address the issues of fairness and environmental justice.

This can be achieved by, say, rebating some revenues in the form of income tax cuts for low-income families or providing support for businesses or regions that are heavily energy-dependent, or even addressing other spending needs. These revenue uses are not mutually exclusive. A hybrid approach can balance competing imperatives.

The most significant political problem facing measures that raise the price of carbon to reduce its use is that the organized interests that face the concentrated costs imposed by those measures marshal resources to weaken or defeat them. Moreover, in countries with high economic inequality, such as the United States, carbon taxes can result in an unequal tax burden if they are not accompanied by complementary policies to assist low-income households. The societal benefits of reduced carbon emissions—the goal of these measures—are well-recognized by the public, but they also are diffuse and often delayed.

The political challenges facing carbon pricing policies lead to significantly weakened versions, but they also point to a broader approach. Public opinion research shows the highest support for indirect measures of establishing a price, such as clean energy standards and investments in energy research and development. Advocates for standards combined with investments in clean energy argue that these policies can more effectively achieve the desired, popular outcomes and that they are more politically achievable. Meanwhile, when regulations do not produce revenue, they leave less room to address the potential regressive impact of those measures through benefits for affected populations. Advocates argue that using revenues from the existing progressive tax system can help to assuage those concerns.

Addressing environmental justice also needs to be a key component of climate mitigation measures. Communities of color are burdened not only by their disproportionate proximity to sources of air and water pollution, but also by the disproportionate impact they experience from such climate change phenomena as natural disasters, increasing heat waves, and rising sea levels.

Solutions have the same potential. For instance, if polluting facilities located in these communities have the option of maintaining or even increasing emissions at those facilities by purchasing allowances or paying a tax, then communities could see their disproportionate exposure maintained or increased. Likewise, these communities can suffer the regressive effects of a carbon tax if revenues are not used to ameliorate the distributive impact. So, another question policymakers face is how mechanisms can be designed to support environmental justice.

Some states and countries have achieved significant results with pricing mechanisms

Policies to reduce carbon emissions typically show trade-offs among efficacy, economic cost-effectiveness, and political feasibility. While existing carbon pricing policies do reduce emissions, they often do so slowly because those policies rarely set a sufficiently high price. If they do impel polluters to reduce emissions, public backlash or interest group pressure might cause them to be weakened or repealed outright.

A number of other countries and U.S. states have established carbon pricing policies. Around 15 percent of global carbon emissions are subject to carbon pricing. The most significant example is the European Union Emissions Trading System, the world's largest carbon pricing program, limiting carbon emissions from more than 11,000 power plants, industrial facilities, and other large emitters. Yet the EU's significant success in reducing emissions to date might be more attributable to other policy measures, such as sectoral efficiency programs, clean energy targets, and direct subsidies for solar photovoltaics and other low-carbon energy sources on the one hand and research and development on the other.

California's system is the most significant in the United States. Its emissions trading system caps around 85 percent of all greenhouse gasses generated in the state. Here, too, the cap-and-trade system is embedded in a comprehensive suite of other policies, including discrete sectoral strategies; direct subsidies for renewable energy, public transit and zero-emission vehicles; environmental restoration; and more sustainable agriculture. The carbon price established by the emissions trading system can play an effective supporting role. Recent legislation further weakened the system.

Another important U.S. pricing system is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a partnership of 11 Northeast and mid-Atlantic states that regulates emissions from power plants under an emissions cap. While emissions have decreased since the program got under way in 2008, this is likely due to factors unrelated to the initiative, as the carbon price set under the agreement is far too low to have a significant impact. The revenue raised, in contrast, has been put to good use to subsidize the deployment of low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency measures.

Others have made progress toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In Washington state, improvements have come primarily through a series of sectoral measures such as clean energy and efficiency standards. Washington's Clean Air Rule, issued in 2016 by Gov. Jay Inslee, effectively instituted a cap-and-trade system, but court challenges have prevented it from being fully implemented. In addition, 2016 and 2018 statewide ballot initiatives to impose a carbon tax were both defeated, in good part due to stiff opposition from the fossil fuel industry, though lukewarm support and outright skepticism from environmentalists also played a role.

Canada offers a wide variety of examples, as the national government set broad targets for carbon taxes but permitted provinces to establish their own policies, with a federal backstop available when they failed to follow through or to sustain a program. British Columbia has a particularly effective carbon tax, while Alberta tried several approaches, including establishing a carbon price, incentives for renewable energy, regulation of methane, and a phaseout of coal. But ultimately, the province repealed the measures it had taken and thus is now subject to the plan established at the national level.

Other countries have had mixed political results. Australia repealed a carbon tax in 2016, 2 years after it was approved. Sweden has had a carbon tax since 1991 that has significantly reduced emissions. Others, such as Norway, have similar explicit carbon taxes, while a French carbon tax law had been struck down by the highest court. China has also been experimenting with local and regional carbon pricing systems.

Setting the social cost of carbon

A critical issue in setting climate policy is the level of ambition. There, the social cost of carbon is an important yardstick. The United States measures the social cost of carbon based on the monetary damages linked to one ton of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere. Importantly, calculating the social cost of carbon alone does not imply that carbon pricing is the only "correct" policy instrument, but the metric is an important yardstick. It is, thus, is a critical element informing regulatory decisions.

With the Biden administration preparing to seek significant climate-related legislation and advance an extensive regulatory agenda, an important first step was President Joe Biden's Inauguration Day executive order that calls for restoration of the process for determining the official social cost of carbon. The Obama administration started this process, which was then significantly weakened during the Trump administration.

The Biden executive order reestablished the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, which is co-chaired by three White House agencies and includes a number of other agencies and departments throughout government. The panel will spend this coming year reviewing the latest evidence and scientific and economic thinking to produce a new calculation that forms the backbone of regulatory policy and actions going forward.

In the meantime, the group has reestablished, on an interim basis, the social cost of carbon of around $50 per ton, originally set in the Obama administration, reversing the Trump administration's changes. This was, in fact, the first of eight recommendations that eight of us made to the Biden administration following an October 2020 workshop, which  was part of the same series as the March 2020 convening.

Lessons and key recommendations

Carbon pricing is one of many necessary tools for designing effective and equitable climate policy. Others include establishing specific sectoral limits on emissions, investments in clean energy and emissions-reducing infrastructure, and measures to reduce the impact of pollution on disadvantaged and marginalized communities. Pricing policies such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems might play an important role with these other measures in an overall system, but they cannot and should not stand on their own.

Centering the challenge of setting equitable climate policy on nonpricing policies can minimize the problem of front-loaded household and business costs overshadowing the benefits of emissions reductions. This policy approach can both reduce carbon emissions significantly and survive the political wars that are never-ending. The evidence of the climate crisis is well-established, and experience with the science, economics, and politics of potential solutions is expanding. Convenings such as this carbon pricing workshop can help bridge disciplinary silos on the one hand, and the gap between academia and political practice on the other.

Factsheet: What does the research say about care infrastructure?

The United States is emerging from the greatest health, economic, and caregiving crises in a century. Many policymakers are looking for ways to jumpstart the economy and, recognizing the tie between infrastructure and economic growth, have turned their sights on investments in U.S. physical and care infrastructure.

In March 2021, President Joe Biden proposed the American Jobs Plan and American Families Plan, a multipart proposal that would boost federal spending on the nation's care and physical infrastructure. (See textbox for details.) Investments of this kind could help the U.S. economy recover from the coronavirus recession and lead toward sustainable, broad-based economic growth in the future.

Care infrastructure in the American Jobs Plan and American Families Plan

The American Jobs Plan includes significant investments in the nation's care infrastructure, including:

  • $400 billion to expand home- and community-based services to help people who are elderly or have a physical or intellectual disability stay in their homes and avoid unnecessary institutionalization
  • $25 billion to upgrade existing child care facilities and increase the supply of child care in communities with limited access

The American Families Plan has yet to be formally released, but President Biden supports the following care infrastructure investments:

  • Twelve weeks of federally funded paid family and medical leave with an additional 7 days of paid sick leave
  • Additional child care subsidies administered on a sliding scale, so that low- to middle-income families pay no more than 7 percent of their income on child care
  • Expanded early care and education options, including universal pre-Kindergarten for all 3- to 4-year-olds and child care options for parents who work nontraditional hours

Care infrastructure includes the policies, resources, and services necessary to help U.S. families meet their caregiving needs. Specifically, care infrastructure describes high-quality, accessible, and affordable child care; paid family and medical leave; and home- and community-based services and support.

This factsheet presents some of the research and evidence on America's care infrastructure as it relates to families' caregiving needs, the care workforce, and U.S. economic growth.

The current state of U.S. care infrastructure

Caregiving is an important component of the economy. Research suggests that adequate care infrastructure can promote labor force participation, particularly among women; boost the human capital of care recipients; and support broad-based macroeconomic growth. Yet the evidence also suggests that U.S. care infrastructure is in need of greater investment, and current caregiving policies and resources may not be sufficient for the nation's caregiving needs. For example:

  • Child care costs more than in-state public college in 30 states, and more than half of all families live in so-called child care deserts, where the supply of licensed child care slots is insufficient for the number of children in that area. Despite these high prices, child care providers run on razor-thin profit margins, making them particularly vulnerable to changes in macroeconomic trends. Meanwhile, the median wage for a child care worker is only $25,460 per year.1
  • The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that today's seniors will incur an average of $137,800 in future long-term services and supports costs, half of which will be financed out of pocket—an unaffordable amount for many. And while COVID-19 outbreaks were particularly devastating to nursing home residents, waitlists for home- and community-based services through Medicaid waivers remain long. In 2018, more than 800,000 Americans were on such a waitlist—approximately 45 percent of the total population already receiving these services.2
  • For workers living in the 44 states that do not currently have an active paid family and medical leave system, finding time to focus on caregiving can be a challenge. Only 20 percent of private-sector workers access paid family leave through their employers, and 44 percent of U.S. workers do not even qualify for unpaid leave through the Family and Medical Leave Act, or FMLA.3

The COVID-19 pandemic and recession exposed preexisting flaws in the nation's care infrastructure and further weakened an already-fragile system. Employment in the child care and home-health sectors remains depressed, suggesting the care economy could struggle to meet demand as the nation reopens, blunting the economic recovery. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

Insufficient care infrastructure constrains the U.S. economy and worker well-being

  • Paid caregivers earn less than workers in noncare jobs with comparable skills, employment characteristics, and demographics. Research demonstrates that professionals in the caregiving industry receive wages that are 20 percent lower than comparable professionals in other industries. Managers face a similar 14 percent penalty. These penalties translate to higher turnover, lower consumer spending, a smaller tax base, and reduced economic security than if care workers were valued the same as comparable noncare employees.4
  • Turnover and disruptions in paid caregiving arrangements are burdensome for family caregivers. Recent research finds that the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted more than half of family caregiving arrangements. Family caregivers who face a caregiving disruption demonstrate increased anxiety and depression, and are 13.9 percentage points more likely to also experience permanent job separation or furloughs during the pandemic, compared with noncaregivers.5
  • Informal caregiving may constrain the economy through lost productivity, wages, and benefits. In data collected by Gallup Inc., 24 percent of family caregivers report that caregiving keeps them from working more, and 30 percent report missing 6 or more days of work in the prior year due to caregiving duties. These productivity losses are estimated to cost the U.S. economy more than $25 billion per year. A 2011 study by the Metlife Mature Market Institute estimates that aggregate cost to the U.S. economy from lost wages, pensions, and Social Security benefits for these family caregivers is nearly $3 trillion.6
  • Caregiving concerns may have driven millions of women out of the workforce in the COVID-19 pandemic. Research shows that caregiving concerns contributed to more than 2.3 million women exiting the labor force between February 2020 and February 2021. By March 2021, the labor force participation rate for women was 56.1 percent, the lowest rate since May 1988. The gap between men's and women's labor force participation widened in communities where school closures exacerbated caregiving needs. Time out of the workforce has long-term implications: Research shows that 13 percent of the gender pay gap can be ascribed to time spent outside of the labor force caring for others.7

Investments in care infrastructure boost economic growth, labor force participation, and worker well-being

  • Investments in care infrastructure have the potential to create twice as many new jobs as investments in physical infrastructure alone. In the wake of the Great Recession a decade ago, researchers estimate that investment in early childhood development and home-based healthcare could have created 23.5 new jobs per $1 million spent, compared to 11.1 jobs from physical infrastructure investments. Approximately 85 percent of new jobs from both care and physical infrastructure investments would reach workers with lower levels of educational attainment.8 (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2

  • Spending in the care economy would strengthen women's employment and reduce the gender employment gap. An analysis of care spending in seven OECD countries, including the United States, estimates that an investment in the care economy equal to 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product would raise the employment rate for U.S. women and men by 8.2 percentage points and 4 percentage points, respectively. This would reduce the gender employment divide by 4.2 percentage points.9
  • Accessible and affordable child care can facilitate labor force participation and support economic growth. Research shows that parents' labor force participation increases when child care is more affordable and accessible. In one study, a 100-slot increase in the supply of child care in a community is estimated to raise women's labor force participation for the entire community by 0.3 percentage points. Conversely, every $100 increase in the price of child care is associated with a 3.7 percentage point decrease in that neighborhood's labor force participation rate among women.10
    • Meanwhile, high-quality early care and education can lead to long-term improvements in a child's human capital. Children in high-quality programs demonstrate better education, economic, health, and social outcomes and fewer negative outcomes—such as involvement in the criminal justice system. These high-quality programs can help pay for themselves, generating up to a 13 percent return on investment per-child, per-year.11
  • Much of the research evidence shows paid leave has a range of positive outcomes for caregivers and care recipients. A growing body of research suggests that paid parental leave can improve a range of childhood outcomes, including infant mortality, low birth weight, preterm birth, breastfeeding rates, and pediatric head trauma, as well as later-in-life outcomes, including lower rates of attention deficit disorder and obesity. Additionally, evidence from California suggests paid caregiving leave can reduce nursing home occupancy among the elderly patients, likely due to enhanced access to family caregivers. And while research on paid medical leave is still comparatively scant, research on related programs indicates such leave can lead to positive health and economic outcomes, as employees have more time and resources to focus on their own well-being.12
    • Paid leave may also improve labor market outcomes for caregivers. The bulk of the research finds positive associations between paid leave and women's labor force participation, though the relationship remains nuancedEvidence from California indicates that under the state's paid leave law, new mothers are 18 percentage points more likely to be working the year after the birth of their child, compared to mothers without paid leave access. Recent research corroborates these findings, indicating an approximately 20 percent increase in the probability of labor force participation during the year of a child's birth. This increase remains significant up to 5 years later.13
  • Patients transitioning from institutions to lower-cost home- and community-based services experience better quality of life and fewer unmet needs. Research shows that patients who transition from institutional care to home-based care express greater life satisfaction (66 percent compared to 83 percent) and fewer unmet care needs (18.3 percent compared to 7.6 percent), compared to their time in institutions. In the same analysis, patients transitioning from nursing home facilities demonstrate 18 percent to 24 percent declines in healthcare spending in their first year in home- and community-based care.14
    • Home-based care may be particularly valuable for patients without access to family caregiversResearch demonstrates that higher levels of state home-health spending is associated with a significant reduction in the risk of nursing home admission among childless patients.15


Inefficiencies in the nation's current care infrastructure—paid family and medical leave, child care, and home-based services and supports—constrain economic growth, and leave families and businesses vulnerable to unexpected health and caregiving shocks. Caregiving work is undervalued, and many U.S. workers across the economy face a financial penalty for engaging in care work, which can lead to high turnover and caregiving instability. When care workers are not available or not affordable, family members take on new caregiving responsibilities, exacerbating work-life challenges. If family caregivers cannot resolve these challenges, then many are forced out of the workforce—costing the economy trillions of dollars in lost productivity and compensation.

Alternatively, research suggests that investments in care infrastructure could create significantly more new jobs than investments in physical infrastructure alone, boosting GDP growth and reducing the gender employment divide. Research on the individual components of the care economy likewise support further investment.

Accessible, affordable, and high-quality child care is associated with employment gains for parents in the short term and human capital improvements for children in the long term. Likewise, a preponderance of the evidence on paid leave indicates positive labor market outcomes for caregivers and health and well-being outcomes for care recipients. Finally, patients who transition out of institution-based long-term care report better quality of life, fewer unmet care needs, and lower healthcare costs.

Altogether, the bulk of the research and evidence suggests investments in care infrastructure are a promising tool to boost U.S. economic growth, productivity, and well-being. Policymakers looking to jumpstart the U.S. economic recovery from the coronavirus recession, ensure broad-based future economic growth, and provide much-needed support to U.S. workers and their families must prioritize investment in both physical and care infrastructure.


1. Child Care Aware of America, "The US and the High Price of Child Care" (2019); Rasheed Malik and others, "The Coronavirus Will Make Child Care Deserts Worse and Exacerbate Inequality" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2020); Jessica H. Brown and Chris M. Herbst, "Child Care Over the Business Cycle," IZA Discussion Paper No. 14048 (IZA Institute of Labor Economics, 2021); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Child Care Works." In Occupational Outlook Handbook (Washington: Department of Labor, 2021).

2. Melissa Favreault and Judith Dey, "Long-Term Care Services and Supports For Older Americans: Risks and Financing, 2020" (Washington: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2021); Kaiser Family Foundation, "Waiting List Enrollment for Medicaid Section 1915(c) Home and Community-Based Services Waivers" (2018).

3. National Partnership for Women and Families, "State Paid Family and Medical Leave Insurance Laws: January 2021" (2021); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "National Compensation Survey, Employee Benefits in the United States, March 2020" (Washington: Department of Labor, 2020); Scott Brown and others, "Employee and Worksite Perspectives of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Results from the 2018 Surveys" (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, 2020).

4. Nancy Folbre and Kristin Smith, "The wages of care: Bargaining power, earnings and inequality." Working Paper (Washington Center for Equitable Growth, 2017); Robert Holly, "Home Care Industry Turnover Reaches All-Time High of 82%," Home Health Care News, 2019.

5. Yulya Truskinovsky, Jessica Finlay, and Lindsay Kobayashi, "Caregiving in a Pandemic: COVID-19 and the Well-being of Family Caregivers 55+ in the U.S." Working Paper (Washington Center for Equitable Growth, 2021).

6. Dan Witters, "Caregiving Costs U.S. Economy $25.2 Billion in Lost Productivity" (Washington: Gallup Inc., 2011); Metlife Mature Market Institute, "The MetLife Study of Caregiving Costs to Working Caregivers" (New York:  Metlife Services and Solutions LLC, 2011).

7. Titan Alon and others, "From Mancession to Shecession: Women's Employment in Regular and Pandemic Recession." Working Paper 28632(National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021); The National Women's Law Center, "A Year of Strength & Loss: The Pandemic, The Economy, and The Value of Women's Work" (2021); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Labor Force Participation Rate – Women [LNS11300002]" (n.d.), retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; Caitlyn Collins and others, "The Gendered consequences of a Weak Infrastructure of Care: School Reopening Plans and Parents' Employment During the COVID-19 Pandemic," Gender and Society (2021);  Jérôme Adda, Christian Dustmann, and Katrien Stevens, "The Career Costs of Children," Journal of Political Economy 125(2) (2017): 293–337.

8. Rania Antonopoulos and others, "Investing in Care: A Strategy for Effective and Equitable Job Creation." Working Paper No. 60 (Levy Economic Institute of Bard College, 2011).

9. Jérôme De Henau and others, "Investing in the Care Economy: A gendered analysis of employment stimulus in seven OECD countries" (Brussels: International Trade Union Confederation, 2016).

10. Taryn W. Morrissey, "Child care and parent labor force participation: a review of the research literature," Review of Economics of Households 15 (2016): 1–24; Chris M. Herbst and Burt S. Burnow, "Close to Home: A Simultaneous Equations Model of the Relationship Between Child Care Accessibility and Female Labor Force Participation," Journal of Family and Economic Issues 29 (2008): 128–151.

11. James Heckman, "Invest in Early Childhood Development: Reduce Deficits, Strengthen the Economy" (The Heckman Equation,2013).

12. Elisabeth Jacobs, "Paid Family and Medical Leave in the United States: A Research Agenda" (Washington: Washington Center for Equitable Growth, 2018); Rui Huang and Muzhe Yang, "Paid maternity leave and breastfeeding practice before and after California's implementation of the nation's first paid family leave program," Economic & Human Biology 16 (2015): 45–59; Joanne Klevens and others, "Paid family leave's effect on hospital admissions for pediatric abusive head trauma" Injury Prevention 22(6) (2016): 442–445; Shirlee Lichtman-Sadot and Neryvia Pillay Bell, "Child Health in Elementary School Following California's Paid Family Leave Program," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 36 (4) (2017): 790–827; Kanika Arora and Douglas A. Wolf, "Does Paid Leave Reduce Nursing Home Use? The California Experience," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 37 (1) (2018): 38–62; Jack Smalligan and Chantel Boyens, "Paid Medical Leave Research" (Washington: Washington Center for Equitable Growth, 2020).

13. Alix Gould-Werth, "New paid leave research demonstrates challenge of balancing work and caregiving" (Washington: Washington Center for Equitable Growth, 2019); Charles L. Baum II and Christopher J. Ruhm, "The Effects of Paid Family Leave in California on Labor Market Outcomes," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 35 (2) (2016): 333–356; Kelly Jones and Britni Wilcher, "Reducing maternal labor market detachment: A role for paid family leave." Working Paper (Washington Center for Equitable Growth, 2020).

14. Carol V. Irvin and others, "Money Follows the Person 2015 Annual Evaluation Report" (Baltimore, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017).

15. Naoko Muramatsu and others, "Risk of Nursing Home Admission Among Older Americans: Does States' Spending on Home- and Community-Based Services Matter?" The Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences 62 (4) (2007): S169–S178.

Friday, April 16, 2021

Enlighten Radio:Talkin Socialism: The Forever Wars

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Thursday, April 15, 2021

Fwd: [WEBINAR] Register now: Unequal power sabotages workers’ ability to protect themselves from injury, illness and death on the job.

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Date: Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 8:09 AM
Subject: [WEBINAR] Register now: Unequal power sabotages workers' ability to protect themselves from injury, illness and death on the job.
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Workers at risk of coronavirus infection and harm in the workplace received neither adequate protection from their employers nor compensation for their added risks during the pandemic.  This can only be understood as a consequence of unequal workplace power.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the law that created it have also failed workers. Willful inaction in deference to employers and the weaknesses in the law have proven that these basic protections—as essential as they are—are inadequate for many of the hazards in workplaces of the 21st century.

The pandemic laid bare two major worker-safety misconceptions that jeopardized workers' health and economic well-being, especially for low-income and Black and brown workers.

We learned that:

  • Businesses do not inevitably do the right thing to keep workers safe or compensate them for health risks.
  • Current OSHA protections, actions, and tools were not adequate to protect workers.

Unequal power in the workplace deprives workers of the ability to protect themselves from injury, illness, and death on the job. Similarly, lopsided employer power prevents most workers from obtaining adequate compensation for the inherent health risks they face at work.

This webinar will delve into the overhaul needed to bolster OSHA and increase worker bargaining power, so workers across the country can obtain good health and safety on the job.

Register for "Unequal power sabotages workers' ability to protect themselves from injury, illness and death on the job."

For updates and to share this event on social media, use #OSHAUnequalPower.

Tuesday, April 20
4 p.m.–5:30 p.m. ET / 1 p.m.–2:30 p.m. PT
Economic Policy Institute


Featured speakers:

Peter Dorman, Emeritus Professor of Political Economy, Evergreen State College.
Leslie I. Boden, Professor of Environmental Health, Boston University
Ann Rosenthal, former Associate Solicitor, Occupational Safety and Health

Randy Rabinowitz
, Executive Director, OSH Law Project

Bernice Yeung, reporter, ProPublica

Register Today
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