Friday, August 17, 2018

NYTIMES: The Costs of Motherhood Are Rising, and Catching Women Off Guard [feedly]

The Costs of Motherhood Are Rising, and Catching Women Off Guard
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/upshot/motherhood-rising-costs-surprise.html

An economic mystery of the last few decades has been why more women aren't working. A new paper offers one answer: Most plan to, but are increasingly caught off guard by the time and effort it takes to raise children.

The share of women in the United States labor force has leveled off since the 1990s, after steadily climbing for half a century. Today, the share of women age 25 to 54 who work is about the same as it was in 1995, even though in the intervening decades, women have been earning more college degrees than men, entering jobs previously closed to them and delaying marriage and childbirth.

The new analysis suggests something else also began happening during the 1990s: Motherhood became more demanding. Parents now spend more time and money on child care. They feel more pressure to breast-feed, to do enriching activities with their children and to provide close supervision.

A result is that women underestimate the costs of motherhood. The mismatch is biggest for those with college degrees, who invest in an education and expect to maintain a career, wrote the authors, Ilyana Kuziemko and Jenny Shen of Princeton, Jessica Pan of the National University of Singapore and Ebonya Washington of Yale.

ADVERTISEMENT

The study — a working paper, meaning it has not yet been published in a peer-reviewed journal — tries to quantify what many parents feel as they struggle with the stress of long, inflexible work hours combined with the demands of STEM classes, screen time rules, college prep, family dinners and children's sick days.

The researchers documented a sharp decline in employment for women after their first children were born, in both the United States and Britain, even though about 90 percent of women worked before having children. They used data from the Labor Department's National Longitudinal Surveys, the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the British Household Panel Survey. Each covers several decades, but the study focused mostly on women born between 1965 and 1975, who were in their 30s in the 2000s.

For many women, the researchers show, stopping work was unplanned. Since about 1985, no more than 2 percent of female high school seniors said they planned to be "homemakers" at age 30, even though most planned to be mothers. The surveys also found no decline in overall job satisfaction post-baby. Yet consistently, between 15 percent and 18 percent of women have stayed home.

One key to understanding why women have diverged from their plans, the economists found, is that their beliefs about gender roles change after their first baby. The surveys ask questions like whether work inhibits a woman's ability to be a good mother and whether both parents should contribute financially to a family. Women tend to give more traditional answers after becoming mothers.

The people most surprised by the demands of motherhood were those the researchers least expected: women with college degrees, or those who had babies later, those who had working mothers and those who had assumed they would have careers. Even though highly educated mothers were less likely to quit working than less educated mothers, they were more likely to express anti-work beliefs, and to say that being a parent was harder than they expected.

EDITORS' PICKS

Billionaire Yogi Behind Indian Prime Minister's Rise

The Scientist Who Scrambled Darwin's Tree of Life

What Happens to #MeToo When a Feminist Is the Accused?

ADVERTISEMENT

Though the study did not analyze fathers' role in depth, it found that their beliefs did not change significantly before and after having a baby. They were less likely than women to say that parenthood was harder than they expected. (Women still do the bulk of child care, even in two-earner families.)

Women got it so wrong, the researchers argue, because it has become harder to work and have children.

The cost of motherhood fell for most of the 20th century because of inventions like dishwashers, formula and the birth control pill. But that's no longer the case, according to data cited in the paper. The cost of child care has increased by 65 percent since the early 1980s. Eighty percent of women breast-feed, up from about half. The number of hours that parents spend on child care has risen, especially for college-educated parents, for whom it has doubled.

Over all, women have had great success in entering the labor force. Seventy percent of mothers with children under 18 work. Women are more likely to work than previous generations at almost every age, found Claudia Goldin, a Harvard economist. They're slightly more likely to stop in their late 30s and early 40s, around the time many are taking care of young children — but they usually return to the labor force, particularly if they have degrees.

Still, the new paper raises questions about why the work-family juggle seems to be getting harder. "It is deeply puzzling that at a moment when women are more prepared than ever for long careers in the labor market, norms would change in a manner that encourages them to spend more time at home," the researchers wrote.

One possible reason is that increasingly, people who work long, inflexible hours are paid disproportionately more, Ms. Goldin's research has found. More women with degrees and these kinds of demanding jobs are having children, and they're likely to be married to men with similar jobs, as Marianne Bertrand, an economist at the University of Chicago, has described. A result is that dual-earning couples may feel the best choice is for one member, usually the mother, to step back from work so the other parent can maximize the family's earnings.

To try to set their children on the best path amid increased competition for college admission, parents, especially college-educated ones, invest significantly more time than they used to in child care, found Valerie Ramey and Garey Ramey, economists at the University of California, San Diego. They described it as the "rug rat race" for top colleges.

ADVERTISEMENT

The lack of family-friendly policies in the United States — such as paid family leave and subsidized child care — most likely plays a role, too. Although policies have improved somewhat since the early 1990s, women's labor force participation in countries that have more generous policies has continued to increase, unlike in the United States.

As women do more paid work, men have not increased their child care and housekeeping tasks to the same extent — another surprise for young women who, research has shown, expected more egalitarian partnerships.

Generations of girls have been told they can achieve anything they aspire to, including having both a career and children — and many women have done so. But at the same time, both work and parenting have become more demanding. The result is that women's expectations seem to be outpacing the realities of public policy, workplace culture and family life.

Claire Cain Miller writes about gender, families and the future of work for The Upshot. She joined The Times in 2008 and was part of a team that won a Pulitzer Prize in 2018 for public service for reporting on workplace sexual harassment issues. @clairecm • Facebook
 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Two and a half years after Jared wrote this, and there is still no sign that the economy has reached "full employment",... [feedly]

Something is awry in the indicators on employment --- 50% confidence bands????

Two and a half years after Jared wrote this, and there is still no sign that the economy has reached "full employment",...
http://www.bradford-delong.com/2018/08/should-read-jared-bernstein-2016-important-new-findings-on-inflation-and-unemployment-from-the-new-erp-jared-b.html

Two and a half years after Jared wrote this, and there is still no sign that the economy has reached "full employment", or that the pace of wage and price growth is even beginning to spiral upwards. Thus he Federal Reserve continues to work with a model of the economy in which we should have very little confidence, if any: Jared Bernstein (2016): Important new findings on inflation and unemployment from the new ERP: "The 'Phillips curve'... negative correlation between inflation and unemployment...

...Peak correlation occurred in the early 1990s, but the relationship has weakened since then, and the end of the figure shows that unemployment explains almost none of the variation in inflation in recent years.... Over the full period... a one point increase in unemployment led inflation to fall by -0.4 percentage point. But... by the end of the period, it too is just about zero.... The natural rate a) has been falling for a while, and b) is hard to pin down to a reliable point estimate. For those of us who were always suspicious that a "natural rate" could be identified accurately enough to guide policy, the mid-1990s were highly instructive....

What you're left with is a point estimate for the natural rate of around 4.5 percent surrounded by a 50-percent confidence band that in 2014 ranges from –4.3 to 6.1.... These figures should lead to a major rethink by those, including some Fed governors, who think transient factors like cheap oil and the strong dollar are temporarily jamming the signal from the Phillips curve to the natural rate. The findings at the end of each series above are based on the last 20 years of data. None of us know the future, but when models fail like this, we must look under new rocks.... The Fed must be... data driven, not model driven. They can't know the natural rate with any confidence right now. They must know the weakness of the slack/inflation correlation. Add to those facts how critical it is for working people that we get to and stay full employment, and the bar to pre-emptive rate hikes should be extremely high...

#shouldread

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Why Brexit is really about Competing Visions of Capitalism [feedly]

Why Brexit is really about Competing Visions of Capitalism
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/17/08/2018/why-brexit-really-about-competing-visions-capitalism

Since the resignation of Boris Johnson and David Davis, ostensibly in response to Theresa May's Chequers plan for the next phase of Brexit negotiations, many have quite understandably wondered: where's your alternative, then?

This is a fair question, but the wrong question. May's lack of a parliamentary majority makes little difference to her ability to shape the focus and resources of the civil service across all departments. It has taken the UK government this long to come up with one half-baked plan, so the prospect of May allowing officials to spend time on an alternative is almost nonsensical.

It is also the wrong question because the Brexiters do in fact have a plan, albeit one which is literally unspeakable in British politics. It is a plan for a different kind of capitalism.

Osbornomics

The UK is not a country comfortable discussing big questions on economic order. The stock-in-trade of critical political economists, like me, is the dissection of things like "the market""free trade" and "public finances": abstract economic concepts that bear little relation to how our capitalist economy actually functions. It's easy to forget that outside our ivory towers, this stuff is implicitly, and entirely uncritically, imbibed with the same solidity with which we might discuss natural systems like the weather or cellular reproduction.

Try to imagine David Dimbleby fielding a query on Question Time about how the panel feels about the failure of Anglo-liberal capitalism. Exactly.

The Brexiter plan that dare not speak its name is actually the completion and internationalisation of "Osbornomics", although former chancellor George Osborne campaigned for Remain. While he was in government, Osborne's vision was for a low-tax, low-welfare, lightly-regulated and highly-globalised economy. He labelled it "austerity", at a stroke both validating neoliberal notions of individual self-reliance, while diverting all public scrutiny to rather marginal questions around deficit reduction.

Leaving the European Union is not necessary to this project, but it does accelerate it. Osborne was a Remainer because he foresaw that it would be difficult for any incumbent government to survive the political and economic shock of withdrawal.

But he also recognised that the EU was itself already moving in this direction. That much is clear from its ever stricter macroeconomic rules, which will enforce fiscal conservatism, and, above all, its zest for new trade deals such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and similar agreements with Canada and Japan. The latter represent a race to the regulatory bottom across a large number of industries. The notion that the EU is a trading "bloc" with a protectionist orientation towards non-members, peddled consistently by the Brexiters, had already been largely consigned to history.

Seizing the moment

The EU is positioning itself in the emerging capitalist order, dominated by American tech companies, the Chinese state and, to a lesser extent, the Indian middle class. In government, Osborne sought to position the UK as the financial centre of this worldwide economy (albeit with low-value services providing mass employment).

Membership of the EU, but not the eurozone, was central to this strategy. But this awkward status could not have persisted indefinitely. And, ironically, a leaner and meaner post-Brexit EU will be liberated to pursue its own anglicised foreign economic policy (including challenging the City of London's role). The only real difference between Osborne, when he was chancellor, and the Brexiters is that the former favoured a gradual detachment from Europe, as EU-wide single market rules softened in favour of fiscal disciplining applicable only within the eurozone, while the latter seek a quicker break.

Ironically, of course, it was only the deleterious consequences of Osborne's austerity that made the Brexit vote possible in the first place, as elite euroscepticism combined perversely with popular discontent on June 23, 2016.

Ultimately, the Brexiters are merely taking Osbornomics to its logical conclusion. Johnson is its mouthpiece but the rightful heir is new home secretary, Sajid Javid, an Osborne acolyte, and a very reluctant Remainerwho now embraces hard Brexit. Their philosophy is one of Schumpeterian capitalism, underpinned by the forces of "creative destruction". You want them to come up with a plan for leaving the EU? That's the destruction bit: leaving is the whole plan.

But do not expect the Brexiters to instead articulate the creative side of things (that is, their strategy for the UK's post-Brexit economy) any time soon. That would involve an impossible degree of honesty about the kind of capitalism they envisage. It would mean going beyond empty cant about "Global Britain", based on 19th-century ideas about trade, and actually outlining what will change about the British economy.

The language needed to do that has long been suppressed in British political discourse. But we should be in no doubt that the trade deals which the Brexiters crave would be designed to cement their vision of how the UK can serve the emerging global order, with a single, globalised city – London – functioning as a financial centre. The rest of the economy would be subject to the whims of the business strategies of global firms, enticed to the UK by promises of low tax and light regulation.

Soft Brexit

Where can we position May in relation to this agenda? Why is she so much keener on (but not necessarily capable of) concocting a plan for EU withdrawal? May has a quite different vision of British capitalism. It's far more continental in orientation, centred around the revival of industrial policy and the development of new advanced manufacturing industries.

In other political circumstances, there would be the makings of a broad and durable coalition around this essentially Brownite agenda, embracing one-nation conservatives, the soft left, Vince Cable's Liberal Democrats and large parts of the Corbynite left. Given the integration of European production networks, the strategy depends absolutely on securing a soft (or pseudo) Brexit. Hence May's willingness to negotiate, and the emphasis on goods trade at the expense of services in the Chequers plan.

Paradoxically, while the supersonic Osbornomics of Johnson et al depends on maintaining high levels of immigration to expand the low-paid workforce as the UK-born population ages, May's industrial strategy-based soft Brexit is more amenable to stricter border controls. It perhaps even depends economically on a less liberal immigration regime so that firms are compelled to upskill their existing workforce. Even Cable and Jeremy Corbyn have counter-intuitively (and some would say disgracefully) accommodated the end of free movement within their Brexit policies.

However, even if such a coalition could be constructed, its vision would be no less illusory or fantastical than that of the Brexiters. The moment has passed. There is little the UK can realistically do now to reposition its economy at the forefront of the so-called fourth industrial revolution. May's vision is more coherent but, sadly, the Brexiters' vision, while destructive, is more credible.

We will still end up, for now, with a soft Brexit, of sorts. Big business is beginning to flex its muscles – the short-term interests of capitalists are not synonymous with the long-term trajectory of capitalism. Even mavericks like Johnson will be brought to heel. Johnson of course expected to lose the 2016 referendum, allowing him to succeed David Cameron as Conservative leader while sticking closely to Osborne's long game when he was chancellor. Yet here we are. Even the best laid plans cannot control for capitalism's capacity for chaos.

 

 

 

Dr Craig Berry is a Reader in Political Economy at Manchester Metropolitan University, part of the Future Economies university centre for research and knowledge exchange.

This post first appeared on:

HH

 

 

Image credit: Johnny Silvercloud via Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0)


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

China’s economy will not buckle under Trump’s trade war [feedly]

China's economy will not buckle under Trump's trade war
http://www.atimes.com/chinas-economy-will-not-buckle-under-trumps-trade-war/

f one were to believe the news coming out of world media, China is about to concede to US President Donald Trump's demands: Refrain from "unfair trade practices" and abandon the "Made in China 2025" industrial policy, the reasons for his trade war against the world's second-largest economy.

According to articles published by outlets such as the South China Morning Post, Reuters and others, Trump is winning the trade war against China. For example, Ben Blanchard and Kevin Yao wrote for Reuters that four "anonymous sources" had said the US-China trade war had caused a rift within the Chinese leadership in part because of the government's overly "nationalistic" tit-for-tat response. The article added that one "source" indicated Xi Jinping's influence and power were waning.

According to Blanchard and Yao, these "anonymous sources" said the leadership's tit-for tat stance had hardened Trump's stance, which they claimed was causing the loss of 20% in stock market values, a 0.1% year-on-year decline in growth in the second quarter and a 1.5% devaluation of the yuan against the greenback. These "sources" also claim China "overestimated" its strength, culminating in  "a state of panic."

Independent China-based researcher Xu Yimiao wrote in an August 10 the South China Morning Post articlethat China should cut its losses and concede defeat to Trump. He argued that China was running out of retaliatory countermeasures and overestimated its economic strength. Xu also saw the newly established EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement as a vehicle against China.

Another sign critics have used to show the US was winning the trade is the opposite directions in which the two economies were heading. The US Department of Commerce revealed that the US economy grew 4.1% in this year's second quarter compared with Q1's 2.3%. The National Bureau of Statistics of China showed that China's second quarter increased slower than the first, 6.7% and 6.8% respectively.

But is China losing the trade war?

However, the critics were silent about China's stock market rebounding since August 8. According to Bloomberg, foreign investors were bullish on the Chinese economy, buying US$2.9 billion worth of mainland shares through Hong Kong links between July 25 and August 8. Since most of the money came from institutional funds looking for long-term investment opportunities, it would seem foreign institutional investors are not worried about China's economic "slowdown," stock market losses or currency devaluation.

The US Chamber of Commerce in China has reported that 73% of its members are profitable and 74% planned to expand investment in China in 2018.

The China "gloom and doom" messengers also fail to mention that unlike Western stock markets, China's are dominated by individual investors who have little knowledge about the economy or capital markets. They only want to make some fast money and for the most part panic at the first negative sign, as they did during the 2017 "Chinese stock-market rout" – which bounced back within a short time period.

Therefore, the stock market in China is never an indicator of economic performance. Rather, small investors see it is a casino in which  to make a quick buck.

On currency devaluation, some critics see the trade war is weakening the Chinese economy while others speculate that China is "weaponizing" the yuan to counter Trump's stance. Either way, that does not mean a weakening economy and capital outflow are in the offing.

Another sign that critics apply to suggest China is taking a hit from the trade war is the fact that the Caixin/Markit Purchasing Managers Index contracted from 5.1% in June to 50.8% in July, suggesting that manufacturing expansion had slowed.

Whether decreases in some economic indicators are a sign that the trade war is taking its toll on the Chinese economy is unclear. But Chinese key economic indicators are far more robust than those of the US, despite its president claiming the economy has never been better.

Further, critics have applied the same logic in past assessments, falling over one another to tell the world that China's economy is collapsing at the first sign of weakness. They were wrong each time in the past. They will be wrong again because their analysis is inconclusive, lacks long-term data, and to some extent is injected with ideological biases.

Impact on US economy

The 4.1% Q2 growth rate in the US might have been a blip rather than a trend. Surging agricultural exports to bypass tariff retaliation by China and other countries contributed to one full percentage point of the growth rate, according to The Wall Street Journal. Trump's tax cuts and increased government spending also contributed. Making allowance for these one-time phenomena, the seasonally adjusted growth rate (an indication of long-term growth trend) would be lower.

What's more, other organizations are not as optimistic as the White House, pointing to a less than successful trade war.

According to an August 8 China Global Television Network (CGTN) report, the Atlantic Federal Reserve revealed that the trade war was forcing 20% of businesses either to postpone or cancel investment plans. If true, US economic growth will contract and unemployment will rise.

The Wall Street Journal has reported that small businesses and startup companies are being particularly hit hard, losing profits and investment funds (largely from China). Unable to withstand the losses, many could shut down, according to the WSJ. Should this occur, the impact on the US economy will be severe because small businesses are its backbone, creating most of the country's jobs.

In the meantime, US farmers are still waiting for Trump's promise of a $12 billion bailout. According the US Chamber of Commerce, Trump will require another $27 billion bailout for other agricultural groups. Where he will get that money is a mystery in light of increasing government deficits.

What's more, the bailouts may only be a Band-Aid solution because they are intended to ease current revenue losses caused by Trump's trade war against China (and other countries). The long-term pain will be much more pronounced because the US may lose the lucrative China market.

According to the China's Ministry of Commerce, the country has other sources in Brazil, Argentina, Russia and other countries for its food and animal feed. And even if the European Union caves in to Trump's bullying and shifts to buying US soybeans, farmers would still face surpluses, culminating in significant price drops.

The latest news on the effects of Trump's trade war relates to the cost of rebuilding houses destroyed by California wildfires. According to the California Construction Association, the cost will rise because of tariffs imposed on lumber, nails, drywall and other building materials. Such costs would affect not only California, but would apply nationwide.

What's more, Trump's trade war against China disturbs the global supply chain, harming other countries, including the US. The parts imported from China and other nations to make the final product in America will become more costly, causing cost-push inflation. Moreover, prices rising faster than wages due to China's and other countries' tit-for-tat tariffs may lead to "price or demand pull" inflation.

History is not on the critics' side, pundits having been wrong again and again over the last 40 years about China's imminent collapse. Based on the cherry-picking of "facts" or inconclusive analysis, they will probably be wrong again.


 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Thursday, August 16, 2018

Re: [CCDS Members] Democrats and democrats --

John,

Thank you. Posted on Facebook??

On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 1:29 PM, John Case <jcase4218@gmail.com> wrote:
Democrats and democrats

Keep talking and a way will open.

One of the more satisfying narratives explaining the divisions in the Democratic party surrounding the campaign(s) of Bernie Sanders is a contest of class perspectives. Its not the only narrative, but it reveals features no other perspective does. The fundamental legitimacy of Sanders campaigns and candidacy is that it puts aggravated income inequality at the top of the list of challenges imperiling US democracy. Hillary Clinton, Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, Michael Bloomberg (Independent~Republican), Robert Rubin, Larry Summers, and Barack Obama ALL agree its an IMPORTANT problem. But 1) they think its very hard to achieve absent very risky structural and institutional changes; and 2) they do not believe the coalition representing labor, civil rights, peace, environmental, and progressive forces are either united enough or capable of managings this economy. 

Without getting long winded, both objections have some merit. And yes, there is considerable risk entrusting the nation's and the world's fate to left wing leadership. Even the most widely supported Left demand -- Medicare for All -- would be a program whose scale, both in term of bureaucracy and diversity of delivery systems, would dwarf any other health care system in the world by an order of magnitude. The costs of such scale will be impossible without restructuring pharmaceuticals, medical schools, national education and the private insurance system (the third largest concentration of US capital, I believe). This means structural changes in the US economy, which means significant shifts in the class structure of US society, including the division of wealth. There are many risks there between the cup and the lip. But, despite these risks, there is a bigger and more devastating one, represented by Trump and the gangster billionaires (and their various backers). The scrambling for crumbs economy an culture that is the consequence of 45 years of aggravated inequality gives fascists multifarious opportunities to grasp a third of the people by the throat with false enemies. That direction is decay and war. But the way out, it seems to me, includes progressives getting more involved in governing at local and grass roots levels and solid experience in the ARTS OF THE POSSIBLE. But the "liberal elites" -- despite their apprehensions, must not repeat errors of the last century's battle with fascism. Ordinary people may be naive about many of the complexities of governing. But they can learn fast. And You can't win without them.  

--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV
Sign UP HERE to get the Weekly Program Notes.

_______________________________________________
CCDS Members mailing list

CCDS website: http://www.cc-ds.org

CCDS welcomes and encourages the full participation of our members in
this list serve. It is intended for discussion of issues of concern to
our organization and its members, for building our community, for
respectfully expressing our different points of view, all in keeping
with our commitment to building a democratic and socialist society. To
those ends, free and honest discussion of issues and ideas is
encouraged. However, personal attacks on named individuals, carrying on
old vendettas, excessive posts and, especially, statements that are
racist, sexist, homophobic, anti-semitic and/or anti-working class are not
appropriate.

Repeated failure to respect those principles of discussion
may result in exclusion from the list.
Please respect each other and our organization.

Any member of the list who objects to a posting on the list or the
behavior of a particular member should send email describing his or her
concerns to members-owner@lists.cc-ds.org

Post: Members@lists.cc-ds.org
List info and archives: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/members
To Unsubscribe, send email to:
Members-unsubscribe@lists.cc-ds.org
To Unsubscribe, change your email address, your password or your preferences:
   visit: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/members/rwshannon3%40gmail.com

You are subscribed as: rwshannon3@gmail.com




--
Randy Shannon

​​
Progressive Democrats of America
, National Board Secretary

"All things are ready if our minds be so."
William Shakespeare, Henry V

Democracy and Capitalism: Rules for Peaceful Coexistence [feedly]

Democracy and Capitalism: Rules for Peaceful Coexistence
http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/democracy-and-capitalism-rules-for-peaceful-coexistence

 Dean Baker

Challenge, August 15, 2018

See article on original site

Bob Kuttner is one of the country's great icons of progressive economic policy. In addition to being a cofounder and co-editor of The American Prospect, he has written a huge number of books and articles over the last four decades from which I have learned a great deal. For this reason, I was anxious to read his newest book, Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism (W.W. Norton & Company).

Long-time followers of Kuttner will not find much in the book new, although the argument is put forward clearly and forcefully. Kuttner lays out the basic story of a well-functioning capitalism in the three decades following World War II, followed by more than four decades of upward redistribution. The first three decades are ones in which the markets are explicitly regulated for the purpose of accomplishing social ends. This regulation is largely unraveled in the next four decades.

The post-World War II Golden Age is a period in which the United States sees rapid growth, that is broadly shared. Workers at the middle and bottom of the wage distribution saw wage gains that were equal to or even modestly above the rate of productivity growth.

The story in Europe and Japan was even better. Growth was more rapid in these countries as they quickly rebuilt from the war and then far-surpassed pre-war levels of output. At the same time they were hugely extending the welfare state, making pensions more generous and adopting universal health care insurance.

This all takes a turn for the worse in more recent decades. Growth slows, although the timing differs somewhat across countries. In addition, the benefits of growth are no longer evenly shared, with the richest one percent gaining disproportionately everywhere, and most of the workforce seeing little or nothing from the growth achieved over this period.

Kuttner points to these megatrends as backdrop to the rise of far-right political parties with questionable commitments to democracy. As he notes, this is not just a problem with peripheral countries without longstanding democratic traditions, but also in countries like France with the rise of Le Pen, Italy with its Five Star Movement, and of course the United States with the election of Donald Trump.

His basic point is straightforward. He argues that the traditional center-left parties in Europe and the United States have essentially bought into the policies that led to this upward redistribution of income. If broad segments of the working class don't see champions on the left pushing an agenda that advances their interests, then they will turn to nationalist and racist demagogues who promise a better future at the expense of racial and ethnic minorities.

Kuttner's argument is powerfully and compellingly presented. While I see little grounds for disagreement with the basic outline, I think there are important differences in how we can understand the path forward. Before I get to these, I first want to highlight three important areas where Kuttner is mistaken about the past.

Golden Age Stock Returns Were Great

The first issue has to do with stock market returns in the Golden Age. Kuttner notes that the stock market was relatively low in the Golden Age era and since then stock prices have risen sharply. The implication is that stock owners were somehow forced to sacrifice for the benefit of the larger society. This is not true.

Read more on Challenge

 -- via my feedly newsfeed

Democrats and democrats --

Democrats and democrats

Keep talking and a way will open.

One of the more satisfying narratives explaining the divisions in the Democratic party surrounding the campaign(s) of Bernie Sanders is a contest of class perspectives. Its not the only narrative, but it reveals features no other perspective does. The fundamental legitimacy of Sanders campaigns and candidacy is that it puts aggravated income inequality at the top of the list of challenges imperiling US democracy. Hillary Clinton, Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, Michael Bloomberg (Independent~Republican), Robert Rubin, Larry Summers, and Barack Obama ALL agree its an IMPORTANT problem. But 1) they think its very hard to achieve absent very risky structural and institutional changes; and 2) they do not believe the coalition representing labor, civil rights, peace, environmental, and progressive forces are either united enough or capable of managings this economy. 

Without getting long winded, both objections have some merit. And yes, there is considerable risk entrusting the nation's and the world's fate to left wing leadership. Even the most widely supported Left demand -- Medicare for All -- would be a program whose scale, both in term of bureaucracy and diversity of delivery systems, would dwarf any other health care system in the world by an order of magnitude. The costs of such scale will be impossible without restructuring pharmaceuticals, medical schools, national education and the private insurance system (the third largest concentration of US capital, I believe). This means structural changes in the US economy, which means significant shifts in the class structure of US society, including the division of wealth. There are many risks there between the cup and the lip. But, despite these risks, there is a bigger and more devastating one, represented by Trump and the gangster billionaires (and their various backers). The scrambling for crumbs economy an culture that is the consequence of 45 years of aggravated inequality gives fascists multifarious opportunities to grasp a third of the people by the throat with false enemies. That direction is decay and war. But the way out, it seems to me, includes progressives getting more involved in governing at local and grass roots levels and solid experience in the ARTS OF THE POSSIBLE. But the "liberal elites" -- despite their apprehensions, must not repeat errors of the last century's battle with fascism. Ordinary people may be naive about many of the complexities of governing. But they can learn fast. And You can't win without them.  

--
John Case
Harpers Ferry, WV
Sign UP HERE to get the Weekly Program Notes.