Wednesday, January 9, 2019

Stiglitz; From Yellow Vests to the Green New Deal [feedly]

From Yellow Vests to the Green New Deal
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/yellow-vests-green-new-deal-by-joseph-e-stiglitz-2019-01


From Yellow Vests to the Green New Deal

Jan 7, 2019 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ

The grassroots movement behind the Green New Deal offers a ray of hope to the badly battered establishment: they should embrace it, flesh it out, and make it part of the progressive agenda. We need something positive to save us from the ugly wave of populism, nativism, and proto-fascism that is sweeping the world.

NEW YORK – It's old news that large segments of society have become deeply unhappy with what they see as "the establishment," especially the political class. The "Yellow Vest" protests in France, triggered by President Emmanuel Macron's move to hike fuel taxes in the name of combating climate change, are but the latest example of the scale of this alienation.

THE YEAR OF TRUMP?

Jan 8, 2019 JOSEPH S. NYE questions whether the US president is capable of understanding the risks that the US faces in 2019.

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There are good reasons for today's disgruntlement: four decades of promises by political leaders of both the center left and center right, espousing the neoliberal faith that globalization, financialization, deregulation, privatization, and a host of related reforms would bring unprecedented prosperity, have gone unfulfilled. While a tiny elite seems to have done very well, large swaths of the population have fallen out of the middle class and plunged into a new world of vulnerability and insecurity. Even leaders in countries with low but increasing inequality have felt their public's wrath.1

By the numbers, France looks better than most, but it is perceptions, not numbers, that matter; even in France, which avoided some of the extremism of the Reagan-Thatcher era, things are not going well for many. When taxes on the very wealthy are lowered, but raised for ordinary citizens to meet budgetary demands (whether from far-off Brussels or from well-off financiers), it should come as no surprise that some are angry. The Yellow Vests' refrain speaks to their concerns: "The government talks about the end of the world. We are worried about the end of the month."

There is, in short, a gross mistrust in governments and politicians, which means that asking for sacrifices today in exchange for the promise of a better life tomorrow won't pass muster. And this is especially true of "trickle down" policies: tax cuts for the rich that eventually are supposed to benefit everyone else.

When I was at the World Bank, the first lesson in policy reform was that sequencing and pacing matter. The promise of the Green New Deal that is now being championed by progressives in the United States gets both of these elements right.

The Green New Deal is premised on three observations: First, there are unutilized and underutilized resources – especially human talent – that can be used effectively. Second, if there were more demand for those with low and medium skills, their wages and standards of living would rise. Third, a good environment is an essential part of human wellbeing, today and in the future.

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If the challenges of climate change are not met today, huge burdens will be imposed on the next generation. It is just wrong for this generation to pass these costs on to the next. It is better to leave a legacy of financial debts, which our children can somehow manage, than to hand down a possibly unmanageable environmental disaster.

Almost 90 years ago, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt responded to the Great Depression with his New Deal, a bold package of reforms that touched almost every aspect of the American economy. But it is more than the symbolism of the New Deal that is being invoked now. It is its animating purpose: putting people back to work, in the way that FDR did for the US, with its crushing unemployment of the time. Back then, that meant investments in rural electrification, roads, and dams.

Economists have debated how effective the New Deal was – its spending was probably too low and not sustained enough to generate the kind of recovery the economy needed. Nonetheless, it left a lasting legacy by transforming the country at a crucial time.

So, too, for a Green New Deal: It can provide public transportation, linking people with jobs, and retrofit the economy to meet the challenge of climate change. At the same time, these investments themselves will create jobs.

It has long been recognized that decarbonization, if done correctly, would be a great job creator, as the economy prepares itself for a world with renewable energy. Of course, some jobs– for example, those of the 53,000 coal miners in the US – will be lost, and programs are needed to retrain such workers for other jobs. But to return to the refrain: sequencing and pacing matter. It would have made more sense to begin with creating new jobs before the old jobs were destroyed, to ensure that the profits of the oil and coal companies were taxed, and the hidden subsidies they receive eliminated, before asking those who are barely getting by to pony up more.

The Green New Deal sends a positive message of what government can do, for this generation of citizens and the next. It can deliver today what those who are suffering today need most – good jobs. And it can deliver the protections from climate change that are needed for the future.

The Green New Deal will have to be broadened, and this is especially true in countries like the US, where many ordinary citizens lack access to good education, adequate health care, or decent housing.

The grassroots movement behind the Green New Deal offers a ray of hope to the badly battered establishment: they should embrace it, flesh it out, and make it part of the progressive agenda. We need something positive to save us from the ugly wave of populism, nativism, and proto-fascism that is sweeping the world.


Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in economics, is University Professor at Columbia University and Chief Economist at the Roosevelt Institute. His most recent book is Globalization and Its Discontents Revisited: Anti-Globalization in the Era of Trump.
 -- via my feedly newsfeed

DeLong: What Will Cause the Next US Recession? [feedly]

What Will Cause the Next US Recession?
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/possible-causes-of-next-us-recession-by-j--bradford-delong-2019-01

What Will Cause the Next US Recession?

Jan 7, 2019 J. BRADFORD DELONG

Three of the last four US recessions stemmed from unforeseen shocks in financial markets. Most likely, the next downturn will be no different: the revelation of some underlying weakness will trigger a retrenchment of investment, and the government will fail to pursue counter-cyclical fiscal policy.

BERKELEY – Over the past 40 years, the US economy has experienced four recessions. Among the four, only the extended downturn of 1979-1982 had a conventional cause. The US Federal Reserve thought that inflation was too high, so it hit the economy on the head with the brick of interest-rate hikes. As a result, workers moderated their demands for wage increases, and firms cut back on planned price increases.

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The other three recessions were each caused by derangements in financial markets. After the savings-and-loan crisis of 1991-1992 came the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000-2002, followed by the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in 2007, which triggered the global financial crisis the following year.

As of early January 2019, inflation expectations appear to be well anchored at 2% per year, and the Phillips curve – reflecting the relationship between unemployment and inflation – remains unusually flat. Production and employment excesses or deficiencies from potential-output or natural-rate trends have not had a significant effect on prices and wages.

At the same time, the gap between short and long-term interest rates on safe assets, represented by the so-called yield curve, is unusually small, and short-term nominal interest rates are unusually low. As a general rule of thumb, an inverted yield curve – when the yields on long-term bonds are lower than those on short-term bonds – is considered a strong predictor of a recession. Moreover, after the recent stock-market turmoil, forecasts based on John Campbell and Robert J. Shiller's cyclically adjusted price-earnings(CAPE) ratio put long-run real (inflation-adjusted) buy-and-hold stock returns at around 4% per year, which is still higher than the average over the past four decades.

These background indicators are now at the forefront of investors' minds as they decide whether and when to hedge against the next recession. And one can infer from today's macroeconomic big picture that the next recession most likely will not be due to a sudden shift by the Fed from a growth-nurturing to an inflation-fighting policy. Given that visible inflationary pressures probably will not build up by much over the next half-decade, it is more likely that something else will trigger the next downturn.

Specifically, the culprit will probably be a sudden, sharp "flight to safety" following the revelation of a fundamental weakness in financial markets. That, after all, is the pattern that has been generating downturns since at least 1825, when England's canal-stock boom collapsed.

Needless to say, the particular nature and form of the next financial shock will be unanticipated. Investors, speculators, and financial institutions are generally hedged against the foreseeable shocks, but there will always be other contingencies that have been missed. For example, the death blow to the global economy in 2008-2009 came not from the collapse of the mid-2000s housing bubble, but from the concentration of ownership of mortgage-backed securities.

Likewise, the stubbornly long downturn of the early 1990s was not directly due to the deflation of the late-1980s commercial real-estate bubble. Rather, it was the result of failed regulatory oversight, which allowed insolvent savings and loan associations to continue speculating in financial markets. Similarly, it was not the deflation of the dot-com bubble, but rather the magnitude of overstated earnings in the tech and communications sector that triggered the recession in the early 2000s.

At any rate, today's near-inverted yield curve, low nominal and real bond yields, and equity values all suggest that US financial markets have begun to price in the likelihood of a recession. Assuming that business investment committees are thinking like investors and speculators, all it will take now to bring on a recession is an event that triggers a retrenchment of investment spending.

If a recession comes anytime soon, the US government will not have the tools to fight it. The White House and Congress will once again prove inept at deploying fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical stabilizer; and the Fed will not have enough room to provide adequate stimulus through interest-rate cuts. As for more unconventional policies, the Fed most likely will not have the nerve, let alone the power, to pursue such measures.

As a result, for the first time in a decade, Americans and investors cannot rule out a downturn. At a minimum, they must prepare for the possibility of a deep and prolonged recession, which could arrive whenever the next financial shock comes  

J. Bradford DeLong is Professor of Economics at the University of California at Berkeley and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. He was Deputy Assistant US Treasury Secretary during the Clinton Administration, where he was heavily involved in budget and trade negotiations. His role in designing the bailout of Mexico during the 1994 peso crisis placed him at the forefront of Latin America's transformation into a region of open economies, and cemented his stature as a leading voice in economic-policy debates. -- via my feedly newsfeed

We must prepare now for the likelihood of a recession [feedly]

We must prepare now for the likelihood of a recession
http://larrysummers.com/2019/01/09/we-must-prepare-now-for-the-likelihood-of-a-recession/

Excess austerity is a bigger risk than fiscal profligacy

When people are fundamentally healthy, they do not yet know what will cause their death. An economic recovery is healthy if it is not clear what will cause the next recession. By this standard, the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, although disappointingly slow, has been healthy for most of the last decade.

This is now in serious doubt. Paul Samuelson's quip that the stock market has predicted nine of the last five recessions cautions against overreacting to recent stock market moves. But credit spreads have widened considerably, commodity prices have softened and investors have started demanding higher yields for short-term US bonds than for those with longer terms. Unlike equity markets, "yield curve inversions" have not historically tended to produce false recession predictions. The overall judgment of financial markets is that recession is significantly more likely than not in the next two years.

Real economic indicators for the world's largest economies, China and the US, also suggest considerable cause for concern. Almost every Chinese indicator in the last few months has come in below expectations. Beijing authorities now see the need for stimulus measures if they are to credibly report the attainment of growth targets. Revisions of economic forecasts tend to run in the same direction for protracted periods as forecasters adjust to emerging reality. This tendency is especially pronounced in China, given the extreme political sensitivity of economic statistics.

In the US, inflation is again running below the Federal Reserve's 2 per cent target and comparisons of the yields on ordinary and inflation-adjusted bonds suggest investors expect this to continue for the next decade. While jobs growth remains strong, employment is usually a lagging statistic. Forward-looking indicators of business and consumer sentiment suggest that growth is likely to slow.

Perhaps the US economy will enjoy a soft landing: jobs growth would slow towards long run sustainable levels, and productivity growth would accelerate enough to allow continued gross domestic product growth of 2 per cent and increased wage growth without accelerating inflation. But this would require both policy skill and great luck. Given that we are starting from very high debt levels and low unemployment, a recession is the more likely outcome.

It is almost inconceivable that the global economy will remain healthy in the face of serious economic problems in both China and the US, even leaving aside their conflicts over trade and technology. Europe lacks economic energy and the uncertainties associated with Brexit, French protests, German political transition and Italian populism mean the continent is more likely to be a source of problems than a solution.

Like generals fighting the last war, too many policymakers are focused on yesterday's problems. The global economy is much more likely to suffer from a downturn than from overheating in the next two years. There is more likely to be too little credit flow than too much, asset price deflation is more probable than a bubble and excess austerity is a bigger risk than profligacy.

The critical challenge for monetary and fiscal policy will be to maintain sufficient demand amid immense geopolitical uncertainty, increasing protectionism, high accumulated debt levels and structural and demographic factors leading to increased private saving and reduced private investment.

The Fed should signal that it is determined to avoid a downturn that would assure another decade of below target inflation. The People's Bank of China and other central banks should also make clear that they recognise that avoiding another recession is the most important thing they can contribute to financial stability.

Fiscal policymakers should realise the very low real yield on government bonds is a signal that more debt can be absorbed. It is not too soon to begin plans to launch large-scale infrastructure projects if a downturn comes. The largest economies should try to limit trade frictions and signal that they are committed to co-operating to support global growth by assuring adequate capital flows to emerging markets and avoiding a cycle of protectionism.

Even if my recession fears are excessive, a shift towards emphasising growth will contribute to bringing inflation up to target levels and can be reversed. If I am proved right, the costs of delay in the policy response could be catastrophic. It is the irony of our moment that prudence requires the rejection of austerity.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

David Bacon: NewDay for Mexican workers

Tuesday, January 8, 2019

Enlighten Radio:Check out our new player!

John Case has sent you a link to a blog:



Blog: Enlighten Radio
Post: Check out our new player!
Link: http://www.enlightenradio.org/2019/01/check-out-our-new-player.html

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Sunday, January 6, 2019

PK: The Economics of Soaking the Rich [feedly]

The economics of Soaking the Rich
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/opinion/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-tax-policy-dance.html

The Economics of Soaking The Rich

What does Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez know about tax policy? A lot.I have no idea how well Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez will perform as a member of Congress. But her election is already serving a valuable purpose. You see, the mere thought of having a young, articulate, telegenic nonwhite woman serve is driving many on the right mad — and in their madness they're inadvertently revealing their true selves.

Some of the revelations are cultural: The hysteria over a video of AOC dancing in college says volumes, not about her, but about the hysterics. But in some ways the more important revelations are intellectual: The right's denunciation of AOC's "insane" policy ideas serves as a very good reminder of who is actually insane.

The controversy of the moment involves AOC's advocacy of a tax rate of 70-80 percent on very high incomes, which is obviously crazy, right? I mean, who thinks that makes sense? Only ignorant people like … um, Peter Diamond, Nobel laureate in economics and arguably the world's leading expert on public finance (although Republicans blocked him from an appointment to the Federal Reserve Board with claims that he was unqualified. Really.) And it's a policy nobody has every implemented, aside from … the United States, for 35 years after World War II — including the most successful period of economic growth in our history.

To be more specific, Diamond, in work with Emmanuel Saez — one of our leading experts on inequality — estimated the optimal top tax rate to be 73 percent. Some put it higher: Christina Romer, top macroeconomist and former head of President Obama's Council of Economic Advisers, estimates it at more than 80 percent.

Where do these numbers come from? Underlying the Diamond-Saez analysis are two propositions: Diminishing marginal utility and competitive markets.

Diminishing marginal utility is the common-sense notion that an extra dollar is worth a lot less in satisfaction to people with very high incomes than to those with low incomes. Give a family with an annual income of $20,000 an extra $1,000 and it will make a big difference to their lives. Give a guy who makes $1 million an extra thousand and he'll barely notice it.

What this implies for economic policy is that we shouldn't care what a policy does to the incomes of the very rich. A policy that makes the rich a bit poorer will affect only a handful of people, and will barely affect their life satisfaction, since they will still be able to buy whatever they want.

So why not tax them at 100 percent? The answer is that this would eliminate any incentive to do whatever it is they do to earn that much money, which would hurt the economy. In other words, tax policy toward the rich should have nothing to do with the interests of the rich, per se, but should only be concerned with how incentive effects change the behavior of the rich, and how this affects the rest of the population.

But here's where competitive markets come in. In a perfectly competitive economy, with no monopoly power or other distortions — which is the kind of economy conservatives want us to believe we have — everyone gets paid his or her marginal product. That is, if you get paid $1000 an hour, it's because each extra hour you work adds $1000 worth to the economy's output.

In that case, however, why do we care how hard the rich work? If a rich man works an extra hour, adding $1000 to the economy, but gets paid $1000 for his efforts, the combined income of everyone else doesn't change, does it? Ah, but it does — because he pays taxes on that extra $1000. So the social benefit from getting high-income individuals to work a bit harder is the tax revenue generated by that extra effort — and conversely the cost of their working less is the reduction in the taxes they pay.

Or to put it a bit more succinctly, when taxing the rich, all we should care about is how much revenue we raise. The optimal tax rate on people with very high incomes is the rate that raises the maximum possible revenue.

And that's something we can estimate, given evidence on how responsive the pre-tax income of the wealthy actually is to tax rates. As I said, Diamond and Saez put the optimal rate at 73 percent, Romer at over 80 percent — which is consistent with what AOC said.

An aside: What if we take into account the reality that markets aren't perfectly competitive, that there's a lot of monopoly power out there? The answer is that this almost surely makes the case for even higher tax rates, since high-income people presumably get a lot of those monopoly rents.

So AOC, far from showing her craziness, is fully in line with serious economic research. (I hear that she's been talking to some very good economists.) Her critics, on the other hand, do indeed have crazy policy ideas — and tax policy is at the heart of the crazy.

You see, Republicans almost universally advocate low taxes on the wealthy, based on the claim that tax cuts at the top will have huge beneficial effects on the economy. This claim rests on research by … well, nobody. There isn't any body of serious work supporting G.O.P. tax ideas, because the evidence is overwhelmingly against those ideas.

Look at the history of top marginal income tax rates (left) versus growth in real GDP per capita (right, measured over 10 years, to smooth out short-run fluctuations.):
Top tax rates and growthCreditTax Policy Center, BEA
Image
Top tax rates and growthCreditTax Policy Center, BEA
What we see is that America used to have very high tax rates on the rich — higher even than those AOC is proposing — and did just fine. Since then tax rates have come way down, and if anything the economy has done less well.



Why do Republicans adhere to a tax theory that has no support from nonpartisan economists and is refuted by all available data? Well, ask who benefits from low taxes on the rich, and it's obvious.

And because the party's coffers demand adherence to nonsense economics, the party prefers "economists" who are obvious frauds and can't even fake their numbers effectively.

Which brings me back to AOC, and the constant effort to portray her as flaky and ignorant. Well, on the tax issue she's just saying what good economists say; and she definitely knows more economics than almost everyone in the G.O.P. caucus, not least because she doesn't "know" things that aren't true.

The bad economics of PAYGO swamp any strategic gain from adopting it [feedly]

The bad economics of PAYGO swamp any strategic gain from adopting it
https://www.epi.org/blog/the-bad-economics-of-paygo-swamp-any-strategic-gain-from-adopting-it/

The obscure Congressional budget rule known as PAYGO ("pay as you go") has burst into the news lately. A PAYGO rule means that any tax cut or spending increase passed into law needs to be offset in the same spending cycle with tax increases or spending cuts elsewhere in the budget. Incoming House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has indicated that the House of Representatives will abide by PAYGO in the next Congress, and this decision has sparked much controversy.

Many Washington insiders assert forcefully that committing to PAYGO rules in the House for the next Congress is good politics. The argument is that it assuages fears of politicians who believe they must make public commitments to lower deficits to avoid being punished by voters who care deeply about this issue. If voters do indeed have strong preferences for reducing deficits, then policymakers—even those who want to use fiscal policy to reduce inequality by expanding public spending and investment—must first commit to PAYGO to convince these voters that budget measures can both reduce inequality and be fiscally "responsible."

The strength of evidence supporting this political claim is debatable. What's less debatable is that PAYGO really has hindered progressive policymaking in the not-so-recent past. For example, it was commitments to adhere to PAYGO that led to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) having underpowered subsidies for purchasing insurance and, even more importantly, having a long lag in implementation; the law passed in January 2010 yet the exchanges with subsidies only were up and running by 2014. This implementation lag meant that the ACA's benefits were not as sunk into Americans' economic lives by the time a hostile Republican Congress and administration began launching attacks on it following the 2016 elections. It is a real testament to how much better the ACA made life for Americans that it has been stubbornly resistant to these attacks. But it would have been helpful to have a couple more years to have it running smoothly, but that didn't happen largely because the ACA's architects wanted to meet PAYGO rules over the 10-year budget window.

Even more fundamentally, it is terrible economics to view federal budget deficits as always and everywhere bad. Making good policy in the future will require that voters be educated on this front. Why not start now? After all, our failure as a society to understand the economics of deficits and debt greatly contributed to the destructive impact of the Great Recession of 2008–09. The stakes of allowing history to repeat itself are high enough that we should take the time to quickly recap the history of how costly irrational deficit-phobia has been.

In the generation before the Great Recession, D.C.-based policymakers and analysts from both political parties cultivated an unhealthy degree of fear around federal budget deficits. This excess fear of deficits led them to miss the real dangers facing the economy as the Great Recession approached. The root of the economic crisis of 2008–09 was the deregulation that allowed an enormous housing bubble to inflate to levels guaranteed to cause a deep recession when it inevitably burst. Yet most Democratic criticisms of the economic stewardship of President George W. Bush stemmed instead around his presiding over run-ups in federal budget deficits. In 2006, for example, then-Senator Barack Obama voted against raising the nation's statutory debt ceiling to signal his disapproval of excessively high deficits and debt. It was bad enough that excess concern over deficits blinded policymakers to gathering economic storms elsewhere. It was even worse that this deficit fear-mongering was happening while the federal budget deficit was extremely small and shrinking rapidly: the budget deficit in 2006 and 2007 averaged less than 1.5 percent of GDP—an amount that is absolutely sustainable forever.

This excess fear around budget deficits became an economic catastrophe during the recovery from the Great Recession. Despite multiple warnings that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 would not be at sufficient scale to generate a full recovery, 2010 saw a pivot away from defending the need for expansionary fiscal policy (i.e., running deficits to finance measures to support the economy) and toward prioritizing measures to reduce deficits. A prime example was in the January 2010 State of the Union address—when the unemployment rate was 9.8 percentwhen President Obama said:

"But families across the country are tightening their belts and making tough decisions. The federal government should do the same. So tonight, I'm proposing specific steps to pay for the trillion dollars that it took to rescue the economy last year…Like any cash-strapped family, we will work within a budget to invest in what we need and sacrifice what we don't…"

Why am I taking you on this extended walk down the memory lane of irrational deficit-phobia? Because it had terrible consequences. The recovery from the Great Recession was the slowest in post-World War II history, and the degree of fiscal austerity canentirely explain its slowness. The figure below shows the growth in public spending per capita in the recovery following the Great Recession compared to previous recoveries. If this public spending following the Great Recession had followed the average path of the recoveries of the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, a full recovery with unemployment around 4 percent would have been achieved by 2013.

 

Figure A

Now, this austerity following the Great Recession was largely driven by Republicans—both in Congress and in statehouses. But the generation of bipartisan fear-mongering about deficits surely helped Republicans hold the line on spending cuts and claim that this austerity was fiscally responsible, even as voters suffered the economic consequences. The fact that Republicans' embrace of deficit-reduction is complete hypocrisy and always takes a backseat to their desire to cut taxes for the rich is infuriating, but it doesn't change the fact that fueling excess fear about deficits (even when done in the service of good policy goals like fighting regressive tax cuts) has been terrible economics.

Some people claim that the economic evils of PAYGO are overstated. After all, any sensible Congress would waive it if the economy entered a steep recession and needed expansionary fiscal policy, right? Here, it helps to look at the previous figure again—most of that spending austerity shown in the figure happened after the official recession ended, but occurred while unemployment remained extraordinarily high. The necessity for expansionary fiscal policy is not confined only to official recessions. As the economy takes longer and longer to mount full recoveries after recessions, the need for fiscal policy to remain expansionary even after official recessions end is becoming clearer.

Further, it is debatable whether or not some forms of spending—particularly public investments—should be subject to PAYGO at all. "Golden Rule" public budgeting argues that investments can be funded through debt. This makes eminent economic sense—the textbook reason to think that federal budget deficits can cause harm when the economy is at full employment and starved of savings is that deficits can raise interest rates and hence cause a reduction in productive business investment. But if deficits finance productive public investment, then total economy-wide investment is unchanged (as public investment just substitutes for private investment), and no economic harm is done.

Does arguing against PAYGO rules mean budget deficits are never harmful or that we can spend all we want without ever having to raise revenue to finance it? No. Deficits can, in certain circumstances, potentially put a steady drag on long-run growth. And progressives need to be full-throated about the need for taxes to be higher to both penalize economic "bads" (like greenhouse gas emissions and financial speculation) and to compress the income distribution to make for more broadly shared growth. And, yes, over the long run the large majority of public spending should, on average, be financed by taxes.

The current debate over PAYGO in the new Democratic majority in the House of Representatives will have very little direct effect on policymaking. The Senate is still controlled by Republicans, so little major legislation will be able to pass a divided legislature. And whatever the House decides to do with its internal rules, there remains a statutory PAYGO requirement that can only be loosened by the House and Senate together. So in the end, embracing PAYGO or not in the next House of Representatives is a purely political decision. In the short run, nodding toward conventional notions of "fiscal responsibility" and adopting PAYGO will likely win approving nods from Beltway pundits. But there's a long game that matters here, too; eventually we need to get much smarter about the economics of debt and deficits, and teach voters that the goal of fiscal policy is not always and everywhere to make deficits smaller. Our failure to do this has cost us dearly in recent decades, and now would be a good time to start.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed